CC BY
0
ВЕСТН. МОСК. УН-ТА. СЕР. 27. ГЛОБАЛИСТИКА И ГЕОПОЛИТИКА. 2024. № 1
DOI: 10.56429/2414-4894-2024-47-1-57-79
Ли Мэнлун
канд. ист. наук, ст. преподаватель, Институт международных и общественных отношений
Цзилиньского университета.
Чанчунь, Китай limenglong@jlu.edu.cn
Лю Пэнци
студент магистратуры, Институт международных и общественных отношений
Цзилиньского университета.
Чанчунь, Китай liuaa77@jlu.edu.cn
Ли Чжилунь
студент магистратуры, факультет гуманитарных и социальных наук Университета Стратклайда.
Глазго, Великобритания zhilun.li.2022@uni.strath.ac.uk
СТРАТЕГИЯ «ЗАМАНИТЬ И ОБЕСКРОВИТЬ»: КАК ИНСТРУМЕНТ ПОДДЕРЖАНИЯ ГЛОБАЛЬНОЙ ГЕГЕМОНИИ США
Li Menglong
Ph.D., lecturer School of International and Public Affairs,
Jilin University. Changchun, China limenglong @jlu.edu.cn
Liu Pengqi
Master Degree Candidate, School of International and Public Affairs,
Jilin University. Changchun, China liuaa77@163.com
©Ли Мэнлун, Лю Пэнци, Ли Чжилунь, 2024
Li Zhilun
Master Degree Candidate, Faculty of Humanities and Social Science, University of Strathclyde.
Glasgow, UK zhilun.li.2022@uni.strath.ac.uk
BAIT AND BLEED STRATEGY:
AS A TOOL FOR THE UNITED STATES
TO MAINTAIN GLOBAL HEGEMONY
Аннотация. В контексте соперничества великих держав изучение стратегической теории имеет большое значение для поддержки национальной безопасности. Цель статьи — интерпретация основ стратегии заманивания в ловушку, расширение ее теоретической базы и способов применения. В статье объясняется, как Соединенные Штаты, реализуя стратегию заманивания в ловушку, добиваются истощения своих конкурентов, сохраняя тем самым свою власть и поддерживая свою гегемонию в мире. Дж. Миршаймер в книге «Трагедия политики великих держав» определяет «стратегию заманивания в ловушку» как одну из основных стратегий, используемых Соединенными Штатами на своем пути к усилению власти и гегемонии в мире. Основываясь на этом, в данной статье методы применения стратегии заманивания в ловушку разделены на два вида: соблазнение и провокация. Когда приманка служит в качестве источника соблазнения, принимающие решения, столкнувшиеся с внутренними и внешними проблемами, часто склонны идти на стратегические компромиссы в обмен на приманку, которая может помочь выбраться из затруднительного положения. В результате они незаметно для себя попадают в заранее расставленную ловушку того лица, кто выставил приманку. Помимо этого, приманка может служить в качестве источника провокации: государства, лишенные чувства безопасности и испытывающие сильное чувство угрозы, склонны вступать в конфронтацию с источником провокации и могут даже прибегнуть к войне, что в свою очередь приводит к длительному истощению этих государств. В этой статье используются два уникальных исторических примера для исследования теоретических основ, описанных выше: попытка НАТО склонить Россию к уступкам в вопросе воссоединения Германии и провокация России со стороны НАТО, которая привела к длительному истощению России вследствие российско-украинского кризиса. Результаты исследования указывают на то, что стратегия заманивания в ловушку является важным стратегическим инструментом для Соединенных Штатов и их союзников для обеспечения истощения и изоляции своих основных конкурентов. Только полностью взвесив структурные риски и долгосрочные цели конкурентов в контексте стратегического соперничества великих держав, а также полагаясь на рациональное и сдержанное принятие решений, можно добиться снижения стратегических рисков попадания в ловушку.
