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РОССИЯ И МИР Russia and the World
M. Lipkin
THE "NEW WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER" AND THE COLD WAR: A VIEW FROM THE USSR (mid 1940s - mid 1960s)*
М.А. Липкин
«Новый мировой экономический порядок»
и Холодная война: Взгляд из СССР (середина 1940-х - середина 1960-х годов)**
The complex picture of multilateral and bilateral economic diplomacy on the issue of the postwar "New World Economic Order" and the role of the USSR in this process has for a long period been at the backyard of historical studies compared with the issues of the arms race and state borders. Taking into account the outbreak of the Cold War and the ideological struggle, the Soviet historians were obviously "ashamed" of any analysis of existed in 1943 - 1947 possibilities to build a tight economic union between Moscow, London and Washington. In the postSoviet period this subject had only occasional references with no deep study of the Soviet archives (for instance, papers of historians from the Saratov school of American studies in Russia based on the US archival evidences1).
The term "New World Economic Order" (for the period mid 1940s - mid 1960s) in this article is used in order to avoid a mishmash with a related but a later term "New International Economic Order". The first one means the process of making up the post-war global economic institutions of the Bretton Woods system and beyond. The second one is the officially adopted in the UN documents term. It was implemented in the "Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order" (May 1974 General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI)) and fixed in the "Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States" (December 1974 General Assembly resolution 3281 (XXIX)). The last one is a result
* Translated by Samuel Wolfson (Institute of World History, Moscow).
** The article is prepared with a financial support of the Russian State Scientific Foundation (project 14-18-02677), gained by the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
of the international campaign for more just economic rights of the Third World states, which arose on a wave of the decolonization process of the 1960s and was to a much extent stimulated by the world oil crisis of 19732.
On September 24, 1941 at the London international conference the USSR agreed with the principal points of the Atlantic Charter. It became the basic document of the anti-Hitler coalition and later — the fundamental premise of the UN Charter. Its fifth principle declared readiness to promote international economic cooperation. So, just after this document was signed the unofficial struggle for the leadership in the post-war world economic system started between the UK and the USA.
The first initiative was taken by the British. As early as November 1942, even before the opening of the second front in Europe, the UK worked out a huge plan for an International Clearing Union. It is well known as the "Keynes plan", since John Maynard Keynes served the head of a financial committee which elaborated this project. On February 20, 1943 the British ambassador in Moscow Archibald Kerr transferred this document to Vyacheslav Molotov "for information".
"This plan represents by itself the beginning of a future economic world order between the countries and benefits of peace", - the plan said (translated from the Russian text of the project stored in the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation3). Essentially, it offered the "financial disarmament" and an introduction of new cashless money to overcome the post-war situation of a currency turmoil and mutual indebtedness between the nations4.
However, besides these purely financial matters the plan contained more far-reaching ideas, that the suggested Clearing Union could become an instrument and a basis for international politics in addition to those aims, which were given as its first priority. "The Union could become an axis for the future economic management of the world", - the document suggested5.
Initially, the Soviet diplomats regarded it as the Anglo-American deal and an attempt to take control of the post-war world in their own hands. Subsequently, they reconsidered it thoroughly. Their second analysis stated that it was one of the projects on international economic planning aimed at "constraining the role of the USSR in a post-war world system, to prevent the raise of political and economic influence of the USSR in Europe and to put under control its post-war economic development". The allies offered the USSR nothing else than to join the project and kept the Soviet Union away from its drafting. The envisaged share of the USSR in the Clearing Union was insignificant, because it was calculated according to the country's foreign trade volume prior to the war - the Soviet trade at those times was comparatively inconsiderable.
In the meantime, Soviet experts and diplomats were far from dwelling at this negative assessment. The detailed analysis uncovered possible benefits of the project. It said, that the Soviet Union was interested in the
extension of its external trade after the war in order to recover its economy. By planning this, it confirmed a necessity to preserve the monopoly of external trade and protect the Soviet market from Anglo-American export. The analysis stipulated a number of concessions and an option of joining the suggested Clearing Union in case of a better legal position for the USSR in the proposed project. The major interest was a possibility to obtain advantageous, interest-free credits. The experts envisaged a possibility to soften Soviet custom duties, offer most favorable nation conditions and to renounce some taxes on external trade on a mutual basis.
