THE ARRIVAL AND ESTABLISHMENT OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY IN SPAIN

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This article summarily describes the arrival and establishment of Analytic Philosophy [= AP] in Spain. It first expounds the role played in that process by philosophers such José Ferrater Mora, exiled after the Spanish Civil War, and by Manuel Garrido, Jesús Mosterín, Javier Muguerza, Josep Blasco y José Hierro, the proper introducers of AP in the Spanish university. Secondly, the article refers to the work developed by the introducers’ former students and disciples, and holds that this second wave of AP in Spain largely helped to its consolidation. Finally, the current situation—a third wave of analytic philosophers in action—is reviewed. Its most active centres are identified, the main changes in the national scientific policy, its profound effects on academic activities for the last twenty years, and the high degree of internationalization reached by Spanish AP from the 1990s, after the founding of the Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica (S.E.F.A.), are concisely pointed out.

Key words: Analytic Philosophy, Spanish Philosophy, Josep Blasco, José Ferrater Mora, Manuel Garrido, José Hierro, Jesús Mosterín, Javier Muguerza

Analytic Philosophy [= AP, hereafter] arrived in Spain with contemporary studies in logic, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of language in the 1930s and 1940s. However, the first steps to consolidate these studies were taken first in the University of Valencia and then in the (Central) University of Barcelona and the Autonomous University of Madrid in the late 1960s. The Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and the ensuing atmosphere prevented AP from developing in Spain. When it finally found its way into university circles, it was identified with study and research in those disciplines, an identification that still persists. In this article, I prefer a less relaxed criterion, namely that an analytic philosopher is not simply one which carefully handles concepts and that meticulously argues for this or that point, but one who believes in the analysis of language – conceptual analysis, not dictionary checking – as a necessary step towards solving problems in philosophy. I will refer to this metaphilosophical approach to separate analytic from non-analytic philosophy in Spain in the last 50 years. On this basis, I will distinguish three stages in the arrival and

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2 In Spanish philosophy this view is paradigmatically exposed in Mosterín (1989). Peña (unpublished) and Bustos (2006) are close to Mosterín’s diagnosis.
establishment of AP in Spain –metaphorically speaking, waves that have brought AP’s methods, concepts and doctrines to its current condition.

Analytic Philosophy in Spain: its arrival and consolidation

During the 1940s and 1950s, Spanish philosophy was seized en masse by a kind of dogmatic variety of Scholasticism in which teaching was required in order to gain access to university full professorship. Other philosophical approaches, i.e. Marxist and Existentialist philosophy (of the Heideggerian and Sartrian kind), were so constrained that to be acquainted with them one had to enter private circles. This barrier even excluded the work of Spanish philosophers like Ortega y Gasset, Marías, and Zubiri. The criticism of metaphysics that Logical Positivism made much of worked against AP, because it was assumed that it challenged Catholic dogma, and the Catholic Church was a bastion of Franco’s ideology. In addition, the exile of promising figures, e.g. David García Bacca to Venezuela (in the 1930s), José Ferrater [Mora] to United States (in the 1940s) and Miguel Sánchez Mazas to Switzerland (in the 1950s), meant that AP’s first appearance in Spain was frustrated.

Among the antecedents of AP in Spain, the case of Ferrater deserves separate attention. Although his academic career was mainly held in the United States of America, his presence in Spanish universities was constant from early 1970s. His own philosophical thought deals with central questions in metaphysics, where he developed a kind of Weltanschaung known as integrationism (El ser y la muerte [Being and Death], 1962). Ferrater’s works abide by standards close to the analytic ones for its conceptual accuracy, argumentative rigour and the recognition that philosophy should take into account the methods and findings of science. His Indagaciones sobre el lenguaje [Inquiries into Language] (1970) and De la materia a la razón [From Matter to Reason] (1979) clearly demonstrate this. Ferrater considered himself an analytic philosopher of sorts. See his “Discurso inaugural” [“Opening Discourse”] in Blasco et al. (1973: 17–22).
generations of analytic philosophers, it was highly esteemed by Manuel Garrido, Jesús Mosterín, Javier Muguerza, José Hierro (the philosopher, not the famous poet), and Josep Blasco, who were the true main forces behind AP’s arrival to Spain.