Ключевые слова: конкуренция великих держав, приманить и пустить кровь, российско-украинский конфликт, расширение НАТО на Восток.
©Li Menglong, Liu Pengqi, Li Zhilun, 2024
Abstract. Within the context of great power competition, the study of strategic theory holds significant importance for the maintenance of national security. The purpose of this paper is to interpret the bait and bleed strategy, and improve the theoretical framework and implementation pathways of the bait and bleed strategy. It explicates how the United States, through the execution of the bait and bleed strategy, achieves the prolonged attrition of its competitors, thereby preserving its relative power and the stability of its global hegemony. J. Mearsheimer, in "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics", defines the "bait and bleed strategy" as one of the core strategies employed by the United States in its global pursuit of power and hegemony. Building upon this foundation, this article categorizes the implementation pathways of the bait and bleed strategy into two modes: seduction and provocation. When bait serves as a means of seducing others, decision-makers, beset by internal and external troubles, often opt for strategic compromises in exchange for bait that could alleviate their immediate predicaments. Consequently, they fall into traps stealthily pre-set by those who deploy the bait. On the other hand, when bait serves as a means of provoking others, states lacking a sense of security and possessing a strong perception of threat, are prone to entanglement in a security dilemma with a supported competitor, and may even resort to war, leading to prolonged attrition for themselves. This article employs two pioneering historical cases to examine the theoretical framework proposed above: NATO's enticement of Russia to concede on the issue of German reunification, and its provocation of Russia, leading to its prolonged attrition in the Ukrainian crisis. The research findings indicate that the bait and bleed strategy is a significant strategic tool for the United States and its allies to exhaust and isolate their primary competitors. It is only by fully weighing the structural contradictions and long-term objectives of the competitors within the context of great power strategic competition, and by achieving rational and restrained decision-making, that the strategic risks of falling into bait and bleed traps can be mitigated.
Key words: great power competition, bait and bleed strategy, Russia-Ukraine conflict, NATO Eastern expansion.
Introduction
Grounded in the logic of realism theory, the United States, as a hegemonic power, has its primary foreign objective in maintaining its relative power and preventing the emergence of challengers with absolute power in various regions. This necessitates the U.S. playing a significant role in the affairs of its allies in both Asia-Pacific and Europe. In the post-Cold War era, the U. S. has habitually employed offshore balancing strategies to sustain its relative power, but the effective initiation of such strategies merits in-depth exploration. As a protagonist of the offshore balancing role, the U.S. endeavours to implement this strategy through its alliance system, continually employing hybrid strategies to squeeze Russia's strategic space, and to contain and isolate Russia. The bait and bleed strategy is a crucial component of these hybrid strategies, serving as an effective tool for the U.S. to continuously weaken its major competitors, augment its relative power, and maintain its global hegemonic status.
J. Mearsheimer argued in his book "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics" that there are four paths for states to seek power: "war, blackmail, bait
and bleed, and bloodletting" [23, p. 113—118]. Within this context, the bait and bleed strategy is defined as a tactic employed by a state to increase its relative power. Its aim is to instigate two adversaries into engaging in a protracted war, causing them to deplete their energies against each other, while the entity deploying the bait remains on the sidelines, observing and preserving its military forces intact [23, p. 117]. However, to date, no scholars have systematically explicated the applicable scope and implementation framework of the bait and bleed strategy, rendering it a topic of scholarly interest. This paper aims to interpret the fundamentals of the bait and bleed strategy, analyzing and summarizing its theoretical framework and implementation pathways. It contends that the implementation pathways of the bait and bleed strategy primarily consists of two modes: seduction and provocation. The main distinction between these two lies in the means employed to guide the adversary towards the position desired by the implementer. When the bait serves as a lure, it emphasizes the use of psychological tactics to draw competitors into a trap of prolonged attrition. Conversely, when the bait serves as a stimulus, it underscores the strategic maneuvering to progressively force the competitor into a pre-set predicament. The cases of how NATO enticed Russia to concede on the issue of German reunification and how it provoked Russia into prolonged attrition in the Ukrainian crisis effectively test the theoretical framework proposed in this article. Since 2021, the Biden administration has actively promoted NATO's eastward expansion, continually compressing Russia's strategic space, and repeatedly breaching Russia's strategic red lines on the Ukrainian issue, severely threatening Russia's national and geopolitical security. This compelled Russia to adopt a "radical" policy. The outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022 has had serious implications for Russia's military capabilities, strategic space, and international image. Once ensnared in the trap set by other countries, how to extricate oneself or make up for the shortcomings becomes a focal point of this strategy's research. Russia's handling of the Russia-Ukraine conflict can serve as an empirical case to analyse the possible choices of actors facing the bait and bleed strategy.
