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Section 9. Political problems of the international relations, global and regional development
Section 9. Political problems of the international relations, global and regional development
Wang Wan,
Beijing Normal University, PhD candidate in International Relations, the School of Government E-mail: wwhmj1988@gmail.com
The Eurozone ^isis and European identity
This essay is phased achievement of project founded by State Key Laboratory of Hydroscience and Engineering Tsinghua University (sklhse-2014-A-03), Beijing 2013 Philosophy And Social Science Planning Project-The Fundamental Research Funds For The Central Universities (13KDB039) and National Social Science Fund Project (14BGJ039)
Abstract: The purpose of this paper was to examine the relationship between the Eurozone crisis and EU identity. The Eurozone crisis erupted in 2009 and highlighted the European identity, which was vulnerable to the Eurozone crisis due to the contradiction between the European identity and the national identity of the EU member states. However, an analysis of Eurobarometer surveys in this paper shows that the Eurozone crisis had little effect on the European identity, and the European identity may not have obviously influenced the behaviors and attitudes of citizens living in the Eurozone on the EU. The contradiction between the European identity and the national identity has always existed, but the identities may be compatible. The Eurozone crisis could be a good opportunity to construct and reinforce a European identity. A more democratic and transparent ruling institution would reinforce European identity, and the importance of media should not be ignored because being informed ofwhat is going on is also vital for people to be engaged.
Keywords: Eurozone crisis; European identity; national identity.
Introduction
The Eurozone’s debt crisis is an ongoing that has been continuously upgrading since it started in 2009. It is a fiercely discussed issue all over the world, particularly in Europe. EU countries are in different situations. Whereas countries such as Germany, Finland and Holland are maintaining a steady economic development, countries such as Greece, Spain and Italy are suffering from the Euro Crisis [1,1]. When the wealthier countries, such as Germany, decided to hold its relief measures, both Europe and the rest of the world wondered: Will the EU really act like a ‘state’? Will there ever be a common European Identity? Some Euro skeptics have argued that the lack of an identity commitment is a factor of economic crisis, and the present situation is verifying their opinion [2, 3]. Some have held the view that the financial crisis showed that the EU integration caused more nationalism [3, 16-18]. The “nation state”— the European Union, which was created by Europe — is facing the challenge of European identity.
There is a need to understand the relationship between the Eurozone crisis and the EU identity. Was the EU identity problem highlighted by the Eurozone crisis? Was the European identity affected by the Eurozone crisis? The analyses in this paper are based on the data of Eurobarometer [4, 61-81], which are surveys conducted by the European Commission.
European Identity During the Eurozone Crisis
Most EU countries, including Germany, did not receive a unanimous agreement from all voters. Policymakers firmly believed that people would accept the new currency when they saw a more prosperous and united Europe brought by the euro. However, euro is now associated with pain, fiscal retrenchment, and debt; inevitably, the solidarity of Europe was much further away from the initial expectations [5, 1]. In addition, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has rejected the idea of distributing Eurobonds (the bond supported by all euro countries). She was aware that Germany would not agree to provide a debt guarantee to all EU countries, particularly to Southern Europe; moreover, there was no clear end to bearing this risk. In Northern Europe, Finland and Holland (two other creditor countries) rejected the idea of Eurobonds more resolutely. Nonetheless, other countries suffering from financial retrenchment, such as Greece, Spain and Italy, feel angry about the indifference of those creditor countries [6, 1]. For example, the EU planned to provide Greece with 130 trillion euros, but Greece had to accept the intervention of a national budget. The premier of Greece rejected the offer and said that Greece would not accept any help, sacrificing the national reputation. He said that Greece objected to this type of insulation.
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The Eurozone crisis and European identity
As noted by a working paper from The European Institute [7, 1-2], Europe is now facing a decreasing of ‘European identity’ commitment among many Europeans who are supposed to attach affection to this supranational polity. According to research from the Pew Research Center, 59 % of Germans agree that their country has benefited from the integration of Europe; in all other member countries, less than half of people agree that their countries have benefited from the integration of Europe. The most negative result is from Greece, in which 70 % say that European integration has hurt them, followed by the French, with 63 % [6, 1].
