CC BY
50
Manfred Sneps-Sneppe1
1 Venspils University College, Ventspils, professor, manfreds.sneps@gmail.com
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND SENSORS IN ROBOTIC WAR
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
Global Information Grid; sensor network; unmanned systems; TCDL; thinking robots; UVDS; Software-Defined Networking.
АННОТАЦИЯ
In this paper, we discuss a "Global Information Grid" as a key concept of military communications and the enabling foundation for network-centric warfare, information superiority, decision superiority, and ultimately full spectrum dominance. We consider sensor environment for robotic war, unmanned systems roadmap and robotic war exercise "Music", as well as telecommunication data link TCDL. Future work list includes military radio communications, thinking robots, unified video dissemination service and software-defined networks.
Introduction
Drums, horns, flags, carrier pigeons, and riders on horseback were some of the early methods the military used to send messages over distances. In nowadays, the key concept is network-centric warfare (NCW) oriented to modern telecommunications and computer networks, oriented to more effective use of existing military forces and more effective interaction between different military powers.
Our goal here is to deliver an insight into telecommunication and sensor aspects in the future robotic war. As one find in Wikipedia, there are six categories of military communications:
• the alert measurement systems,
• cryptography,
• military radio systems,
• nuclear command control,
• the signal corps, and
• network-centric warfare.
Sensors are relates to the alert measurement systems [1]. Sensors are everywhere in today's technology-driven world. There are sensors in traffic lights, vehicles and smartphones. Sensors in military applications gather data that researchers hope will give soldiers the decisive edge. The Army has multiple legacy sensor systems in theater that communicate only with specific systems. This limitation makes sharing actionable information beyond set parameters and costly point-to-point integration task. The arrangement also poses a growing deployment challenge as emerging sensor technologies become more available.
Network-centric warfare (NCW) regards a "Global Information Grid" - a key concept of military communications. GIG was born out of concerns regarding interoperability and end-to-end integration of automated information systems. The GIG provides the enabling foundation for network-centric warfare, information superiority, decision superiority, and what is the most important - ultimately full spectrum dominance (Figure 1). According to Pentagon's plan, the U.S. must have information superiority all over the world: the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same.
The information advantage gained through the use of NCW allows a war-fighting force to achieve dramatically improved information positions, in the form of common operational pictures that provide the basis for shared situational awareness and knowledge, and a resulting increase in combat power. The ability to achieve shared situational awareness and knowledge among all elements of a joint force is increasingly viewed as a cornerstone of transformation to achieve future war-fighting capabilities. The success of the GIG will depend in large part on how well it helps achieve fully interoperable forces by connecting today's islands of interoperability to allow force-wide information sharing.
Figure 1. GIG as an Enabling Foundation for Full Spectrum Dominance [2]
Airborne C2
Airborne Weapens
Airborne Weapens
Maritime Weapens
Figure 2 shows the future robotic war model. GIG facilities connect three comand and control (C2) points: ground, airborne and maritime. In own order, they collect data from sensor networks and information sources and deliver commands to weapens systems. Department of Defense (DoD) and commercial gateways provide access to military and nonmilitary satellites and to the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) transport and Internet Protocol (IP) netcentric services, which in turn provide global distribution of mission data and enable long-range C2 of unmanned systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss sensor environment for robotic war, in Sections III and IV -- unmanned systems integrated roadmap 2013-2038 and the robotic war exercise "Music". In Section V, we consider robotic war telecommunication Data Link TCDL, and some Future Works, in Section VI._
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Fig 2 Future Robotic War Model [3]
Sensor Environment for Robotic War
The Integrated Sensor Architecture (ISA) is an interoperability solution that allows for the sharing of information between sensors and systems in a dynamic tactical environment and interaction. The ISA created a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) that identifies common standards and protocols which support a net-centric system of systems integration. CERDEC NVESD (Communications-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center's Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate)
developed ISA under a deployable force protection program, which seeks to provide the critical capabilities needed for a forward operating base to defend itself [4].
Utilizing a common language, these systems are able to connect, publish their needs and capabilities, and interact with other systems even on disadvantaged networks. As Army researchers and engineers develop ISA, they hope to put together fundamental interoperability so that when future sensors come online to a network, they can register and communicate their capabilities; assets and sensors on that network can then subscribe to the types of information they need.
