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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Irada BAGIROVA
D.Sc. (Hist.), Head of the Caucasian History Department
at the Institute of History, National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan (Baku, Azerbaijan).
THE PAST AND FUTURE OF CONFLICTS, IDENTITY, AND INTEGRATION IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS
Abstract
This article examines some aspects of the formation of national identity in the Central Caucasian peoples, the influence of this factor on their national self-awareness, and the emergence among them of both conflict and integration processes. All of these trends can be traced throughout the 20th century, arising in one form or another at sharp turning-points in historical events when the century-long imperial traditions were broken and new states emerged.
Moreover, integration trends, which also have historical precedents, began to gain momentum. The Central Caucasian community became a topic of international discussions, which was enthusiastically taken up by Western countries, but perceived rather pessimistically by the local political and intellectual elites. For the time being, ethnic affiliation dominates over regional in the three main nations of the Central Caucasus.
Introduction
The study of national identity and the emergence and growth of national self-awareness is a relatively new phenomenon in our historiography and political science. The influence of West-
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ern humanitarian sciences, which make these issues particularly important, plays a significant role.1
When the Soviet Union declared the formation of a new historical community—the Soviet people, who over time were supposed to wipe out all the differences among the peoples of the U.S.S.R.—the nationalities question seemed to have been decided once and for all. The imperial policy of the czarist authorities was given as the reason for the emergence of ethnic conflicts in prerevolutionary Russia. At the same time, talking about the existence of such conflicts in the Soviet Union was a taboo subject.
In the post-Soviet period, ethnic conflicts, which are what in fact initiated the collapse of the Union, as well as increased national self-awareness, were discussed more by journalists carrying out specific political orders, than by scientists, which gave rise to the superficial and sometimes openly provocative nature of these studies. And it was not until recent years that serious academic publications began to appear that shed light on certain problems of national identity, the emergence and development of ethnic conflicts, and so on. However, the historical aspect of this problem has been given little attention. From this viewpoint, rethinking and discussing the historical processes and events in an unbiased way in the context of how they affected the awakening of national self-awareness in some ethnicities seems rather pertinent and promising and provides the opportunity to take a fresh look at how some nations and political unions were formed and their transformation into state formations.
Shedding light on the genesis of national identity in the Central Caucasian peoples, on how this factor influenced the establishment of their statehood, as well as on the emergence of both conflict and integration processes among them, seems to us to be one of the most important areas of contemporary scientific research in the sphere of Caucasian studies.
Level of National Identity of the Peoples of the Central Caucasus in the 20th Century
In the most general sense, national identity is understood as the formation of an individual's ideas about his place in the world and relation to his own status and national group, on the one hand, and the acceptance of certain historical experience that allows individuals to perceive themselves as part of the overall political structure and sociocultural space, on the other; that is, recognition of the interests of one's people and an understanding of their language, territory, and culture. Ethnic affiliation is one of the ways to adapt, become better orientated, and achieve certain social goals in today's complex world.2 Perception of one's identity becomes especially urgent at crisis times in history, when nations are threatened with both external danger and civil war.
By the beginning of the 20th century, the three titular nations of the Central Caucasus—the Georgians, Azerbaijanis, and Armenians—had reached different levels of national self-identity, which was already manifested in their self-designation. Whereas the Georgians and Armenians
1 See: T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan 1905-1920. The Shaping of Nation Identity in a Muslim Community, Cambridge University Press, 1985; A. Alshtadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, Stanford, 1992; R.G. Suny, The Baku Commune 1917-1918. Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution, Princeton, New-Jersey, 1972; A. Bennigsen, Ch. Lemercler-Quelquejay, Islam in the Soviet Union, London, 1967; G. Imart, "Un intellectual Azerbaidjanais face à la revolution de 1917, " Cahies du monde Russe et Sovietique (Paris), Oct.-Dec. 1967; Ch. Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets, London, 1957.
