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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Khaladdin IBRAHIMLI
D.Sc. (Hist.), Professor at the Azerbaijan Tourism Institute
(Baku, Azerbaijan).
THE IDEA OF A CAUCASIAN HOME AND THE PROBLEM OF INTEGRATION IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS
Abstract
T
his article researches the historical prerequisites of the idea of a Caucasian Home and its development and evolu-
tion over the span of 200 years. The author substantiates that the idea is not limited to the independence of the states in the region,
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but includes their further formation and integration into a confederation at a later stage, like the EU. The author also implies that two main factors detain integration in the region: the fact that the North Caucasian Republics are constituencies of the Russian Federation and the aggressive policy of Armenia in the Central Caucasus. However, since its ag-
gressive policy is so alien to the spirit, nature, customs, and traditions of the Caucasian peoples, Armenia cannot be in opposition and insist on aggression for a long time. Based on this consideration, the author assumes that when Armenian aggression is over, the idea of a Caucasian Home can be realized in some way.
KEYWORDS: Caucasian Home, Free Caucasus, confederation, independence, Bolshevism, diaspora.
Introduction
The idea of a "Caucasian Home" or "Caucasian Union" is not new. In its contemporary form it emerged at the beginning of the 20th century and went through a long evolutionary process after the overthrow of the national states in the Caucasus in 1920—during the period of political emigration.
The idea of a union of Caucasian peoples is closely related to the policy of occupation implemented in the region by the Russian Empire since the time of Alexander I. The endless Russian-Caucasian wars from the beginning of the 19th century until the 1870s showed that only joint struggle and action against the same very powerful aggressor can lead to freedom.
At the end of the 20th century, the Central Caucasian states regained the independence they acquired after World War I but lost two years later. Today, there are three independent states in the Central Caucasus, as well as the republics in the Northern Caucasus that are constituencies of the Russian Federation. The idea of a Caucasian Home, however, has not been realized yet because this idea is not limited to the independence of the states in the region. In actual fact, independence is the first step toward the formation of a union followed by a mutual approach, integration, and the formation of a political confederation. For this reason, some scholars consider the idea to be a myth.
Another reality is that there are serious integration problems not only between the Central and Northern Caucasus, but also among the three Central Caucasian states. The formation of national states has not been very stable over the last 100 years. Why does Armenia continue to make territorial claims against its neighbors, systematically threatening security and stability in the region and paving the way to intervention by outside forces? What are the ideas and principles that increase separatism in Armenia's national interests, hinder interstate integration in the region, and increase cooperation of these states with the West? All of these similar questions require serious research, neat arguments, and valid answers.
Emergence of the Idea of a Caucasian Home
Long ago, in the 1830s, "the Adighe people convened a national congress, at which they declared the independence of four million mountain dwellers and put forward the idea of a union of Caucasian peoples, while the whole of Chechnia and Daghestan were embroiled in bloody battles."1 This was
1 Kh. Ibrahimli, "Kavkazskiy dom: mif ili realnost?" Kavkaz (Baku), No. 1, 1997.
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the first glimmer of the "Free Caucasus" and "Caucasian Home" ideas that developed and acquired more definite shape at later stages.