CERDEC has a formal agreement with the Program Executive Office Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors (PEO IEW&S) under its Sensor Computing Environment program (Sensor CE). Sensor CE is a component of the PEO IEW&S mission, which has a portfolio that covers a broad range of capabilities across the reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition spectrum.
The Common Operating Environment (Figure 3) is an approved set of computing technologies and standards that enable secure and interoperable applications to be rapidly developed and executed across a variety of Computing Environments (i.e., Server(s), Client, Mobile, Sensors, and Platform).
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Figure 3. Common Operating Environment Architecture [5]
To build up the Common Operating Environment Architecture, many problems should be solved. Point out only few. Seamless integration must exist across the Army Enterprise Network and between computing environments. Control points facilitate the integration of mission environments (Figure 4), and serve as intermediaries between mission environments and the corresponding computing environments. Control points also isolate (or firewall) local standards from the rest of the enterprise.
Commercial
Figure 4 - Tactical army network and its four control points [6] Control points are placed throughout the Common Operating Environment Architecture [6] to
enable and to enforce:
Interoperability (Logical boundary of mission environments)
Structured Data (e.g., databases, geospatial data, spreadsheets)
Unstructured Data (e.g., documents, presentations, pictures, audio, video)
Security and Gateways (Act as an intermediary for requests from one computing device to Another).
There are four control points shown in Figure 4. Two of them are related to sensors.
Control Point 2 - Enterprise/Command Post to Platform/Soldier/Sensor. Information is flowing between a fixed, somewhat stable network at the command post to individual platforms, Soldiers or sensors. This provides a control point for interface to/from the enterprise standard to a local protocol that is more optimized for disadvantaged networks:
Interoperability - Authentication via PKI, LDAP or Active Directory.
The prescribed interface for data exchange is Mission Command Messaging - Variable Message Format (VMF).
Geospatial data standard is VMF/MIL-STD 2525C.
Security standards will include: network access control - local, varies; external access control -network gateway;
encryption- NSA/NIST-certified solutions; key management - EKMS/KMI-compliant solutions; end-point protection - Host-Based Security System (HBSS); enterprise service management -Remedy/ITSM, IP Management/SPECTRUM); and patch management - manual.
Gateways - The enterprise/command post server is responsible for translation of XML/SOAP to/from VMF.
Control Point 4 - Platform/Soldier to Sensor. Requirements CP4 are identical except gateways -No translation is required.
The more sophisticated tasks relating to ISA should be solved for Unmanned Aircraft Systems. Many UAS interoperability gaps could be pointed out, including between others:
• Provide selectable intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) data in joint approved network formats and waveforms.
• Provide accurate position reporting sufficient for joint common operational picture and joint common air picture applications.
• Provide UAS sensor point and area of interest location information to authorized subscribers in the specified format.
• Provide communication gateway and aerial network or network node services compatible with appropriate joint networks.
• Transmit, relay, or retransmit required voice transmissions or sensor data in accordance with joint standards to authorized DoD and non-DoD subscribers.
• Provide fire support functions that are compatible with joint targeting control systems and procedures.
• Provide meteorological and oceanographic data in common, discoverable, retrievable format to authorized subscribers.
• Provide chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive data in prescribed format to authorized subscribers.
Unmanned Systems as a Basis for Robotic War
The recent document "Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038" [7] continues the path outlined in the 2011 edition of the Roadmap and addresses three unmanned operating domains: air, ground, and maritime. Wherever possible, unmanned systems programs should leverage the DISN core as their baseline terrestrial networking infrastructure for global connectivity. Connection points to the DISN core are already available at DoD gateway sites. The IP networking component of enterprise gateways provides routing and encryption/decryption to multiple security enclaves for access to DISN. Encrypted unmanned systems traffic would be routed through the DoD gateway net-centric convergence router, which provides connectivity between IP modem hubs and DISN.
