CC BY
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The natural intonation break is before the coordinator and not after it. This is particular clear in polysyndetic and correlative coordination.
In order to add greater clarity and precision to coordination, correlative coordinators are used.
She was so tired that she went immediately to
bed.
Ajo ishte aq e lodhur sa shkoi menjehere ne shtrat. Conclusion
On the whole, we may say that coordination plays a crucial role in language. Coordination is used to combine elements. In both languages coordination
elements are sometimes irreversible and sometimes not. If we reverse the elements the meaning of the clause is lost. The major coordinators are: and, or, hut. Based on our study, the most common coordinator is and. The coordinator may be used only to link two elements or it can be used to indicate relationship between them such as: to indicate that two actions happened at the same time; to mention two related facts; to describe events; to link two negative clauses; to add a contrasting fact; to mention two alternatives, etc.
References:
1. Zhang, Coordination in Syntax. Cambridge University Press, 2009. P. 9.
2. Huddleston R., Pullum G., The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language. 2002. P. 1276.
3. Cobuild C., English Grammar. Collins Publisher: The University of Birmingham, 1990. P. 327.
4. Huddleston R., Pullum G., The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language. 2002. P. 1277.
5. Biber D., ConradL., Leech G., Longman Student Grammar of Spoken and Written English. Pearson Education, 2002. P. 229.
Cipriani Enrico,
University of Turin (IT) - Department of Philosophy
PhD Student E-mail: [email protected]
The generative grammar between philosophy and science
Abstract: Chomskian UG hypothesis has been criticized from several points of view. In this paper, I will focus on some philosophical objections which have been advanced against the MIT linguist, and I will show that Chomsky’s answers are adequate only for some of them. Furthermore, I will discuss about the epistemological status of Chomsky’s assumptions and conceptions, and I will conclude that it is again unclear if generative grammar is a philosophical or an empirical theory.
Keywords: UG hypothesis — Epistemology of linguistics — Psychological reality of grammar — Common notions vs. scientific notions
Criticisms against Chomsky
Chomsky’s hypothesis of Universal Grammar (UG) is one ofthe most discussed topic in philosophy of language and linguistics. Such hypothesis, formulated by Chomsky since the beginning of his activity [2-4], supports the idea that all languages share syntactic rules which are innate in human beings and which can be described by recursion theory (developed by Turing and Church in thirties) and combinatorial rules [35]. Furthermore, Chomsky argues that such principles are innate, and that the syntactic structures postulated to describe
them are psychological real, in the sense that they correspond to internal principle of human mind [7]. Consequently, Chomsky thinks that linguistics is part of psychology [11; 22]. As Antinucci [1] pointed out, two different approaches characterizes Chomsky’s work: on the one hand, Chomsky, at least in his first works, was interesting in the analysis of language as a mathematical object; on the other hand, he has always supported the idea that, being the language a biological object, mathematical and logical structures to describe it refer directly to mental principles; however, not all the scholars
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accepted such convergence between the logical approach and the psychological approach (as it is clear by the analysis of linguistic wars: [1; 17; 18; 25; 26]).
During the years, different scholars have opposed to Chomsky’s hypothesis. I want to mention only two of the more frequent objections that Chomsky must face. The first one consists in pointing out that even if Chomsky’s formal syntax was adequate to explain linguistic structures and had a sufficient degree of predictability, there were not reasons to assume that such formal structures were psychological real [27, 195-6]. I think that these criticisms can be summarized by this question: how would we react in the case where another — or many other — formal systems could explain with a pair — or a higher — degree ofpredictability syntactic structures of natural languages? Quine’s [30] funds his criticism on this point, and argues that while it is possible to find an empirical criterion to distinguish between two or more adequate physical theories, we cannot do the same with psychological ones [34]. On the other hand, Dummett [14] pointed out that the fact that Chomsky’s structures are abstract and are adequate to predictively examine language structures does not entail that such structures are psychological in any sense. Chomsky provides a clear answer to both the criticisms. He rejects Quine’s criticism by pointing out that there is not reason to suppose that there is a distinction between psychological and physical hypothesis: it is possible that two equivalent predictive theories are proposed to explain a physical phenomenon, and that such theories are incompatible, because they involve different unobservable causal mechanisms; however, one can assume a realistic position for both the theories [9, § 2].