2 See: V.P. Levkovich, I.B. Andrushchak, "Etnotsentrizm kak sotsialno-psikhologicheskiy fenomen," in: Dinamika sotsialno-psikhologicheskikh iavlenii v izmeniaiushchemsia obshchestve, Collection, Moscow, 1996.
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were called the same as they are today beyond their habitat (they, on the other hand, called themselves "kartvelos" and "haik"), the authorities of czarist Russia called the Azerbaijanis "Tatars." Several external and internal factors also had an influence on the level of national identity. Due to their religious affiliation with the Russians, the Georgians and Armenians were in a much more privileged position than the Azerbaijanis. Essentially until the collapse of the Second Transcaucasian Federation in 1936, Tiflis (Tbilisi) was the cultural and political center of the Caucasus, while the Georgians and Armenians occupied several high posts, first in the Russian Empire and then in the Soviet system. The rights of the Azerbaijanis, however, were limited not only in the power hierarchy, but even in obtaining a secondary and higher education (until 1918), which greatly complicated the formation of an intellectual elite capable of expressing the national idea. However, despite even these obstacles, a national intellectually Europeanized elite had formed in Azerbaijan at the turn of the 20th century, and after the collapse of the Russian Empire, its prominent representatives founded the first democratic republic in the Muslim East with a parliamentary form of rule.
The ethnic conflicts of 1905-1906, 1918-1920, and 1988-1994 had a significant influence on the national self-awareness of the Central Caucasian peoples, since, despite all of their blood-shedding and negative consequences for the region, they were instrumental in consolidating the Azerbaijanis and Georgians in particular. Similar examples can also be found in the history of other states (France, Russia, Great Britain, India, and others), when an external threat consolidated the nation and forced it to forget its internal contradictions. In Soviet times, ethnic contradictions were neutralized by the Lenin-Stalin nationalities policy, which drove them into a latent phase. However, they were quick to erupt again with new force at the slightest weakening of central power.
The profound changes at the beginning of the 1990s that shook the foundations of socioeconomic life caused a new outburst of mass protest. Geography began to dictate foreign policy—the administrative borders of the former Union republics became state-political boundaries. In postSoviet reality, traditions of ethnic community, tolerance of the interests of other ethnicities and confessions, and conflict prevention have stopped working. The Soviet imperial space was stirred by the irredentist ambitions of the new nationalist elites ("Armenia is where Armenians live," Abkhazia for the Abkhazians, reunification of South and North Ossetia, and so on) and claims on ethnic self-determination. The ethnocratic egoism of politicians who acquired political, ideological, and information resources, but in so doing continued to think in narrow regional terms led to the contradictions and conflicts in the region. The leaders of the unrecognized republics continue to make the right to national self-determination absolute. However, the contradiction between the principle of self-determination and the principle of the territorial integrity of states causes a serious problem in contemporary international law.
Integration Trends of the Most Recent Times
The conflicts remain unsettled, however, paradoxically, integration trends gained momentum throughout the whole of the 20th century in the Central Caucasus. Twice during the first third of the century, in 1917-1918 and 1922-1936, Central Caucasian state unions—Transcaucasian federations—were created, although in both cases they could not be preserved. It should be noted that in both cases, it was outside pressure that instigated the creation of an integrated federative union—in 1918 from Turkey and in 1922 from Russia.3 In the first case, the federation fell apart due to internal
See: Dokumenty i materialy po vneshnei politike Zakavkazia i Gruzii, Tiflis, 1919.