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Figure 5. Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) as of July 1,2013 [7]
Particular attention is drawn to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). As of July 1, 2013 (Figure 5), the vast number is covered by micro/mini tactical UAS: more than 90% from the total number around 10 thousand. The trend should be kept in power for the coming 25 years (Figure 6)._
Small Family of Systems
USN/USAF T-Hawk
USSOCOM / USA/ USMC Puma &
USA / USN/USMC/ USSOCOM RQ-11 Raven
USMC/USSOCOM Wasp
Figure 6. Micro/Mini Tactical UAS FY2013-2038 [7]
USA Nano UAS
It is worth to pay attention to micro aerial vehicles [8]. "Micro aerial vehicles" - no larger than a common house fly - are currently being developed by the US military and could enter mass production later this decade. These machines could be used in spying missions, recording and transmitting audiovisual information. An individual robot would serve as a literal "fly on the wall" - equipped with miniature cameras, microphones, modem and GPS. Many terrorist cells could be infiltrated thanks to this radical new technology.
More sophisticated versions might be developed for assassin roles (Figure 7). These would have capsules in the abdomen of the insect, filled with cyanide or another lethal toxin. This would be delivered to the target via a small needle capable of piercing human skin.
However, concerns may be raised as to how this technology affects the safety and security of
citizens.
Unmanned Ground Systems (UGS) are a powered physical system with (optionally) no human operator aboard the principal platform, which can act remotely to accomplish assigned tasks (Figure 8). UGS may be mobile or stationary, can be smart learning and self-adaptive, and include all associated supporting components such as operator control units.
Figure 7. Insect-sized assassin drones [8] Music - the Robotic War Exercise 2011
Interoperability has been a top objective of the Army and the UAS project office for years. Interoperability greatly increases efficiency in Army systems through common interfaces and shared assets In an effort to streamline and coordinate interoperability initiatives across products, the UAS project office hosted its first Manned-Unmanned Systems Integration Capability (MUSIC) exercise in September 2011. The exercise was the largest demonstration of manned-unmanned interoperability ever attempted. The exercise has been in the works for over one and one half years.
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The MUSIC exercises showcase to the soldier and Army community the progress being made in unmanned interoperability and emerging technologies through common interfaces [9]. There were many objectives to the MUSIC exercise including:
• demonstrating advancements made in manned-to-unmanned teaming (MUM-T);
• demonstrating interoperability among unmanned systems through the Universal Ground Control Station (UGCS), Mini-UGCS (M-UGCS), and the One System Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT); and highlighting open architectural approach that allows multiple control nodes and information access points via the Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL).
Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T). The concept of MUM-T is to combine the inherent strengths of manned platforms with the strengths of UAS, with product synergy not seen in single platforms. MUM-T combines robotics, sensors, manned/unmanned vehicles, and dismounted soldiers to achieve enhanced situational awareness, greater lethality, improved survivability, and sustainment. Properly designed, MUM-T extends sensor coverage in time and space and provides additional capability
to acquire and engage targets.
The pilot can use the sensor on the UAS, just as a sensor would be used aboard an aircraft, except that the position of the UAS sensor can be up to 80 km ahead from the aircraft. The MUM-T capability provides an unprecedented standoff range from threat weapons and acquisition systems.
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Figure 9. MUSIC Exercise 2011 [9]
UGCS. One major capability that will be demonstrated at the MUSIC exercise will involve the unmanned aircraft Gray Eagle, Shadow, and Hunter platforms, operating off a Universal Ground Control Station (UGCS). The UGCS supports interoperability by providing common hardware and software functionality across the UAS platforms.
OSRVT. The One System RemoteVideo Terminal (OSRVT) will be demonstrating its new bidirectional capability with the larger platforms Gray Eagle, Shadow, and Hunter AVs. The OSRVT will also be demonstrating its ability to receive video from the small aircraft, Raven and Puma, along with the video from the manned platforms Apache and Kiowa.
M-UGCS. Mini-Universal Ground Control Stations (M-UGCS) demonstrate a move toward a common controller for UAS's fleet of small aircraft to include the Raven, Puma, and eventually the Wasp. Current plans are to also demonstrate the M-UGCS control of the electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors on the Gray Eagle through DDL. This capability known as TRICLOPS, allows for three sensors in the air on a single AV that can be controlled through separate data links increasing range and SA to the soldier.