To Dummett, Chomsky answered by pointing out that the naturalistic approach and the unification of linguistics to hard sciences allow to show that syntactic principles, which are cognized by the speakers but not explicitly knows (as he suggests in his 1975 book [6] following Ryle’s [31] distinction distinction), can be studied by conscious knowledge. I-language is a natural object which must be studied by the methodological naturalism, as physical phenomena are studied. In chapter 2 of Knowledge of Language, Chomsky answers to Dummett proposing
an example who shows how principle B of Theory of Government and Binding [8] is valid.
Can languages differ over certain point?
Criticisms against UG hypothesis are of three kinds: some authors think that UG is not necessary [36; 37]; some other argue that it is contrast with Neo-Darwinian hypothesis [13]; and other again argue that the great variation of linguistic levels in human languages is sufficient to reject UG [15; 23]. Such criticisms are very complex, and involve different points of view and conceptions of human beings and language faculty. However, there is a simpler but more efficacious objection that I want to mention.
The UG hypothesis entails that languages — syntactic principles of human languages — cannot differ over a certain point (which is represented by UG principles). This hypothesis was supported by Paul [28] too, as Graffi [17] pointed out, and sustains that since some syntactic principles are shared by all human speakers, structures of all human languages cannot differ over a certain point: given a set of principles S, no language will violate S. It must be added that S can be modified in S1, to better and fully describe universal principles: Chomsky, in fact, has never suggested that UG principles must not be integrated [4], but has instead argued that natural language analysis can lead to postulate further universal principles.
The strong criticism which can be advanced against this hypothesis consists in pointing out that to say that languages cannot differ over a certain point (over a set of principles which can vary) is to say nothing, since it is a petitio principii. In fact, it is possible to argue that if it is possible to modify or integrate the principles which describe syntactic structures when new languages structures are discovered, it is logically true that language structures will not differ over such principles. If we assume, as Chomsky suggests, that human languages cannot differ over a certain point, it will follow that whatever is the set of principles by which we describe natural languages and whatever are the changes of such set after the discovery, for example, of exceptions, the UG hypothesis will be true anyway.
Chomsky’s strategy to answer against such
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criticism consists in pointing out that a theory cannot be abandoned only in virtue of some exceptions to the descriptive apparatus whose scholars dispose, otherwise we should suppose that it is sufficient a datum to confute a theory. UG hypothesis is so seen as a wide hypothesis, whose apparatus is constituted by specific syntactic rules. However, Chomsky’s strategy can be put in discussion. Sampson [32], for example, explicitly states that the UG hypothesis cannot be confuted, and so, as Popper explains, is pseudo-scientific. Sampson’s idea is clear: even ifwe discovered a language that does not respect any of the UG principles, we could fit such principles to the new language, and the hypothesis that all languages cannot differ over a certain point would be true (see above).
Sampson’s criticism is very strong, and it does not seem that Chomsky’s answers just mentioned (or other that the MIT linguist provided) can easily face it. Sampson’s objection can be explained in these terms: while for other disciplines, i. e. physics or chemistry, there is an ideal number of exceptions which determines the abandonment of a theory, this is not true for UG theory, so that UG theory is anyway true: consequently, it cannot be falsified, and, according to Popper, it is not scientific.