At the beginning of the 20th century, the idea of a "Free Caucasus" was substantially put into practice. Émigrés from the Northern Caucasus, Azerbaijan, and Georgia organized a Caucasian Committee in Turkey. In December of 1915, a delegation was formed by the committee and sent to Berlin and Vienna to present a memorandum to the Western states. The delegation included Isa Pasha, Aziz Meker, and Fuad Pasha from the Northern Caucasus, Salimbey Behboudzade from Azerbaijan, and Prince Machabeli and Kamilbey Togiridze from Georgia. The memorandum asked that "the Caucasian Committee be rendered material and spiritual assistance to save the Caucasus from the Russian yoke and establish a confederative state that would include Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and the Northern Caucasus."2 The Caucasian Committee struggled for independence of the Caucasus under the chairmanship of Marshal Fuad Pasha, an émigré from the Northern Caucasus, and prepared the theoretical basis for the formation of a confederative state after separation from Russia. Members of the Committee carried out intensive propaganda to form public opinion in Europe. As non-official members of the Committee, two well-known public men from Azerbaijan—Alibey Huseynzade and Ah-madbay Aghaoghlu—settled in neutral Switzerland during World War I and worked intensively on ways to free the Caucasus from the Russian yoke. "They sent notifications to the European states in which they described the real situation of the people living in the region."3
After the Caucasian states gained their independence in 1918, some important steps were taken to unify the states and peoples living in the region: on 16 April, 1919, an agreement on a military and defense alliance was signed between Azerbaijan and Georgia, which was declared open to Armenia too. At the congress of the Musavat Party in 1919, a resolution was adopted on activities regarding the formation of a Caucasian Confederation. Furthermore, defense of the Northern Caucasus was discussed at the Azerbaijani-Armenian Conference held in Baku in 1920 and at the Tbilisi Conference of the three Central Caucasian states held later, where a decision was made to express solidarity with the mountain dwellers and to render them military and material assistance.
At the Tbilisi Conference, an agreement was reached on forming a Council of Caucasian Republics on the initiative of the Azerbaijani delegation that included Head of the Delegation Fatali Khan Khoysky, Hasanbay Aghayev, Mustafa Vekilli, and O. Nayman Krichinsky. Later, a draft consisting of 24 articles was prepared by Deputy Minister of Justice of Azerbaijan O. Nayman Mirza Krichinsky on formation of the Council aimed at establishing a real political union of the Caucasian peoples. However, the 11th Red Army occupied Azerbaijan on 27 April, 1920, after which all these steps failed.4
The Idea of a Caucasian Home in Emigration
After the Bolshevik occupation in April 1920, the idea of a Caucasian Home was raised again during the very first years of emigration. The Azerbaijani delegation was intensively working for de jure protection of the Azerbaijan Republic, while independence had already been lost de facto. They made efforts to coordinate their activities with representatives of the other Caucasian Republics. For this purpose, on 8 May, 1921, the Azerbaijani delegation got together at the Diplomatic Representative Office of Azerbaijan in Paris and discussed the formation of a Caucasian Confederation taking into
2 M.A. Rasulzade, "The Idea of the Caucasian Union in Immigration," Kafkasiya (Munich), No. 11-12, 1952 (in Azeri).
3 Kurtulu§ (Berlin), No. 28, 1937 (in Azeri).
4 See: Kurtulus, No. 5, 1935.
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consideration the joint efforts to achieve independence of the Caucasian Republics. As early as 10 June, 1921, authorized representatives of the three Central Caucasian Republics held their first meeting under the chairmanship of A.M. Topchubashi, where a decision was made to form a political and economic alliance among the states. They informed the Head of the French Council of Ministers, Mr. Briand, of this decision, who, in turn, gave instructions and authority to his Minister for Liberated Territories, Mr. Lucsher, to conduct negotiations with representatives of the three Caucasian states.
The first meeting of the representatives of the Central Caucasian Republics and Russia was held at the Paris Court House on 7 July, 1921, where Azerbaijan was represented by Ali Mardanbay Topchubashi, Georgia by Gegechkori (ex-minister of foreign affairs) and Sabakhtarashvili (former undersecretary for foreign affairs), Armenia by Avetis Agoranian, Russia by Maklakov (Ambassador to France under the Kerensky Government) and Mandelshtam (ex-ambassador to Turkey), and France by ex-supreme commissar Shevalier and Dean of the Law Faculty of Sorbonne Prof. Vernaut.
A.M. Topchubashi was the first to speak at the meeting held under the chairmanship of Vernaut. Mentioning that Azerbaijan was an adherent supporter of the idea of a Caucasian Home, he said that Turkey also advocated this idea. At the end of his speech, A.M. Topchubashi appealed to the Allies (supporters of the idea of splitting Turkey—England, France, and Greece) to recognize Turkey's rights and render assistance to Turkey—Guarantor of Peace in the East. He tried to convince them that the Turkish-Bolshevik Agreement was temporary because Bolshevik ideas deny Islamic moral and traditions.
