27THE EMERGENCE AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE TERM FREEDOM, STUDIED IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANTIQUITY
Dilnavoz Sunnat kizi Rakhimdjanova
PhD student of National University of Uzbekistan named after Mirzo Ulugbek
Tashkent, Uzbekistan Scientific supervisor: R. R. Karimov
ABSTRACT
The article focuses on the problem of emergence and the development of the various views on the notion of freedom in antiquity. It attempts to systematically examine the categorical dynamics of the notion of freedom from Greek Mythology up to the Roman Stoicism. It is argued that, in antiquity, the notion of freedom in antiquity is represented in relation with human activity and behaviour.
Keywords: freedom, cultural universals, ancient polis, mythology, civil rights and freedoms, ancient philosophy
INTRODUCTION
The contemporary philosophical notions of freedom, including the notion of freedom as a cultural universal date back to the period of antiquity. The system of polis served as a basis for the formation of the rational mentality, personal discourse and its individual attributes by asserting the rights and freedoms of a part of polis' citizens. The two mutually-exclusive morality of such a polis society: one being the antagonistic (based on competition) and the other communal gave birth to the notion that human rights and freedoms are interrelated.
The antique society, in the course of history, both on the level of daily consciousness, and on the level of the system of rights and the philosophical doctrines, has been subject to certain changes. The ancient philosophy illustrates the main interrelationship between human freedom and rights and the normative and regulative character of this notion.
METHODOLOGY
The views on human freedom in antiquity, like in many other archaic societies rooted in certain myths. Ancient Greek mythology is a collection of myths about the struggle of various divinities or gods and goddesses for the domination over the kosmos, andanthropogenic myths include various problems of human dominance and freedom. The relationship and competition of divinities, such as Chaos, Chronos, Uranus, Zeus, and their wars with various Titans symbolically illustrates the fact that majority of cultural and social norms, including the notion of freedom itself subjected to changes over the time.
The formation and confirmation of the authority of the Olympic Pantheon was reflected in the appearance and consolidation of the principles of legitimacy, justice
and obedience. The notion of "Dike" (or "Dice")is reflected in the will of Zeus in the form of the supreme defender of general justice. Its violation is considered as illegal and antisocial act and as an act of overstepping the divine authority. With this, one can agree with A.A. Takho-Godi, who argues that ancient Greek mythology depicted the specific life of the ancient polis in a figurative-symbolic form[18].
The emerging polis laws and legal norms, the skills of communication and collective decision-making, emerged in the form of a boundary of opportunity, where cross-cultural exchanges led to the expansion of that boundary. The formation of freedom as a cultural universal in the ancient Greek polis by adding external conditions to the ranks of internal factors took place in the process of understanding the connection between freedom and its limitation. First of all, through the formation of political and legal norms, state regulations.
Democritus, one of the first thinkers of antiquity to draw attention to the connection between freedom and the rule of law, argued that the interests of the state take precedence over the interests of the individual. "Public affairs should be considered more important than other affairs; Everyone should strive for the prosperity of the state, not to achieve the glory he deserves, not to gain power beyond the level that benefits the common cause ..."[12, 360]. From the point of view of the founder of ancient atomism, living in a democratic society, albeit among the poor is better that being rich in a monarchy, "just as freedom is better than slavery" [12, 361]. He deals with the problem of freedom in the context of the confrontation of civil and slave possibilities. They are not only interconnected, but also contradictory to each other. "How! Is freedom available with the help of slavery? It could be. These two edges intersect ... There are such difficult situations that one can maintain one's freedom only at the expense of the freedom of others, and a citizen can be absolutely free when the slave is a slave to the last degree. This is the situation in Sparta!" [20, 223].
Democritus also argued that freedom is inextricably linked to legal and political rules. Because "the law tries to assist human life. But this can be achieved only when the citizens themselves want to live a happy life: for those who obey the law, the law is only a sign of their personal goodness" [3, 361].
