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14THE APPOINTMENT OF A PERSON AS A CITIZEN OF THE WORLD IN ANTHROPOLOGY: THE
INTERPRETATION OF M. FOUCAULT
Gorchackova S.,
assistant professor, PhD in Philosophy Kursk state University, Kursk, Russia Kovaleva M.
assistant professor, PhD in Philosophy Kursk State and Municipal Service Academy,
Kursk, Russia
Abstract
The article deals with the interpretation and critical interpretation of Kantian antropology, proposed in the early works of Foucault. The famous metaphysical question of I. Kant, demonstrating the original "problematic" of man, believes the subject of philosophy "in the world-civil plan", that is anthropology transfers "criticism" to the empirical level and makes it pragmatic. M. Foucault through the conceptualization of Gemüt, or character, as a new dimension that appeared in I. Kant, reveals the role of language in the anthropological study of subjectivity.
Keywords: pragmatic anthropology, man, moral being, subjectivity, character, Gemüt, language.
The transcendental critical philosophy of I. Kant made a real revolution in the history of thought, but his anthropological views aroused particular interest, perhaps. The important role of the Konigsberg thinker in this sense, as noted by Yu.V. Perov, in the preface to Kant's "Anthropology", is concluded in the following points: Kant asserts that the main three questions of metaphysics are "what can I know?", "What should I do?" and "what dare I hope for?" - boil down to the fourth question, "What is a person?" [5, p. 55]. Having formulated such a question, I. Kant shows the original "problematic" of a person, his very existence is "problematic" both for himself and for others. And since these three initial questions define a person not as a being of the natural order, but as a "citizen of the world", insofar as they constitute the subject of philosophy "in the world-civil plan", that is, the field of philosophy as such. In the Critique of Pure Reason, I. Kant already brings to our attention all the same three questions as belonging entirely to the sphere of transcendental philosophy and comes to the conclusion that pure reason, more precisely in its moral application, contains the principles of possible experience, of those actions that could meet in human history according to moral requirements. Thus, the philosopher assumes the existence of pure moral laws that a priori determine all human behavior, that is, "the use of freedom of a rational being in general" [3, p. 599], and which are unconditional and, therefore, necessary in all respects. Now these three questions reappear at the beginning of "Logic" [4, p.280], but having undergone a decisive change. Added fourth question: what is a person? - the question that follows the first three, bringing them together in a single coordinate system, where metaphysics is called upon to answer the first question, morality to the second, religion to the third, and, finally, anthropology to the fourth. But in essence, as I. Kant writes, they can all be reduced to anthropology, since the first three questions relate to the latter. Thus, the main attention in the late period was directed by I. Kant to the problem of applying transcendental philosophy to life. For this reason, I. Kant is engaged in the consideration
of pragmatic anthropology, which examines what a person, being a freely acting being, "does or can and must make of himself" [2, p. 131].
I. Kant interprets anthropology as an empirical science about man, which studies man as a phenomenon in experience, that is, his stay in nature, first of all, as a natural bodily-sensual being in space and time. According to I. Kant, only knowledge deduced from a priori principles and in this respect possessing universality and necessity should claim the title of philosophical, then an empirically determined anthropology cannot become a philosophical anthropology in the sense of a section or part of philosophy. But since transcendental philosophy, in addition to formulating, substantiating and concretizing its own provisions, also concerns the possibility of applying a priori knowledge, it itself needs for such an application in anthropology. The question "what is a person?" it is impossible to consider within the framework of pure thinking, for the person being questioned about is already in the world in the role of its inhabitant. Therefore, thinking about a person, we simultaneously think about the world. What is being discussed in the anthropological question is not determined at the level of the phenomenon in which the human being is captured and defined; rather, it is an unfolding of self-consciousness and "I", the subject himself acts on the movement, in which he recognizes himself as an object: "I exist - in this both the world outside me in space and time, and I myself as a world being; I am aware of any correlations and driving forces of perception. A person's self appears as his own external meaningful object, a part of the world "[7, P. 79]. The pathos of I. Kant himself is that the world of objects as phenomena is, in principle, cognizable because it is constituted by the same transcendental abilities of the subject, thanks to which cognition of this world is realized. This moment, as M. Foucault notes in his "Introduction" to Kantian anthropology, makes it possible to determine the space within which anthropology is generally possible: it is not only the study of the "I" as an object of pure synthesis and self-awareness of this "I", but also to myself, being an object and existing exclu-
sively in its only phenomenal truth. It is probably impossible to impart transcendental meanings to empirical contents, or to move them into the area of constitutive subjectivity, without resorting to the help of anthropology - that is, to such a way of thinking in which the actual (natural) limits of the knowledge gained, and, therefore, of all empirical knowledge, are at the same time by concrete forms of existence, in other words, they are given in the same empirical knowledge. I. Kant, first of all, seeks to investigate how our human being, being in the material world and obeying the laws of nature, at the same time demonstrates the freedom of the mind.