Shevalier, however, did not accept his criticism and did not emphasize that he defended Turkey. In his speech he mentioned in particular that Georgia and Armenia were more developed and that he himself was surprised at how these republics had been able to survive so close to Turkey—"the ruthless enemy of the Allies." He also asked Gegechkori to respond to Topchubashi but the former declined. Agoranian, however, said that Turkey and later, beginning in 1920, Russia had entered the South Caucasian Republics as imperialist states although the latter had been struggling for their independence since 1918. Furious that Russia was being accused of imperialism and annexations, Maklakov reminded the Armenian representatives of "Russia's historical patronage" of the Armenians and reproached them. At the end of his speech he said that "Russia would rise again!", creating a hysterical atmosphere at the meeting with these words.
Émigrés from the Caucasus "formed a permanent Caucasian Council consisting of the members of four delegations,"5 in which detrimental émigrés from Armenia and Russia were not included. Established after the delegations of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Northern Caucasus signed a common appeal, the Caucasus Union in Emigration paved the way for the formation of more effective organizations at later stages.
In 1927, the Caucasus Independence Committee was formed by Azerbaijani, Georgian and North Caucasian representatives. The organization was founded on the basis of the 3+1 principle: the three Caucasian states plus Poland. Poland coordinated the activities of the Caucasian delegations and rendered all kinds of assistance, including material aid. Azerbaijan was represented in the organization by M.A. Rasulzade and M.Y. Mehdiyev, Georgia by N. Jordania, A. Chkhenkeli, A. Asa-tiani, and S. Mdivani, and the mountain dwellers by M. Sunshev and I. Chumshov. The organization also included a Department of the Military, Department of the Press, and a tripartite consisting of N. Mehdiyev, M. Sunshev, and I. Salamoda for carrying out operative activities.6
Inspired by the ideas of "the European Union" and "the Balkan Union," émigrés from the Caucasus tried to involve Armenia in the Committee in 1920s. However, the Armenian émigrés preferred Kerensky and Miliukov—the leaders of the Russian émigrés who adherently supported the idea of an "Indivisible Russia" and published articles in their main newspaper Dni.
M.A. Rasulzade, op. cit.
6 See: Kh. Ibrahimli, The History of Azerbaijani Immigration, Elm ve Tehsil Publishing House, Baku, 2012 (in Azeri).
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The Caucasian Confederation Council
Émigrés from the Caucasus took another step forward in 1934 and got together with the support of Marshal Jozef Pilsudski in Brussels on 14 July, where they signed a Pact on the Caucasian Confederation (historians call it a "Treaty"). National centers of Caucasian émigrés from Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Northern Caucasus declared the following principles of the Caucasian Confederation:
1. The Caucasian Confederation will act on behalf of the Republics included in it and will have joint customs borders.
2. Foreign policy of the Republics will be conducted by authorized delegations of the Republics involved in the Confederation.
3. The borders of the Confederation will be defended by the Confederation Army consisting of the national armies of the Republics and led by a joint headquarters.
4. Disputed internal matters of the Confederation will be examined by the Supreme Confederation Court.7
The pact was signed on behalf of Azerbaijan by M.A. Rasulzade and A. Topchubashi, on behalf of Georgia by N. Jordania and A. Chkhenkeli, and on behalf on the Northern Caucasus by M. Girey Sunj, Ibrahim Chuluk, and Tausultan Shahman. The Declaration of the Caucasus Independence Committee on the Pact of 14 July read: "Soon a new conference will be held to accept resignation of the Caucasus Independence Committee and to establish a new organization." The mentioned conference was held on 14 February, 1935 and declared establishment of the Caucasian Confederation Council. The document, consisting of 10 articles defined by the Conference, set forth its duties as follows:
1. To prepare the Caucasian nations for eliminating Russian occupation in the Caucasus, establishing national republics, and forming a confederation.