The Keynes plan encouraged even more sympathy among Soviet experts, when they compared it with the alternative American projects of the International Stabilization (later — Monetary) Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
The question to participate or not in the projected international bodies raised a tough discussion of the leading experts and heads of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (NKID), People's Commissariat of Finances (NKF), State Bank of the USSR (Gosbank) and the People's Commissariat of External Trade (NKVT) in late 1943. The estimates of direct economic benefits were mostly the same - the IMF was of little interest for the Soviet Union, but the Bank represented an essential interest as an international crediting institution.
A result of this extremely interesting discussion was summed up in a A. Vyshinsky's letter to V. Molotov. It said, that despite the fact that the Clearing Union was the most acceptable as it required minimum obligations, «for us the major interest is in getting long-term credits what could be done through.. .the Bank"6.
Even though the American project stipulated a Stabilization Fund, the decision was made to support the American proposal. The key determinant was a political factor, not an economic one - "the USSR's membership in the Fund can be dictated only by political considerations, i.e. by a desire to support Americans as initiators of the Stabilization Fund, having in mind that after the war, as one can foresee, the Soviet Union will be interested in the development of credit and trade relations with the USA more than with England"7.
In December 1943, Directives were written for the People's Commissariat of Finances' representatives, who were going to unofficial talks with American experts. It said that "the Soviet experts are allowed to state that they consider possible participation of the USSR in the international monetary organization as a form of the post-war cooperation"8. The task was to prevent the American interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, playing down the golden share of the USSR and the decentralization of gold depositing, and to increase the Soviet influence in the head structures of the proposed international economic institutes. The same instructions were given for the talks about the Bank with one essential addition: to state that the Bank would not be able to solve the basic question of large orders for the American industry by the Soviet
Union - it could be done only under a condition of a large long-term American credit.
In July 1944, at the financial conference of the UN in Bretton Woods with a consent of the USSR, the projects of the IMF and the IBRR were adopted. Yet, Soviet attempts to link it with the several billion dollars loan, promised by Roosevelt, received no attention.
That's why in December 1943 both the head of the NKID Economic Department V. Geraschenko, and Molotov's Deputy V. Dekanozov were unanimous that time was not ripe yet to join. If the UK and France had obtained large credits and were conducting talks on even bigger sums, the Soviet request hadn't got the adequate attention. They were for wait-and-see tactics.
Still, a decisive document that moved the weighing machine for optimists in the Soviet establishment became the unique record - around 60 pages detailed report of the Soviet delegation at the Bretton Woods conference. Among direct economic benefits of the Soviet participation in the Fund it stated a possibility to cover the passive post-war balance by some short-term and medium-term loans. This was not a panacea that would have solved the major credit problem of the USSR, but it was regarded as an additional source of both the imports and the convertible currency for the freedom of maneuver in the Soviet external trade. The USSR share was established as 1.200 bln. dollars what meant a right to use a credit of up to 300 bln dollars per year (25 % from the general share).
The Soviet Delegation managed to gain what it wanted. It was decided, that the gold deposited by the USSR as a member of the IMF would be stored by the Fund at its depositary in the USSR, i.e. on a special account of the State bank of the Soviet Union. The members of Delegation foresaw a situation when Moscow could become a regional center, keeping the IMF gold reserves of neighboring countries of Eastern Europe. Taking into account the cost of gold transportation from such a distant place as Moscow, and the fact, that initially according to the IMF Charter not less than a half of all gold reserves were to be preserved in the USA, where it was required to be exchanged for dollars, they considered of low probability a situation that in the nearest years the Soviet gold would be transferred out of the Soviet territory.
As for the non-gold, a cash fee that the USSR had to pay as a member also had to be allocated at a special ruble account in the State bank. Moreover, as the authors estimated, the execution of all payments in the IMF in the convertible currency was the best guarantee for the USSR of any real demand for this sum in rubles from the other members of the IMF.
According to the IMF Statute in the end of each financial year, all members had to cover their liabilities to the Fund starting from the moment when a member state would reach the raise of its welfare. The criteria was the moment when its national currency and the gold reserve
would exceed the quota of this country as stated when it joined the Fund. First, the Soviet experts envisaged such a situation of restoration of the country's external trade to the prewar level in a long run. Second, they managed to adopt a clause that the countries, which suffered most from the occupation during the war, obtained a 5 year moratorium on accounting of their local gold extraction.