In self-consciousness, in a person's reflection on himself, I. Kant sees the essential uniqueness of a person, which, again, betrays the closeness of Kant's interpretation of the subject to the Descartes philosophical tradition, where cogito is cogito me cogitare. I. Kant says that a person, first of all, thinks of himself and adds: "the fact that a person can have an idea of his I, infinitely raises him above all other creatures living on earth. Thanks to this, he is a person, and due to the unity of consciousness with all the changes that he can undergo, he is one and the same person "[2, p. 139]. Although, according to I. Kant, anthropologically this is in principle inexplicable, in transcendental philosophy such an essential difference between a person is substantiated through the same transcendental unity of apperception, which, as the main foundation of reason, is a necessary and sufficient condition for any mental activity of a person. It is impossible to think about something at all, if at the same time there is no comprehension of oneself as a self-identical subject. Therefore, the knowledge that a person can know what he should do and what he dares to hope for is essential knowledge about a person in his capabilities and abilities. In other words, the reduction of questions to one is a reduction to the basis, that is, the answer to the question about a person is the basis, prerequisite and source for obtaining answers to the other three. Thus, anthropology as a "study of mankind" is equally a world study. The fourth question, not differing from the first three in a radical way, resumes their formulation. From this perspective, anthropology is seen as a continuation and development of critical philosophy. Kant's version of anthropology involves the study of people's actions as free moral subjects and the ways in which conditions, habits and character traits influence their actions. Pragmatic anthropology in a moral and practical sense is called upon to cultivate human nature within the framework of civil society. Anthropology is pragmatic not in the sense that it comprehends a person as belonging to the moral sphere of the soul (which would make it practical) or forms a civil society from subjects of law (which would make it legal), instead, it considers a person as a citizen of the world [7, P. 42].
Anthropology deals with the existence and functioning of human abilities at the empirical level, but it also includes, although applied to experience and reflects in it, abilities of a priori origin. In anthropological and pragmatic terms, such abilities simultaneously characterize a person both as a subject influencing others and on himself, and as an object being influenced
by them. At the same time, all the a priori abilities of the transcendental subject appear in application to their empirical existence as normative, since in critical philosophy they were investigated in their universality and necessity, and not in the individually empirical randomness of their existence in man as a subject of anthropol-
°gy.
Cognitive abilities in pragmatic anthropology are interpreted as contributing to practical means and as a means to achieve goals. Reason, given in the Critique of Pure Reason as the universal legislator of possible and actual experience and theoretical knowledge of nature, here turned out to be the source of rules artificially established by man to guide activity. Reason in a pragmatic sense appears as the ability to judge according to principles, evaluate consequences, make decisions and act in accordance with them. Thus, it is asserted that a person "has a character that he creates for himself, being able to improve according to his own set goals" [6, p. 245]. Let us dwell in more detail on the concept of character, for which we turn to M. Foucault and his "Introduction to Kantian Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View." In this work, through the interpretation and critical interpretation of the Kantian text, Foucault already considers the idea of technology, self-care, the role of language in the anthropological study of subjectivity, and also puts forward, but still very carefully, warnings about the danger of anthropology for metaphysics - themes characteristic of his later philosophy.
M. Foucault in his introduction writes about a new dimension that appeared in I. Kant - this is Gemüt, that there is some inner sensation that can be considered as a character, or disposition, or even a part of the "soul", but subject to the content of that that manifests itself in experience. Otherwise, the knowledge of this feeling would be impossible. This definition lies at the basis of the identity of anthropology and empirical psychology established by I. Kant, according to which it is impossible in any way to investigate the human "soul" outside the body. Any mental experiences and states of a person are given to him in feeling as objects of internal and external human experience, in which both bodily and mental states are merged together so that, in principle, their independent existence from each other is not possible, and, accordingly, separate cognition of the soul and body ... If, in the analysis of internal experience, we abstract from the metaphysical question of the incorpo-realness of the soul as a special substance, then our thinking stems from anthropology, but not from psychology. That is, rational psychology cannot exist, and empirical psychology is possible only in the form of anthropology. Of course, the opposite attitude turns out to be biased, psychology is always completely covered by anthropology, which, in turn, cannot be reduced only to psychology.
But if in anthropology there was no moment associated with the work and application of the higher abilities of the subject, it is obvious that the content of anthropology as a whole would turn out to be psychological. All objectification and all "artificial" on the part of the subject, I. Kant believed, can be considered as conscious manifestations of his feelings, goals and
knowledge, the totality of which, including metaphysical and philosophical thought processes, is given directly in the inner experience under the a priori form of time and in an empirical sense, refer to the "mental". Therefore, for myself, "I" is a "psychological-anthropological subject" [5, p. 103], but the other person as an object influencing me is also seen by me, first of all, as a psychic being. In addition, within the framework of his anthropology, I. Kant focuses on the "unreasonableness" of human affects and passions. It is found that passions for their existence necessarily presuppose reason and at the same time inevitably come into conflict with it. Passions and affects are not unreasonable, but unreasonable, all of them are inevitably in collision with the "idea of freedom of practical Reason" [5, p. 106].