In addition, most Europeans believe that countries such as Greece are to blame for the euro crisis because they borrow money from other EU countries without regard for the new European fiscal policies. The euro, as a single currency, provided an umbrella for them to act on old national impulses [5, 1]. However, not everyone in the EU would like to save others from financial crisis unless they identify themselves as a family; however, the situation in the EU is the opposite now. There was a huge divergence between EU countries in terms of supporting Greece. IFOP conducted a survey about whether France, Germany, Italy, England and Spain should give financial support to Greece in March 2010. The results showed that 58 % of respondents disapproved of giving finical support to Greece in the interest of maintaining the European solidarity. There are statistics that show attitudes of respondents from each of the five countries. Respondents from England and Germany showed the least support, just 22 % and 24 %. Approximately half of respondents from the other three countries were willing to support Greece, 53 %, 55 %, 67 %, figures that were much higher than that of England and Germany but still not enough to support Greece [8, 2]. Some politicians and scholars even thought that the EU should have taken measures in the early phase of the euro crisis that might have prevented the situation from worsening; nonetheless, it failed to do so due to the lack of common commitment. Therefore, this Eurozone crisis indeed highlighted the European identity problem.
The Possible Effect of the Eurozone crisis on the European Identity — By the Analysis of the Eurobarometer
According to the data mentioned above, it seems that the Eurozone crisis broke out in 2009 exposed the lack of
EU identity commitment. Because citizens living in the Eurozone feel less like a family, they were reluctant to support others when crisis occurred. The Eurozone crisis posed significant challenges to European unity and identity. However, five years after the crisis’ occurrence, things may not be that dim.
In this section, we will study the possible effect of the Eurozone crisis on the European identity based on Eurobarometer surveys. To select appropriate data related to the European identity, first, we have to know understand the concept of this identity. Richard Herrmann and Marilynn Brewer attempted to clarify the concept of European identity, which is a conscious identification with Europe, an awareness of Europe, attitudes related to Europe and participation in European elections [9, 1113]. The European identity is a type of collective identity that consists of common concepts that make people feel similar. These concepts can be embodied by interactions between people or by shared symbols, which arouse an identity commitment and a sense of belonging. Therefore, we selected five groups of surveys related to aspects of identity, trust and support on the EU and Euro.
Every year, the European Commission conducts Eurobarometer surveys in all EU member states and asks questions about the EU. One of the frequently asked questions is “Do you see yourself as..The answers include “national citizens only", “national and European citizens”, “European and national citizens”, “European citizens only”, “none”, “refusal” and “do not know”. According to the Eurobarometer [4, 73-81] surveys conducted from the 2010 to 2014, most respondents identify first as national citizens and then as European citizens at an average level of (46.8 %). The proportion of respondents who identify first as European citizens and then as national citizens stays at a very low level. When comparing the sense of European identity to that of national identity, people tend to identify with their national identity more. However, we can also see that, after the Eurozone crisis, the number of people identifying only as national citizens decreased, and the number of people identifying first as national citizens and then as European citizens increased. In other words, although people living in the Eurozone still have a stronger national identity, the sense of being European to some degree has been strengthened instead of decreased due to the Eurozone crisis (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Eurobarometer survey of the question “Do you see yourself as European or national?” conducted from 2010 to 2014
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Section 9. Political problems of the international relations, global and regional development
According to the Eurobarometer [4, 81] surveys, respondents were also asked the question “Who do you think is best able to take effective actions against the effects of the financial and economic crisis?”. Based on the statistics published every September from 2009 to 2014, more respondents thought that the EU was best able to take effective actions. The percentages of respondents who chose the EU stayed at an average level of approximately 23 %. However, we cannot ignore the fact that the national government closely followed the EU. Moreover, particularly after the Eurozone crisis, the percentage of respondents who chose the national government increased rapidly to 19 % in 2010 from 12 % in 2009, and the gap between the EU and the national government grew even closer (Fig. 2).