An essential gain of the Soviet Delegation, especially having in mind the character of the state trade in the USSR, was that at Bretton Woods it was written that a member state could change its currency parity without the Funds consent "if this change does not affect international trade of the Funds member-countries"9. It was considered that as far as international payments were not conducted in rubles therefore a change in Soviet ruble's parity was not affecting the volume and prices of export and import and therefore did not influence trade interests of other countries, leaving the USSR with a freedom of maneuver without a need of coordination in its currency politics.
One of the most important factors was the amount of the overall Soviet quota, which directly correlated with its level of representation and a number of votes in the IMF. The Soviet Union gained secured place in the Executive Directorate of the IMF. It gained 12,5 % from the total votes of the Fund's members (UK - 13,5 %, USA - 28,3 %). Thus, by its full weight Moscow was on the 3rd place, just a bit after such a world financial center as London. As the report envisaged by combining its efforts with other countries the USSR could exert influence on the decision making process in the IMF.
Besides, the report mentioned several indirect benefits of this membership. For instance, joining the IMF would be regarded by the USA and other United Nations as a Soviet desire to participate in the international economic cooperation. On the contrary, a refusal to join would only play in hand of reactionary elements among the American and British financial capital - opponents of the post-war cooperation among the major countries in building the post-war peace and order.
The question appears: what was the cause of such a brilliant performance of the Soviet delegation at Bretton Woods and why they were so optimistic about further cooperation in the IMF and the IBRR?
Although this may sound a paradox, but a decisive factor recognized by the Soviet delegation itself was a support of the USA - on a majority of issues the Soviet and American delegations had preliminary consultations. They prepared joint position for sessions and acted together sometimes even against the British! The countries of Latin America supported this duet and the British had to refrain or vote against.
Of course, this system of consultations appeared only after a hard work and a stalemate situation with the amount of the Soviet quota, which Americans suggested initially. Without going deep into details one may conclude that, of course, it was also a result of the existed at that moment political will for cooperation between the leaders and their close
supporters in both countries.
The paradox of Bretton Woods is that according to the NKID documents the level of cooperation with Americans on financial issues was much higher than when discussing the Bank. Sessions on the IBRR showed, on the contrary, deep cooperation between Americans and the British and much less sympathetic ear to the Soviets. Moreover, it happened despite the fact that initially the USSR was much more interested in the Bank and its credits than in the IMF.
A possible explanation could be that the discussions on the IMF took place in the first part of the conference and the commission on the Bank worked in the second part (July 11-22 1944). By this time the British could reach a compromise on the issues of loans in which they were much interested themselves. If the IMF project for the British was interesting from the point of preserving their claims on the world financial influence (the zone of sterling), then in case of the Bank they were much more accommodating.
Few Russian historians that touched this subject disagree on whether the gained at Bretton Woods conditions could be implemented in practice. For instance, Vladimir Popov from the Tambov State University believes that they were absolutely incompatible with the Soviet planning economy and meant a need for radical changes towards the market laws10. On the contrary, Vladimir Batiuk from the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences wrote about much higher desirability for restoration of the Soviet economy with western credits through these institutes than from the old equipment gained as reparations11.
Few doubts, that in case of joining, a pressure from the West towards convergence of the Soviet economy would rise essentially. Within the Soviet leadership there were serious opponents to joining. Yet, as the logics of the Soviet representative's report shows and as the further steps demonstrated, considerations of coexistence between the state economy and membership in based on market rules global economic organizations was a serious one.
The chain of steps necessary for the USSR to join the IMF and the IBRR was stated in a draft resolution prepared by members of the Soviet delegation in January 194512. It proposed to form a commission consisting of A. Zverev (People's Commissariat of Finances - NKFIN), A. Vyshin-sky (People's Comissariat of Foreign Affairs - NKID), G. Kosiachenko (State Planning - Gosplan), A. Krutikov (People's Commissariat of External Trade - NKVT) and V. Emchenko (State Bank - Gosbank) to work out within 3 months and present for consideration of the State Council of People's Commissars of the USSR proposals on such issues which have never been considered by the Soviet diplomacy and which could mean only one thing: preparation of Soviet integration into the forming new world economic system13. It included such issues as the ruble's parity (in gold or dollars); buying and selling of gold in the USSR; a golden coverage of the issue of bank shares of the State Bank of the USSR; existing in
the USSR limitations on consumer money transfers; the time of joining the Fund; law changes concerning privileges of the Funds employees; the system of international specialists' education for the Fund and Bank, as well as final provisions (reservations) - preliminary conditions of the Soviet participation in the Fund and the Bank14.
