CC BY
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Balagura A.A. (2019). Some features of teaching the section "Graph Theory" to schoolchildren and students (from work experience). Problems of the educational process in innovative schools. Collection of scientific papers. Ed. O.V. Kuzmina. Irkutsk. p. 368-371.
Belousov A.I., Tkachev S.B. (2020). Discrete Mathematics. Textbook for universities (6th ed). M .: Publishing house of MSTU named after N.E. Bauman.
Belousov A.I. (2018). Some properties of semirings. Mechanical engineering and computer technology, 3, 35-50. DOI: 10.24108 / 0318.0001379.
Goroshkin A.P. (2019). On the methodological features of the course "Graph theory" in technical universities. Actual problems of teaching mathematics in a technical university, 7, 106-108 DOI: 1025206 / 23075430-2019-7-106-108.
Zykov A. A. (2004) Fundamentals of graph theory. M.: University book.
Kuzmin O.V., Lavlinsky M.V. (2019). Development of a software package for the elective course "Discrete Mathematics" under the section "Introduction to Graph Theory". Informatization of education and e-learning methodology. Materials of the III International Scientific Conference. Siberian Federal University, Institute of Space and Information Technologies. 2019.p. 368-371.
Mandrikov V.B., Krayushkin A.I., Perepyolkin A.I., Gorelik E.V. & Efimova E.Yu. (2019). Graph theory in the construction of a lecture course at the department of a medical higher educational institution. For high quality education. Materials of the IV All-Russian Forum. p. 311 -314.
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Serba A.S., Kirichek K.A. (2019). Formation of students' ability to solve practical problems based on the use of graph theory. Bulletin of the Belgorod Institute of Education Development, Vol. 6, 2. P. 101 -107.
THE IMPACT OF BREXIT ON THE SANCTIONED REGULATION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF BRITISH COMPANIES
In this article, we will look at the impact of Brexit on the procedure of sanctions verification of counterparty companies and transactions with them, and examine the changed legal regulation due to this event.
Keywords
sanctions, Brexit, sanctions regulation
AUTHOR
Yana S. Butakova,
Head of the Department for Support of international activities and non-discriminatory access to foreign markets of Public Joint Stock Company Chelyabinsk Pipe Plant, Chelyabinsk 21, st. Mashinostroiteley, Chelyabinsk, 454129, Russia [email protected]
1. Introduction
At 11pm on 31 December 2020, the Brexit transitional period ended and the UK's autonomous sanctions regime, consisting of approximately 30 regulations, came into force. It is largely based on the EU's sanctions legislation that was previously implemented in the UK, but there are important differences.
Companies operating in the UK will need to ensure that their sanctions systems and controls reflect this sanctions legislation. Companies will also need to consider if these changes could affect existing contractual relationships and their approach to sanctions-related representations and warranties in the future.
2. Materials and methods
The methodology of this study consists of theoretical methods, in particular the analysis of the regulatory framework of the United Kingdom, as well as theoretical research by a number of English, American and Russian authors. The purpose of this article is to study the peculiarities of the English sanctions regulation as a result of Brexit. The relevance of the topic of this study is due to its novelty and weak elaboration in the environment of Russian and European scientific research. As a result of this article, the author came to the conclusion that it is necessary to update the local procedures of companies for approving sub-sanction transactions, taking into account the updated regulation.
3. Discussions
3.1.UK SANCTIONS LEGISLATION
Sanctions - embargoes, moratoriums, trade, economic, social, political restrictive measures (including those that make it impossible to make settlements in a certain currency) that are not trade policy measures usually used to regulate trade flows (import and export duties, anti-dumping, countervailing, special safeguard measures, import licensing, tariff quotas and other quantitative restrictions on imports and exports, measures of technical regulation and other tariff and non-tariff measures) imposed for political purposes by the United States of America, the European Union, member states of the European Union, the UK, the Russian Federation, the United Nations (UN), an authorized government agency or institution of any of the above states (including but not limited to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OfAc) of the US Treasury, US Department of State, US Department of Commerce, Her Majesty's Treasury), an authorized body of another state, an authorized body of another international organization.