2. To establish contacts with representatives of the nations under Soviet occupation for this purpose.
3. To declare this Council ready for contact with any form of Russian power that recognizes the independence of all the Caucasian nations, including nations of other regions under the Russian yoke.
4. To ensure that the Council relies upon its power on the path to independence, etc.8
The Caucasian Confederation Council was established on the basis of parity and was declared open to the Armenian representatives who broke off with the émigrés from the Caucasus in 1921. They did not join the Council until 1940 after the beginning of World War II.
The Situation after World War II
After World War II, the idea of a Caucasian Union gained importance once more. The old émigrés met again in Munich in 1952. The Caucasian Independence Committee was established at the Conference of the Caucasus held on 10-11 December. The Committee determined its duties as follows:
1. To represent and lead the national liberty struggle of the Caucasian nations abroad.
2. To coordinate the activities of the Committee with the U.S. and other Western countries.
7 See: Kurtulus, No. 5, 1935.
8 See: Ibidem.
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3. To involve the nations of Eastern Europe, Central Asia (Turkistan), etc. in the national liberty struggle.9
The last article reads that the people of the Caucasus do not hate the Russians and Russians will be saved after the collapse of Bolshevism. The Declaration was signed by Chairman of the Azerbaijan National Center M.A. Rasulzade, Chairman of the Georgian National Political Center N. Jordania, and Chairman of the North Caucasian National Committee Prof. A.N. Magoma. The Committee was the last organized émigré center established abroad around the idea of a Caucasian Union.
For many years, émigrés have held discussions on the idea of a Caucasian Union. Despite the formation of two opposite poles on this issue, the absolute majority of the émigrés supported the idea of a union. They acknowledged that the Caucasus is a region where ethnographic diversity is much more complex than in any other region and that every state in the region has its own "Achilles heel." So the émigrés were determined to establish a state that would look like Switzerland, where internal regional disputes would be solved by confederation institutions in which all the Republics would be represented.
Collapse of the Soviet Union and National Independence Movements in the Caucasus
The idea of a Caucasian Union regained popularity after the collapse of the Soviet Union. On 8 March, 1996, Presidents Heydar Aliev and Eduard Shevardnadze signed the Tbilisi Declaration, in which the two Republics declared their agreement on cooperation in strategic and humanitarian issues, including collaboration in investment and international projects, as well as in the development and security of transport and communication systems. The Declaration led to the establishment of GUAM in 1997, construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Jeyhan Main Crude Oil Export Pipeline, and implementation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Gas Pipeline and TRACECA (the idea of which was put forward in 1992) at later stages. It also paved the way for operation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway line.
In the late 1990s, after long negotiations among Georgia, Azerbaijan, Daghestan, Chechnia, and Ingushetia, parliamentary representatives of the mentioned nations declared their intention and initiative to establish a Caucasian Parliament and sent appeals to the Parliaments of the Caucasian nations. The Appeal was signed by V. Guliyev, Z. Garalov, and A. Manafova from Azerbaijan, B. Kakubava and G. Patsatsiya from Georgia, A. Nalshev and M. Yandiev from Ingushetia, and Makhachev, Hajiev, and Ashuraliev from Daghestan.10 The Appeal found support in the Chechen Parliament, however it was not signed for technical reasons. Later an initiative came from the Northern Caucasus: establishment of an OSCE-like structure in the Caucasus. Unfortunately, none of these ideas has been realized.
Armenian National Interests and Opposition to Integration in the Caucasus
Armenia occupies a political position that does not correspond to the interests of the Caucasian nations and states and even opposes them with antagonism in most cases. This antagonism was
9 See: M.A. Rasulzade, "The Caucasian Issue," Kafkasiya, No. 11-12, 1952 (in Azeri).
10 Kavkaz, No. 2, 1997.
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clearly revealed during the short independent life of the four states established in the region in 19171921: Armenia declared war on Azerbaijan and Georgia. The States in the region faced a new type of state "philosophy" that corresponded neither to the existing regulations, nor to the so-called Regulations of the Caucasus. What does this philosophy mean? What does Armenia want? What are Armenia's interests founded on?