Materials and methods
Great power competition is fundamentally a struggle for power. The formation of realism theory accompanied the competition among great powers on the European continent; hence it possesses substantial explanatory power regarding power struggles. This article, while delineating the foundations of realism theory, seeks to analyze the theoretical origins of the bait and bleed strategy. The British scholar E.H. Carr, in his 1939 publication "The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919—1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations", first introduced the concept of realism theory [18]. In 1948, Morgenthau's "Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace" established the foundations of classical realism theory [26]. H. Morgenthau emphasized power or force in international relations, arguing that states continuously seek to expand
their power, viewing power as an end in itself, with the pursuit of power rooted in human nature. Neorealism, however, contends that it is the anarchic nature of the international system, rather than human nature, that is the primary driver of international relations; it focuses on the impact of power balance and structure on the international system. After the Cold War, power remained a focal point of realism theory, but different branches emerged, such as offensive realism, defensive realism, and neoclassical realism. After World War II, realism gradually became the theoretical core of American foreign policy, primarily reflected in U.S. Cold War policies and the theory of containment.
Offensive realism, a representative theory of realism in the post-Cold War era, primarily focuses on great power politics, emphasizing the significant influence of great powers on the changes in international politics. J. Mearsheimer, a leading figure in offensive realism, amalgamates the insatiable power desire of traditional realism with the a priori existence of an anarchic international state from structural realism, endeavoring to provide an objective basis for states' desire for maximized power with the a priori logic of international anarchy. Building on this, Mearsheimer summarizes the logic of interstate power competition into five points: the international system is anarchic; great powers possess military capabilities that allow them to inflict harm and destruction upon each other; states can never be certain of others' intentions; survival is the primary goal of states; and states are rational actors. It can be said that offensive realism holds a pessimistic view of the international community, believing that in a Hobbesian state ofanarchy, "power is the ultimate means to ensure security, with the greatest power ensuring the greatest security". Driven by the anarchy of the international system, great powers always seek to maximize their power to ensure security. The introduction of offensive strategies inevitably leads to conflicts and wars, epitomizing the tragedy of great power politics. It can be stated that the theoretical origin of the bait and bleed strategy lies in offensive realism theory.
Offensive realism posits that great powers are perpetually driven by four primary objectives: becoming the sole regional hegemony, controlling as much of the world's wealth as possible, dominating land power in their region, and possessing nuclear superiority [23, p. 108—112]. In the anarchic state of the international system, where no central authority exists to regulate the actions of states, actors are inevitably inclined to pursue unlimited power. This unending quest for power inevitably makes power competition a defining characteristic of relationships among great powers. This relentless pursuit is seen as an inherent aspect of the international system and shapes the dynamics of global politics. Throughout history, states have typically pursued power through four primary strategies: warfare, deception, baiting, and passive observation of bloody conflicts [23, p. 113—118]. These methods are employed to prevent rivals from gaining power at the state's expense, often through a balance of power and the deflection of responsibilities. However, in situations where a state is incapable of effectively countering threats, it may adopt passive approaches to major power competition, such as free-riding and appeasement policies. Mear-
sheimer characterizes the bait and bleed strategy as causing two rivals to engage in a protracted war, so that they bleed each other white, while the baiter remains on the sideline, its military strength intact [23, p. 117]. However, the theoretical concept of bait and bleed strategy lacks rigor and clear boundaries. Consequently, this article aims to refine the theoretical framework of the bait and bleed strategy by integrating interdisciplinary knowledge, analyzing the implementation pathways of the bait and bleed strategy, and selecting the initiation of German unification and NATO's eastward expansion, as well as the emergence and escalation of the Ukraine crisis, as case studies to test the aforementioned theoretical framework.
