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Вестник Челябинского государственного университета. 2022. № 8 (466). С. 42-55. ISSN 1994-2796 (print). ISSN 2782-4829 (online)
Bulletin of Chelyabinsk State University. 2022;(8(466):42-55. ISSN 1994-2796 (print). ISSN 2782-4829 (online) Review
doi: 10.47475/1994-2796-2022-10806
THE DEFENSE DIPLOMACY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN: WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSILE TECHNOLOGY
Hamid Hakim1®, Saeid Gholami2
1,2 Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran 1 hhakim@atu.ac.ir
Abstract. Defense diplomacy is a part of the government policies that play an important role as an essential tool in achieving the massive goals of the armed forces, and its goal is to create favorable political, national, and international conditions for the preservation and expansion of national and vital values of the countries against actual and potential enemies. One of the characteristics of defense diplomacy in the current conditions is considered to be a political-defensive and strategic tool in identifying and legitimizing the countries. After the revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran faced a series of tensions with the international system that created problems such as military sanctions, the war with Iraq, etc. Nevertheless, during this period, Iran tried to solve these problems through certain defensive and diplomatic tactics at different times. Therefore, the main question in the research is: according to the military sanctions and the current threats in the region, what is the position and function of missile technology in the defense diplomacy of Iran? Defense diplomacy, as an effective tool for advancing towards the goals and policies of Iran, building trust, de-escalating the tension, strengthening security, and building power to face regional threats and neutralizing them, has turned to localization (Indigenization) and deterrence systems based on missile technology as well as asymmetric warfare. This research is descriptive-analytical, the contents have been collected through the library method, and it is based on news and reports of newspapers and news sites.
Keywords: Defense Diplomacy, Deterrence, Missile Technology, Asymmetric warfare
For citation: Hakim H, Gholami S. The Defense Diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: With Emphasis on Missile Technology. Bulletin of the Chelyabinsk State University. 2022;(8(46б):42-55. doi: 10.47475/1994-27962022-10806
Обзорная статья
ОБОРОННАЯ ДИПЛОМАТИЯ ИСЛАМСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ ИРАН: C УПОРОМ НА РАКЕТНЫЕ ТЕХНОЛОГИИ
Хамид Хаким1Н, Сайд Голами2
1,2 Университет Алламе Табатабаи, Тегеран, Иран 1 hhakim@atu.ac.ir
Аннотация. Оборонная дипломатия является частью государственной политики, которая играет важную роль в качестве важнейшего инструмента в достижении масштабных целей вооруженных сил, ее целью является создание благоприятных политических, национальных и международных условий для сохранения и расширения национальных и жизненно важных ценностей стран против реальных и потенциальных врагов. Одной из характеристик оборонной дипломатии в нынешних условиях считается политико-оборонительный и стратегический инструмент идентификации и легитимизации стран. После революции 1979 года Исламская Республика Иран столкнулась с рядом трений с международной системой, которые создали такие проблемы, как военные санкции, война с Ираком и т. д. Тем не менее в течение этого периода Иран в разное время пытался решить эти проблемы с помощью определенной оборонительной и дипломатической тактики. Поэтому главный вопрос в исследовании заключается в следующем: в соответствии с военными санкциями и текущими угрозами в регионе, какова позиция и функция ракетных технологий в оборонной дипломатии Ирана? Оборонная дипломатия как эффективный инструмент продвижения к целям политики Ирана, укрепления доверия, деэскалации напряженности, укрепления безопасности и наращивания мощи для противостояния региональным угрозам и их нейтрализации превратилась в локализацию (индигени-зацию) системы сдерживания, основанной на ракетных технологиях, а также асимметричной войне. Это
© Hakim H., Gholami S., 2022
исследование носит описательно-аналитический характер, его содержание было собрано с помощью библиотечного метода и основано на новостях и сообщениях газет и новостных сайтов.
Ключевые слова: оборонная дипломатия, сдерживание, ракетные технологии, асимметричная война
Для цитирования: Hakim H., Gholami S. The Defense Diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: With Emphasis on Missile Technology // Вестник Челябинского государственного университета. 2022. № 8 (466). С. 42-55. doi: 10.47475/1994-2796-2022-10806
Introduction
Despite sanctions and threats during its lifetime, the Islamic Republic of Iran has made significant progress in the defense industry. In addition to the prosperity of indigenous capabilities, this has led to widespread deterrence for the country. The Islamic Republic of Iran, according to valuable experiences of war with Iraq, tried to establish an independent security-defensive system. Accordingly, Iran, as an independent, developing, and industrialized country, has set one of its main goals to improve the security of the country concerning the component of technology in the international system; Thus, the promotion of the achievements of the Islamic Republic of Iran in technology, especially missile technology, is one of the strategic its goals for de-escalating the tensions and maintaining its security. To develop and promote its missile technology and knowledge and maintain its existence and security against the threats, Iran, as one of the members of the international community, like other countries, needs to communicate with other countries, and in some way, requires missile technology mobility. In this process, a defense diplomacy is a tool along with other tools such as equipping, developing, repairing, strengthening power in the form of using and producing soft and strategic power, to prevent and deal with threats that are assumed for a political unit. Through this tool, threats can be identified and the basis for building and organizing national power, appropriate to the type of threats, can be provided, and the basis for strategic cooperation with regional units and tactical cooperation with major powers can be formed. In this process, defense diplomacy is a combination of two dimensions of soft and hard power and its realization in the international environment. Now, concerning the military sanctions and threats in the region, what is the position and function of missile technology in the defense diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran? Defense diplomacy is an effective tool in advancing the goals and policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, building trust, de-escalating the tension, building security, and making power so that it has turned to localization and missile-technology-based deterrence systems as well as asymmetric warfare to face threats and neutralize them.