If slavery was seen as something that existed in ancient society, then the problem of freedom had nothing to do with the state of slavery; the rights and freedoms belonged only to those who had citizenship. In particular, the responsibility rested solely on them. As noted above, freedom and law were firstly defined in a political and legal context. If, in the political aspect, freedom is defined and understood as a clear algorithm of action necessary to wipe out and solve social problems, then there are no formalized rights of the individual in the legal perspective. This is where the interests of the state and the community come to the fore.
Notions of freedom, its interrelationship with civic duty and responsibility are formed in the field of politics. Only in the classical period of the development of
ancient philosophy was Socrates one of the first to focus on the inseparability and unity of morality and politicality in freedom, individuality and the community, its creative character and its connection with choice. It is impossible to understand freedom without an analysis of Socrates'views moral choice and disobedience to moral norms. Because, people have a perceptive ability that reflects their moral views, which helps in the choice between good and evil. When a man is before a choice, in the eyes of Socrates he appears to be an active being, and as a result, he is confronted with possible alternatives. At the same time, the basis of human choice is responsibility and moral evaluation: "Those who err in the choice between good and evil do not understand the responsibility sufficiently and make mistakes" [6, 183].
In particular, while freedom is shaped as a cultural universal in the conditions of ancient police life, it not only becomes a component of the algorithms of a citizen's activity, but also undergoes philosophical reflection. Focusing on the moral side of human problems, Socrates associated freedom not only with choice, but also with virtue, goodness, and morality. In the philosophical dialogues of Socrates, goodness is considered one of the dominant choices of behavior or activity as the basis of morality, that is, it implies not only the right to choose, but is responsible for the choice itself as well as its consequences. From the standpoint of Socratic ethics, a symbiosis of individuality and community emerges in the reflection of freedom. For the first time, the thesis that the limitation of human freedom bythe freedom of other citizens is formed.
In the philosophical teachings of the schools of Socrates, Cynics and Cyrenaics one can distinguish different interpretations of civil liberties. From the point of view of the Cynics, man is sinful and cruel by nature, so he cannot attain freedom. The culprit for all this is the limited resources of nature. In this respect, "the sinner is subject to his passions and loses the most precious treasure of his soul - freedom" [7, 37]. Cynics defined the question of pure freedom through their individual responsibility to society throughout their individual lives. According to the Cynics, autarky is pure freedom. It includes the independence and autonomy of the individual, which are "more valuable than the blessings that the ignorant pursue" [4, 14].
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The representatives of the Cyrenaic school put forward the idea of the natural and primordial origin of freedom in harmony with the idea of equality. Rejecting generally accepted cultural and moral norms; the Cyrenaics (Theodore, Gegesius) argued that they were contrary to human nature. Delight has been declared as the perfect blessing. Achieving them is through perception and goodness.
We can agree with A. F.Losev: "If we discuss the primary basis of the Cyrenaic philosophy, then it is the desire to build a spirit of freedom for man. In this respect, they are no different from the views of Socrates at all. Nevertheless, they have a completely different configuration of the concept than Socrates, and the
opposite view of the Cynics. If the vital instincts in the Cynics were left in completely arbitrary hands, the mind used this arbitrariness to organize its independence from them. We know that in practice this would lead to the abolition of vital instincts, or, in the absence of understanding the interaction with the mind, they would become a purely physical and mechanical process. The Cyrenaics also built on the freedom and arbitrariness of the vital instincts, which also provided for the whims and zigzags of life's chaos. The Cyrenaics, along with the Cynics, did not set the sole purpose of the spontaneous chaos of life, but the freedom of the soul, manifested in the form of a reaction to this chaos. However, both of them later deviate from this idea" [10, 242].