Data Link TCDL - Robotic War Telecommunication Standard
Two type data links are in use for unmanned aircraft systems: Tactical Common Data Link (DCDL) and Digital Data Link (DDL).
The Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) is a secure U.S. military communications protocol to send secure data and streaming video links from airborne platforms to ground stations. The TCDL can accept data from many different sources, then encrypt, multiplex, encode, transmit, demultiplex, and route this data at high speeds. It uses a Ku narrowband uplink that is used for both payload and vehicle control, and a wideband downlink for data transfer. The Ku band is the 12-18 GHz portion of the electromagnetic spectrum in the microwave range of frequencies.
The TCDL was designed for UAVs, specifically the MQ-8B Fire Scout, as well as manned non-fighter environments. The TCDL transmits radar, imagery, video, and other sensor information at rates from 1.544 Mbit/s to 10.7 Mbit/s over ranges of 200 km. TCDL will soon support the required higher CDL rates of 45, 137 and 274 Mbps.
User Channels
User Channels
Overhead Channels
Figure 10. Common Data Link Functions
TCDL Transmitter Functions are the following (Figure 10).
Multiplexer simultaneously provides multiple dedicated channels to users and mixes the data bits from each channel to form one aggregate bit stream. The Multiplexer function is used in the Forward Link (FL) and in all modes of the Return Link (RL).
Encryption is used to protect the data in the event that the data is intercepted, and is performed on the aggregate bit stream by Communications Security (COMSEC) devices. COMSEC devices change (encrypt) the bit stream in such a way that is difficult to reconstruct the original bit stream without a complimentary decryption device. The disadvantage of encryption is that the decryption process adds multiple additional errors for any error encountered. This characteristic is known as error extension.
There are several types of encoders that are used within the CDL system, although differential and convolutional encoders are the two most common. Some types of encoders add redundant bits to the bit stream, which enable the correction of errors that may occur in transmission. The addition of redundant bits expands the data rate.
Differential encoding transforms the digital bit stream by converting space or zero pulses into the transitions that occur between a one and a zero. Since there is no ambiguity of the transmissions coming from the demodulator, the differential decoder can restore the bit stream. This process, however, doubles the bit error rate, because one bit error will affect two transitions.
Convolutional encoding is applied to the data link signal in order to correct bit errors that might occur during transmission and results in coding gain for the system. Decoding is the process that actually corrects transmission errors.
Interleaving is used to inter-mix the bits of the code words generated through convolutional encoding. The motivation for leaving interleaving is to compensate for burst or sequential errors, which can otherwise exceed the capability of the decoder to correct errors.
Direct Sequence Spreading is performed to provide jam resistance against narrow band jammers, which concentrate all power on the signal such as tone and narrow band noise. In addition, it effectively hides the signal spectrum, resulting in low probability of the detection/low probability of intercept signal
qualities.
Modulator converts the aggregate digital bit stream into Radio Frequency (RF) analog signal.
Upconverter/Power Amplifier/Filter. The upconverter translates the 1700 MHZ RF signal to its final X or Ku band frequency where it is amplified to provide the required power to the antenna. Filtering assures that the spectral purity requirements for the allocated frequency are met. The size of the power amplifier is determined through Link Budget analysis and mission requirements. Upconversion, power amplification, and filtering exist in both the FL and all modes of the RL.
The diplexer contains filters which isolate the transmit frequency from the receiver frequency. This makes it possible for the transmitter and receiver to share a common antenna.
Receiver Functions are symmetric one to Transmitter Functions, except Viterbi Decoder. Viterbi decoding is applied to the data link signal to correct errors that may have been encountered through RF transmission. The encoding/decoding process adds what is referred to as coding gain, which may be necessary for the successful data link transmission. Decoding corrects errors before bypassing the aggregate bit stream on to the decryption device. Correction of the errors occurs because the convolutional encoder (or transmit side of the data link) creates code words, which contain data bits with added redundant bits. The redundant bits allow the decoder to detect and correct errors that may exist in each code word. The process of decoding is much more complicated than the encoding process, and limits the speed of the bit stream that can be decoded.