By a Decree of the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom) from March 5, 1945 the Commission on the issues of Soviet participation in the IMF and the IBRR was established. It was led by a Head of Gos-plan N. Voznesenskiy. The Commission ordered the Soviet Delegation in Bretton Woods conference to prepare proposals on the Soviet entry. The proposals were presented for Commission's consideration on April 8, 1945.
We still don't know for how long this Commission worked since that date. Still on December 29 1945 the Soviet government stated to the US government that the SU by present found it impossible to sign the project of Bretton Woods Agreements. A majority of researchers consider it as the end of a story. Not at all. As the NKID documents show the question was raised again at least twice after that in 1946 and early 1947.
A temporary refusal to sign the Agreement was not equal to a final refusal to participate. That is why in 1946 serious frictions arose between the People's Commissariat of finances and the People's Commissariat of foreign affairs (NKID) on the issue of whether to send or not an observer to the founding session of the IMF and the IBRR on March 9-18, 1946 in Wilmington Island (Georgia, USA). The People's Commissariat of foreign trade together with NKID were against it. The NKFIN had a "minority report" - it stated for sending an observer. Moreover, astonishingly the point of view of the Financial ministry prevailed - a Soviet trade representative in the USA F. Bystrov was sent as an observer.
Another fascinating story happened with a project of directives on talks with the USA on the credit and other issues represented to Stalin by A. Mikoyan, A. Krutikov and A. Arutunian on May 23 1946. It showed that the chance to entry did exist, but it was connected with an uneasy question of the post-war American government loan of 1 bln. US dollars and a final settlement of the lend-lease issues. Directives stipulated, that in case of success with these two issues, the delegation should have stated about the Soviet readiness to join the IMF and the IBRR.
As a thorough study of Mikoyan's biography by M. Pavlov from Krasnodar shows, the project caused serious frictions in the Soviet gov-ernment15. By a sanction of Mikoyan its deputy — Stepanov sent the text to Molotov's deputy — Lozovsky, who was an acting minister while Mo-lotov was away. It was done for mutual information, while the document expected approval of the Central Committee of Politbureau. On May 17 1946, Lozovsky for uncertain reasons made an unbelievable crime by those times - contrary to the whole Soviet hierarchy of not passing documents on external affairs without informing Stalin, he sent the draft as the official Soviet proposals to the American side. All participants were
lucky that Americans rejected this proposal. Stalin was furious for concessions in this draft and all accusations laid on Lozovsky. Several years after he was repressed.
Yet the last serious discussion of the issue of the Soviet participation in global economic structures happened in December 1946 - January 1947. It was connected with a request of the Secretary General of the UN Trugve Lie about a need for short-and long-term crediting for the urgent reconstruction of economies, which he planned to forward to the IMF and the IBRR. On December 26, 1946 the Head of the UN department of MID and a Deputy head of the Economic department of MID submitted a memo in the name of Vyshinsky, suggesting to make a bid for credits using this proposal. Although they stressed the fact that the USSR was not a member of these organizations the senior MID officials called to international cooperation and thought unwise to reject the UN offer. They suggested giving some economic information on the USSR, Belorussia and Ukraine. The idea got a negative response from the Ministry of foreign trade and Vyshinsky. Nothing came out of this attempt. Most probably it was inspired by Molotov, who wanted to remain in a shadow, but obviously by this time general mood on the top has changed completely.
Neither the credit, nor the lend-lease settlement happened in 1946 in Soviet-American relations. A new team of "hawks" came to power in the White House after the death of Roosevelt and started transforming the Breton-Woods system from the original design. Finances on the reconstruction of Europe were given through the politicized Marshall Plan. The UK and France had got credits, the USSR - not.