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contradictions and the different foreign orientations of the Central Caucasian states. The second case can be regarded as an artificial administrative union within the framework of the single Soviet state, both created and eliminated by an order from above with the goal of equaling out the economic situation in the republics of the region, mainly by means of Azerbaijan's energy resources. At the beginning of the 1990s, the idea put forward by Jokhar Dudaev and supported by Eduard Shevardnadze of integrating the Caucasian states within a "Common Caucasian Home" gained popularity. In March 1996, a Manifesto on Peace, Security, and Cooperation in the Caucasian Region, which came to be called the Tbilisi Declaration, was signed between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Georgia Heydar Aliev and Eduard Shevardnadze.4
During the Kislovodsk meeting of the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, and Russia in 1997, a declaration was signed "For Peace and Economic and Cultural Cooperation in the Caucasus." A Pact on Stability in the Caucasus has been put forward twice in the past 10 years, first at the Istanbul summit of 1999 and the last time by Turkey in the fall of 2008 after the Georgian-Russian conflict over South Ossetia. The idea of regional cooperation was enthusiastically taken up by the West, which was striving to minimize Russia's role in the Caucasus. The political and economic future of the region, despite the different vectors in foreign orientation of the three Central Caucasian countries, is gradually being drawn into the unified European political and economic space being created, which all three countries became a more realistic part of after signing the Action Plan with the European Union in November 2006.
The idea of a Central Caucasian community within a federative state, which could later become a member of the European Union, is also being advanced at international forums. According to Western political scientists for the most part, such a union, which presumes mutual limitation of the sovereignty of the member states, coordination, and joint security efforts, will help to reach compromises and, in the final analysis, a peaceful solution to the ethnic conflicts.
In contrast to the foreign enthusiasts, most domestic researchers and politicians are relatively pessimistic about the prospects for this integration, motivating this by the fact that today the peoples of the Central Caucasus are experiencing that awakening of national self-awareness that was inherent in the West European countries in the 19th century but is still far from the integration processes that unfolded in the West European states of the end of the 20th century.5 This is also confirmed by the traditionally different vectors of the foreign policy of the Central Caucasian countries: Georgia toward the U.S. and the European Union, Armenia toward Russia, and Azerbaijan, which is trying to build equal relations with all the key players of the outside world. Georgia has recently been stepping up its activity in the Black Sea Basin, believing itself to be more a part of it than a part of the Central Caucasus. As a result, all three countries are building their relations with the European Union independently, outside the regional context, although this is envisaged in their Action Plans for the next five years.
It goes without saying that globalization processes will help to accelerate this process, but so far the closest economic cooperation has developed only between Georgia and Azerbaijan, which are involved in transnational projects. Owing to its irreconcilable position in the Armenian-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenia has found itself essentially isolated from all the large regional and transnational projects. With respect to social relations, only humanitarian projects based on a coalition of nongovernmental organizations are yielding the most significant results so far.
Another form of self-identification is to associate oneself with the whole of the Caucasian region, that is, feel oneself to be a Caucasian with all the unique cultural and civilizational characteris-
4 See: D. Malysheva, "Security Problems in the Caucasus," Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1 (7), 2001, pp. 37-49.
5 See: G. Pashaeva, "Myths and Realities of the Southern Caucasus System of Regional Security," Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1 (7), 2001, p. 26.
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tics inherent in this image. This form of self-identification is usually more characteristic of representatives of the Northern Caucasus or several ethnic minorities of Georgia, or can be found beyond the region, in Russia, for example, where everyone is united under the general name of "people of Caucasian nationality." The three leading nations of the Central Caucasus prefer to associate themselves with other regions and their sense of ethnic affiliation prevails over regional.
Current trends espouse that any nation, be it the dominating one or a national minority, should link its identity not with its ethnicity, but with its citizenship. However, it has proven very difficult to confirm this principle in the post-Soviet expanse, since the Soviet mentality is still alive in the territory of the former Soviet Union and manifested particularly frequently against the background of conflict situations, despite the fact that ethnic affiliation is no longer indicated in passports.
When people are mainly guided by their sense of citizenship, that is, their belonging to a particular country, the question of special "national" rights usually does not arise. However, when the determining factor is affiliation with a particular ethnic group, especially when we are talking about a national minority in the particular country, the question of acquiring special ethnic rights could become extremely acute.