Although it is impossible to eliminate passions completely, man, as an intelligent thinking creature, must curb them in himself and subordinate them as much as possible to rational control. Thus, M. Foucault concludes, the meaning of character is expressed not simply in "what it is", but in "what it makes of itself." "Self" provides that which distinguishes man from all other beings. "Himself' makes a person a person, and this concept gives him power over everything else, this makes him an object of self-reflection. "Himself' is involved in all our thought and action, and our greatest concern is about ourselves [8, p. 39]. The status of a citizen of the world obliges a person to make something of himself, guided by reason, but as soon as a person as a freely acting and moral being finds in himself "the courage to use his own reason", he will immediately come out of his state of "minority". To this it must be added that Gemüt is "the most possible application of reason" - an application that is carried out through "ideas."
M. Foucault continues, anthropology supports the division of abilities established in critical philosophy. However, its privileged area is not where abilities and capabilities flaunt their positive traits, but where they show their defects - or at least where they face danger, risking annihilation. The only possible anthropology, notes M. Foucault, is one where, instead of existence tied to the passivity of a phenomenal definition, Gemüt is revived by the work of ideas at the level of the space of experience. Spirit is therefore the principle of "de-dialectical", non-transcendental "dialectics within Gemüt, oriented towards the field of experience and acting as a component in the workings of the phenomenon itself.
The presence of spirit and, at the same time, that dimension of freedom and fullness, which are transcendental to Gemüt, guarantees that the only correct one is pragmatic anthropology, where every fact is placed inside an open system of can and should. I. Kant wrote only one kind of anthropology. The relationship between time and the subject, fundamental for transcendental philosophy, in anthropology becomes the relationship between time and art. Indeed, for example, universal improvement through enlightenment should be the result of the work of generations, knowledge and human abilities develop in time, and therefore improvement is the work of all mankind. In the criticism, the
self-aware subject was given as "determined in time," and this irresistible determination, referring to the existence of the external world, in relation to which a change in internal experience is possible, suggests that time and the initial passivity to which it indicates lay at the root of the relationship that characterizes the first discovery of all knowledge. In anthropology, time and variance in the structure of a relationship determine the mutual belonging of truth and freedom.
M. Foucault asks the question, on what basis, then, can we present a person as a citizen of the world? And he answers - from the standpoint of Kantian anthropology, a person is indeed a citizen of the world, but not because of his belonging to a particular social group or any social institution. He is a citizen of the world exclusively and only because he speaks. It exists in the exchange of a language that it manipulates in its own interests in order not only to achieve, but also to realize a particular universality. According to M. Foucault, "a person's livelihood is initially his stay in language" [7, p. 102].The truth that anthropology reveals is for this reason not the truth that precedes language, and not what language is entrusted to convey. This truth is more than the inner content and complex structure of the utterance, it lies in the very movement of exchange and is a universal human truth, realized in linguistic exchange. The universal here arises from the very heart of experience in a truly temporal and actually exchanged context. The main themes of the Criticism - the relation to the object, the generalization of diversity, the general legitimacy of representation - are thus directly related to the problem of communication. Anthropology transfers the "Critique of Pure Reason" to the empirical level, where the "Critique of Practical Reason" fixes the sphere of the necessary for the action of the imperative. Therefore, anthropology from a pragmatic point of view is the study of that space in which theory and practice are suppressed and completely cover each other, and in which, in the same place and in the same language, the a priori of knowledge and moral legislation are presented. Thus, through the movement of this empirical discourse, she introduces what she posits: transcendental philosophy, where the relationship between truth and freedom is set from the very beginning.
The result of pragmatic anthropology regarding the purpose of a person and his essential characteristics is expressed in the following: "a person is determined by his mind to be in communication with people and in this communication with the help of art and science to improve his culture, civilization and morality and, no matter how his animal tendency was strong to passively indulge in the impulses of peace and well-being, which he calls happiness, to become, waging an active struggle with the obstacles imposed on him by the coarseness of his nature, worthy of humanity "[2, pp. 435436]. Pragmatic anthropology, which becomes a transcendental discipline and empirical knowledge, and which, according to M. Foucault, is rooted in the system of experience and expression, is also called upon to help the realization of this purpose of man. Her stay in the world is her stay in the language. So it falls into the Kantian triangle: "criticism asks about a priori cognitive activity, anthropology - about a universal language,
problematizing the already-givenness of the world, transcendental philosophy - about the relationship of truth and freedom, problematizing the finiteness of human existence" [1, p. 385]. In a similar way, the problems of modern philosophy are formed, in the field of study of which there are now three parts, respectively: devoted to questions about a priori, about origin and about fundamental foundations.
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