On a joint meeting of the UN committees on economic and social questions and on social, humanitarian and cultural issues in October 14, 1947 the new line of the USSR came firm: Soviet representative criticized and opposed coming into force Agreements on the IMF and the IBRR, accusing them in breaking the UN Charter and developing out of the UN control.
During the war, the spirit of cooperation was a characteristic of the Soviet expert community, as analysis shows a major stake was at special post-war relations with the USA. However, the break-out of the Cold War put an end to discussions on the "right terms" of joining global structures, suggested by the allies.
As the final point in the financial and economic cooperation in multilateral organizations with the West, one can consider the unilateral introduction of a new ruble parity to the US dollar in the beginning of 1950 (a decrease from 5 rubs 30 kopeks to 4 rubs) and a simultaneous switch to a golden standard (instead of the existed before correlation to the US dollar). This artificial change in an exchange rate (explained officially by a growth of the ruble's capacity) pursued the aim of strengthening ruble as a major currency in the financial area of COMECON and to exclude any possibility of the financial pressure from the West.
Created in 1949 within NATO COCOM and within COMECON -
Committee on coordination of trade with Western countries represented the beginning of the "economic cold war". Instead of multilateral economic cooperation, the global multilateral rivalry got its start.
In the 1950s, the first sign of Soviet attempts to build some alternative global economic structures were voiced in decision passed by the international Moscow Economic Conference on April 7-15, 195216. It was one of the first signs for Western diplomats, that the USSR was becoming more active in developing ties with their former colonies and used successfully the economic weapon in a propaganda war with the West. The idea of fair trade without discrimination became one of the major themes in the 1950s and 1960s.
In 1955 - the year of high hopes and good expectations from the Geneva meeting of Great Powers (first after the mid-1940s) the media and the public expected Soviet proposals of a new world economic conference. The British Treasury even issued a series of memoranda on its attitude towards this expected move17. Yet, the general conclusion was very modest and precautionary. Experiencing serious problems with the sterling and the trade balance, the British were more in favor of solving their own troubles, rather than joining a new international venture. In reality, in Geneva only the French proposed to set up a new international fund trying to use the attractive idea of the reduction of arms to save the money for solving problems of the Third world (first of all - growing problems in their own colonies)18. The idea did not get any serious backup as well as the Geneva Conference did not bring any breakthrough in relations of East and West.
1960 was a year, which could put the clock back and put all former allies back to fruitful cooperation in global economic matters. High hopes were raised with the long prepared Paris summit of the great powers in May 1960. All countries prepared for this event. The inner documents of the USSR show that the Soviet Union linked its declaration on desirability to join the newly formed OECD (voiced at the European Economic Committee of the UN) with this summit. The notorious U-2 spy aircraft incident and scandalous failure of the summit meant the failure of this early détente and all preparatory work that had been going.
In the end of 1960 the Department of International Economic Organizations in the MID of the USSR prepared two drafts. One considered regional integration - a Soviet position towards the EEC and EFTA, another one - "About a possible joining of the USSR to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)". One cannot trace, what was the fate of this proposal in details, but obviously it was not supported at the top. Still, it shows that the ideas of joining and changing from the within towards more fair and non-discriminatory rules of international trade flourished again among the Soviet experts in the early 1960s.
As my study on the Soviet Union and European Integration has shown, there existed two schools of thought in the USSR by that time - "dogmatic" and "progressive", or "creative"19. The same refers to the
Soviet attitude towards the structures of economic world order. The dogmatic school opted for the alternative structures such as created in 1964 UNCTAD. The "progressive" - for joining on special terms and changing from within the existing international organizations (OECD, GATT - the ones where some socialist countries already experienced full or partial membership status). The same diversity of opinions can be seen among the Soviet economists (theoretic school). A division between the "pro-marketers" and "anti-marketers" started right during these times and continued until the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev in mid 1980s.
Still, during the 1960s the official line of the USSR towards GATT remained hostile. Perhaps the last train on the opportunity to enter the global financial structures was missed in 1965, when the capitalist world again offered the USSR to join the new institution - the Asian Development Bank.