These criticism leads to consider UG hypothesis in a weaker way. UG hypothesis could refer not to the principles postulated, but to the way in which they are constructed. In other words, while it is difficult to say which are the specific principles of Universal Grammar, it is nevertheless possible to assume that whatever UG principles are, they can be describe by computational procedures which are innate in human minds. In this sense, UG hypothesis would talk not about the principles, but about the computational procedures involved in linguistic production and comprehension. Generative grammar would be equivalent, in this perspective, to the generative procedure by which syntactic structures are constructed, and the internal and biological component of language would consist in such computational procedures. As Chomsky[l2, 35]writes: each language incorporates a generative procedure GP of some sort which characterizes the internal expressions and provides the appropriate “instructions” for the interfaces, by
means of its transfer mechanisms. UG determines what qualifies as a GP for some human language. We can think of a GP as itself a language in the sense of I-language: language understood as internal, individual, and intensional (the actual procedure of generation, not the class of structured objects it generates). (my remark)
Some closing words
The discussion about the plausibility ofbiological linguistic endowment and the naturalistic hypothesis more generally cannot find a conclusion, since it is a discussion about philosophical and epistemological assumptions of generative grammar, not about its formal structures. It is difficult to answer to purely skeptical philosophical arguments, since such arguments attack a theory at its theoretical basis, which can be accepted only by what we could call an act of faith, which could be more or less justified. On the one hand, in fact, the innativeness of syntactic principles is an inference to the best explanation; on the other hand, this assumption is shared — and seems to have been confirmed — in biological studies too [22; 33].
It must be said, however, that philosophical objections to Chomsky can be in some sense right. The MIT linguist, in fact, often uses common notions which are not part of the scientific language to support theories and justify research program. Cases which show this are the notion of limit as it is used in UG hypothesis, the notion of following a rule or, again, the notion of simplicity in minimalist program. It is not easy to see how such notions — which are ordinary notions — can enter in a scientific program. However, it must be reminded that Chomsky, who is conscious of such problem, has always argued that common notions must be reinterpreted in a scientific way, if they want to enter in empirical investigation of language. For example, he gives explanations (as Carnap would have said) of notions like language, knowledge of language, or following a rule [9; 11]. By providing such answers, Chomsky passes on a philosophical and epistemological level, where, as Wittgenstein [39] pointed out, a conceptual clarification can be done, but no empirical assumption can be advanced, pace Williamson [38]. The same problem arises with the notion of simplicity, as it is used in the minimalist program [10], [11]. Several
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scholars criticized Chomsky by pointing out that the notion of simplicity is so vague to be unfalsifiable, so that minimalist revolution is not a scientific revolution (or even more it is not a revolution at all [19; 20; 21]).
Chomsky’s strategy to provide explanations of common notions is in a certain sense plausible, since, as he [11, 76] points out, biologists who study dolphins communication do not wonder about how the word “communication” is used in ordinary speech. On the other hand, this strategy is problematic, because it seems not so easy to distinguish between common and scientific sense for ordinary words and expressions. The problematic point of Chomsky’s strategy can be explained in such a way: even if we give precise and accurate definitions of common words, we nevertheless provide such definitions by using the ordinary language, and not a formal or a mathematical
language. This seems to be the great difference between linguistics and hard science disciplines: while the latter use metalanguages which differ completely from ordinary language (so that no meaning problem is involved), the former uses rigorous definitions which are however expressed in ordinary language. If we accept Quinian conclusion of circularity of definitions, we see that to really get a scientific definition of ordinary notions, Chomsky should define in a scientific way also other words which compose explanations of common lexical entries, and he should do the same for every further definition: clearly, this process falls in circularity, and it is not easy to see how Chomsky could proceed in this direction. This further pushes to think that by scientifically defining ordinary notions Chomsky operates a conceptual clarification, in Wittgensteinian sense [39].
References:
1. Antinucci, F. 1976. Le due anime di Noam Chomsky, Lingua e Stile, 11. P. 167-87.
2. Chomsky, N. 1955/75. The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory, Chicago-London: The University of Chicago Press.