Contrary to the schools of Socrates, another student of Socrates, Plato, interpreted freedom as embodied in the i5ss^(eidos) of an ideal state. Only in the absence of such social upheavals of society and in the legalized model of grouping citizens does freedom provide a framework for action within strict guidelines. At the same time, "excessive freedom for the state becomes excessive dependence" [14, 352]. However, the Platonic position recognizes the need to obey state laws. It involves individual responsibility and choice options. According to Plato, "a state without the rule of law and under someone's authority is on the brink of collapse. Where there is a law, it is the lord of the ruler, and they are his subjects, and I am consideringmaintaining the state all the blessings that the gods can and give to it"[1, 99]. In this case, the law is the "only true expression of freedom" [13, 22]. Then the questions of not only the existence of freedom, but also whether it is necessary for the individual, how it is connected with the necessity of obedience to the law and the supremacy of the interests of the state, are valid. Recognizing the dominance of commonality in relation to privacy, Plato concludes that obedience to the law and adherence to tradition exaggerate freedom, impede its supremacy over the interests of the state, and lead to rebellion and disobedience. The ideals of freedom are the privilege of the ideal model of public administration, not of the individual, and an attribute of the state, not that of the person.
Thus, while acknowledging the existence of freedom in both the world of ideas and the world of shadows, Plato emphasizes the duality of the nature of freedom. It determines its danger to man, the difficulty of choice, and the negative consequences for the state.
From the beginnings of the antique philosophy, through the position of philosophical reflection, freedom acquires an ideal appearance. By analyzing it as a theoretical concept, the question of the limits of freedom is raised from the standpoint of the necessity of restricting freedom by the government, giving the next network of philosophical traditions. In the process of analyzing freedom as an ideal and as an individual's pursuit of harmony through the laws of the state, Plato demonstrates the uniqueness of this concept in the form of cultural universals. The possibility of ideas about freedom is presented as a theoretically ideal construction in which the interests of the community take precedence over the interests of the individual. Historically,
the influence of Plato's ideas was considered quite bold at the time, not enough to make human activity or the recognition of human free will more acceptable only with the concept of fatalism. Not surprisingly, Plato failed to solve the paradox of responsibility - on the one hand, he could not explain how to choose his own character without being determined by an unknown proto-character, on the other hand, without following randomness or arbitrariness in his choice [23, 17]. While linking freedom with ideals in the context of political philosophy, Plato and his followers avoid analyzing this concept from a moral-ethical point of view.
In antiquity, a different approach to the term freedom is observed in the works of Aristotle. In Aristotle's philosophy, man is interpreted as an active being, in the form of a creature with a unique quality - free choice. In this case, in order to make a choice, it is necessary not only to know, but also to act in the form of a volitional act, an autarky perfected in freedom, that is, in the form of noble knowledge and the pursuit of goodness. From Aristotle's point of view, the order of police life based on perception and laws reflects autarky. Only for the wise, of course, in harmony with the Logos, it takes on the appearance of the pursuit of happiness. At the same time, freedom remains not only associated with responsibility, but also manifests itself as a characteristic of activity. It should be noted that free activity, according to Aristotle, remains the same even when it acquires a spontaneous character, despite the fact that it has a well thought out, clear purpose. In particular, the activity is revived freely because it is "caused by its own personal influence" or, as the scholastics say, because it is sua sponte[23, 12].
Along with the interpretation of freedom in the form of a characteristic of activity, Aristotle considers it in connection with the concepts of arbitrariness and goodness.All types of activity are divided into arbitrary and non-arbitrary. The former are characterized by rules, norms, obedience to natural or social order factors, or their implementation without knowing the consequences, that is, without knowledge.
Cognition and reason are the necessary conditions for independent activity. They are consciously actualized anyway. In human reality, the freedom of choice, which determines the purpose and means of action and deeds with the help of reason and knowledge, thus arises. Arbitrary activities thus require a certain degree of freedom and understanding.
It is precisely the mind that is one of the factors of an individual's activity, in which the choice of purpose and means of action, the violation of social norms and the acceptance of responsibility for possible consequences are interrelated with understanding the cause. Aristotle thus interprets mental-arbitrary activities in two more directions: values and morals. In the pursuit of happiness, that is, in eudonomy, human attention is focused on goodness and its realization. Virtue itself is valued as a measure of both eudonomy and freedom. It is freedom of choice that determines whether there is freedom and responsibility from the position of arbitrariness. "A person can do strange as well as shameful things. The character of the deeds he is
doing depends on him. According to his will, a person is either just or unjust, and according to the deeds done - he is honored or punished by a court" [5, 117].