Undoubtedly, the activity and esprit de militance deployed by several groups of professors, lecturers, and students in the universities of Valencia, Barcelona, and the Autonomous of Madrid, in the 1960s and 1970s, opened AP to a public interested in Western thought in general. The arrival of AP to Spain is due to them. To a significant extent the success was owed to the increasing number of higher-education and university students as well as to the expanding book-publishing industry (until that time, most philosophy either written or translated into Spanish came from Argentina and Mexico). However, the identification of AP with the work in logic, philosophy of science, and philosophy of language, together with the study of the thought of very specific philosophers, like Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap or Quine, gives a biased image of the arrival and consolidation of AP in Spain. The reason for that obliqueness is that most of those who led the process were not analytic philosophers in the strict sense. Miguel Sanchez Mazas, Javier Muguerza, Alfredo Deaño, Victor Sánchez de Zavala, Hierro (in Madrid), Emilio Lledó, Mosterin, and Jacobo Muñoz (in Barcelona), Garrido, Blasco (in Valencia), and Miguel Quintanilla (in Salamanca) were the central figures. However, among these, only Blasco and Hierro had the right profile – Mosterín too, but to a much lesser extent (see note 2). Accordingly, the first substantial works in Spanish AP were Hierro’s Problemas del análisis del lenguaje moral [Problems in the analysis of moral language] (1970), a book that resulted from Hierro’s doctoral dissertation in Oxford under Richard Hare’s guidance, and Blasco’s Lenguaje, filosofía y conocimiento [Language, Philosophy and Knowledge] (1973), which discusses certain views on meaning, mainly those related to Wittgenstein’s, which are brought to bear in language analysis. With the passage of time, Blasco’s and Hierro’s philosophical works have grown and enriched. Over his career, Blasco has produced outstanding work as a teacher and research director, sharing some of his published work with former students of his. Hierro soon changed from an Oxonian style of philosophy to a more naturalistic approach in which linguistics, sociolinguistics, and psychology are strategically combined. His book La teoría de las ideas innatas en Chomsky [Chomsky’s Theory of Innate Ideas] (1976) helped introduce Chomsky’s work to Spanish philosophers. His naturalism is also patent in his later work.

Mosterín’s contribution to AP in Spain is more difficult to assess than Blasco’s and Hierro’s. In the 1960s and 1970s Mosterín was concerned mainly with logic and the foundations of mathematics. Nevertheless, his teaching aimed at a fuller philosophical panoply, a feature of his work best reflected in his *Racionalidad y acción humana* [*Rationality and Human Action*] (1978). Mosterin’s high regard for the work of Frege, Russell, Carnap, and Quine emerged in his teaching and deeply influenced many of his students. His own work in AP, including a rich production addressed to a wider public, resulted in a series of papers on the logic of scientific terms, the Spanish edition – and the first in any language – of Kurt Gödel’s *Obras completas* [*Complete Works*] (1981) and the German edition of Carnap’s *Untersuchungen zur Allgemeinen Axiomatik* (2000).

Muguerza’s contribution to Spanish AP differs. In his influential introductory study to his edition of *La concepción analítica de la filosofía* [*The Analytic Conception of Philosophy*] two volumes, 1974), a notable compilation of essential texts in AP, from Russell to Austin, he argues that AP was on the edge of collapsing into scholasticism, and of becoming exhausted as a source of relevant philosophical pursuits, because AP tended to ignore the idea that philosophy is “criticism, criticism, and more criticism” (Muguerza 1977: 217). His attitude spread to many of his students and colleagues philosophically closest to him, the effect of such attraction being that AP did not touc them. Despite having reiterated his dissatisfaction with AP, in 1990 Muguerza founded *Isegoría*, a philosophy journal that published a significant number of papers in and on AP during its early years. *Isegoría* focuses on questions of ethics as well as moral and political philosophy, fields renewed with substantial contributions from Muguerza. On the other hand, Muguerza’s qualms about AP were not unanimously accepted. For example, his criticisms of utilitarianism were rejected by Esperanza Guisán (in Guisán 1981), and Guisán’s replies turned out to be more than an isolated reaction when a new journal, *Télos*, began to be edited in the University of Santiago (in Galicia, Spain) as a utilitarian alternative to anti-analytic statements.

