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THE CONCEPT OF PUGDALA IN THE BUDDHIST SCHOOL OF PUDGALAVADA: THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPTION
L.I. Titlin
Department for Oriental Philosophy Studies Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences Volkhonka, 14/1, build. 5, Moscow, Russia, 119991
The article investigates the notion of the self in Pudgalavada — one of the least studied schools of Buddhism. The Pudgalavada is an "unorthodox" trend of early Buddhism, which holds the doctrine of the existence of the self, or person — pudgala. The author examines the history of the formation of the Pudgalavada, makes an overview of available literature on the topic and analyzes the concept of the self in the key texts of this philosophical trend, analyzes in detail the philosophical arguments of debating parties — classical Buddhism and Pudgalavada Buddhism. The author comes to the conclusion that the apparent contradictions in the interpretation of pudgala can be explained by the consistent and logical evolution in the understanding of the concept of pudgala in the school of Pudgalavada. The article will be of interest to researchers in the fields of history of philosophy, philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology and to scholars investigating the problem of the self.
Key words: Buddhism, Pudgalavada, self, person, pudgala, soul, atman, anatman.
The problem of existence of the self and the problem of its properties seems to be one of the most important for the whole Indian philosophy. The largest contribution to the development of this problem was made by the controversy between the Buddhists and the Brahmanists. The catalyst for these discussions was the emergence of the Buddhist doctrine of the "non- self" (anatmavada).
In the debate on the self in Buddhism the school of Pudgalavada (Pali Puggalavada) comes forth. In contrast to most of the Buddhists it advocated the teaching of the existence of the self ("pudgala").
The doctrine of anatman, as presented in the Pali Canon (hereinafter — the PC), was not entirely clear because of its lack of rationalization and hence necessarily required some sort of philosophical and exegetical interpretation. The main "intraBuddhist" problem in the doctrine of anatman was that the Buddha nowhere in the PC directly denied the existence of the atman, but also nowhere did he openly claim it. Moreover, in many discourses he refused to directly answer this important philosophical and religious question, relating it to the category of avyakrta (Pali avyakata — lit. "indeterminate" questions, to which it is impossible to give any answer). The followers of the Buddha, who tried to somehow rationalize Master's words, were to solve in a philosophical way the problem deliberately excluded by him from the discourse. In addition, the doctrine of anatman as such was fraught with considerable difficulties and inevitably caused heated controversy by other philosophical schools.
Thus the concept of the existence of pudgala, i.e. the self with a specific ontolog-ical status, was designed, on the one hand, to rationalize the philosophical teachings of the Buddha and to explain the dark places of anatmavada for the Buddhists them-
selves, and on the other — to answer to the criticism of the Brahmanists and to give a rational explanation of the phenomena of rebirth and karmic retribution given the actual exclusion of the subject of these phenomena from the ontological and epistemo-logical system of early Buddhism.
Although Pudgalavada continues to be regarded as a "heretical" trend in Buddhism, the followers of this school considered themselves to be loyal to the ideas of the Buddha. They believed that their treatment of the self allows to protect the Buddhist teaching against many absurdities which arise, in their opinion, from a mere denial of atman as a reality.
However, Pudgalavada, which offered an alternative to the traditional interpretation of anatmavada, still remains one of the "dark spots" among the variety of the Buddhist schools for the most part of Russian and foreign scholars. This happens, on the one hand, because the original Sanskrit texts of the Pudgalavadins didn't remain (being now available only in a small number of Chinese translations), and on the other because the concept of the self as proposed by the Pudgalavadins, proved to be itself quite complicated and difficult to expound. Due to these facts, in various texts we have seemingly contradictory accounts of the concept of the self in Pudgalavada. As a result this notion appears to be extremely hard for interpretation. This article makes an attempt to explain the above mentioned apparent contradictions and to give more or less adequate interpretation of the concept pudgala in Pudgalavada Buddhism.