PDDL. The Portable Digital Data Link system (PDDL) was also tesred during MUSIC exercises. PDDL developed by Tadiran Spectralink is a complete solution for digital communication between the ground control station and the unmanned aircraft vehicle. The system consists of a Ground Data Terminal and Aircraft Data Terminal. The PDDL has up to 12 Mbps link rate, serial communication port and Ethernet port. Specifications: Parameter Value Frequency 2.320-2.70 GHz or 2.405-2.407 GHz, Link Rate up to 12 Mbps, Encryption 128 bit AES/ 256 bit AES, Distance up to 100 km range.
Future Work and Discussion
Accurate intelligence about the enemy is always on the military's wish list, and success in future conflicts will require technologies that can perform persistent surveillance to help identify enemies and friendly forces. Robots that can operate autonomously also will be essential tools of war, not necessarily to fire weapons, but to conduct mundane tasks such as delivering cargo.
Anytime Anywhere Communications [10]. High-speed mobile broadband is a military holy grail. Soldiers want the ability to communicate, as well as exploit the capabilities of the latest smartphones. FM radios don't cut it anymore. Troops want the same technology that powers high-speed commercial cellular networks so they can send photos, video and keep track of their unit's location. But there are still some hurdles in achieving that vision. One is the acute shortage of network bandwidth for deployed troops. The Army has been testing deployable 3G broadband networks that troops can set up quickly in a temporary shelter or aboard a military vehicle. The combination of advanced cellular base stations and mesh networking also could give soldiers tens of megabits per second of data throughput in moving vehicles. The Army sooner, rather than later, must bridge the bandwidth deficiency gap that exists today in combat zones.
Experts predict that as 4G networks roll out globally during the next decade, the military will not only benefit from more reliable networks, but it also will be able to use smart radios that can frequency hop and take advantage of unused spectrum. The Army has predicted for some time that smartphones will play an important role in combat, but it is yet unclear just how iPhones and Androids might eventually supplement or replace current combat net radio voice architecture.
Robots That Think for Themselves [10]. Remotely piloted aircraft have supplied troops with overhead surveillance as well as the ability to launch precision-guided bombs. One thing air, land and seaborne robotic systems currently have in common is that there is a human controlling them from a distance. In the next war, military leaders want drones that can operate themselves. For the technology to progress, the machines will have to move away from the current tele-operated model and be able to make decisions on their own.
Autonomy is a key need across every domain where robotic systems operate — land, sea and air. The human brain can function in dynamic environments, reconstruct paths, predict where it needs to go and live adaptively every day. Robots need to be able to do the same and become untethered from their human masters.
Unified Video Dissemination Service [7]. To reduce overhead costs, optimize manpower requirements, and improve data sharing among various services, organizations, and allied partners, unmanned systems data should be consolidated into cloud-enabled enterprise data centers with a
standard infrastructure established to distribute the data to all authorized consumers. This goal includes the Intelligence Community's "big data" cloud computing efforts and DISA's Unified Video Dissemination Service (UVDS) established to support real-time distribution of VMF data to consumers around the globe (Figure 11).
DISA's UVDS provides DoD-wide VMF consolidation, and a robust routing capability for worldwide dissemination of VMF. Installed in DISA's Defense Enterprise Computing Centers, UVDS supports various VMF sources and user communities by providing for the dissemination of black (encrypted) and red (unencrypted) VMF streams via multicast streaming and near-real-time web-based streaming. UVDS implements DoD and industry standards, protocols, and profiles (e.g., SD, HD, H.264, MPEG-2, FLASH) to ensure the greatest level of interoperability among existing systems while taking advantage of existing computing infrastructures associated with DoD's Global Information Grid (GIG) terrestrial connectivity.
DOAN
Figure 11. DISA Proposed UVDS Functional Architecture (fragment). DDAN = DISN Deployed Access Node
Software-defined networks [11]. The future of networking will be defined by software. According to the opinion of CERDEC's Space & Terrestrial Communications Directorate, one of the most promising developments in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) communication is software-defined networks (SDNs), a new approach that unbundles the traditional device-bound, vertically integrated network stack to provide greater network automation, architectural flexibility and programmability for policy-driven control and self-service innovation.