Alfredo Deaño’s case is in some respects similar to Muguerza’s (both belonged to the AP group in the Autonomous University of Madrid). His posthumous work *Las concepciones de la lógica* [*Conceptions of Logic*] (1980) was the first significant work on the philosophy of logic studied in Spanish universities. He claims that his

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book contains analytic research into the nature of logic, but he qualifies
his claim by adding that he gives the term ‘analytic’ the Aristotelian
meaning. Consequently, Deaño did not think of conceptual analysis as
the right way of approaching problems in the philosophy of logic. In his
view, logic matters insofar as it is central in a theory of human
rationality and in the relationships between philosophy and scientific
knowledge. This naturalistic stance is manifested even more clearly in
the work and thought of Eduardo Bustos (a former student of Deaño)
whose publications have dealt with linguistic phenomena such as
presupposition, which have a foot set on semantics and another foot on
pragmatics. Bustos contends that, although philosophy’s core has to
consist of conceptual analysis, the materials that philosophical activity
is concerned with must be provided by science. In his own case, faithful
to such a precept, Bustos’ works have adopted a cognitivist perspective
and have dealt with topics such as metaphor and the role of cognition in
communication (Lenguaje, comunicación y cognición [Language, Communication and Cognition], 2004).

Two journals, Teorema and Theoria, have been prominent in the
establishment of AP in Spain. Teorema was founded by Manuel
Garrido and Fernando Montero in the University of Valencia, in 1971,
aiming at encouraging and publishing “research works on modern
philosophical problems approached from a critical perspective”. In its
first period (up to 1986) Teorema published works by Bunge,
Chomsky, Dummett, Habermas, Popper, Quine, Searle, and other
active and influential philosophers and scientists. Around them,
Garrido organized conferences, seminars, and interviews that exerted a
powerful impact on the university milieu. One accomplishment was the
edition of a series of translations into Spanish of papers by Ayer, Beth,
Chomsky, Feigl, Gödel, Kuhn, Lukasiewicz, Russell, Turing, and
many others (including continental philosophers such as Albert,
Gadamer and Habermas). This made first-rate work in AP accessible to
a broad readership. Another initiative was the so-called Symposia,
which facilitated the acquaintance with distinguished American and
European philosophers such as Davidson, Kutschera, Pears, Quine,
Strawson, Thiel, etc., and made it possible for an engagé audience to be
in direct contact with them. In 1996, Luis Valdés, a former student of
Garrido in Valencia, took charge of Teorema’s editorial work and
started its second period. Under Valdés’ editorship, Teorema has
become one the leading journals in AP throughout the
Spanish-speaking world.

Theoria was founded in Madrid by Miguel Sánchez Mazas and
Carlos Paris in 1952. Their goal was to publish research on the theory,
history, and foundations of science, lending specific attention to logical and epistemological investigations. *Theoria*’s first period lasted until 1956, when Sánchez Mazas went into exile. Almost 30 years later, in 1985, Sánchez Mazas, after returning to Spain, resumed control of *Theoria* with the support of the University of the Basque Country. Sánchez Mazas was far from being an analytic philosopher, his work focusing on the history of logic and the logic of normative systems inspired in statute law (*Obras escogidas* [Selected Works], 2002 and 2003). Although in its the second period of the journal, Sánchez Mazas did not give *Theoria* an analytic slant, and its first issue included articles written by Castañeda, Hierro, Kalinowski, and Peña, projecting the character that *Theoria* would assume in later years. From 1995 to 2002, as an associate editor, and from 2002 onwards, as the main editor, Andoni Ibarra has given *Theoria* an international character, focused mainly on analytic philosophy of science.

The consolidation of Analytic Philosophy in Spain

If AP in Spain took its first roots in Spain the 1970s and 1980s, this was due largely to the stimuli and training provided by Manuel Garrido and Jesús Mosterín. Three of Garrido’s former students stood out in the ensuing years: Blasco, Alfonso García Suárez, and Valdés. Of these three, García Suárez, whose career has been linked to the University of Oviedo, is the one who best meets AP’s standards. In 1976 he published *La lógica de la experiencia* [The Logic of Experience], on the private language argument devised by Wittgenstein. However, his more recent book *Modos de significar* [Ways to Mean] (2nd edition, 2001) is the most ambitious work that Spanish analytic philosophy of language has produced. As for Valdés, his work as the leading editor of *Teorema* has already come to the fore. Furthermore, he has made a significant contribution to AP by translating works of Wittgenstein, Dummett, and Searle (among other authors) into Spanish. His translation of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (2004), which is supplemented with pithy comments on many of its aphoristic propositions, is the one most studied among the existing ones.