The UK's Sanctions and Money Laundering Act 2018 ("SAMLA") was enacted in May 2018 as a framework for the UK's post-Brexit sanctions regimes. SAMLA gives the UK government the power to enact sanctions and details the types of measures that may be imposed. However, the substantive restrictions are contained in approximately 30 country-specific, or thematic, regulations (the "UK Regulations" and, together with SAMLA, "UK Sanctions").
UK Sanctions apply to: (1) persons and entities located in the UK; (2) entities incorporated in the UK, including their foreign branches and offices, and potentially foreign subsidiaries if the UK parent company maintains control or oversight; and (3) UK citizens located anywhere in the world (together, "UK Persons").The majority of the UK Regulations were passed in 2019, but to the extent they overlapped with the scope of existing EU sanctions, they could only come fully into force once the Brexit transitional period had ended. There are three features of the UK's financial and capital market sanctions that differ from those of the EU.
Financial Sanctions-Ownership and Control
The most significant difference between asset freezes employed in the UK and the EU is their effect of on entities owned or controlled by a sanctioned person.
Under EU sanctions, an asset freeze directly affects the person it targets (a "Listed Person"). The freeze extends to any funds or economic resources held or controlled by the Listed Person. EU guidance also states that any funds or economic resources made available to an entity owned or controlled by a Listed Person are presumed to be made available to the Listed Person. This is known as the "indirect benefit presumption". This presumption can be rebutted if it can be reasonably determined that the funds or economic resources will not be used by or be for the benefit of the Listed Person. In practice, this means that subsidiaries of, or entities owned or controlled by, a Listed Person will not always be affected by an EU asset freeze, particularly if they can be shown to operate independently in their own commercial interests.
In contrast, UK Sanctions extend the asset freeze to any entity owned or controlled by a Listed Person. This goes beyond making new funds and economic resources available to a Listed Person; the assets and funds of all of a Listed Person's subsidiaries or controlled entities must be immediately frozen under UK Sanctions. There are no exceptions if, for example, an entity that is majority-owned by a Listed Person operates independently, with the Listed Person acting as a passive investor.
Prohibition on Providing "Financial Services"
EU trade sanctions prohibit persons subject to EU sanctions ("EU Persons") from providing "financial assistance" in relation to certain goods. In contrast, UK sanctions prohibit UK Persons from providing "financial services" in relation to those goods. "Financial services" are defined more broadly than "financial assistance" and include the provision of insurance and payment and money transmission services.
Russia Capital Market Exemption
UK and EU capital market restrictions against Russia prohibit directly or indirectly purchasing, selling, providing investment services for or assistance in the issuance of, or otherwise dealing with, certain transferable securities and money-market instruments of designated state-owned Russian banks, manufacturers and oil and gas companies. Hey also prohibit offering certain new loans or credit to such designated entities. These restrictions apply to any entity that is more than 50% owned by a designated entity (directly or indirectly), or that acts on behalf or at the direction of a designated entity.
The EU sanctions create an exemption to the above for EU subsidiaries of designated entities. The UK sanctions, however, provide an exemption only for UK subsidiaries of designated entities. The UK sanctions also contain no grounds on which UK Persons can obtain a licence to provide restricted services to an EU subsidiary of a designated person. Consequently, UK Persons are now prohibited from entering into certain transactions with large EU banks, such as Sberbank Europe and VTB Bank Austria.