In March 1965, the XXI session of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) passed the resolution on creation of the Asian Development Bank for the countries of this region. In October-November 1965, a preparatory meeting of 21 countries elaborating the Charter of this new institution gathered together in Bangkok. The key actors included the USSR, the USA, the UK and Netherlands. Interesting to note that 10 Western countries (not located in this region) felt vital to take part. They included Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Western Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. France refused to take part demonstrating its negative attitude towards this pro-American project. As a result, the adopted version of Bank's Charter proved De Gaulle's worst apprehensions - only 20% of votes were divided equally between the member states, the last 80% were distributed according to the size of the capital stock. In other words, the US and Japanese shares were obviously the highest. Yet it is interesting that both these key capitalist countries were very interested in the Soviet membership. They wanted to show the universal nature of this organization and to play down the too obvious US domination in this Bank. Some Asian countries also expressed their wish to see the USSR among the Bank's members as their partner in a struggle against the American dominance.
For the USSR it was a unique opportunity to join the new trans-regional financial organization from the beginning, to get foreign investments and credits for the development of the Asian part of the Soviet Union and the Far East and to credit many interesting joint projects with Japan and other countries, which suffered from a lack of long-term currency loans. This could become a launching pad for the Soviet inclusion into GATT and other global trade and financial structures.
Although the Soviet delegation at the Bangkok meeting did not say a definite "no", the analysis submitted to the special meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU denied the idea of joining this Bank. The joint memo of the Ministry of Finances and the MID of the USSR stated that the "Soviet Union's participation in the Bank is inexpedient first of all from the
political point of view as far as the conditions of its creation and planned activities obviously guarantee domination of the USA, Japan and a number of other imperialistic states"20. The second argument was also very important: the participation of Taiwan, South Korea and South Vietnam "could be used by China for new provocative actions against the USSR" 21. The ongoing war in Vietnam and the deepening quarrel with Mao Zedong played an essential role in this negative assessment of "pro" and "contra" joining the Asian Development Bank. Choosing between the economic benefits and geopolitical considerations the last ones - considerations of security - won in the battle between the optimists and pessimists in the Soviet government. The second meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU in December on this issue confirmed conclusions of the earlier ministerial memo22.
The dramatic and sometimes detective story of the Soviet participation or non-participation in the post-war New World Economic order has laid down the whole spatial framework for economics of the Cold War for decades ahead. Since 1952 the Soviet Union started campaign for the alternative global structures. In 1964 the UNCTAD was established as a counter-organization to GATT. On the wave of economics of détente, and as a result of decolonization process and appearance of a lot of new actors from the Third world, several efforts of bridge building between socialist and capitalist versions of the "New International Economic Order" took place. For instance, the emergence of a joint GATT-UNCTAD trade centre on the wave of the CSCE, or more active Soviet position in discussions on reviewing of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s23.
Instead of the idealistic ideas of the post-war joint financial disarmament and cooperation (suggested the Keynes plan in 1942), the story of the development of the New World Economic order was full of sharp competition and joint accusations between the founding nations of the Bretton Woods system, especially the USSR and the USA.
To conclude with, can we say that the Soviet Union was a participant or only a dreamer of the "New World Economic Order" in the 1940s -1960s? Looking from the point of global history development Immanuel Wallerstein considered the Soviet Union as a part of the capitalist economy24. As the recent study by Oscar Sanchez-Sibony shows, the USSR was an important link and an active participant of the global economic system acting as a bridge between the First and the Third Worlds, especially in the 1960s25. Few doubts that the USSR was a global player and affected the architecture of the world even though it did not participate directly in a majority of the post-war global economic institutions. For a long time it demonstrated the alive alternative to the capitalist market economy and even though the global struggle between the communism and capitalism was lost, and the Bretton Woods system itself collapsed in early 1970s, the structures - such as UNCTAD - and progressive socialist values it pursued are still alive, and the example of China, which linked socialist and capitalist systems together, shows that nothing was
strictly predetermined ideologically in the history of the 20th century.
Notes
1 Шенин С.Ю. Американская программа «пункта-4»: 1949 - 1953. Саратов, 2000; Батюк В.И., Евстафьев Д.Г. Первые заморозки: Советско-американские отношения в 1945 - 1950 гг. М., 1995.
2 Garavini G. After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization and the Challenge from the Global South, 1957 - 1986. Oxford, 2012; Burke R. Decolonization and the Evolution of the International Human Rights. Philadelphia, 2012.