In Russian there are no works devoted entirely to Pudgalavada, the texts of the school still remain untranslated. Among the foreign works we know of only one monograph of Canadian scholar L. Priestley "Pudgalavada Buddhism. The Reality of the Indeterminate Self' [8] (main ideas of which are summarized in his article in the "Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy" [9]). The classic edition on early schools of Buddhism is A. Bareau "Les sectes bouddhiques du petit véhicule" [2]. It is possible to find in it information on all the schools of Pudgalavada Buddhism, including their basic theoretical guidelines. The monograph of bhikshu Thich Thien Chau "The Literature of the Perso-nalists of Early Buddhism" [10] contains the most complete account of the history of the Pudgalavadins and their ideas.
A. Bareau [2], (1) considers that Pudgalavada emerged from a split among the Sthaviravadins (the future Theravadins), which occurred c. 280 BC during the reign of King Bindusara Maurya. The first school of Pudgalavada trend was Vâtsîputrîya (Pali Vajjiputtaka), from which in the period from about the 3rd century BC and up to the 3rd century AD four schools separated (listed in order of their appearance): Dharmottarîya and Bhadrayanîya — both appeared about three centuries after the Buddha's Parinirvana, Sâmmatîyâ — emerged in the period from approximately the 2nd century BC to the 1st century AD, and Sannagarika — the latest school of Pudgalavada, emerged c. the 3rd century AD. Thus Pudgalavada consists of five schools of early Buddhism in total. The gradual split of the Pudgalavadins was caused mainly by disagreement on some theoretical questions of Buddhist doctrine and philosophy (such as, for example, the problem of the nature of Arhat).
C. the 7th century this school, nowadays known only to the limited number of specialists in the history of Buddhism gains tremendous popularity. As early as by the 3rd
or 4th centuries Sammatiya, which was identified by contemporaries with the previously famous but later disappeared ancient school of Vatsiputriya, known also as Vatsiputriya-Sammitiya or Arya-Sammatiya, becomes the dominant school in one of the largest Buddhist centers Sarnath, where it even surpasses the popularity of "orthodox" Sar-vastivada. Since the 7th century it turns into the most popular and in fact the only one school of Pudgalavada Buddhism. At this time Sammatiya is a set of two schools separated, most likely, mostly by geography: Kurukula and Avantaka.
The famous Chinese monk and traveler Xuánzáng (602—644/664) reports that at the time of his stay in India (c. 630—645) Sammatiya community had more than 60 thousand monks, being the most numerous of the Buddhist communities [3. P. 117.]. The school also enjoyed the sympathy of the royal power: chronicles say that even the sister of King Harsavardhana (606—646) joined the Pudgalavadin sangha as a nun.
Despite its popularity, unlike Theravada and Mahayana, Pudgalavada still didn't manage to spread beyond the Indian subcontinent (although some interest in the school was in China — this is evident because Pudgalavadin treatises preserved only in Chinese translation). Therefore, c. 11th century due to the Muslim conquest and expulsion of Indian Buddhism into the neighboring regions Pudgalavada completely ceases to exist. Thus, other schools of Buddhism turned out to be "historic winners". Nowadays they have the status of "orthodox" and regard Pudgalavadin current as "heretical".
Due to the mentioned historical reasons very few textual sources of this school are available to us. We have only four writings, preserved only in Chinese translation: the "Vinaya-dvavimsati-vidya-sastra" (in Chinese "Lu erh-shih-erh ming-liao lun"), a treatise with a Chinese name "Ssu-a-han-mu ch'ao chieh", the "Sammitiya-nikaya-Sastra" (hereinafter — the SNSH) and the "Tridharmaka-Sastra" (2).
Apart from the mentioned treatises, the most important source of our knowledge of Pudgalavada is the criticism of its views preserved in the writings of the philosophers of other Buddhist schools. Among them we should mention the "Kathavatthu" (2nd century AD), "Satyasiddhi-sastra" of Harivarman (3rd century AD), "Vijñanakaya" of Devasharman (2nd century AD.), "Mahayana-sütra-lamkara" of Asanga (5th century AD), "Tattva-samgraha" of Shantarakshita, or the compendium of the teachings of all schools (8th century AD), "Madhyamaka-hrdaya-vrtti" of Bhavaviveka, "Bodhi-caryavatara" of Shantideva (8th century AD.). The most important sources for the formation of various Buddhist schools and their views also include works of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinitadeva (3). The teaching of the Pudgalavadins also was subject to severe criticism by famous philosophers such as Nagarjuna, Vasubandhu and Chandrakirti.