SDN technology works by separating a network's control and forwarding planes, making each easier to optimize. In an SDN, a controller supplies an abstract, centralized view of the overall network, allowing network administrators to quickly and easily make and enact decisions on how underlying systems, such as routers and switches, on the forwarding plane will manage network traffic. With a centralized, programmable network that can automatically and dynamically handle changing requirements, an SDN can deliver increased agility and flexibility. Although SDNs were initially designed for data center environments, they have taken the networking industry by storm due to their cost savings, the ability for customization and operational flexibility they provide, including virtualization, orchestration and automation.
SDN Stack
Controllers
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Fig. 12. The classical model for SDN [12]
SDN concept, by the definition, is based on the various programming interface (Figure 12). SDN (and OpenFlow as a key communication protocol) technology is clearly impacting the data center network, including data centers in large carriers [13]. SDN has also the potential to transform the telecom industry by improving the ability of carriers (both wired and wireless) to flexibly deliver bandwidth "on demand." But in the telecom infrastructure market, the way to define SDN is less clear.
The telecom infrastructure as well as GIG consists of a number of unique market segments, including optical networks, carrier-grade routers, wireless edge, wireless core, CPE, etc. It relates to SDN Southbound API and seems rather useful for SDN. Telecom services delivering area is much less clear for SDN success. To deliver services and make money, the transport network must be tied to a complex set of operational support and billing (OSS/BSS) tools to manage the network and bill the customer for services, as well to create the very services. All these features relate to SDN northbound API. By now seems a few papers are on the topic [14,15,16,17].
References
1. Army Technology http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/ArmyTechnologyMagazineJan-Feb2015.pdf
2. Global Information Grid. Architectural Vision for a Net-Centric, Service-Oriented DoD Enterprise. Department of Defense. Version 1.0 June 2007
3. SysML http://www.omgsysml.org/INCOSE-OMGSysML-Tutorial-Final-090901.pdf
4. Sensors in Army http://www.army.mil/article/140584/Sensors_move_Army_closer_to_common_environment/
5. (Jan. 7, 2015)
6. SoSECIE http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/webinars/2011-07-12-SoSECIE-Army-COE-Farah-Stapleton-brief.pdf
7. Common Operating Environment Implementation 12 JUL 2011 Appendix C to Guidance for 'End State' ArmyEnterprise Network Architecture U.S. Army CIO/G-6 1 October 2010, DoD's Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2013-2038, December 2013
8. Future timeline http://www.futuretimeline.net/resources/military-war.htm#.Vf_fDt_tlBc
9. Army Mil http://www.army.mil/mobile/article/?p=67838
10. Eric Beidel, Sandra I. Erwin and Stew Magnuson "10 Technologies the U.S. Military Will Need For the Next War " November 2011
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2011/november/pages/10technologiestheusmilitarywillneedforthene xtwar.aspx
11. GGM Whitepaper http://hub.c4isrnet.com/Global/FileLib/GGM_Whitepapers_Editorial/C4-12-11-2014-RedefineISR.pdf
12. The Northbound API- A Big Little Problem http://networkstatic.net/the-northbound-api-2/ Retrieved: Aug, 2015
13. SDN for Telecom http://www.networkworld.com/article/2162090/lan-wan/what-does-sdn-mean-for-telecom-infrastructure-.html
14. Caio Ferreira et al „Towards a Carrier Grade SDN Controller: Integrating OpenFlow With Telecom Services" AICT2014 : The Tenth Advanced International Conference on Telecommunications, 70-75
15. Hampel, G., Steiner, M., & Bu, T. (2013, April). Applying software-defined networking to the telecom domain. In Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS), 2013 IEEE Conference on (pp. 133-138).
16. Wang, J. Q., Fu, H., & Cao, C. (2013, August). Software defined networking for telecom operators: Architecture and applications. In 2013 8th Int'l Conf Comm and Net in China (CHINACOM) (pp. 828-833).
17. Sneps-Sneppe M., Namiot D. Metadata in SDN API for WSN //New Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS), 2015 7th International Conference on. - IEEE, 2015. - C. 1-5.
18. Sneps-Sneppe M., Namiot D. Micro-service Architecture for Emerging Telecom Applications //International Journal of Open Information Technologies. - 2014. - T. 2. - №. 11. - C. 34-38.
Souin bound API