While Valencia was the first front on which AP fought its battle, the second one was Barcelona. There the major proponent was Mosterín—as mentioned above, his view of AP has been quite general. Mosterín’s work left a considerable number of followers, among which three have, or have had, the profile of more orthodox analytic philosophers, namely Ulises Moulines, Daniel Quesada, and Juan...
Acero. Moulines has had a long career as a philosopher of science, Quesada as a philosopher of language and as an epistemologist, and Acero as a philosopher of language and mind. In *La estructura del mundo sensible* (*The Structure of the Sense World*, 1973), Moulines makes up a phenomenalist system that goes beyond the scope of the systems designed by Russell-Whitehead, Carnap, and Goodman. Because of Wolfgang Stegmüller’s suggestions, Moulines soon shifted to Suppes and Sneed’s structural conception of scientific theories, which had just been stated in *The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics* (1971). From that moment on, Moulines has been a leading and tireless promoter of that view, a project of his that has given rise to numerous publications (*Exploraciones metacientíficas* [*Metascientific explorations*], 1982; *Structuralist Theory of Science* (1996, together with Balzer). In addition to this, Mouline’s influence on Spanish philosophy of science has been, and still is, profound, having helped to set institutional relations with a substantial number of philosophers of science, especially in Barcelona, Santiago, the Basque Country, and Granada.

Within the philosophy of language, the idea of using logic and set theoretic resources as tools for the analysis of meaning was soon a familiar one in Barcelona. Daniel Quesada’s first steps were to apply three-valued logic to semantic analysis and the study of Chomsky’s grammatical proposals, specifically the philosophical significance of his grammar hierarchy, and the work of Richard Montague, which Quesada translated into Spanish. Since the middle of the 1990’s Quesada’s interests have evolved towards the philosophy of perception and epistemology in general. His book *Saber, opinión, ciencia* [*Knowledge, Opinion y Science*] (1998) is at present a major reference within epistemology syllabi in Spanish universities. Acero, the author of this paper, and a former student of Emilio Lledó and Mosterín in Barcelona, undertook postdoctoral studies in the Academy of Finland, with Jaakko Hintikka, on game-theoretical semantics, which applied to a number of phenomena in the semantics of Spanish (*La teoría de los juegos semánticos* [*Game-theoretical semantics*] (1977). In the 1980s he broadened his range of interests and focused on questions concerning the philosophical foundation of semantics (*Lenguaje y filosofía* [*Language and Philosophy*] (1993) and the philosophy of mind. His work in this latter sphere led him to the more specific area of the philosophy of emotions.

The Barcelona group of analytic philosophers, in the 1970s, also included Andrés Rivadulla and, in the 1980s, Francisco Rodríguez Consuegra. Like Acero, their academic careers began outside
Barcelona – Rivadulla in the Complutense University of Madrid and Rodríguez Consuegra in the University of Valencia. Rivadulla has authored a considerable body of work on Carnap’s and Popper’s philosophy of science, on probability and statistical inference (Probabilidad e inferencia estadística [Probability and Statistical Inference], 1991) and on the philosophy of physics. Rodríguez Consuegra’s main focus of research has been the philosophy of mathematics, specifically the unpublished work by Russell (The Mathematical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, 1991) as well as by Peano and Pieri, and has won international acclaim in this field. He has also been the first to edit Kurt Gödel’s unpublished writings.

Apart from these two lines of development, the work of Lorenzo Peña, researcher at the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC) since 1987, should not be overlooked. He was forced into exile in the 1960s and was trained as a philosopher in Ecuador and Belgium, under Paul Gochet’s guidance. Notable regarding Peña, his philosophical heroes were Gustav Bergmann, Chisholm, Neri-Castañeda, in sharp contrast with those of Valencia (the later Wittgenstein, Strawson, Davidson) and Barcelona (Frege, Russell, the early Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine). Peña has been concerned with matters of metaphysics, related mainly to ontology, to which he has applied logical tools (Hallazgos filosóficos [Philosophical Findings], 1992). His later work has involved him in research on the logic and philosophy of law.