Results of the study
Following the conclusion of the Cold War, the United States emerged as the sole global superpower. Maintaining its share of power and sustaining its hegemonic status became primary objectives ofits foreign strategy. As the only country that successfully achieved regional hegemony (in the Americas), the United States assumed the role of an "offshore balancer", delegating responsibilities to regional allies to establish checks and balances, thereby preventing any potential rivals from seizing regional hegemony. This article posits that by implementing the bait and bleed strategy, the United States can effectively obstruct the maintenance of regional cooperation, instigate confrontations between potential rivals and their neighboring countries, and thus deplete the strength of its competitors, maintaining its relative power.
As a pivotal strategy for power acquisition, the implementation pathways of the bait and bleed strategy primarily involves two modes: temptation and provocation, which can entice nations into strategic compromises or drag them into warfare. After the upheaval in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union faced unprecedented socio-economic and external pressures. Germany proposed to exchange significant economic aid for Soviet concessions on German unification. Meanwhile, Western countries, led by the United States, repeatedly promised not to promote NATO's eastward expansion. Eventually, Gorbachev agreed to German unification. However, after Yeltsin's government completed the withdrawal in 1994, the West reneged on its promises and initiated the negotiation process for NATO's eastward expansion that same year. In the 21st century, the United States has not abandoned its Cold War mentality and habitually adheres to policies of containing and weakening Russia, wary of Russia's potential resurgence to compete for European hegemony. The U.S. persistently provoked Russia on the issue of Ukraine, continually compressing Russia's strategic space through NATO's eastward expansion, and repeatedly crossing red lines, compelling Russia to resort to military action to maintain national security, eventually leading to the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. After the conflict erupted, the U.S. further employed strategies of balance of power and responsibility shirking to prevent Russia from gaining power at the expense of American interests. It led NATO in supporting Ukraine to counterbalance
and confront Russia, thereby depleting Russia's strength. In summary, the bait and bleed strategy serves as a crucial strategic tool for the U.S. and its allies to exhaust and isolate their primary competitors.
Discussion
Literature Review
The concept of "Bait and Bleed", though historically applied in ancient China with instances such as "When the snipe and clam fight, the fisherman gets benefit" and "Sow discord, then stand aside on the wall", as strategies to deal with adversaries, was formally theorized as a major power strategy for the first time in J. Mearsheimer's work "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics". Mearsheimer defines the bait and bleed strategy as a national approach aimed at increasing relative power. This strategy involves causing two rivals to engage in a protracted war, so that they bleed each other white, while the baiter remains on the sideline, its military strength intact [23, p. 117]. Chinese scholar Jiang Peng attempted to analyze the applicability of the bait and bleed strategy within a bipolar competitive context. He used the case of the Soviet-US rivalry during the Vietnam War's Brezhnev era to elucidate the theory of edge baiting. This theory posits that, due to the bipolar power structure, major powers and their allies tend to engage in offensive actions at the periphery rather than the core regions [10]. Additionally, there is a lack of comprehensive scholarly exposition concerning the scope of application and implementation framework of the bait and bleed theory.