The two groups of data mentioned above show that most people living in the Eurozone still mention national first and then European.
However, data of Eurobarometer [4, 61-81] surveys also show that the support of citizens living in Eurozone for the EU stayed at a relatively stable high level. Another standard question is “Do you think the euro is a good or a bad thing for the EU?”. According to the Eurobarometer surveys conducted from 2007 to 2014, nearly 70 % of the respondents thought the Euro was a good thing for the EU. However, after the Eurozone crisis occurred, the percentages of supporters in 2009 and 2010 declined by 1 % and 2 %, they still stayed at high levels (Fig. 3).
Another Eurobarometer [4, 61-81] survey asked, “Do you support the euro?” According to the surveys conducted from 2004 to 2014, the average percentage of respondents supporting Euro was approximately 67 %, with small fluctuations. However, since the year of 2009, the number of respondents supporting Euro has declined, the percentages still stayed at a high level (Fig. 4).
Fig. 2. Eurobarometer survey of the question “Who do you think is best able to take effective actions against the effects of the financial and economic crisis?” conducted from 2009 to 2014
Fig. 3. Eurobarometer survey of the question “Do you think the euro is a good or a bad thing for the EU?” conducted from 2007 to 2014
Fig. 4. Eurobarometer survey of the question “Do you support Euro?” conducted from 2004 to 2014
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The Eurozone crisis and European identity
Comparing these groups of data, it seems that the Eurozone crisis had little impact on the European identity. And we can also learn the low European identity of citizens living in Eurozone may not obviously influence their behaviors and attitudes on the EU. Although people do not feel more Europeans than national citizens, actually they enjoyed being Europeans and are willing to support the EU. Just as Thomas Risse thinks it is overstated that European identity is not necessarily incompatible with national identity [9, 1113-1114]. And we can also see that people living in the Eurozone feel more and more Europeans instead of being affected negatively by the Eurozone crisis.
European Identity and National Identity
The European identity has gradually formed during the constant constructions of the EU integration process. From 1952 until the 1970s, the EU integration primarily focused on the development of the economy and technology. In 1973, the European identity was proposed during the Copenhagen Summit. In 1991, the Treaty of Maastricht explained the concept of European identity, which was to establish the common citizenship among the EU and adopt common diplomatic and security policies. This attached the supranational feature to the EU [10, 381-382]. In 1997, the Treaty ofAmsterdam stressed that the aim of European identity was to make people living in the Eurozone feel more European and proud of being Europeans.
However, European countries do not share the same language, and there is no common media. Even the very traditional aspect of Christianity has faded in modern times. The EU is attempting to set up bonding in different member countries by empowering economic benefits, such as freer transferring, easier trade and immigration [7, 2]. In addition, deploying subsidies from wealthier countries to the relatively poorer countries is also a point being considered. Therefore, it is not difficult to understand that people may be more loyal to their national identity than to their European identity and that they may retain individual national identities rather than call themselves “Europeans" as a result of the Eurozone crisis and economic fallout.
It seems that the European identity problem is rooted in the contradiction between state sovereignty and the EU and the national identity and the European identity. The EU is easily described as a threat to the national identities of EU member countries. Wilson noted that many groups of people in the member nations perceive the EU as a political organization that has diminished national state sovereignty, and these groups resist the EU’s efforts to create a ‘European identity’, seeing it to be directly at odds with their own superordinate national identities [11, 208]. This contradiction has existed since the establishment of the EU. The EU integration process needs member states’ commitment to the European identity and to gradually give up their sovereignty to obtain more benefits. However, the national identities of the EU member states have formed after a long history, which are the essences of nations. As said by Calhoun
and McNeil, the nation-state not only remains the primary unit of Western societal organization; it also continues to shape collective identities to an extent that is not likely to be overshadowed by any form of European identification in the foreseeable future [11, 36].