A factor that has decisively contributed to the consolidation of AP in Spain from the late 1980s onwards was a scientific policy that provided increasing financial and institutional resources for research initiatives, and helped new generations of teachers and research students to complete or develop their training in high-quality university departments in Western Europe and North America. The so-called Seminarios Interuniversitarios de Filosofía y Ciencia Cognitiva [Interuniversity Seminars on Philosophy and Cognitive Science] (SIUCC), held yearly since 1990 – and Seminarios Interuniversitarios sobre Mente, Arte y Moralidad [Interuniversity Seminars of Mind, Art and Morality] (SIMAM), launched since the year 2000 – have enabled the most active analytic philosophers to make their work in progress known and have presented it to Spanish audiences prepared for the encounter. In more recent times, this support has been bolstered with the Ramón y Cajal (from 2000) and Juan de la Cierva (from 2004) research contracts, which have fostered the return of researchers and lecturers who held posts in foreign institutions and have promoted new research careers. These contracts
have reinforced the research activities of some Philosophy
departments, mainly those in the Universities of Barcelona, Granada,
the Basque Country, and Valencia.

Spanish Analytic Philosophy’s Third Wave

Garrido, Hierro, Moserín, Muguerza, and Blasco introduced AP in
Spain during the 1960s and 1970s. Save Muguerza, they are the first,
still modest, wave of Spanish AP. Acero, Bustos, García Suárez,
Moulines, Peña, Quesada, Rivadulla, Rodríguez, Valdés ride AP’s
second wave, which began in the 1970s and 1980s, continued in their
predecessors’ wake. The third wave has been growing since the middle
of the 1990s as the teaching and training work by the second wave’s
philosophers has been moving forward. The third wave best meets the
today’s prevailing international standards. I will briefly describe this
stage by referring to the work by Moulines and other analytic
philosophers of science and to the work of some groups in Valencia,
Barcelona, Granada, and Santiago.

Philosophy of science began in Spain in the 1950s, impelled
primarily by Sánchez Mazas, Paris, and Sánchez de Zavala. The impact
of Popper’s philosophy in the next decade left a few traces in the
philosophy community, as witnessed by the proceedings of the 1968
Burgos Congress (Ensayos de filosofía de la ciencia [Essays in
Philosophy of Science], 1970), Quintanilla’s short monograph
(Idealismo y filosofía de la ciencia [Idealism and Philosophy of
Science], 1972) and, later, the much more systematic work by
Rivadulla (Hipótesis y verdad en ciencia [Hypotheses and Truth in
Science], 2004). Though few could resist the Holy Trinity, i.e. Popper,
Kuhn, Lakatos, some philosophers, not only in Spain but also in
Argentina and Mexico, were attracted by the structuralist conception of
scientific concepts, theories, and theoretical networks that Stegmüller
was developing at the University of Munich since the early 1970s,
because it promised to include some of Kuhn’s new proposals.
Following the structuralist path, Moulines wrote, in collaboration with
José Diez (University of Barcelona), Fundamentos de filosofía de la
ciencia ([Foundations of philosophy of science] 1998), which has been
and it is still widely used in university teaching. Among those who
adopted Moulines’ approach were Magí Cadéval (La estructura de la
teoría de la evolución [The Structure of Evolution Theory], 1988), José
L. Falguera (Problemas ontosemánticos de los términos científicos
[Ontosemantic Problems of Scientific Terms], 1992) and Andoni Ibarra
One of Moulines' students, Luis Fernández Moreno (Complutense University of Madrid), began working on Tarski’s theory of truth, a path that led him years afterwards to systematic studies in the theory of reference and the work of philosophers such as Putnam and Kripke (La referencia de los nombres propios [Proper Name Reference], 2006).