In particular, unlike his predecessors, Aristotle singled out the following aspects of the understanding of freedom:
• perception and understanding of action
• the relationship between the nature and conditions of the activity
• availability of choice and responsibility
• different options for freedom in different types of actions
• the value of freedom in moral and ethical aspects
Thus, in Aristotle's philosophy, not only the philosophical features of the understanding of freedom were taken into account, but also its role in the form of the internal conditions of activity, the character and aspirations of the individual.
Within the framework of his philosophical teachings, Aristotle linked politics, legal norms, and ethics into a single system. The purpose and content of the state is to achieve goodness and the happiness of its citizens; for human beings to live happily, freedom must be compatible with virtue and supreme goodness.
At the same time, from Aristotle's point of view, the phenomenon of freedom, on the one hand, does not have a simple attitude to man as a "measure of all things" that brings Aristotle closer to Sophist thought, but is a political-ethical concept with social limits and components.
The Hellenistic period witnessed not only the emergence of new philosophical schools because of changes in the socio-political environment, but also the interpretation of human freedom as a universal of culture. Epicureanism offers a concept that, quite contrary to its predecessors, has completely abandoned other types of fatalism. In him, freedom is the result of the idea of chance. According to Epicurus, "the freedom of individuals depends on the degree of freedom of that society" [11, 361].
At the heart of freedom lies the laws of nature, human suffering. The pursuit of ataraxia as a measure of complete peace implies the expansion of the boundaries of freedom, freedom from physical suffering and emotional discomfort. The purpose of the chosen choice is "health of body and peace of mind" [20, p. 126]. People are required to agree with each other in order to exist peacefully and without suffering, they must rely on "justice, which is considered an agreement of utility with the aim of not getting harmed or inflicting harm to one-another" [20, 128].
If for Aristotle freedom is a sign of democracy, for Epicurus it is associated with a conscious choice and responsibility to him. The component of the scope of freedom includes not only responsibility for oneself, but also responsibility for other people. At the same time, necessity is excluded from the list of required factors, because "necessity cannot take responsibility" [1, 519]. Coercion and suffering can be avoided through reconciliation and cooperation. The value of freedom is of equal importance to any human being. In particular, the phenomenon of freedom in
Epicureanism is inextricably linked with the inner choice of the individual and his personal diligence, which contradicts Aristotle's interpretation. This is why a number of scholars believe that "Epicurean harmonious conception of equality, freedom, and independence of the members of society is the first concept of liberalism" [9].
In Hellenic philosophy, the Stoics gave a different interpretation of freedom. According to them, human independence is recognized. Freedom is associated with responsibility and is seen as a social phenomenon by its very nature. Seneca, who supported Epicurus' position on the matter, recognized the need for freedom based on the supremacy of spiritual freedom and equality, including freedom for all, including slaves. Epictetus, on the other hand, insisted that only a man who lived as he wished could be free.
The line of return to fatalism is drawnbased on the Stoic interpretation. There, the idea of following destiny and completely submitting to it, accepting it, and refusing to try to change anything through activity and behavior prevails.
While limiting the borders of freedom, the Stoics, such as Cleanphe, argued that the ability to understand responsibility is innate in man and "has existed in man since birth." The pursuit of perfection as a virtue of responsibility on the scale of development limits freedom. Because "the life is a good when in harmony with nature", is understood and considered proper [2, 801]. While perception is emphasized as a general law of existence, the Stoics define things through activity-oriented objects, taking into account the human body. The task of perception is to find the line between freedom and responsibility in these activities, to "create a system of practical principles that will help to determine the level of responsibility in each case" [2, 801].