Fortunately, from to the analysis above, we may see that although the contradiction between the European identity and the national identity has always existed, it does not have significant negative effects on the development of the EU. Thomas Risse’s empirical findings even prove that national identity and European identity can coexist instead of replacing each other [12, 1-5]. Committing to the European identity does not mean that people have to make a choice between seeing themselves as national and seeing themselves as European. Jeroen Moes even optimistically thought that the potential emergence of a European identity may provide us with the exciting opportunity to witness the birth a “new type” of identification that may well shape our social reality in the decades to come [11, 4].
Although the European identity problem did not have significant influence on the Eurozone crisis, this could also be a good opportunity to construct and reinforce a solid European identity. Only when people identify themselves as part of a community will they be willing to be devoted to the community and sacrifice their own interests when necessary. The importance of European identity has been realized by EU leaders, and the leaders of the EU member states understand the essence of common commitment. The European Commission published the “EU 2020 strategy” in 2010, which put forward its development focuses and objectives in the next 10 years. Strengthening cohesion is one of the three development focuses.
Possible Measures to Be Taken
More democratic and transparent ruling institutions would reinforce European identity among EU countries. Some scholars claim that the only way to prevent returning to monetary nationalism or to a state of permanent euro crisis is to start the process of moving towards a political union, and the first phase begins from the 17 core EMU member countries. A nation is an imagined community where people identify themselves as a union, sharing the same interests and values. It is usually accompanied by a convincing regime; however, for the EU, an invented ‘state’ without a powerful regime it is more difficult and also more important to construct a commonly committed identity. Setting the right position between a European identity and a national identity is not impossible. As noted by a historian Lana Colley, identities are not like hats. Human beings can and do put on several at a time.
However, a European identity would not be constructed artificially. It is a long distance to cover, and it requires participation. From the perspective of the institution, it is essential to share more democratic power with the people and distribute more power to the European Parliament [13, 3]. Some people criticize that the executive has gained too much
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Section 9. Political problems of the international relations, global and regional development
power and the Council and the Commission were not scrutinized by parliament. This essay will not discuss the details regarding conducting democratic process within EMU in this essay; nevertheless it is vital to grant authority to ordinary people and make them feel respected. Only in this way would they devote part of their identity to the European Union or, in circumstances such as the ongoing euro crisis, be willing to sacrifice parts of their interests to rescue other parts of the EU.
Apart from accelerating a more democratic and transparent institution within the EU, the media is playing an important role in constructing European identity, and it is supposed to reinforce the democratic process within the EU. The media provides information about the EU to Europeans, and being informed is the essence of democracy. The framework of current European news and media presentation is thought to be based on national interests, or one news source would be broadcasted by different genres of media. Consequently, it seems that Europe has only one voice, and the broad public does not perceive that information [13, 5]. Many audiences have commented that the news is boring, whereas many audiences have shown their willingness to obtain more information and express their own ideas simultaneously; they are also expecting more evolvement and interaction. Therefore, a news report diversified in terms of content and genre seems to be crucial.
In the meantime, authentic negative reports should not be eliminated because coverage of non-positive news will
not necessarily cause the demobilization of EU citizens. To the contrary, a certain amount of negative news coverage would prompt the interests and engagement of citizens, who are more likely to vote when they feel self-engaged, according to Semetiko [13, 6]. Then, it is natural that one would identify as part of a community and want to a difference in that community.
Conclusion and Discussion
In summary, the Eurozone crisis, which was a fiscal problem of Europe, indeed highlighted European identity. Although the European identity problem did not have significant influence on the Eurozone crisis, it cannot be denied that European identity is a more deep-rooted problem. Strengthening European identity could improve the settlement of the Eurozone crisis and the process of the EU integration. Only when people identify as part of a community will they be willing to devote themselves to the community and sacrifice their own interests when necessary. This could also be a good opportunity to construct and reinforce a solid European identity. As discussed above, a more democratic and transparent ruling institution would reinforce European identity. Second, the importance of media should not be ignored; being informed of what is going on is also vital for people to be engaged. These measures are supposed to reinforce European identity. Therefore, although a lack of commitment to European identity is a major cause of the euro crisis, it could nonetheless be a good opportunity to construct and reinforce a European identity.
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