3.2.UK ASSET FREEZE LIST
The UK asset freeze list was released at 11 pm on 31 December 2020. It largely tracks the EU list, with a few exceptions:
- 113 persons subject to EU asset freezes are no longer subject to asset freezes under the UK legislation. Almost all of the de-listings relate to government officials and their family members, the majority of whom are located in Tunisia (42% of the de-listings), Belarus (24%), Egypt (8%), Guinea- Bissau (7%) and Syria (4%). The UK has not provided formal reasons for each of these de-listings, though according to Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office ("FCDO") officials, they are primarily due to the FCDO's determination that there were insufficient grounds for sanctioning these persons under the UK criteria (usually due to a lack of evidence);
- Seven persons subject to UN sanctions are no longer subject to asset freezes under the UK legislation;
- Ten persons have been listed under a different sanctions regime in the UK than the regime under which they are listed in the EU, and one person listed under multiple EU sanctions regimes is only listed under one UK regime (Iran nuclear sanctions); and
- Eleven persons have had additional aliases added to their asset freeze listings.
So far, the UK has not added anyone to its asset freeze lists under the country-specific regimes it imported from the EU. It is likely that the UK will do so in the near future as it seeks to establish its own foreign and economic policy. A Listed Person, or a person acting on their behalf, can request a revocation or variation of their UK sanctions designation by submitting a Sanctions Review Request Form, along with supporting evidence, to FDCO, which will review the request and notify the applicant of its decision and reasoning. FCDO's decision can be challenged in the English High Court. There is no longer any mechanism to challenge EU sanctions designations in the UK courts.
3.3.NEW SANCTIONS REGIME: MISAPPROPRIATION OF STATE FUNDS
The Misappropriation (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (the "Misappropriation Regulations") impose financial and immigration sanctions to deter and punish misappropriation of State funds from a foreign country. The regime has been introduced as part of the UK government's objective to tackle corruption (including misappropriation), as set out in the UK Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017- 2022.
The Misappropriation Regulations represent a significant step forward for the UK's foreign policy. When the UK introduced its Global Human Rights sanctions regime in July 2020, it faced criticism for excluding corruption as a ground for which sanctions could be imposed. Research has shown a strong link between endemic corruption and serious human rights abuses, leading the U.S. and Canada to extend their human rights sanctions regimes to cover corruption.
The Misappropriation Regulations replace three country-specific EU regimes—against Egypt, Ukraine and Tunisia—and create a thematic regime that can be used to target persons in any jurisdiction. This may make it easier to deploy the restrictive measures, as it avoids political sensitivities surrounding sanctioning specific countries. It also limits the impact of the sanctions on unintended third parties: country-specific sanctions can be an event of default in some financing agreements, even if the parties to the agreement are not directly targeted.
So far, no persons have been sanctioned under the Misappropriation Regulations. The persons targeted under the three EU regimes are sanctioned in the UK under the Global Human Rights regulations, demonstrating the close link between corruption and human rights abuses.
3.4. CHANGES TO THE LICENCING REGIME
UK Specific Licences
The UK's sanctions regime contains some important differences from the EU's regime.
UK General Licences
Under SAMLA, the UK authorities can issue general licences that allow multiple parties to undertake activities that would otherwise be prohibited by sanctions legislation without the need for a specific licence. In addition to the general licences introduced by the UK in 2011, on 1 January 2021, the Office for Financial Sanctions Implementation ("OFSI") introduced a general licence to allow UK Persons to make payments to the Crimean Sea Ports for the provision of certain services. Companies conducting business in the UK should be aware of the general licences available to them and their scope.
UK Persons wishing to obtain a licence to undertake an activity that is otherwise prohibited by UK sanctions must complete the new OFSI Licence Application Form. Some UK
sanctions regimes have changed licencing criteria, so companies will need to ensure that they continue to have licencing grounds available to them.
Key takeaways
There are three practical takeaways for companies conducting business in the UK.
Sanctions Screening Software Updates Companies operating within the UK should ensure that their sanctions screening software has been updated to include the new UK asset freeze lists and the new ownership and control provisions. This is particularly important if companies rely on in-house software, or manual tools, to conduct sanctions screening. International companies with operations in the UK should also ensure that their global policies include appropriate provisions for applicable UK sanctions.