One of the most important reasons that raised the necessity of carrying out this research is the threat and security component. The Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the most important and strategic countries in the region and the world, which has always faced threats throughout history, especially in the contemporary era; however, these threats have been different at different times and under different circumstances.
Conceptual Framework: Defense Diplomacy
Defense diplomacy is an organizational concept for defense, related to international activities, which was re-evaluated after the Cold War in the West, led by the British Ministry of Defense. Western countries utilize defense diplomacy in "facing the new international security environment" (www.bt.com.bt). Defense diplomacy at first glance has a contradiction (Baluchi, 2010). Because diplomacy is a soft tool against a tough defense approach. But when we delve into the depths of the debate, it encompasses both the soft, hard, and operational dimensions of power in the international environment, so that the interests and goals of the political system, with the help of the defense sector and without the use of hard power, is provided (Javanmard, 2009). The contradiction of defense diplomacy arises from the classical division of the means of implementing national goals in the scale of foreign policy, which includes political, economic, cultural, and military means (Du Plessis, 2008). Instead of relying on effects, defense diplomacy deals with causes and is based on the principle of prevention contrary to treatment and is a determining tool in global equations. Defense diplomacy is a central concept for separating the concept of security from defense so that the power should not be employed only in times of diplomatic stalemate but it should be deemed as a tool for eliminating hostility, maintaining independence and national security, developing military power, and maximizing defensive security; in general, it is a tool in the service of deterrence strategy (Zolfaghari & Khosravi, 2016).
But finally, it can be said that: defense diplomacy is considered as the promotion of structural capabilities to achieve the goals that create the necessary conditions for the exercise of power in an anarchic
environment. Such a process should be considered as a part of the need to produce power in an environment that focuses on the use of various institutional, strategic and functional tools. Thus, the basis of defense diplomacy means "forcing the other side to do something we want or preventing it from doing something according to the actors' will." the most important difference between the two concepts is the "abi-
Defense Diplomacy Levels, Models, and Actions (Gholami, 2018)
In maintaining the security of any country, in addition to emphasizing defense power, it is very important to pay attention to defense diplomacy to reform security zones and retire other nations; to some extent, defense diplomacy is the basis for explaining the defense strategy and it makes possible to explain the norms in national security. In other words, the application of defense policy in the field of diplomacy is in the form of a macro-national strategy to achieve the lofty goals of a political system (Alam-dari, 2010). Although military security remains important as one of the most important forms of security, the threats are wide-ranging and coercive means are applied to be used to face any threat. Defense diplomacy is a tool to prevent the use of military force, is used to reduce threats, and turn threats into opportunities; So that defense diplomacy is an active tool in the field of disarmament and arms control in all its dimensions. In other words, the function of defense
lity to exercise power". (Minaee, Hajianee, Dehghan, & Ja'farzadeh-pur, 2017: 115).
1. Interactions and communications of defense diplomacy
Interactions and communications of defense diplomacy have different levels, models, and actions which we refer to in the following table:
Table 1
diplomacy as a means of maintaining security is to prevent the use of force.
An important dimension of the concept of national security is the application of military policy and strategy to protect the internal system against external threats. Therefore, the use of defense diplomacy has become a fundamental principle for the foreign relations of countries and its use in resolving conflicts is undeniable. Today, "defense diplomacy is often associated with conflict prevention" (Fabiani, 2003). This approach to defense diplomacy defines military and defense security in a new sense so that military security is not exclusively defined in its traditional context. The most important component in this new definition is the use of defense diplomacy as a soft tool to expand the relativity of defense security.
2. Regional deterrence as the defense-security strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Deterrence means convincing the opponents that the costs and the risks of their policies are greater
Defense diplomacy levels Strategic cooperation model Signs of action and interaction of actors in the process of strategic cooperation
Bilateral Level Military Collaborations - Military training exchanges - Deployment of military affiliates - Bilateral agreements - Scientific (military) and technical (military) cooperation - Negotiating to establish military bases - Agreement on conducting joint exercises - Official visit of the navy - Airport cooperation - Selling and repairing military weapons - Technology Transfer
Regional Level Regional Military Collaborations - Establishing regional security structures - Resolving regional disputes - Presence in security agreements - Regional exercises
International Level Strategic Collaborations - Participating in UN peacekeeping operations - Participating in UN humanitarian operations - Participating in trans-regional military alliances - Assisting in the process of military intervention - Cooperating with actors in the process of military action - Strategic alliances - Signing security notes and conducting strategic negotiations
than the benefits that they earn (Friedman, 2006). If we define defense-security strategy as the art of using war and military force to achieve political goals as Liddell Hart did (Hart, 1967) or we define it as the methods of using various components of national power to achieve the defense-security goals of countries in line with national policies, Iran's strategic position at the regional level with some characteristics such as having multiple neighbors, existing many differences among them (due to some reasons such as border and territorial disputes, problems and issues on ethnicity, and disputes over resources) historical crises and conflicts, intra-regional conflicts and wars, the continuous involvement of the great powers and the complexity of the security conundrum, and thinking about regional security concerns will be at the forefront of Iranian policy-making. The political-military scene of the region includes a complex environment in which, in addition to the countries of the region, supra-regional powers are also involved. Accordingly, the solution that is on the agenda of Iranian policymakers, in addition to the regional dimension, also emphasizes the trans-regional dimension. Iran's national security is influenced by geopolitical indicators, regional environmental characteristics, and structural necessities; Thus, it faces many challenges and risks, the management of which requires an effective military doctrine. Today, countries have rejected unconventional defense strategies and based conventional deterrence on their defense doctrine. The Islamic Republic of Iran, because of its values and legal principles, rejects the unusual nuclear deterrence and limits its military authority to defense (Argha-vani Pir Eslami and Pirankho, 2017); As the Supreme Leader said in a speech at a meeting with the head and officials of the Atomic Energy Organization and a group of nuclear scientists: "Iran is not looking for nuclear weapons"; "Because the Islamic Republic of Iran, intellectually, theoretically and jurisprudential-ly, considers having a nuclear weapon a great sin and believes that the possession of such a weapon is also useless, harmful and dangerous". "Nuclear weapons are neither a source of security nor a means of consolidating political power, but a threat to both", he said in a speech to the Summit of Non-aligned Nations Conference at the height of increasing pressure on Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran considers the use of nuclear and chemical weapons and like a great and unforgivable sin... I emphasize that the Islamic Republic of Iran never seeks nuclear weapons and never ignores the right of its people from using peaceful nuclear energy" (Supreme Leader's website, 2012). According to this approach, Iran's defense policy is based on de-
terrent defense, and its armed forces are required to achieve maximum power and authority so that they can be effective in times of threat against the security interests of the country, with a defensive approach to intimidate the enemies from launching an attack, to create relative stability and to avoid war (Arghavani Piraslami and Pirankhoo, 2017).