3. Chomsky, N. 1957. Syntactic Structures, Mouton, The Hauge.
4. Chomsky, N. 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press.
5. Chomsky, N. 1966. Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Rationalist Thought, New York: Harper & Row.
6. Chomsky, N. 1975. Reflections on Language, New York: Pantheon Books.
7. Chomsky, N. 1980. Rules and Representations, New York: Columbia University Press.
8. Chomsky, N. 1981. Lectures on Government and Binding: The Pisa Lectures, Mouton, The Gruyter.
9. Chomsky, N. 1986. Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin, and Use, New York: Praeger.
10. Chomsky, N. 1995. The Minimalist Program. Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press.
11. Chomsky, N. 2000. New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
12. Chomsky, N. 2013. Problems of Projection, Lingua, 130. P. 33-49.
13. Christiansen, M., Chater, N. 2008. Language as shaped by the brain, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31, P. 489-558.
14. Dummett, M. 1981. Objections to Chomsky, London Review of Books, 3-16 September.
15. Evans, N., Levinson, J. 2009. The myth oflanguage universals: language diversity and its importance for cognitive science, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32. P. 429-92.
16. Graffi, G. 1975. Equivalenti o inconciliabili? Su alcuni sviluppi recenti della linguistica trasformazionale, Teoria e storia degli studi linguistici: Atti del settimo convegno internazionale di studi Roma 2-3 giugno 1973, Viguzzi, U., Giulianella, R., Raffaele, S. (eds.), Roma: Bulzoni. P. 281-339.
17. Graffi, G. (1995), Old Debates and Current Problems: Völkerpsychologie and the question of the individual and the social in language, Formigari L., Gambarara D. (eds.), Historical Roots of Linguistic Theories, Amsterdam-Philadelphia: Benjamins. P. 171-84.
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18. Lakoff, G. 1970. Linguistics and Natural Language, Synthese, Vol. 2, No. 1, Semantics of Natural Language. P. 151-271.
19. Lappin, S., Levine R., Johnson D. E. 2000a. The Structure of Unscientific Revolutions, Natural Language and Linguistic Theory, 18. P. 665-771.
20. Lappin, S., Levine R., Johnson D. E. 2000b. The Revolution Confused: A Reply to our Critics, Natural Language and Linguistic Theory, 18. P. 873-90.
21. Lappin, S., Levine R., Johnson D. E. 2001. The Revolution Maximally Confused, Natural Language and Linguistic Theory, 19. P. 901-19.
22. Lenneberg, E. H. 1967. Biological Foundations of Language, New York: Wiley.
23. Levinson, S. C., Evans, N. 2010. Time for a sea-change in linguistics: response to comments on ‘The Myth of Language Universal’, Lingua, 120. P. 2733-58.
24. Lees, R. B. 1957. Review of Chomsky, Language, 33. P. 375-408.
25. Newmeyer, F. J. 1986. Linguistic Theory in America, Boston: Academic Press.
26. Newmeyer, F. J. 1996. Generative Linguistics, London: Routledge.
27. Matthews, R. J. 1991. Psychological Reality of Grammars, in Kasher (ed.). P. 182-99.
28. Paul, H. 1920. Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte, 5th ed., Halle, Niemeyer.
29. Quine, W. V. 1951. Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Philosophical Review, 60. P. 20-43.
30. Quine, W. V. 1960. Word and Object, Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press.
31. Ryle, G.1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson.
32. Sampson, G. 2005. The ‘Language Instinct’ Debate: Revised Edition, Bloomsbury Academic.
33. Sherman, M. 2007. Universal genome in the origine of metazoa: thoughts about evolution, Cell Cycle, 6 (15). P. 1873-77.
34. Sober, E. 1980. Language and Psychological Reality: Some Reflections on Chomsky’s rules and representations, Linguistics and Philosophy, 3 (3). P. 395-405.
35. Tomalin, M. 2007. Reconsidering recursion in syntactic theory, Lingua, 117. P. 1784-800.
36. Tomasello, M. 2005. Constructing a Language, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
37. Tomasello, M. 2008. The Origins of Human Communication, Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press.
38. Williamson, T. 2007. The Philosophy of Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell.
39. Wittgenstein, L. 1953. Philosophical Investigations, Ascombe G. E. M., Rhees R. (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell.
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