3 Archive of External Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Russian Federation (AVP RF). F. 06. Op. 6. P. 17. D. 170. L. 40.
4 Ibidem.
5 Ibidem. P. 32.
6 Ibidem. P. 181.
7 Ibidem. P. 187-188.
8 Ibidem. P. 173.
9 AVP RF. F. 046. Op. 7. P. 49. D. 96. L. 34.
10 Попов В.П. Экономическая политика Советского государства. М.; Тамбов, 2000. С. 80.
11 Батюк В.И., Евстафьев Д.Г. Первые заморозки: Советско-американские отношения в 1945 - 1950 гг. М., 1995. С. 20-22.
12 AVP RF. F. 06. Op. 7. P. 19. D. 197. L. 1-4.
13 Ibidem.
14 Ibidem.
15 Павлов М.Ю. Анастас Микоян: Политический портрет на фоне советской эпохи. M., 2010. С. 228, 229.
16 Lipkin M. Avril 1952, la conférence économique de Moscou: Changement de tactique ou innovation dans la politique extérieure stalinienne? // Relations internationals (P.U.F.). 2011/3. № 147. P. 19-33.
17 The National Archives (UK) (TNA). T229/871.Treasury. Central economic planning staff. Proposed World Economic Conference arising out of the Geneva discussions (1955). Draft Brief Geneva Conference: should there be a World Economic Conference? G. van Loo, 1st July 1955.
18 Женевское совещание глав правительств четырех держав - СССР, Великобритании, США и Франции (18 - 23 июля 1955 г.): Документы и протоколы. М., 1955. С. 30-33.
19 Липкин М.А. Советский Союз и европейская интеграция: середина 1940-х - середина 1960-х годов. М., 2011. С. 212, 213.
20 Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI). F. 3. Op. 16. D. 805. L. 64.
21 Ibidem.
22 RGANI. F. 3. Op. 18. D. 816. L. 79.
23 Липкин М.А. Европейская интеграция и советские экономические инициативы (1950-е - первая половина 1970-х годов): По новым материалам российских и зарубежных архивов // Новая и новейшая история. 2009. № 3. С. 47-64.
24 Валлерстайн И. Анализ Мировых Систем и ситуация в современном мире. СПб., 2001. С. 13, 14.
25 Липкин М.А. Глобальное прочтение истории СССР: Дискуссии вокруг «Красной глобализации» Оскара Санчеса-Сибони // Российская история. 2016. № 1. С. 131-144.
Author, Abstract, Key words
Mikhail A. Lipkin - Doctor of History, Director of the Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences; Professor of Moscow State Institute of International Affairs (University) (Moscow, Russia)
mli@igh.ru
The article is based on new evidences from the Archive of External Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Russian Federation and the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History. It deals with the issue of Soviet (non-) participation in the formation of a New International (World) Economic Order (NIEO) after the World War II. It provides a detailed analysis of peculiarities of Soviet position at the conference in Bretton Woods and offers the first reconstruction of the full chronology of key discussions on the Soviet part. The author argues that the temporary refusal to sign the agreements did not mean an ultimate refusal to have economic cooperation with the West. Various Soviet experts continued discussing this topic until the beginning of 1947. The article reveals the new evidence that in 1965 the USSR was again invited to one of the key banks in the global economy. This time it was the Asian Development bank, a transregional organization with global participation. However, the current geopolitical situation in the South-East Asia prevented Moscow from joining the Bretton Woods system through the 'backdoor'. The author comes to the conclusion that even without its participation in official Bretton Woods institutions the Soviet Union influenced the world economy through the Third World countries taking part in designing new institutions of another New International Economic Order of 1960s - 1970s, such as UNCTAD.
New International (World) Economic Order (NIEO), Bretton Woods system, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID), USSR, USA, Great Britain, Cold War, détente, cooperation, global economy, credits, lend-lease, J. Keynes, V.M. Molotov, A. Vyshinsky
References (Articles from Scientific Journals)
1. Lipkin M. Avril 1952, la conférence économique de Moscou: Changement de tactique ou innovation dans la politique extérieure stalinienne? Relations internationals (P.U.F.), 2011/3, no. 147, pp. 19-33.