The choice of the missiles as the basis for Iran's deterrence, in addition to the advantages of the missiles, was arisen due to regional threats and military conditions. The number of Iranian operational aircraft decreased from 445 to 150 between 1979 and 1991. Towards the end of the war, Iraq acquired the advanced French Mirage aircraft and had 350 fighter jets. While Saudi Arabia bought a large quantity of F-15 aircraft from the United States, Iran's air fleet was almost dependent on western countries, especially the United States, and providing spare parts to keep them operational became the main priority of the Iranian Air Force (Pourakhundi, 2013).
Iran's security environment has changed dramatically since the event on September 11, 2001. The United States, after this event, occupied Iraq and Afghanistan near the Iranian borders and strengthened its military presence in the region by concluding military agreements with countries in the region, especially in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, Iran's investment in missiles was not only in line with solving its strategic problem but also the development and production of missiles were a cost-effective way to overcome regional imbalances and the stronger air force of countries in the region. Iran could also compensate for the issue of lack of access to spare parts for military weapons through missiles (Pourakhundi, 2013).
On the one hand, Iran's defense policy is based on reducing war and aggression and using diplomatic solutions for hostile operations, and on the other hand, it is based on asymmetric warfare, which provides a strong force to defend its territory (Federation of American Scientists, 2012:1). Factors such as ideological orientations, Iran's experience in the imposed war, and geopolitical realities have been very influential in shaping Iran's defense doctrine. Islam and ideological necessities play a key role in formulating Iran's security strategy, and military-political ideology is an influential factor in Iran's strategic mindset and approach for designing a defense structure. Following the teachings of Islam, Iran has based its security on defending and rejecting any aggression; Therefore, in its defense policy, it seeks a deterrent and defensive strategy. Iran's experience in the imposed war also plays an important role in influencing its deterrence and defense approach; In a way,
this experience strengthened the will of the Armed Forces to increase deterrence and re-equip with modern weapons. One of the most important elements in Iran's defense doctrine is the emphasis on asymmetric warfare, which stems from Iran's experience in the war with Iraq. The emphasis on asymmetric warfare is because this type of war significantly increases Iran's deterrent power (Arghavani Pir Eslami and Pirankho, 2017).
Iran, as one of the countries in the Middle East, whose security environment is related to many countries in the region and the world, can not meet its interests to maintain its security and repel potential threats, regardless of the international system, and faces many threats and opportunities. Accordingly, the design of a regional deterrence system, according to its defense doctrine, is regarded as one of the necessities of the country's defense policy. This system is influenced by several key variables: the US unilateral deterrence system in the region, geographical variables, structural constraints (such as the US pre-emptive and preventive war doctrine that complements its unilateral deterrence in the region and is under contractual pressure from the {So-called} sponsors of terrorism countries), the Iranian military forces, which consists of the Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as well as being located in the middle of the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and the Caucasus, and southwest Asia and Europe which created a strategy for Iran). The general structure of the Iranian deterrence system is of the defensive type, based on which it has three types of defensive deterrence:
2.1. Network inhibition
Iran's geopolitical position and being located between three important circles (Persian Gulf; Central Asia and the Caucasus; South Asia) has given Iran a special advantage that this network system provides a favorable perspective for it to deal with possible threats.
2.2. Indirect or independent deterrence
Because there is a strategic asymmetry between Iran and the United States, indirect or independent deterrence is more effective than direct and bilateral deterrence in neutralizing potential threats.
2.3. Conventional defensive deterrence
In this area, Iran has several advantages including Iran's defensive deterrence strategy encourages defense, Iran's periphery is turbulent, so any factors exacerbating regional unrest will not be in Iran's interest; Iran's geographical location makes defense less costly than aggression; and its armed forces have a more defensive structure (Ghasemi, 2009).