From all sources regarding the Pudgalavadins the oldest and one of the most important is the "Kathavatthu" (c. 2nd century AD), or "The Topics for Discussion", part of the Abhidhamma-Pitaka of the PC. The "Kathavatthu" reflected numerous discussions which took place between various Buddhist schools during the 3rd Buddhist Council at Pataliputra under Emperor Ashoka (reigned from 268 to 232 BC). It should be noted that the text is written by "orthodox" Buddhists, supposedly the Theravadins, so it may significantly distort the original teaching of Pudgalavada.
Consider a small excerpt from the debate on pudgala from the "Kathavatthu":
"Controverted Point. — That "the person" is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
[§ 1] Theravadin. — Is "the person" known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?
Puggalavadin. — Yes.
Th. — Is the person known in the same way as a real and ultimate fact is known?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Th. Acknowledge your refutation: (i.) If the person be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also say, the person is known in the same way as [any other] real and ultimate fact [is known].
(ii.) That which you say here is wrong, namely, (1) that we ought to say, "the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact", but (2) we ought not to say, the person is known in the same way as [any other] real and ultimate fact [is known].
(iii.) If the latter statement (2) cannot be admitted, then indeed the former statement (1) should not be admitted.
(iv.) In affirming the former statement (1), while (v.) denying the latter (2), you are wrong" [7. P. 8—9.].
The essence of the debate is as follows. From the point of view of classical early Buddhism ontology (Sthaviravada, Sarvastivada etc.) only 75 dharmas, or elements of psycho-physical flow of existence. The Pudgalavadins argue, that the self, or pudgala is known, or "perceived" (upalabbhati) as "real and ultimate" (saccikattha-paramatthena), but refuse to admit that it actually is "real and ultimate".
Indeed, the introduction of pudgala, which was not recognized (but at the same time was not denied) by the Buddha as the 76th dharma would have been a flagrant violation of the tradition, which would have been regarded not even as a "heresy", a "false view", but also as a denial of anatmavada, the cornerstone of Buddhist teaching. This could lead to an automatic exclusion of the Pudgalavadins from the number of the Buddhists. Also the position of the Pudgalavadins seems for the Theravadins to be internally inconsistent. They argue that if pudgala is known, or "perceived" as "real and ultimate" (1), it must be in fact "real and ultimate" (2). It only remains to add that from the statement (2) inevitably follows that pudgala is a dharma (3).
It is obvious that the Theravadins and the Pudgalavadins use different ontological systems of reasoning. The Pudgalavadins believe that there is a category of things (namely, pudgala), which, on the one hand, is known as "real and ultimate", but on the other is not a dharma. But as far as they realize that frank assignment of pudgala to the domain of "real and ultimate" — will make it a dharma from the Theravadins point of view, they are forced to deny that it is "real and ultimate". In the case of classical Theravada Buddhism we are dealing with a two-part ontology (the "real and ultimate" dharmas and all other objects, which are conventionally real). Pudgalavada, on its part, offers a completely new three-part ontology: the "real and ultimate" level, conventionally real and the third — pudgala, which is known as "real and ultimate", but at the same time is not a dharma. Perhaps here we are dealing with the treatment of pudgala as a so-called "unspeakable" (avaktavya), the thing which is neither absolutely real nor conventionally real and constitutes therefore a separate ontological level.
The most important treatise of the Pugdalavadins themselves is the "Sammitiya-nikaya-sastra" (the Sanskrit name is a reconstructed one, the Chinese name is "San-
mi-ti pu lun", c. 350 AD). This is the only text of the Sammatiya school that has survived till our time. Like the rest of the Pugdalavadin treatises it has preserved only in Chinese translation.