Recent initiatives within the philosophy of science have opened at least two new lines. First, the philosophy of physics has become an independent line of research because of a group of philosophers in Madrid, Barcelona, and Granada, all with a twofold training in physics and philosophy. This group includes Mauricio Suárez (Complutense University), who is one of the leading figures of the European Philosophy of Science Association. Secondly, the philosophy of biology has won its own place within the philosophy of science, despite its still not having gained comparable recognition in university syllabi. The success is owed chiefly to Carlos Castrodeza (Complutense University), who has left a rich body of work on the theory of evolution and Darwinism (Ortodoxia darwiniana y progreso biológico [Darwinian Orthodoxy and Biological Progress], 1988), and to Alvaro Moreno (University of the Basque Country), who heads an active group specializing in artificial life, complex systems, and cognitive systems (La vie artificielle [The Artificial Life], 1997, with Julio Fernández Ostolaza). This new line within the philosophy of science is followed also by Antonio Diéguez (La vida bajo escrutinio [Life Under Scrutiny], 2012), Wenceslao Fernández (Evolutionism: Present Approaches, 2008) and Alfredo Marcos, editor of the biological writings of Aristotle.

In 1985 Blasco took the chair in Epistemology at the University of Valencia, where he had been on the teaching staff for 20 years. His work was fruitful, and at present some of his former students – Carlos Moya, Josep Corblí, Josep Prades, and Tobíes Grimaltos – are among the most creative Spanish analytic philosophers. Thanks to them, metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of action, dealt with in an analytic anti-reductionist and anti-naturalistic style, often placing attention on ethics and moral philosophy, have become solidly established in Valencia. Moya has translated Davidson’s work on philosophy of mind and philosophy of action into Spanish (Mente,
mundo y acción [Mind, World and Action], 1992), but he is now concerned primarily with central problems on the boundary between philosophy of action and ethics (Moral Responsibility: The Ways of Skepticism, 2006). On the boundary between metaphysics and philosophy of mind are the problems that Corbi and Prades have approached (Minds, Causes and Mechanisms, 2000). Corbi goes beyond the philosophy of mind and addresses pressing questions pertaining to moral philosophy and the philosophy of values, an interest prompted by the work of Bernard Williams and Richard Wollheim (Morality, Self-Knowledge, and Human Suffering, 2012). Grimaltos, following a path closest to Blasco’s, has centred on epistemological problems (Signo y pensamiento [Sign and Thought], 1999, with Blasco and Dora Sánchez (Teoria del Coneixement [Theory of Knowledge], 2003, with Blasco).

In Barcelona, Quesada, and especially Manuel [García-Carpintero, have led a process that has placed Barcelona at the forefront in European AP. Quesada’s students include Ramón Cirera (Carnap and the Vienna Circle, 1994), prematurely deceased, David Casacuberta (Qué es una emoción [What an Emotion Is], 1990), and Carpintero. Carpintero (Las palabras, las ideas y las cosas [Words, Ideas and Things], 1996), the main figure of the LOGOS group, brings together researchers and students from the Universities of Barcelona (Central and Autonomous) and Gerona. Carpinero has coedited two volumes of essays, on two-dimensional semantics (with Josep Macià) and on truth-relativity (with Max Kolbel). LOGOS was founded in 1993 and encompasses almost all fields in contemporary AP except ethics and moral and political philosophy. In this broad area, Carpintero, his colleagues, and his students are carrying out high-quality work not only as research trainers but also as creators and supporters of academic and institutional relationships at the highest international level. The scientific production of the LOGOS members can be found in many of the most demanding international journals. LOGOS has the only Master’s degree programme and the only Philosophy doctoral programme in AP in Spain. Other members of LOGOS are Manuel Pérez Otero (Conceptos modales e identidad [Modal Concepts and Identity], 1999), David Pineda (La mente humana [The Human Mind], 2012) and Diez. Model theory, modal logic, two-dimensional semantics and the work of logicians and philosophers such as Tarski, Kripke, Grice, David Lewis, David Kaplan, Peacocke or Williamson are references for many LOGOS members.
In Granada the group of analytic philosophers formed over the 1980s. In 1986 the University of Granada awarded Quine an honorary doctorate, and the ensuing international conference arranged to discuss his work (*Symposium Quine*, edited by Acero and Tomás Calvo in 1987). This was the first step in a long path to the present. During the 1980s and 1990s, almost all analytic philosophers in Granada were former students of Acero, the first ones being Aurelio Pérez Fustegueras (*La epistemología de Quine* [*Quine’s Epistemology*], 1986) and María José Frapolli (*The Nature of Truth*, 2013), and the philosophy of language has been the nexus linking them for long. From the year 2000, the group profile become richer as new members contributed novel research foci – metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of physics, and the philosophy of psychology – and philosophical backgrounds. Although Hintikka’s philosophy of language and semantics has been a constant in Acero’s academic career, and Christopher Williams has played a similar role in Frapolli’s work on philosophy of logic, pragmatism in Granada has gradually gained prominence. It started with the study of Quine’s writings and then focused increasing attention on the works of Wittgenstein, Ramsey, Susan Haack, Sellars, and Brandom. The group has edited collective volumes on the philosophy of Wittgenstein, Ramsey, Quine, Hintikka, Evans, Burge, and Recanati and built up international relationships both with European and with American institutions.