Reviewing Contractual Arrangements
Companies should check their existing contractual arrangements to see if they have any sanctions-related warranties or representations that could be affected by the divergence between EU and UK sanctions regimes.
Taking into account the formation of independent sanctions regulation by the United Kingdom, the company's lawyers and compliance officers significantly complicate the procedure for checking transactions and counterparties in terms of sanctions risks.
The compliance officer of the company from January 1, 2021 checks the transaction with the counter-net according to the following main sanctions lists:
MAIN LISTS
USA OFAC
The European Union The Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force
United Kingdom HM Treasury
UN UN Sanctions
OTHER SANCTIONS AND NEGATIVE LISTS
USA ISN
USA BIS
USA DDTC
USA Cuba Restricted List
EU The EU Air Safety List
UK Proscribed Terrorist Organizations List
Canada DFATD
Switzerland SECO
Switzerland Federal Council
Japan Japanese finance ministry sanctions
Australia DFAT
Ukraine NSDC
And also studies WATCH LISTS:
- Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation
- CAATSA Section 231(e) -Defense and Intelligence Sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation
- CAATSA Section 241(a)(1) -Senior Foreign Political Figures and Oligarchs in the Russian Federation
- Special Counsel Investigation (Russian Interference With The 2016 Presidential Election And Related Matters)
Below is the current legal regulation (basic), guided by which, you can make a conclusion about the presence and level of sanctions transactions for the company.
(UK) Regulations
Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulation 7 Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulation 8(6) Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulation 9
(EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulation 11(1) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulation 11 (5)(b) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulation n(ô) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulation 11(7) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulations 58(1 )-(2) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulation 58(3) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulation 58(5) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulation 58(6) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulation 58 (EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulation 12(4) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulation 14(4) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulations 16(1) and 16(9) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulations 16(2)(b) and (c), 16(4)(b) and (c) and 17(5)
Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulations 16(7), 16(8), 59(3)(b)
Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions)
and Schedule 1
Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) (e) and (5)
Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions) Russia (Sanctions)
EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulation 59(1 )(a)
EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulation 59(l)(b)
EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulation 59
EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulation 18
(EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855, Regulations 18(2)(b), (c), (d) and
EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855 EU Exit) Regulations 2019/855
Regulation 28 Regulations 28(1), (3), (4) Regulation 28(7) Regulation 29 Regulation 29(3) Regulation 30 Regulation 37 Regulation 37(6) Regulation 38 Regulation 38(3) Regulations 44(1 )-(3) Regulation 44(5) Regulations 45(1 )(d)-(f) Regulation 45 Regulations 52(1 )-(2) Regulation 52(3)(a) Regulation 52(5)(a) Regulations 53(1)(e)-(g) Regulation 53(3) Regulation 64 Regulation 65 Regulation 66(5) Regulation 67(1) Regulation 68(1) Regulation 70(5) Regulation 80
(EU) Regulations
Common regulation:
Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 Implementation Regulation (EU) No 810/2014 of 25 July 2014
Implementation Regulation (EU) No 826/2014 of 30 July 2014