Armenian nationalism is a type of religious nationalism. It is difficult to find an analogy for this type of nationalism. Some scholars assume that there is a similarity between Persian-led Islamic nationalism and Armenian religious nationalism. However, there are serious differences between them. Islam is a kind of veil for Tehran, from behind which Persian ideologists are trying to assimilate all of the Turkic people in Iran, who are as many as the Persians in Iran. To express it as official, Tehran cites: the main policy is formation of a "United Iran," a process of "ethnic, religious, and cultural integration." Armenian religious nationalism, however, is quite different: self-separation from neighbors—other peoples in the Caucasus, and confrontation with them in most cases—isolating nationalism. That is why, despite the fact that Armenians live in almost every part of the world, they do not want representatives of other peoples and ethnic minorities to live in Armenia, including their Christian neighbors—the Georgians. This mentality originates from the continuous conflicts with their neighbors. And what might disturb the Armenians in this situation? Namely the same territorial claims of their neighbors against Armenia. This is the main reason why they do not want other minorities in Armenia. In short, if there is no other ethnic minority or population in Armenia, there cannot be any claims. They do not even have the desire to assimilate with others, while they pretend to be easily assimilated themselves, remaining intact, however, in other nations for a long period. All the changes are formal, superficial, whereby the essence remains the same.
There are three factors that give shape to Armenia's interests and form the state policy of Armenia:
1. The World Armenian Diaspora,
2. The Armenians of Armenia, and
3. The Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh.
All three of them have played their part in forming the Armenian national ideology that emerged in the late 19th century, creating artificial boundaries around this ideology.
Armenian national ideology is what the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutiun considers as its basis: "The Armenian Issue" or "Haydat." According to "Haydat," the Armenian national ideology conception has three fundamental principles:
1. Return of the so-called lost Armenian lands and establishment of a United Armenian State
("Greater Armenia ");
2. Return of the Armenians scattered all over the world to the national state;
3. Social state-building.
How do the Armenians think these aims can be reached? What methods and means do they consider possible for achieving this?
According to Dashnaktsutiun ideologists, realization of Armenia's national interests is possible through revolutions and armed struggle. Hrant Markarian (current head of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation) writes: "As long as power is decisive in the world, not laws, Dashnaktsutiun is obliged to remain legal as a political and ideological movement, conserving its revolutionary power at the same time."11
Along with showing the illegality of the revolutionary struggle, this citation also considers it possible to act outside the law to restore "justice and truth." Another Dashnaktsutiun ideologist Edu-
11 M. Sarkisian, Politicheskie problemy Kavkaza i Armenia. Politika Armenii v regione, Erevan, 1995.
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ard Ohanesian lays bare this logic in his considerations: "Justice is above the law as a spiritual value. So this value can be established by circumventing the law, even sometimes repulsing it by force."12
The matter is clear. The interesting thing is what do the Dashnaktsutiun ideologists mean when they say justice or injustice? They undoubtedly mean return of the "lost Armenian lands"—the main principle of the "Haydat" concept. If the main purpose of Dashnaktsutiun is return of the "lost lands," those "who have captured the historical Armenian territories" are unjust, and the most convenient way to return these territories is through revolutions and armed struggle. But the international regulations and laws consider forced border changes and territorial occupation to be unacceptable. According to the same regulations and laws, armed revolutions are not met with sympathy. In this case, Armenia's interests contradict international regulations and laws and, for these interests to be realized, violation of international regulations and laws is inevitable. The principle of "the possibility and necessity of bypassing and violating laws in the case of injustice" originates precisely from this mentality. So it turns out that the Armenians consider the international regulations and laws to be unjust and this is what makes it impossible for them to return "the historical lands."13
There are many examples in history of how the Armenians have tried to return "the lost lands" only during serious international upheavals, wars, and revolutions. They engaged in unrest, armed confrontations, revolts, massacres, and occupation only during times of disorder and crisis. The Baku massacres of 1914-1915, the armed revolts in Van during the same years, the Karabakh massacres of 1917-1920, the Baku, Shamakhi, Ganja, and Guba massacres in March-April 1918, the slaughters in Borchali and Akhalkalaki (Georgia) in 1919, the reprisals after the 11th Russian Army suppressed the Ganja uprising in May 1920, and the massacres in Nagorno-Karabakh, Nakhchivan, Abkhazia, and Javakhetia since 1989 are obvious examples of the ideology named "preparation" for further territorial claims and occupation.