3. The concept of deterrence and its place in the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran
The Islamic Republic of Iran has a special strategic and security position. A combination of factors together has created this unique situation. Worldview, culture, type of the political system, the position of political geography, slogans of the revolution based on independence and history, especially the experience of eight years of holy defense, lack of strategic allies, diversity of local, regional, and international enemies and rivals, etc. each of which has influenced the formation of Iran's special defense and security culture. Thinking about regional security concerns are the main priorities of Iran's security and defense policymaking, but the threats to Iran, in addition to the regional dimension, have dimensions beyond the region that have taught Iranian policymakers to think both regionally and globally in their defense doctrine. In this environment, the special deterrence strategy has been a key element of Iran's security and defense, and the success and efficiency of this approach over the past four decades have enabled Iran to maintain its security in the dusty and tense atmosphere of the region. The constant threats of various enemies and the mobilization of their capabilities; the attempt to use the military option against Iran and the destruction of Iran or to influence the change in Iran's behavior due to the logic, power, effectiveness; and success of deterrence strategies have failed. Deterrence model strategies are divided into different types according to the main purpose of deterrence, which is to deter the enemy from a possible attack, the most important of which are: offensive and defensive strategies. In offensive strategy, strategy games will be formed based on mutual threat; But in defensive strategy, the goal is to protect the political or regional system; In such a way that its survival is guaranteed in the face of enemy attacks and it leads the enemy to the conclusion that even if it attacks the country or region, it will not be able to surrender it, and ultimately, the attack will cost more than the achievements. (Aminian and Zamiri Jirsa-rai, 2016). Iran's experience in the imposed war has also been an important factor in emphasizing deterrence. Iranian politicians believed that Iraq invaded Iran when the post-revolutionary chaos, the purge of the armed forces, and the loss of political-military support for the great powers in Iran created this illusion in the minds of Iraqi leaders that the deterrent capacity of the Iranian armed forces has been severely reduced. Therefore, they considered it possible to overcome Iran. During and after the war, one of
the measures taken to increase the deterrent capacity of the armed forces was to re-equip them with new weapons, one of the most important of which is missiles (Taremi, 2003). Thus, in recent decades, Iran's security strategy has been based on deterrence, and missiles have played a decisive role in this approach, consequently, Iran's security. Adopting a model of deterrence against regional and international threats highlights Iran's military capabilities in the direction of adopting a defensive strategy as well as ensuring Iran's national security; Iran's ability in the military and missile fields will give it a greater deterrent capability and can provide national interests and security for this country in this area; and missiles are an important factor in achieving this goal for Iran's national security (Abbasi, Talebi, & Nejat, 2016).
The Wall Street Journal reported that in an unprecedented and direct attack, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps targeted ISIS positions in Deir ez-Zor with surface-to-surface missiles. The newspaper also wrote in its report that the IRGC had warned that it would respond in the same way to anyone who invaded Iran.
- The New York Times reported that Iran attacked their positions in Syria with a missile to punish those terrorists who recently carried out a terrorist attack in Tehran. The action also sent a message to Iran's enemies in the region, including Saudi Arabia and Israel, as well as the United States, which has several military bases in the Middle East. The New York Times also wrote that the IRGC missile strike was a sign of Iran's growing military power in the region.
- The Iranian correspondent in Tehran also said in this regard that Iran's missile attack on Syria shows the increasing role of Iran in the developments in Syria.
- The Persian section of Sputnik News Agency with the headline "ISIL was slapped so that others could hear its sound" examined this attack and wrote: In retaliation for ISIL's attack on Tehran, Iran could repay it in various ways, but chose the option of using medium-range missiles. It was both a retaliation for the attack and a message to ISIL supporters, and it is clear that Iran's goal was more than retaliation to warn others. Sputnik referring to Iran's indigenous missiles also mentioned the fact that at the time of Iraq's invasion of Iran, no country refused to supply missiles to this country so it prompted Iran to start producing its defense weapons and not to depend on foreigners. Today, the Iranians no longer dream of delivering missiles to Baghdad; Rather, Iranian missiles easily pass over Baghdad and land hundreds of kilometers away (Nasim Online, 3/26/1396).
4. Future Wars
Since the end of the imposed war and after the occurrence of major wars in its surroundings, the Islamic Republic of Iran has shown sensitivity to the concept of future war and theorizing in this regard. Especially since Iran still considers the United States to be its main threat, and in the wars of the last two decades, the Americans have always been a party to the scene. For this reason, the type of approach of the country to the concept of future war will play an important role in the major defense and security directions. Emphasizing that future trends are uncertain, and at the same time, it is quite difficult to infer a clear and objective threat, we can define future wars in many ways, one of which is advanced weapons technology. This weapons technology can be identified in four categories: information technology, software, weapons of mass destruction, and conventional weapons. Also, they know air and missiles future wars used in terms of military strategies have some features such as flexibility, expansion of battlefields, integration of three levels of tactics, operations and strategy, extensive use of the element of intelligence and counter-intelligence, Preparing to face asymmetric battles, anticipating the appropriate mechanism for adapting advanced weapons systems to unfamiliar environments by gaining time, paying attention and emphasizing special forces, paying more attention to the mass media, and prioritizing war.
At the same time, the characteristics of the future war from an operational point of view are heterogeneity in technology, tactics, and strategy; short conflict time; the vastness of the battle area; high speed and intensity of operation; adaptation of tactical, operational, and strategic levels; fast rotation of information; use of public opinion; high power, accuracy and intelligence of weapons; use of sophisticated and modern technologies to manage the war; non-periodicity of war; being a coalition; and the implementation of continuous psychological operations (Mo'menzadeh, 2013).