The AP group in Santiago (Galicia, Spain) began to form in the 1980s, after Rafael Beneyto, a former student of Garrido’s in Valencia, assumed the Logic chair. Despite not being an analytic philosopher, by his performance he set the basis on which the group became consolidated (some of its members had studied in Santiago as well as in Valencia). The philosophical interests of its members fall within the domains of logic, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of language, a profile to which its relations to Corcoran, Prawitz, and Michael Dummet have greatly contributed. The question of the nature of truth and the confrontation between realism and anti-realism in logic, epistemology and semantics has polarized much of their work. Juan Vázquez (*Mente y mundo* [*Mind and World* 2007]), José Sagüillo (*El movimiento antitematífico* [*The Anti-Metaphysical Movement*], 2001, with Rom Harré) and Uxía Rivas (*El significado dispersado* [*Meaning Dispersed*], 1994) belong to this group.

At these four institutions, individual careers need to be taken into account. Hierro and Quintanilla have contributed to the establishment of AP in Spain, though neither has headed any group. Manuel Hernández
Iglesias has dealt mostly with the work of Davidson (El tercer dogma: interpretación, metáfora e incommensurabilidad [The Third Dogma. Interpretation, Metaphor, and Incommensurability], 2004) and Anastasio Alemán, whose work has focused philosophy of logic and mathematics (Lógica, matemática y realidad [Logic, Mathematics and Reality] 2001) were students of Hierro. Manuel Liz (La vida mental de algunos trozos de materia [The Mental Life of Some Bits of Matter], 2001) and Fernando Broncano (Saber en condiciones [Knowledge Proper], 2003) were students of Quintanilla. Roderick Chisholm’s rationalism as well as Ernest Sosa’s the epistemological work have heavily swayed Broncano’s and Liz’s viewpoints.

The view offered in this paper would be incomplete if a circumstance that has taken place repeatedly over the last decade were not reported. From the 1990s, philosophers have completed their MA or even PhD degrees in Spain and have continued their education outside Spain, e.g. in the United States and Britain (though also Germany and France, after AP took hold in these two countries) In some cases, Spanish institutions have managed to enlist philosophers, e.g. Mario Gómez Torrente, Genoveva Martí, Mauricio Suárez and Pepa Toribio, whose contributions to AP in Spain are being decisive in reinforcing its quality and gaining recognition beyond the Spanish borders. In other cases, such as María Álvarez (Kinds of Reasons, 2010), Jordi Fernández (Transparent Minds, 2013), and José L. Zalabardo (Skepticism and Reliable Belief, 2012), despite not belonging to national institutions, their work is well known by their colleagues in Spain and is usually integrated into their research activities.

The Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy (S.E.F.A.)

This final paragraph is meant to record the exact episode that certifies the establishment of AP in Spain, namely, the foundation of the Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica (SEFA) [Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy] in 1996. The event took place in Valencia, and the first SEFA President was Josep L. Blasco. The presidents after him have been Moya, Acero, Carpintero, and Toribio. SEFA coordinates the edition of a book series on the different philosophical fields. Up to now three volumes have been published within this series, on philosophy of logic, epistemology, and aesthetics. In addition, SEFA
promotes, organizes, and financially supports four series of international conferences and seminars: the SIUCC, the SIMAM, the Latin Meetings in Analytic Philosophy and the Encuentros Hispano-Argentinos de Filosofía Analítica [the Spain-Argentina Meetings in Analytic Philosophy].

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