The treatise offers a fundamentally new approach to the notion of the self (pudgala), which is not found in the texts of the other Buddhist schools (4).
Sammatiyas argue that pudgala can be perceived (prajnapta-pudgala) on the three different grounds.
1. Pudgala which is perceived in relation to its location (asraya-prajnapta-pudgala). By this they mean that pudgala is perceived as a self based on a particular set of aggregates, which is present in this birth. The treatise clearly states that pudgala is a concept: «Although the self exists, it is conceptual; the self is not substantial» (TI649, 464b6). However, the text notes that pudgala is not identical with aggregates, although not different from them.
2. Pudgala which is apprehended in relation to transmigration (sankrama-prajnapta-pudgala). The self is one who was someone in a past life and will be someone else in the future. Pudgala is understood in the perspective of rebirth. It is in this sense, according to the Pudgalavadins, the Buddha said that in the past life he was that person or other.
3. Pudgala which is perceived in relation to cessation (nirodha-prajnapta-pudgala). By this they mean the self which before the complete cessation (nirodha), i.e. before Nirvana, had such and such skandhas. Here pudgala is regarded from the point of non-existence of the previously existed aggregates (skandhas). From the point of view of the Pudgalavadins even in the state of Parinirvana when skandhas disappear and it is impossible to point to a specific denotation of the word "self" it is still wrong to say that pudgala doesn't exist.
Another text which is very interesting in case of the debate on the notion of the self between the Pudgalavadins and the "orthodox" Buddhists is the "Pudgalaviniscaya" ("The Investigation of the Self", hereinafter the PV) of Vasubandhu (c. 4th cent.).
Here is a quite representative passage from the first part of the PV.
"...Nonetheless, the Vatslputrlyas hold that there is a person.
Now, this must be examined: do they hold it to be substantial, or conceptually constructed?
What is [meant by] "substantial", and what [by] "conceptually constructed?"
If, like physical form, etc., it is a discrete entity, then it is substantial. But if like milk, etc., it is a collectivum, then it is conceptually constructed.
What follows from this?
If it is substantial, then because it is essentially separate, it must be said to be discrete from the bundles, just as the bundles are one from the other.
...this would imply [that the Vatslputrlyas hold] a non-Buddhist view..." [6].
On this the Pudgalavadins answer that pudgala "...is neither substantial nor conceptually constructed... " [6. P. 351].
Pudgala is perceived "As is fire, depending upon fuel.
How is it that fire is conceptually constructed depending upon fuel?
Though the fire is not conceptually constructed without fuel, one can neither assert that fire is discrete from fuel, nor that it is non-discrete. For if it were discrete, the
fuel would be not hot; and if it were not discrete, then the combustible would itself be the combustion. Just so, though the person is not conceptually constructed in the absence of the bundles, one cannot assert that it is discrete from the bundles, because that implies permanence; nor that it is not discrete, for that implies annihilation" [6. P. 351—352].
Thus, in the PV we see a new significant modification of the teaching of the Pudgalavadins. In this text pudgala appears not as a concept, but at the same time not as a reality, that is, is neither one nor the other, in other words — it is avaktavya, or ineffable.
Tracing the history of the teachings of the Pudgalavadins from the early treatises (the SNSH, the "Kathavatthu") until the era of the developed Buddhist philosophy (Va-subandhu), the apparent contradictions in the interpretation of pudgala can be explained by the consistent and logical evolution in the understanding of the concept of pudgala in the school of Pudgalavada. If in the early texts pudgala was understood as a mere concept, so their teaching was difficult to be separated from the teachings of the "orthodox" Buddhists, then by the 4th century they state more clearly their understanding of pudgala as, on the one hand, not just a mere designation, and on the other — not as a separately existing dharma. So happens the assertion of hitherto unprecedented teaching of a new type of ineffable realities — avaktavya, or avacya.
FOOTNOTES
(1) Here and after we follow the reconstruction of historical events and dating made by Dutt and Bareau: Dutt, Nalinaksha. Buddhist Sects in India. D.: Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1998.