Undoubtedly, one of the most important pillars of Iran's military strategy is to try to prevent deterrence and increase defense capabilities, the main goal of which is its missile capability. After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, many efforts were made to increase defense capabilities, but planning to invest in the advanced missile industry has been the most important effort to increase defense deterrence. Missile authority is not only a part of the defense doctrine based on Iran's conventional deterrence but also as its center. Iran's military system during the Second Pahlavi era was based on American weapons. Following the revolution and the Iraqi invasion of
Iran, the fledgling Islamic Republic found itself very weak in terms of military power, especially the air force, and got isolated in terms of international relations, Because the air force was equipped only with equipment left over from the Shah's time, which after the revolution, due to the arms embargo, was deprived of its reconstruction and stagnated in the imposed war; So to compensate its shortcomings, it turned to alternative weapons like missiles.
Missile weapons do not require very high technology compared to warplanes and other military equipment, and their production and development costs are lower. Missile production is also easier for countries such as Iran, which face limitations in access to advanced technologies due to the need for less infrastructure. By investing in the capabilities of its domestic industries and importing weapons technology from the former Soviet Union, China, and North Korea, Iran has been able to make great strides toward achieving its defense goals, despite its limited access to Western technology (Ghavam-Maleki, 2011). Based on the nature of Iran's enemies, missile power must be enhanced, which will lead to wider military deterrence.
5. The position of missile technology in the security of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Achieving missile power has a special place in the defense strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Iraq war against Iran and the first Persian Gulf War showed that the restrictions contained in international treaties on the use of weapons of mass destruction and the prohibition of the use of military means against civilians did not prevent Iraq from using these weapons; the international community has not taken any serious action in this regard. Besides, these wars showed the very important role of missiles in future battles. The regional situation in Iran after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the large US presence in the Persian Gulf and neighboring countries of Iran, and the threats of the Zionist regime made the adoption of a defensive self-reliance approach against foreign threats an inevitable option for the country. This was achieved by the localization of missile technology, and considering the choice of deterrence as the main defense strategy of Iran in the process of modernization of military industries, much emphasis was placed on the acquisition and promotion of missile technology (Aminian and Zamiri Jirsarai, 2016).
5.1. Development and evolution of ballistic missiles and defense strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Increasing the level of missile capability is a key step in the development of space technologies, which
will be achieved to create effective deterrence by Iran through the development of space capabilities and the construction of powerful and advanced missiles; Therefore, one of the effective strategies by Iran, which has the ability of flexibility as a native technology and also the ability to deal with widespread threats, is to increase the capability of its ballistic missiles.
Iran is a growing and powerful missile force that has not been seriously affected by global sanctions. Relying on missile capabilities, the country is trying to upgrade its defense capabilities; Therefore, to achieve its goals, it needs to develop range, carrying capacity, accuracy, and indigenous testing and technical principles (Cordesman, 2015). To maximize the deterrent power of ballistic missiles, Iran has tried to increase their range and accuracy; the most emphasized indicator of ballistic missiles is their range. Ballistic missiles include short-range missiles (up to about 1,200 km), medium-range missiles (from 1,200 to 2,800 km), intermediate-range missiles (from 2,800 to 5,500 km), and long-range or intercontinental ballistic missiles (over 5,500 km). Therefore, in terms of range, the needs of countries are different. For this reason, Iran, which is under regional threats and also the United States and some NATO members have enmity towards it, needs to increase the range of ballistic missiles to expand its deterrence capability against regional and transregional threats. Iran's ultimate goal in the increasing range is to acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles to achieve its cross-border deterrence. Although Iran does not currently have this type of missile, access to it is not beyond the technological capability of this country (Ghavam-Maleki, 2011). Therefore, one of the future directions of Iran's missile development, in addition to the increasing range, is to enhance the accuracy of missile strikes, which will be done using internal tracking guidance technology and satellite guidance, and the latest modified missile guidance techniques. Replacing liquid fuel of rocket engine for solid fuel and using multi-stage missile launching technologies is one of the important capabilities that Iran uses in its missiles to increase missile range. Solid-fuel rockets are ready to fire much faster, do not require refueling before launch, and require less maintenance; Therefore, the time required to react to the threats of enemies is reduced and the defense capacity of the host country is increased (Taremi, 2003).
Iran's efforts to increase range, accuracy, and other missile capabilities began with the launch of missile activities. During the imposed war and the beginning of the urban war, Iran's missile activity began to produce Scud-B missiles with a range of 300 km
and continued with the construction of Scud-C missiles with a range of 500 km. Having bought missiles during the war and tried to adapt them to its needs, Iran later sought to produce indigenous missiles for longer range and solid fuel, but apparently because it failed to achieve this technology, in late 1989, it imported more than 200 Chinese CSS-8 missiles with a range of 150 km. This type of rocket had solid fuel and was launched into the air by a launcher. In 1995, it also imported the CSS-7 single-stage missile 11 with solid fuel (Feickert, 2014), but Iran was not satisfied with the performance of these missiles, so the development of a new missile began and Zelzal 2 was selected as a base and then Fateh 110 missile was produced, which initially had a range of 200 km. In the anti-ship model called the Persian Gulf, its guidance system has changed (Cordesman, 2014). In 2012, the fourth generation of Fateh, which has a range of more than 300 km and is equipped with a targethit system, was unveiled; It has been introduced as the most accurate Iranian missile, whose accuracy in hitting the target by using a very precise guidance and control system has been improved. But the core of Iran's missile force is the Russian-designed Scud-B missile, a single-stage, and liquid-fueled missile. Iran received the first Scud-B missile from Libya in response to the Iraqi invasion but later imported more from North Korea. (Cordesman, 2007). The Iranian version of the missile is named Shahab 1. Also, Sha-hab 2 is an Iranian design. It is an example of Scud-C, which is one step higher than Scud-B (Cordesman, 2014). The Qiam missile is the gateway to Iran's new arena in the construction of ballistic missiles based on Shahab 2 and is designed for the use of precision technology methods, guidance, and control to create the stability of needlessness to the fins; its range has been increased to 800 km. With the production of Shahab 3, a special defense advantage was given to Iran, and it was upgraded up to the level of Ballistic missiles, but due to its short-range, they cannot survive as intercontinental ballistic missiles, so longrange ones are being developed. Iran is developing and producing the Shahab 4 with a range of 2,000 kilometers; it is a version of North Korea's Taepodong two-stage missile that, if used with three-stage technology, will be able to cover all Western countries. The Shahab 5 has the characteristics of North Korea's Taepodong missile, which is a two-stage missile with an estimated range of about 6,000 kilometers. The Shahab-6 rocket, which uses a two- or three-stage solid-fuel rocket, is more like the Shahab 5; But by reducing its weight, its range reaches from 6000 to 10,000 kilometers (Cordesman, 2003: 145).