Along with the establishment of another system of legal norms in the Roman period, the view that freedom is a cultural universality is changing. The notions of civil rights and individual liberties are formed. They are studied together with the problems of inequality and justice, which are based on tradition and secrecy. Gradually, such imaginations become attached to everyday life. For Roman society, law was inextricably linked with responsibility. Their philosophical teachings reflects this situation. In their philosophical doctrines, the Stoics define the duties, goals, and perceived activities that are interrelated with the issue of civil liberties and rights. In the teachings of the representatives of Stoics, freedom is in the form of constituting the meaning of life, witnessing power and its defeat, resisting calamities and misfortunes. The ideal of freedom is complete submission to destiny, which is seen as a coverage and reflection of the nature of the universe.
Freedom in Roman culture and legal consciousness is not unique to man simply because he is part of a universe or a social system. Man has moral stability, rights and duties, is able to make his choice rationally, and has qualities such as being responsible for its consequences. The understanding given by the analysis of philosophical notions of freedom has undergone many changes at the heart of the development of Roman culture.
Forms of theoretical understanding of freedom, such as cultural universals, have undergone a transformation from the fixation and discourse of confrontation of free citizens and slaves, from the recognition of the physical independence of the individual to the recognition of legal and political freedoms and rights of the Roman citizen. Later, the idea of human inner freedom, associated with the evaluation of one's own choice, theoretical reflection, and an understanding of responsibility for that choice, emerged. This is reflected in the teachings of the latter Stoics.
At this point, the concept of freedom was a vivid expression of social diversity for Roman citizens at the level of everyday consciousness. It was not yet a full-fledged philosophical category and theoretical concept. The meaning of this concept was the agreement with cultural and social norms, the recognition of the guarantee of rights and freedoms by the state. Citizens did not try to violate this or that limit for freedom at all. They agreed with the control of "the state to ensure unlimited opportunities for activity in both material and spiritual production", "participated in the control exercised by the state to ensure economic independence, which conditioned all other freedoms" [22, 47].
It should be noted that a number of researchers in the field of philosophy of law emphasize the specificity of the binary principle in the understanding of freedom in Roman culture. In Roman law, the term "freedom" was used as a cultural universal in terms of defining the limits of what citizens could do. In addition, the spatial-temporal parameters of actions, their purpose and randomness are clearly indicated.
However, freedom as a cultural universality, together with its position of reflection, acquires theoretical interpretations, philosophical substantiation, axiological and moral significance. One of the important functions of freedom at the domestic level in daily life is the recognition and strengthening of social stratification and collective hierarchy. First, it is the division of the rights and freedoms of citizens and slaves, and second, it is the separation of the freedoms and rights of citizens according to their social origins. Given the whole culture of Roman law, it is utilitarian in nature. In it, the focus was on making the phenomenon of freedom understandable, visible in everyday life, and appearing as a regulator of a particular relationship in society. Therefore, the acceptance of freedom for man in the process of understanding is transferred from external rules attached to legal norms to the component of the inner world, where it becomes not only a practically important phenomenon, but also the result of moral choice and regulator.
In this respect, the focus is on the specific understanding of freedom and the main points of the philosophical schools and teachings of the period. Trying to show that man strives to live happily, Roman philosophy asserts that freedom is a necessary structure of happiness. If, for the Stoics, submission to the path of destiny is the attainment of inner freedom itself, then Epicureanism interprets freedom in a rather different waythan the idea of chance.
A comparative analysis of the ideas of the Stoics and the Epicureans shows that in the first the search for happiness is based on the following thesis: the pursuit of
freedom is possible only when it is in harmony with its nature. The latter, following Epicurus's idea of the supremacy of chance, define the action for freedom as a spontaneous process that can take on a vague, chaotic character. Opposing the Stoics and all other earlier philosophical traditions, Epicurus was one of the first to try to overcome fatalism, which was considered dominant in the interpretation of freedom.