(2) For the exposition of the four treatises see: Thich Thien Chau, Bhikshu. The Literature of the Personalists of Early Buddhism. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1999.
(3) See: Bareau, André. "Trois traités sur les sectes bouddhiques attribués à Vasumitra, Bhavya et Vinïtadeva." I partie: Journal Asiatique, 242. Paris, 1954, P. 229—66; II partie: Journal Asiatique, 244. Paris, 1956, P. 167—200.
(4) In the presentation of the main ideas of the SNSH we use mostly the exposition made by R. Buswell: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. VIII. Buddhist Philosophy from 100 to 350 A.D. Ed. by K.H. Potter. D.: Motilal Barnasidass, 1999. P. 353—365. English translation of the Sammitlyanikayashastra: Venkataramanan, K. "Sammitlyanikaya Sastra." Visva-Bharati Annals, 5 (1953), 155—243.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Bareau, André. "Trois traités sur les sectes bouddhiques attribués à Vasumitra, Bhavya et Vinïtadeva." I partie: Journal Asiatique, 242. Paris, 1954, P. 229—66; II partie: Journal Asiatique, 244. Paris, 1956, P. 167—200.
[2] Bareau, André. Les sectes bouddhiques du petit véhicule. Paris: École française d'Extrême-Orient, 1973.
[3] Bareau, André. The Buddhist Sects of the Lesser Vehicle. Translated from the French by Ge-longma Migme Chodron, 2005. URL: http://www.gampoabbey.org/translations2/ani-migme/Bareau-Sectes-Bouddhiques%20.pdf
[4] Dutt, Nalinaksha. Buddhist Sects in India. D.: Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1998.
[5] Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. VIII. Buddhist Philosophy from 100 to 350 A.D. Ed. by K.H. Potter. D.: Motilal Barnasidass, 1999.
[6] Kapstein M. Reason's Traces: Identity and Interpretation in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Thought. — Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2001.
[7] Points of Controversy, or, Subjects of discourse: Being a Translation of the Kathavatthu from the Abhidhamma-Pitaka. by Aung, Shwe Zan and Rhys Davids, C.A.F. — L.: Pali Text Society, 1915. P. 8—9.
[8] Priestley, Leonard. Pudgalavada Buddhism: The Reality of the Indeterminate Self. Toronto: Centre for South Asian Studies, University of Toronto, 1999.
[9] Priestley, Leonard. Pudgalavada Buddhist Philosophy / The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 2161-0002. — URL: http://www.iep.utm.edu/pudgalav/#H7
[10] Thich Thien Chau, Bhikshu. The Literature of the Personalists of Early Buddhism. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1999.
[11] Venkataramanan, K. "Sammitiyanikaya Sastra". Visva-Bharati Annals, 5 (1953).
ПОНЯТИЕ ПУДГАЛЫ В БУДДИЙСКОЙ ШКОЛЕ ПУДГАЛАВАДА: ПРОБЛЕМА ИНТЕРПРЕТАЦИИ И ЭВОЛЮЦИЯ КОНЦЕПТА
Л.И. Титлин
Институт философии РАН Сектор восточных философий ул. Волхонка, 14/1, стр. 5, Москва, Россия, 119991
В статье исследуется понятие субъекта в пудгалаваде — одной из наименее изученных школ буддизма. Пудгалавада является «неортодоксальной» школой раннего буддизма, которая придерживается учения о существовании субъекта, или «пудгалы». Автор рассматривает историю формирования пудгалавады, дает обзор имеющейся литературы по данной теме и анализирует концепцию субъекта по ключевым текстам этого философского течения, подробно анализирует философские аргументы обеих сторон — «классического» буддизма и буддизма пудгалавадинского. Автор приходит к выводу, что кажущиеся противоречия в интерпретации пудгалы можно объяснить последовательной и логичной эволюцией в понимании концепта пудгалы в школе пудгалавада. Статья может представлять интерес для исследователей в области истории философии, философии сознания, когнитивной психологии и для ученых, изучающих проблему «я» и субъекта.
Ключевые слова: буддизм, пудгалавада, я, человек, пудгала душа, атман, анатман.