Due to the short range of Shahab 3, an attempt was made to produce a missile with a longer range and with solid and liquid fuel; Shahab-3 missiles with liquid fuel are called Qadr 1 and solid fuel are called Sajil and Ashura (Hildreth, 2012). But the first longrange ballistic missile in Iran that can be guided and controlled until the moment of hitting the ground is the Emad missile capable of destroying its targets with high accuracy. The Emad missile has increased Iran's deterrence more than ever before; it has been estimated with a range of 1,700 to 2,500 km and an error coefficient of less than 5 m, compared to Shahab 3, its accuracy has quadrupled; this indicates a great leap in the field of accuracy (Kayhan newspaper, October 17, 2015). The expansion and strengthening of Iran's missile system indicate two main goals in defense policy; on the one hand, Iran's missile progress has increased and strengthened the military and defense power of this country in regional and trans-regional relations, and on the other hand, it has expanded its deterrent capability beyond its borders. One of the important consequences of developing missile capability in today's world is the importance of geography; Therefore, strengthening missile activities will enable Iran not to consider bordering with enemies as an important priority in entering the war and engage with the enemies to face the threats. The use of longrange missiles and greater accuracy has accelerated the deterrent power beyond the borders. Also, Iran's success in increasing its missile capabilities in terms of accuracy and range has greatly increased the strike force of the armed forces and has given the country a special defense capability, in which case its defense policy will be able to deal with threats concerned with national security and the political independence of the country from a distance. Accordingly, the scope of Iran's defense-security strategy has expanded beyond geographical borders with the evolution of missile system technology and continues to expand.
The main reason for the expansion of Iran's deterrent capability beyond its borders and the strengthening of its defense capability is due to advances and changes in missile capabilities, which have been made for several reasons:
a. Iran's experience in the imposed war and understanding the great difference between the missile capabilities of Iran and Iraq;
b. Large US presence in the region and open hostility to Iran, changing the meaning of security and threatening the security environment of the Middle East;
c. Iran's defense doctrine emphasis on deterrence and asymmetric warfare to defend the territorial integrity and political independence;
d. Equipping the countries of the region with missiles and weapons of mass destruction and huge investments in this field;
e. The superiority in the military capability over Iran's two main enemies (i.e. The United States and the Zionist regime) in the field of air and missile forces;
f. The essentially deterrent feature of missiles in terms of the low cost and the short time in achieving it;
g. Providing better national security by having special missile capabilities (such as range, accuracy, speed, target-hit system, destructive power and capability, and carrying).
In general, it can be said that Iran has taken appropriate measures in the field of missile activities to strengthen its extra-territorial deterrence, to expand its future battles, and to form an asymmetric war against its enemies, with the ultimate goal of improving its defense capabilities and deterrence against enemies (Arghavani Pir Salami and Pirankhoo, 2017).
6. Discontinuity of Iran's missile capability with nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (security)
One of the main reasons for the security of Iran's missile capability is its connection with the production and use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, three separate and related claims have been made: 1) the inherent ability of Iran's medium-range and long-range ballistic missiles to carry nuclear warheads and weapons of mass destruction; 2) Iran's ability to produce intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and attacking Europe and the United States; 3) Development of satellite launch technology by Iran as a cover for the construction of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the production technology of which is in many respects similar to the technology of production of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
The Americans claim that when the developed ballistic missile program is analyzed alongside Iran's nuclear program, there is a major concern that Iranian missiles have the inherent ability to carry weapons of mass destruction (Hildreth 2012:1-10).
US missile experts, including Stephen Hilbert, wrote a detailed report to the US Congress in December 2012, stating: "Countries' access to ballistic missiles is not necessarily a problem for the US, and in fact, America's friends and allies have such missiles with their modernization program, but when this program is pursued by countries that are hostile to the United States, it is against the national interests of the United States and its friends and allies and is considered to be a source of concern and threat. These
concerns are exacerbated when the enemy is likely to seek the development of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons capable of launching missiles (Hildreth 2012: 5).
Unfortunately, linking Iran's missile capability to nuclear weapons, in addition to the claims made by military officials and experts, is also addressed in paragraph 9 of Security Council Resolution 1929. In addition to outlining the need to ban Iran's access to military equipment, including missile systems, the aforementioned resolution also stipulates that it should prevent the expansion of ballistic missile capabilities and link them to nuclear weapons. According to the clause, Iran should not take any action on ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons, and all governments are obliged to take all possible measures to prevent the transfer of technology or any technical assistance to Iran in this regard.