2. Lipkin M.A. Evropeyskaya integratsiya i sovetskie ekonomicheskie init-siativy (1950-e - pervaya polovina 1970-kh godov): Po novym materialam ros-
siyskikh i zarubezhnykh arkhivov. Novaya i noveyshaya istoriya, 2009, no. 3, pp.47-64.
3. Lipkin M.A. Globalnoe prochtenie istorii SSSR: Diskussii vokrug "Kras-noy globalizatsii" Oskara Sanchesa-Siboni. Rossiyskaya istoriya, 2016, no. 1, pp.131-144.
(Monographs)
4. Batyuk V.I., Evstafev D.G. Pervye zamorozki: Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniya v 1945 - 1950 gg. [The First Frosts: Soviet-American Relations in 1945 - 1950]. Moscow, 1995, 253 p.
5. Batyuk V.I., Evstafev D.G. Pervye zamorozki: Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniya v 1945 - 1950 gg. [The First Frosts: Soviet-American Relations in 1945 - 1950]. Moscow, 1995, pp. 20-22.
6. Burke R. Decolonization and the Evolution of the International Human Rights. Philadelphia, 2012, 240 p.
7. Garavini G. After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization and the Challenge from the Global South, 1957 - 1986. Oxford, 2012, 336 p.
8. Lipkin M.A. Sovetskiy Soyuz i evropeyskaya integratsiya: seredina 1940-kh - seredina 1960-kh godov [The Soviet Union and European Integration: mid 1940s - mid 1960s years]. Moscow, 2011, pp. 212, 213.
9. Pavlov M.Yu. Anastas Mikoyan: Politicheskiy portret na fone sovetskoy epokhi [Anastas Mikoyan: A Political Portrait in the Background of the Soviet Era]. Moscow, 2010, pp. 228, 229.
10. Popov V.P. Ekonomicheskaya politika Covetskogo gosudarstva [Economic Policy of the Soviet State]. Moscow; Tambov, 2000, p. 80.
11. Shenin S.Yu. Amerikanskaya programma "punkta-4": 1949 - 1953 [The American Programme of "Point 4": 1949 - 1953]. Saratov, 2000, 148 p.
12. Vallerstein I. Analiz Mirovykh Sistem i situatsiya v sovremennom mire [The World-System Analysis and the Situation in the Modern World]. St. Petersburg, 2001, pp. 13, 14.
Автор, аннотация, ключевые слова
Липкин Михаил Аркадьевич - докт. ист. наук, директор Института всеобщей истории РАН, профессор Московского государственного института международных отношений (университета)
mli@igh.ru
В статье на материале неопубликованных документов двух российских архивов - АВП МИД РФ и РГАНИ - рассматривается проблема участия/ неучастия СССР в построении новой системы мирового экономического порядка после Второй мировой войны с участием других ключевых стран Западного мира. Подробно разбираются нюансы советской дипломатии на конференции в Бреттон-Вудсе, впервые выстраивается хронология ключевых дискуссий советской стороны. Автор показывает, что временный отказ СССР подписать Бреттон-Вудские соглашения еще не означал окончательного отказа от экономического сотрудничества с Западом. Советские
эксперты обсуждали эту тему вплоть до начала 1947 г. Принципиально новым является тезис о том, что в 1965 г. СССР вновь получил приглашение принять участие уже в Азиатском банке развития - трансрегиональной организации с глобальным участием. Однако геополитическая ситуация в Юго-Восточной Азии не позволила тогда войти через этот банк в систему Бреттон-Вудских институтов «с черного хода». Автор приходит к выводу, что даже не входя в официальные институты Бреттон-Вудса, СССР оказывал влияние на мировую экономику, влияя на страны Третьего мира и участвуя в разработке институтов уже Нового международного экономического порядка 1960-х - 1970-х гг., таких как Конференция ООН по торговле и развитию (ЮНКТАД).
«Новый мировой экономический порядок», Бреттон-Вудская система, Всемирный банк, Международный валютный фонд, Народный комиссариат по иностранным делам (НКИД), СССР, США, Великобритания, Холодная война, разрядка, сотрудничество, глобальная экономика, займы, ленд-лиз, Дж. Кейнс, В.М. Молотов, А.Я. Вышинский