Nevertheless, it seems to us that the region's ethnopolitical and ethnic ailments are not lethal and can essentially be cured. The peoples of the Central Caucasus should bear the burden of responsibility for peace and stability in the region and their own national security, remembering not only the conflicts, but also the historical achievements, and cultivating them. Ethnic contradictions can essentially be brought under state and public control and legal regulation if the fundamental precepts of international law are preserved. It is crystal clear that "long-gone affairs" cannot serve as a foundation for remaking the contemporary geopolitical map of the world. There is not one place on the earth that can claim such remaking, and we do not have to go far for examples: essentially every European state (Germany, France, Italy, Greece) was formed as the result of a collective agreement of several independent kingdoms-regions, the population of which often formed a certain autonomous ethnic unit. The Russian Federation is also one of the most multinational states in the world.
It should be noted that the national ideas of the Central Caucasian republics, if socialized, that is, if the socioeconomic rights of all their citizens are realized, can also perform integration functions. But, as past experience shows, any union created under pressure from the outside is sooner or later doomed to failure. Only if the states themselves clearly understand the expediency of such integration, no matter what form it takes, can it enjoy a certain amount of vital potential.
Problems of Regional Security in the Post-Soviet Period
The idea of regional security of the Central Caucasus put forward by the European Union and the U.S. is a new phenomenon of post-Soviet reality that appeared in the globalization era after the empire collapsed. From the viewpoint of international security, the Central Caucasian region is still a blank spot in this system due to the different vectors in the foreign policy priorities of the three countries. One of the three countries of the region, Armenia, belongs to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is officially headed by Russia. Georgia's efforts, particularly after the conflict with Russia in August 2008, are aimed at accession to NATO and creating its locators there.
It would be an exaggeration to claim that the Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia dramatically changed the balance of geopolitical forces in the region, but there is no doubt that it more clearly designated the priorities of some of the world nations and changed the orientation of others.
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Security in the Caucasus, particularly in the Central Caucasus, has become a topic of international discussions, this region being classified as one of the explosive spots on the planet. It is obvious that Russia has been quite successful; it managed to curb NATO's enlargement to the East and remove Georgia's accession to this military-political bloc from the agenda. Russia was given the opportunity to legally determine the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. What is more, a direct threat was created to the transnational energy projects that could in the future put an end to Europe's energy dependence on Russia.
Of course, the U.S. also considers the Central Caucasus to be a zone of its primary interests. Along with Washington's concern about the development of Iran's nuclear technology, the U.S. is also worried about the security of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. This oil pipeline, like the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, runs right next to the zone of the Armenian-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. On the other hand, promising oil and gas projects supported by the U.S., including the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, are also in a high risk zone. This justifies the U.S.'s concern about pipeline security, since all of America's so-called projects of the century have in one way or another been threatened with failure. Keeping in mind that the Central Caucasus is a territory through which energy resources can be transported, Washington is objectively interested in the most rapid settlement of the conflicts in the Central Caucasus.