World War I, the independence period of the Caucasian Republics during 1917-1921, their reoccupation and the infliction of reprisals on them by Russian-Soviet forces, and finally the period of Soviet collapse, after which large-scale changes, local conflicts, and confrontations occurred in Eurasia are all examples of serious changes, as well as deep crises, in international relations—the entire 20th century was full of such events. It is precisely these deep crises in international relations that provide the most convenient conditions for realizing Armenia's national interests.
The issue of the "lost lands" riles the Armenians up against their neighbors. Director of the National and Strategic Research Center of Armenia M. Sarkisian states: "Armenian national consciousness has yielded a strange stereotype of 'the defender of justice,' which is related to the fact that Armenians have always been victims of foreign political powers."14 The citation allows us to assume that Armenians can be satisfied with the establishment of justice only when neighboring nations are oppressed and undergo violation of their rights. It means that preventing Armenians from returning their lost lands is unjust and having to face such obstacles makes the Armenians victims of "external forces."
The most dreadful thing, however, is that the Armenians are educated and brought up in this spirit, convincing themselves that they have been unjustly deprived of their "lost lands" and that they are "victims of foreign aggression," and imposing this ideology on generation after generation. And "the lost lands" are the Van province of Turkey and the Nakhchivan and Nagorno-Karabakh regions of Azerbaijan, including all the territories to the west of the River Kura and even Borchali (Kvemo-Kartli) and the Javakhetia regions of Georgia.
The Armenians' claims are against all their neighbors, as well as the international relations system and the regulations on the basis of which international organizations work. Armenia has territorial and genocide claims against Turkey and territorial and cultural claims against Azerbaijan and Georgia. Thousands of books have been written about these claims. It explains why the Armenians
12 Ibidem.
13 Ibidem.
14 Quoted from: H. Ibrahimli, Deyiçen Avrasiyada Kafkasiya, ASAM, Ankara, 2001.
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consider many cultural and culinary traditions of Turkey and various Caucasian peoples to be their own. Even most of the religious monuments and tombstones in South and West Georgia have been catalogued and presented to the world as Armenian cultural artifacts.
In general, causing disturbance in the Caucasus, creating headaches for their neighbors, and reflecting on justice for the Armenians originate from the idea of "Greater Armenia" and its cartographic image. A map of "Greater Armenia" for the Armenians is the same as the Lenin Mausoleum was for Communist Russia. It perturbs the Armenian soul, preventing it from trusting its neighbors.
Armenians were busy with thoughts about "the return of national territories" and worried about "liberation of the territories" (in other words, occupation of territories of neighboring nations) while the Caucasian nations struggled for their national independence. So there is no room in the Armenian mind for national independence that excludes "the return of the lost territories." The Armenians never considered weapons as a means to be used against the Russian Empire-Soviets that deprived them of their freedom. Actually, it makes no difference to Erevan who is in charge in Kremlin—reds, whites, or democrats. No matter what the shape, content, or character of the government in Moscow, Erevan has always had close mutual relations with and a positive attitude toward Russia. This can only be explained by the fact that national independence for Armenia does not necessarily mean a break with Russia. This is why it would be unimaginable or too naive even to imagine that the Soviet Army would commit the slaughter in Erevan that it committed against the demonstrations in Tbilisi on 9 April, in Baku on 20 January, and in Riga on 21 January, 1989-1990.