Regulation (EU) No 959/2014 of 8 September 2014 and Implementation Regulation (EU) No 961 /2014 of 8 September 2014
Decision 2014/512 / CFSP of 31 July 2014 Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 Regulation (eu) No 960/2014 of 8 September 2014 Regulation (eu) No 1290/2014 of 4 December 2014 Regulation (EU) No 692/2014
Additional:
Ukraine (European Union Financial Sanctions) (No 2) Regulations 2014/693, Regulation
3(1)
Ukraine (European Union Financial Sanctions) (No 2) Regulations 2014/693, Regulation 3(2)(b)
Ukraine (European Union Financial Sanctions) (No 2) Regulations 2014/693, Regulation 3 Ukraine (European Union Financial Sanctions) (No 2) Regulations 2014/693, Regulation 8(1)(a) (b)
Ukraine (European Union Financial Sanctions) (No 2) Regulations 2014/693, Regulation 8 Ukraine (European Union Financial Sanctions) (No 2) Regulations 2014/693, Regulation 8(1)(c)
Ukraine (European Union Financial Sanctions) (No 2) Regulations 2014/693, Regulation 4 Ukraine (European Union Financial Sanctions) (No 2) Regulations 2014/693, Regulation 6 Ukraine (European Union Financial Sanctions) (No 3) Regulations 2014/2054, Regulations 3A(1 )
Ukraine (European Union Financial Sanctions) (No 3) Regulations 2014/2054, Regulations 3(2)(b)-(c), 3A(2)(d)-(e) and 3B(1)
Ukraine (European Union Financial Sanctions) (No 3) Regulations 2014/2054, Regulation 3B(2)(a)
Ukraine (European Union Financial Sanctions) (No 3) Regulations 2014/2054, Regulation 3B(2)(b)
Ukraine (European Union Financial Sanctions) (No 3) Regulations 2014/2054, Regulation 3C(3)
Export Control (Russia, Crimea and Sevastopol Sanctions) Order 2014/2357, Articles 7(b), (c), (d) and (e)
Export Control (Russia, Crimea and Sevastopol Sanctions) Order 2014/2357, Article 5(1 )(b)
The Export Control (Russia, Crimea and Sevastopol Sanctions) Order 2014/2357, Article 5(1)(a)
Export Control (Russia, Crimea and Sevastopol Sanctions) Order 2014/2357, Articles 3(ac) and (c)
Export Control (Russia, Crimea and Sevastopol Sanctions) Order 2014/2357, Article 4(2)(a)(iii)
Export Control (Russia, Crimea and Sevastopol Sanctions) Order 2014/2357, Article 4(2)(c)
Export Control (Russia, Crimea and Sevastopol Sanctions) Order 2014/2357, Article 4(2)(a)(ii)
Export Control (Russia, Crimea and Sevastopol Sanctions) Order 2014/2357, Article 6 Export Control (Russia, Crimea and Sevastopol Sanctions) Order 2014/2357, Article 8(b) Export Control (Russia, Crimea and Sevastopol Sanctions) Order 2014/2357, Article 8(c) Ukraine (European Union Financial Sanctions) (No 2) Regulations 2014/693, Regulation 9
Ukraine (European Union Financial Sanctions) (No 2) Regulations 2014/693, Regulation 12
(USA) Regulations
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act 2017
OFAC Directives No. 1 and No. 2 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 13662 of 20.3.2014
OFAC Directives No 3 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 13662 of 20.3.2014
OFAC Directives No 4 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 13662 of 20.3.2014
FAQ OFAC 540-547, 579, 589
Executive Order 13685 of December 19, 2014
Additional:
OFAC Specially Designated Nationals And Blocked Persons List
OFAC Consolidated Non-SDN List
Separately, we note that responsibility for violating US sanctions:
- an administrative fine for a company that violates the sanctions legislation of up to $ 250,000 or double the value of the transaction, whichever is greater;
- criminal liability-a fine of up to$ 1,000,000, or imprisonment of the guilty person (the person responsible for entering into a prohibited transaction) for up to 20 years, or both types of punishment. Here, as a rule, the heads of companies and structural divisions responsible for concluding a sub-sanctioned transaction are attracted. Responsibility for violations of EU sanctions is established by a specific EU State. In the UK, liability is currently up to 1 million GBP or up to 50% of the transaction value.
I recall the sad example of 2017, when ExxonMobil was awarded a fine of$ 2,000,000 for violating blocking sanctions. And it seemed so simple-to appoint a signatory under the power of attorney and not from the blocking list.