The term "Bait and Bleed" is often construed as a strategy where in one strategically baits a trap with an enticing element, much akin to placing a piece of meat as bait, causing adversaries to experience a gradual attrition of their resources or capabilities, metaphorically likened to a slow loss of blood. In the context of this translation, "Bait and Bleed" frequently intersects with the concept of "Entrap", where the act of enticement involves the deliberate intention to deceive someone, motivating them to take certain actions, often leading to unfavorable outcomes, which could metaphorically be likened to entering a perilous and potentially disastrous situation, akin to stepping into a figurative bloody trap. The concept of enticement has found extensive application in the fields of psychology, biology, and computer network security. S. Plous categorizes the concept of enticement within the realm of behavioral traps, and endeavors to elucidate this concept through the illustration of the "one-dollar auction game" [28]. B. Staw identified the phenomenon of "entrapment" and likened the sustained competition among bidders in the one-dollar auction game to being "mired in quicksand", representing a commitment to escalating a misguided course of action [31]. J. Brockner and J. Rubin define this process as "entrapment", highlighting that individuals engage in a decision-making process termed entrapment when they continuously escalate commitments to prior choices, even if they were erroneous, in order to justify or make prior investments seem rational. They propose that a viable approach to mitigate or avoid
the entrapment phenomenon is to carefully consider the exit costs before embarking on long-term risk investments. This consideration influences the decision-making regarding intensifying investments or exiting the venture, irrespective of the initial costs incurred [16]. In the field of biology, the concept of "entrapment" is predominantly applied in areas such as field trapping and gene trapping. For instance, in field applications, entrapment involves the deployment of traps to lure and capture pests like fruit flies, with the aim of analyzing the effectiveness of various attractants and trapping mechanisms in inducing mortality among the target species [5]. In the realm of computer network security, the application of "entrapment" primarily revolves around the domain of Honeypot-related technologies. Network security experts have formulated a network entrapment-based intrusion defense model by building upon research and analysis of Honeypot technologies. This model adopts a proactive defensive approach to address network security concerns. By strategically introducing hacker intrusion activities into a controlled environment, this approach enables the understanding of the methods and techniques employed by hackers, tracing their origins, recording evidence of their criminal activities, and concurrently expending their time and resources [11].
In illustrating the concept of "bait and bleed", Mearsheimer provides an example by suggesting that the United States could have encouraged the Soviet Union to become entrapped in conflicts similar to the one in Afghanistan [23, p. 117]. This notion can be easily confused with the term "entrap". However, this article contends that "bait and bleed" extends beyond merely enticing competitors into prolonged wars or decisions leading to resource depletion for the purpose of attrition. It holds a more significant aspect in the form of " bait", involving deliberately provoking irrational decisions in order to trap and consistently drain resources. Offshore balancing serves as a crucial strategy for the United States to contain potential competitors in Europe and East Asia. This strategy encourages regional states to engage in ongoing balancing and confrontation against potential hegemony, even escalating to warfare, to achieve prolonged exhaustion of challenges to hegemony. Nonetheless, as Mearsheimer emphasizes, it remains challenging to manipulate rival states into instigating wars they would otherwise avoid. This forms a focal point of this article's exploration, namely how to effectively implement the offshore balancing strategy. This article contends the bait and bleed strategy indeed constitutes an effective strategy for major powers to enhance their relative power.
Theoretical Framework
This paper posits that the implementation path of the "bait and bleed" strategy primarily comprises two components: "bait" and "bleed". The concept of "bait" is not confined solely to the act of enticement; it can also encompass the strategy of provocation. Both these tactics, when adeptly deployed at opportune junctures, possess the capacity to ensnare competitors within traps that have been premeditatedly orchestrated. On the other hand, "bleed" underscores the notion of resource consumption, particularly in a protracted
manner. However, it is also worth noting the potential risk that one of the states being baited might unexpectedly achieve a swift and decisive victory, thereby gaining power instead of losing it. Therefore, a crucial aspect in the implementation of the "bait and bleed" strategy involves maintaining sustained attrition between the two rivals without inadvertently escalating conflict to the point where it spills over to impact the initiator itself. This consideration stands as a key challenge in implementing the "bait and bleed" strategy.