Ideological-Political and Geopolitical Considerations
Why has the "Armenian Genocide" ideology become so popular recently with the Armenians? What does it serve?
1. To form a united network of Armenians scattered all over the world and unite them around one idea;
2. To make Armenians stay alert by creating a hostile image of the Turks;
3. To incite the great powers against Turkey, exploiting anti-Turkish inclinations and interests;
4. To commit actual genocide, hiding behind the false one;
5. To isolate Azerbaijan by putting pressure on Turkey and estranging it from the Caucasus.
6. To serve the Armenian Diaspora and even private Armenian businessmen with the funding gathered under the umbrella of "Genocide."
Armenia is a landlocked state with insignificant geostrategic and political importance. Taking this into consideration, Armenian politicians do not think it convenient to consider the Nagorno-Karabakh issue within the scope of Russian-Armenian relations and prefer a doctrine based on groundless claims, balancing principles, isolation, etc. The main principles of this doctrine can be characterized as following:
—Armenia is compensating for its insignificant geopolitical position by making claims against its neighbors with important geopolitical positions (Georgia with its direct access to open waters, Azerbaijan with its rich carbohydrate resources, which are transported to the world market through Georgia) and is trying to fill the vacuum in this sphere;
—Armenia is pursuing a policy of isolation and integration in parallel. According to this policy, integration conditions are defined from the viewpoint of Armenian national interests. So if any
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parameter of the globalization process does not fit Erevan's self-isolation course, it cannot be accepted. For instance, there is a parallel between resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and integration into the Euro-Atlantic zone. If the conflict is not resolved in Armenia's favor, integration into the West cannot be considered acceptable either (here we can add the strong influence of the "foreign aggression" stereotype shaped in the Armenian mind long ago).
—Armenia considers itself to be a power that balances the interests of Turkey, Russia, and the West in the Caucasus and prevents "economic and political expansion." According to Armenian analysts, Armenia is the only state in the Caucasus that considers the region's unambiguous orientation to be harmful and opposes it. According to this consideration, being cautious of Georgia and Azerbaijan's unambiguous integration course toward the West, Armenia is trying to draw other states into the Caucasus. The purpose is to get the superpowers to restrain each other in the region. Armenian strategists think that this is precisely Armenia's political mission.
According to the same analysts, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is important from the viewpoint of Georgian's interests. This conflict strengthens Georgia's position in the region and enables it to play a neutral role and sometimes the role of arbiter. According to this logic, Georgia should not oppose Armenia's interests regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict if it wants to gain strength in the region.
The leading principle in Armenian-Iranian relations is similar. Armenia regards Iran not as a power capable of opposing integration into the West, but as a player that stimulates Russia and China against the West, forming at the same time a strong buffer to possible Turkish economic and cultural expansion toward the Caucasus.
Conclusion
At present, we can conclude that there are two main obstacles to realizing the "Caucasian Union" idea. First of all, the Caucasus has not transformed into a single cultural, political, and economic zone with its North and South. Second, Armenia's aggressive policy and its territorial claims against its neighbors prevent this process.
Georgian President Mikael Saakashvili's appeal to form a Caucasian Confederation was a recall of historical memory, proving that the idea has not turned into a myth, as several politicians thought. It is extremely difficult to predict the political configuration of the Caucasus in the future. There are three independent states in the Central Caucasus, as well as the republics in the Northern Caucasus that are constituencies of the Russian Federation.
The integration process between the Northern and Central Caucasus is monotonous and too weak, while relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Central Caucasus are the worst because of Armenia's occupation of Azerbaijani territories. However, despite its limited resources and potential for a better infrastructure, it is not beyond the bounds of reality that the Central Caucasus might become a smaller version of the EU (with the Northern Caucasus j oining this union later). The theoretical and practical research carried out by outstanding scholars, politicians, and businessmen from the region over the last 200 years, as well as the results of this research and the historical-cultural links between the peoples of the region, lead to positive thoughts about the possible future of a Caucasian Union.