In particular, both the Stoics and Epicurus theoretically represent the process of interaction of the individual and the state, the axiological and moral aspects of the rights and freedoms of the individual before the imperial state machine. A common condition for these philosophical schools is the recognition of the necessity of a person's choice of a definite position. In it, he either agrees to abide by the rules of state and legal norms peculiar to the Stoics, or renounces them for freedom. One can determine one's attitude towards freedom by one's personal views and choices.
For the Stoics, with all the attention paid to the question of freedom in the form of a form of happiness, its value is not absolute, but relative. "Freedom is a chimera. We consider ourselves free only because we do not know the reasons, or because we are unable to take into account all the circumstances that compel us to try this or that. Man really has the ability to define himself! Can we assume that thousands of external combinatory objects animate and define it? Is not his will an indeterminate and independent ability to act without choice? He acts as follows, either as a result of reasoning, as a result of an act of reason, which offers something useful to his interests, or as a result of an act involving a person which does not depend on that act, forcing him to return to a certain party; imagines that he is doing it freely"[21, 165]. As long as man experiences and evaluates the judgment of destiny, then he has a free choice of methods of action and measures of its actualization. At the same time, although internal worries and personality devices are determined based on strict determination of destiny, they incorporate the possibility of theoretical reflexive and active choice.
Thus, the traditions of ancient philosophy interpret human freedom as a manifestation of the subject's activity, the basis of his activity in relation to choice. The connection between individuality and commonality is determined. This is evident in the legal system in which the recognition of individual rights and freedoms by the legal norms and social status of the individual is interrelated.
At this point, we conclude that in the process of transformation of the ancient variant of traditional society, the interpretations and understandings of freedom as a universal of culture underwent several changes. During Hellenism and the Roman Empire, the emphasis on the discourse of freedom shifted from the domination of external factors to the domination of the interior. Along with the notions of man, the interpretation of freedom also acquires an axiological appearance. For the individual, however, the problem of moral choice and internal experience took precedence over the attitude to external factors or sacred rules. At the same time, the issue of understanding freedom for man, being responsible for his own choices, and
autonomous justification of both activities, goals, methods, and outcomes began to come to the fore.
A number of researchers have identified a deep connection and succession in early Christianity and later Stoicism (K. Fischer, V.V. Sapov, etc.) [19-8], combining philosophical concepts concerning the concept of man and his destiny, his freedom. According to Renan, the ethical value of Christianity could only change behavior through the power of faith in greatness, and there was a gap between the ideas of the Stoics and the early Christian thinkers because they were alien to each other and their relationship was "mostly harmful rather than helpful" approaches. [15, 5]. However, despite the differences in approaches and assessments, researchers agree that there is a clear relationship between inheritance and development in the emergence of conceptual aspects of freedom that reflect the evolution of traditional society.
The notion of the place of the individual in the world, or society, is intertwined with the various aspects of the notion of the recognition of human rights and freedoms; the spirit of freedom required theoretical justification and found it in the form of philosophical reflection. This reflection is evidenced by the views of ancient philosophers on its specificity. They are illustrated in a comparative analysis of the Socratic schools of thought, such as Democritus, Cynics, and Cyrenaics, Plato and Aristotle, the Epicurean and Stoic Hellenic schools of thought.
Ancient thinkers exercised the reflection of freedom in relation to the analysis of human activity and behavior. As a result, each interpretation of freedom and its aspects are determined by the specifics of a particular socio-cultural context. In ancient times, as a universal of culture, freedom occurs in the form of an arbitrary and non-arbitrary classification of activity, subject to individual choice, intertwined with law and moral norms, natural factors, and moral beliefs.
CONCLUSION
The comparison of the peculiarities of the philosophical reflection of freedom, which is the universality of culture in antiquity, illustrated that it was understood as the interrelationship of the analysis of human activity and behavior. The relevance of freedom is expressed in three main degrees:
1. in daily consciousness, in mythological representations;
2. at the theoretical level in legal norms and legal codes;
3. thephilosophical concept of freedom in the teachings and doctrines of the thinkers of the Antiquity.
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