Hot on the heels of the dramatic events of2008, many analysts, particularly Russian, began talking about the need to create a new security system in the Caucasus that will require categorical exclusion of global players who are not associated vitally and physically with the fate of the Caucasus.6 It goes without saying that the U.S. is meant by "global" and "alien" players, while Russia and to some extent the countries of the European Union, particularly France, which suddenly made an active show of their position in the current situation, are considered to be "vitally associated with the fate of the Caucasus." While the whole world had its attention riveted on the events in Georgia, the Armenian-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict receded into the background. However, after the end of the Georgian-Russian war, Azerbaijan unexpectedly found itself drawn into the sphere of another outburst of attention toward the Karabakh problem from the leading world players and primarily Russia, which ended in the signing of the Moscow (Meyendorff) declaration and activation of the OSCE Minsk Group.7
In the situation created, Russia and Turkey experienced an unprecedented warming trend in their relations, the latter being able in a short time to significantly raise its role in the region. In September 2008, Turkey put forward the idea of a Platform of Stability and Security in the Caucasus that also included the Black Sea-Caspian Basin.8 The 3+2 model offered (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia + Russia and Turkey) is not new; it was put forward as early as 1999 by President Süleyman Demirel, but this time it was filled with more specific content. As early as December 2008, a meeting of the foreign ministers of all five countries was held, and on 26 January, 2009, a meeting was held in Istanbul of the deputy foreign ministers of the five countries.9 The consummation was Turkish President Abdullah Gül's first state visit in history to Moscow, where the two presidents signed a declaration on multilateral partnership. Abdullah Gül's words express the significance and informality of this document: it "is not a framework agreement, but an all-encompassing and precise document."10 And this is confirmed by the positions voiced by Moscow and Ankara that security in the region is ensured only by its countries without involving non-regional states, that is, what Russia has precisely been aiming for during the past decade. Of course, the incredible activation of the key players in the Cauca-
6 See: M. Kolerov, "Novy Bolshoi Kavkaz: vzaimnoe sderzhivanie bez chuzhikh," available at [www.regnum.ru], 8 December, 2008.
7 Interfax, 8 November, 2008.
8 See: New Architecture of Security in the Southern Caucasus, Round table papers, Ankara, 2008, pp. 5-8.
' See: Milliyet, 27 January, 2009.
9 Í
10 Milli gazette, 15 February, 2009.
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sian region after the Russian-Georgian conflict has greatly slackened off in the past few years due to the Arab Spring events, which have placed the Middle East in the center of attention of the world nations once more. Now the region, which is delivering a large part of its oil and gas resources to the world market, is already under direct threat.
So it can be asserted that there is currently no unified regional security system in the Central Caucasian region, which at one time was considered a direct sphere of Russia's influence. Moreover, the region itself is essentially in the grips of centrifugal processes, in which different countries are striving for different military-political poles. Despite several restraining, subjective, and objective obstacles, Georgia is trying to accelerate its accession to NATO, while Armenia is just as quickly integrating into the CSTO (the 2009 summit of this organization led to the creation of collective rapid response forces, which the Russian president compared with similar NATO forces). After Georgia and the U.S. signed a memorandum on strategic and military cooperation, and after the U.S. announced, at the end of the NATO Bucharest summit, that by hook or by crook Georgia and Ukraine would become members of NATO, it became obvious that the security architecture in the Caucasus would change. It is entirely possible that this process has already begun and, in the foreseeable future, will lead to the establishment of some stability in the regional security system.
In this situation, Azerbaijan, 20% of the territory of which is under Armenian occupation and which has as many as one million refugees and forced migrants, is striving, without joining either NATO or the CSTO, to preserve a balance between these poles of power and put an end to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, without the settlement of which it is impossible to talk about any security system in the Central Caucasus.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it should be noted that the problems of conflicts, ethnic identity, integration, and regional security in the Central Caucasus are interrelated and interdependent. On the one hand, in the post-Soviet period, each of the countries in the region has been experiencing an aggravated sense of ethnocultural identity, leading in some cases to negative consequences in the form of ethnic and even interstate conflicts. While on the other, not only regional nations (Russia), but also global players (the U.S. and the European Union) have been drawn into the settlement of these conflicts, competing with each other on the world geopolitical and geo-economic arena and striving to draw the Caucasian region into the orbit of their strategic interests. The conflicts are also posing a serious threat to the implementation of transnational energy projects, which is significantly stimulating the West to create a unified regional security system. But opposition from separatist forces and their lack of desire to compromise is essentially reducing all of these efforts to naught and excluding them themselves from both regional and global partnership. So rapid settlement of the regional conflicts guarantees the realization of economic potential and geopolitical stability in the Caucasus.