4. Conclusion
The company's lawyer needs to double-check all business-related contracts and divide them into three groups of contracts with counterparties located in the company:
- in EU member states;
- in countries with a free trade agreement with the EU;
- outside the EU, where the supply chain includes the EU (since the additional costs of trade between the EU and the UK can be transferred throughout the chain).
Second, contracts need to be reviewed for how a No Deal Brexit could affect either party's ability to meet its contractual obligations and whether there would be uncertainty about the continued scope or applicability of the contract.
Thus, Brexit has significantly complicated the sanctions regulation of the activities of British companies, giving rise to the need to check external and internal transactions, in addition to the existing regulation, for compliance with their emerging UK sanctions regulation.
REFERENCES
Andrews, N. Development in English Civil Procedure: How Far Can the English Courts Reform their Own Procedure? (1997) 2 ZZP Int (Zeitschrift für Zivilprozess International: Germany), p. 14-17.
Andrews, N. English Civil Procedure, Oxford UP, 2003, 312 p.
«Brexit» opens doors for stronger Russia-UK trade ties. https://www.rt.com/business/349140-russia-
ukBrexit- prospects. Cranston, R. Complex Litigation (2007), 26 CJQ, 190. Colman, A. Court (5 edn, 2000), 193 p.
Sir Leonard Hoffmann. Changing Perspectives on Civil Litigation (1993) 5, MLR 297.
Sir Rupert Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs (December, 2009: London, 2010), 111 p.
Zuckerman, A.A.S. The Jackson Final Report on Costs - Plastering the Cracks to Shore up a Dysfunctional System (2010) 29, CJQ, 263 p.
The Admiralty and Commercial Courts Guide (8 edn, 2009), 198 p.
Knobel, A., Firanchuk, A. "Brexit" and trade and economic relations between Russia and the UK. Economic development of Russia. 2016 (7).42-46.
How Britain will leave the EU: steps London needs to take after the referendum. http://eer.ru/a7article/u123265/24-06-2016/52574.
Larionova, M., Sakharov, A., Shelepov, A. Great Britain after Brexit: its relations with the EU and the future in multilateral institutions // Economic development of Russia.2016(7).50-54.
Malikhin, A. B. Consequences of the UK's withdrawal from the EU. Bulletin of IE RAS. 2019(4).169-181.
Maksimov, I., Rokossovskaya, A., Brexit: why the UK is leaving the EU and what it will lead to. https://rg.ru/2020/01/31/brexit-pochemu-velikobritaniia-vyhodit-iz-es-i-k-chemu-eto-privedet.html
MAKING SENSE OF THE WORLD
The relevance of the problem under study is due to the existence of different worldviews in the modern world. The purpose of the article is to examine the various sets of minds of cultures. The leading approach to the study of this problem is multicultural. The article deals with the main problems of theology and atheism in today's world. The authors make a special scientific perspective on the positioning of the multicultural basis of ideology in different cultures. Much attention is paid to considering the Biblical worldview. The materials of the article can be useful in the general process for acquainting with differences in the cultures' sense of the world.
Keywords
a worldview, faith, atheism, customs and traditions, theology
AUTHORS
Elena V. Vasilyeva,
Lecturer the North-West Branch of the Federal State-Funded Educational Institution of Higher Education "The Russian State University of Justice", Saint-Peterburg 5-a, Alexander Park, Saint-Peterburg, 197046, Russia [email protected]
Sofia V. Matvienko,
Senior lecturer the North-West Branch of the Federal State-Funded Educational Institution of Higher Education "The Russian State University of Justice", Saint-Peterburg 5-a, Alexander Park, Saint-Peterburg, 197046, Russia [email protected]
«You only live once, but if you do it right, once is enough»
Mae West
1. Introduction
The sense of the world is not given to a person from the outside. It opens up to each individual in a different way. It is impossible to find the meaning of life - one and common - for all times and peoples. The purpose of life is an independent and conscious choice of the values that a person focuses on in his being.