The draft of this clause thus has no legal precedent regarding missile capability, in which Iran's missile defense, which is the strong point of the country's asymmetric defense deterrence, is directly mentioned. In general, UN Security Council Resolution 1929, in terms of content and form, was more severe than previous resolutions and contained new founding axes designed to cripple the security and economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The measures envisaged in this resolution could implicitly push Iran to the brink of war and military confrontation. Among the measures envisaged in this resolution is the possibility of converting Article 41 of the UN Charter (economic sanctions) into a military confrontation under Article 42 of the Charter.
The third issue to secure missile power in parallel with the nuclear program is the connection between the space program and the launch of the Iranian satellite with the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. US sources claim that due to the similarity of satellite launch technologies to earth orbit in many parts with the process and technology of production and development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, Iran's satellite launch program is a cover for the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles with a range of at least 5,500 km that can target the whole of Europe and even the United States. The production of intercontinental missiles with a range of 10,000 km will enable Iran to attack directly on American soil. On the other hand, the same American experts were amazed by the unparalleled transparency of Iran regarding the television coverage of the missile drills, satellite launches, and the open interviews of military and civilian officials in this regard (Hildereth 2012:10). Regardless
of the type and content of the claims of US military officials and experts, the most significant issue is the vast amount of written information and literature that is being published in the West, and especially in the United States, about Iran's missile capability. This written literature discusses in detail all the efficiency parameters of this capability, the results of tests and military exercises and the internal infrastructure of this capability, and the amount of assistance received from other countries. Hildert's is just one example of the aforementioned.
In response to these allegations, apart from the Supreme Leader's fatwa on the prohibition of the production and use of nuclear weapons, state and military officials have repeatedly stated that nuclear weapons have no place in the military doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran and that such weapons will not guarantee Iran's security; As for the military importance, considering the valuable experiences of war against Iraq, the missile itself, as an efficient military tool with a conventional explosive warhead, is a weapon with a clear identity and with a superior strategic function and deterrence, and the selection of this military tool in Iran's defense strategy has nothing to do with the use of nuclear weapons.
Concerning the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the military commanders and the Ministry of Defense have explicitly stated, first, Iran has no intention of producing intercontinental ballistic missiles to attack any country or use it as a launcher, and Iran's conventional missile capability only implies defensive deterrence capability. Second, Iran's missile deterrence capability is one of the strengths and most important military tools of its defense strategy, and it is organized in such a way that creates a striking retaliatory force to maintain the country's security so that the enemies do not dare to attack Iran. Despite security threats and challenges, Iran, with popular support, internal social cohesion, and the strength of asymmetric defense deterrence, has maintained the security and survival of the system and proved the effectiveness of the missile capability in advancing defense objectives.
Meanwhile, the expansion of the missile defense shield by the United States, NATO, and the southern allies in the Persian Gulf, which is being created and expanded to nullify missile capability, is the most important challenge to missile capability complicating the security puzzle for Iran, especially in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Therefore, it seems necessary to confront this new security puzzle while maintaining and continuing to strengthen defensive deterrence and achieve reasonable adequacy in ac-
tive defense by relying on the principle of innovative and effective defense to avoid unwanted conflict in unlimited arms race resulting from the expansion of the missile defense shield, which poses a serious challenge to the legitimacy and social mobilization power of the Islamic Republic of Iran, through strengthening defense diplomacy, especially in relations with its southern neighbors. Reasonable active defense adequacy means that the military is only one of the necessary means to maintain national security. Such an attitude reflects the economic and social realities and foreign policy position of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the national security strategy and requires accepting the fact that economic and social health inside Iran and having credibility and influence in international relations are the main pillars of Iran's national security. Unilateral emphasis on military power as the sole or, at least, the most important pillar of security endangers the economy on the one hand and exacerbates the security dilemma with its neighbors on the other, and it leads to suspicion of these governments, especially their southern neighbors, which have placed themselves entirely under US security protection in the Persian Gulf, against the intentions of the Islamic Republic of Iran. As such the Suspicion has intensified their actions in strengthening the military forces and their costly participation in the expansion of missile defense shields in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf (Heidari, 2014).
Astronomical figures for arms deals between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman in the purchase of military weapons from the United States, France, and the United Kingdom; and in particular the equipping of these countries with missile defense shields equipped with third-generation Patriot and Todd missiles and the presence of the US Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf, which has led to the expansion of US military bases in Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Oman, has fueled an unwanted arms race against Iran and forced it to further strengthen its military might. Thus, a new round of arms race between Iran and rivals is taking shape in the light of developments in the expansion of the missile defense shield, which should not divert Iranian security policy makers' attention from other components of national security, including the realization of the economic epic that the supreme leader desires.
In this regard, the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War are the most instructive phenomena in the history of international relations, which showed how the former Soviet Union, despite having one of the world's most powerful
armies throughout history, due to structural, economic, social, and international crisis collapsed. The former Soviet Union became too late aware of the fact that the main threat to the national security was not military, but above all, it was due to threats with economic and political nature and that the exercise of the military could not help it to dispel the danger of collapsing (Arbatov, 1988: 8).
Finally, given Iran's territorial position, having a missile may be the only strategic tool in regional wars that has demonstrated its function in the wars of recent decades in the West Asian region; As in the Iran-Iraq War, in the stage of which is referred to as the War of the Cities, Scud ballistic missiles were widely used, and ultimately, following the destruction and devastation at this stage, the war ended; and this demonstrated the decisive effect of missiles on the war (Cordesman, 2002). Therefore, the Islamic Republic considers missile defense as an inevitable option in the face of regional and trans-regional threats.
7. Defense diplomacy; Advisory assistance and balance of power
The Islamic Republic of Iran has provided comprehensive assistance to its strategic allies during the Syrian crisis. Iran's assistance to the Syrian government (as well as to its other allies, including Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, etc.) should include the following: 1. Oil and financial assistance 2. Informational and intelligence support 3. Arms and military equipment supply 4. Sending specialists and technical officers to Syria to train the Syrian army 5. Formation and training of militias such as the Al-Shabaab (Fatimid Army) following its military-defense strategy in Syria (Clarion Project,2014:11). It should also be noted that Ayatollah Khamenei sees the internal conflict in Syria as a black and white issue. Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei believes that "the Syrian regime is an important part of the axis of resistance against Israel and the front line of Iran's struggle against the United States." Some Iranian officials have been skeptical of Tehran's unwavering support for the Assad regime, but it seems that the Islamic Republic of Iran has provided full support (Heshmatsena, 2016).
It seems that in addition to continuing and maintaining relations with allied groups, Iran's support for the Syrian government against the opposition has other opportunities for the Islamic Republic of Iran, the most important of which can be the superiority of Iran and the axis of resistance in the region within the framework of the balance of power with its re-
gional rivals, especially Saudi Arabia, increasing its soft power in the region, removing the threat from its borders, dragging the threat beyond the borders of the Zionist regime, and most importantly, Utilizing its regional influence as an important factor in defense diplomacy and international developments. In this regard, it should be said that the Islamic Republic of Iran, within the framework of principal positions and diplomatic efforts of its defense diplomacy to establish stability and peace in the region and Syria, has supported an approach that prevents war and conflict and strengthens Syrian-Syrian dialogues and has presented various plans to resolve the Syrian crisis politically; the plans that take into account both the principles of the country's foreign policy and a practical solution to the Syrian crisis. For example; On November 22, 2017, the presidents of Iran, Turkey, and Russia hold an important trilateral meeting in Sochi, Russia.
Restoring Syrian sovereignty, launching talks between various Syrian political forces, and ending counter-terrorism operations in this country were among the topics of this meeting (Masoudnia, Ebra-himi, and Darj, 2018).
Thus, to achieve its goals in the region, using the military option, especially missile weapons in the Syrian crisis, and showing more power and expression to its enemies, the Islamic Republic of Iran, from its strength point (missile power), sent this message to the enemies and their allies that any threat to its strategic interests leads to a response; and it would be as a response to make the arms embargo ineffective.
Conclusion
After the Islamic Revolution, especially during the imposed war, important efforts were made to increase defense capabilities and military programs, the most important focus of which was the acquisition of advanced missile technology. Since missile capability is today the basic principle of countries in the deterrence strategy, Iran's attention to increasing its missile capabilities to increase the capacity and scope of defense deterrence is obvious; and it is one of the basic principles of deterrence in the defense doctrine of the country. Iran's progress in developing space capabilities has led to the development of the country's indigenous capabilities in the production of missiles with better defense capabilities and has reduced the country's need for imported technologies. Also, strengthening the military capability of the country's armed forces by unifying and integrating existing systems in space and developing the ability of
anti-satellite missiles to disrupt enemy communication systems to develop its defense policy has increased the country's deterrence capability beyond its geographical borders and has made it possible for the defense force to respond to attacks and threats beyond Iran's territory. Increasing the country's missile capability is a key step in the development of Iran's defense-security strategy, which will be achieved by developing space capabilities through strengthening the range and accuracy of ballistic missiles to create effective deterrence. Accordingly, Iran can cover the targets in a wider dimension; therefore, the scope of Iran's defense-security strategy has expanded, and in addition to the repulsion of regional threats, the repulsion of trans-regional and extraterritorial threats has also been achieved. Iran's goals of striving for missile capability to strengthen deterrence can be achieved by expanding influence and interaction between countries in the region and the world, strengthening sovereignty in the region, eliminating US influence in the region, preventing the US and Zionist regime domination and war, and a change in the balance of power, the most important dimension of which is the strengthening of international relations and the expansion of defense deterrence beyond the borders.
The basis of the combined network deterrence strategy, based on conventional defense capability, is the transition from " a deterrence based on covert power or pure intimidation"; Because the strategic model of Iran seeks to raise the level of deterrence, improve the country's security, and create a favorable and constructive security environment. Such an environment is the bedrock of growth and development and well-being of most of the people of the country at the domestic level and will promote and institutionalize the model and collective security regime at the level of its peripheral and trans-peripheral environment. This is the same as defense-strategic diplomacy, namely, the use of diplomatic power and political tools to advance military objectives or the maximum use of civilian means to achieve the highest military objectives to counter regional threats. Hence, Iran's arms and security strategy emphasizes a defense, balancing, and interaction strategy based on trust, detente, and cooperation. Therefore, the approach and discourse governing Iran's weapons security strategy, which works to build trust, de-escalate, provide security and generation of power, and counter regional threats and neutralize them, is a comprehensive interactive-defensive combined approach.
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Information about the authors
H. Hakim — PhD, Assistant Professor of International Relations.
S. Gholami — MA of Regional Studies.
Информация об авторах
Х. Хаким — доктор философии, доцент кафедры международных отношений. С. Голами — магистр региональных исследований.
Статья поступила в редакцию 22.08.2021; одобрена после рецензирования 31.08.2022; принята к публикации 12.09.2022.
Вклад авторов: все авторы сделали эквивалентный вклад в подготовку публикации. Авторы заявляют об отсутствии конфликта интересов.
The article was submitted 22.08.2021; approved after reviewing 31.08.2022; accepted for publication 12.09.2022.
Contribution of the authors: the authors contributed equally to this article.
The authors declare no conflicts of interests.