Mearsheimer defines "bait and bleed" as a strategy involving inducing two rival states to engage in an extended conflict, leading them to exhaust their resources, while the instigator remains on the sidelines with its military strength intact. This definition raises some ambiguity — are the two rivals competitors with each other, or are they both rivals of the strategic implementer? Does inducing prolonged attrition between the behavior entities necessarily imply a protracted conflict? Is there a possibility ofexternal influence leading to erroneous decisions and sustained resource depletion based on prior judgments? This paper posits that "bait and bleed" can be analyzed from two perspectives: a conspiracy perspective and a strategic perspective. The distinction lies in the methods employed to guide opponents into desired positions by the implementer. When bait serves as a means of enticing others, the focus is on employing psychological tactics to trap competitors in a scenario of prolonged attrition. When bait serves as a means of provoking others, the emphasis shifts to strategically maneuvering competitors into predetermined predicaments, thereby enhancing the implementer's relative power through the strategic layout. The former approach highlights the role of external interference in causing competitors to make erroneous decisions, while the latter advocates for strategic maneuvering to corner competitors, forcing them into preset predicaments. Even if decision-makers intend to exit, they find themselves trapped and unable to extricate themselves. The success rate of the first model is lower and depends on the acceptance of the bait by competitors. It requires advanced information technology and hinges on the opponents' response to the bait. On the other hand, the second model has a higher success rate. While its strategic deployment is time-consuming, once successful, it gradually transfers initiative to the implementer (figure).
When bait serves as a means of enticing others, the implementer (baiter) concurrently exerts substantial external pressure on rival A while deploying the bait. Under the weight of both internal and external pressures, rival A often engages in a cost-benefit analysis to rationally assess whether to take the bait. When the cost or sacrifice is outweighed by the benefits and when the implementer and its allies continue to coordinate and provide sustained commitments, the bait is typically regarded by country A as a viable solution to their current predicament. At this juncture, country A may opt to incur certain costs, concessions, or compromises on specific issues in exchange for the bait, thus engaging in a conditional exchange with the implementer. After country A has made these concessions, the implementer continues to employ tactics such as information obfuscation and strategic appeasement. Utilizing the psycholo-
Bait and Bleed Strategy
gical tendency of opponents to avoid unnecessary sunk costs, the implementer guides country A into further escalating its previous erroneous decisions. In cases where the anticipated outcomes fail to materialize or where A is deceived into making additional sacrifices, country A's decision-makers, seeking to mitigate sunk costs or justify their actions domestically, typically choose to increase their investment or costs in order to achieve the initial objectives. This leads to sustained resource consumption or relinquishing control over a specific strategic direction due to the continuous escalation of costs or a loss of initiative in that strategic domain.
When bait serves as a means of provoking others, the implementer (baiter) typically engages in continuous stimulation of a core security issue or concern of rival A. This is achieved through strategic deployments or policies designed to intensify A country's sense of insecurity. In an international system charac-
terized by an absence of global governance, country A constantly seeks to maximize its power to ensure its security. This behavior can also pose a security threat to neighboring rivals of A. During such circumstances, the baiter often amplifies the narrative of a "security threat" posed by country A and fuels the flames of this perception. By leveraging the interests of A's competitors, the baiter continues to provoke country A, thereby creating a security dilemma that may escalate into the onset of conflict or even war. Before initiating hostilities, the baiter may use information obfuscation to convince country A of its capacity to win the war. However, once the conflict commences, the baiter strategically supports A's competitors with arms, funding, and other assistance through its own alliances and networks. This transforms what A anticipated to be a swift war into a protracted conflict, thereby achieving the goal of inflicting sustained resource loss on country A.
Mearsheimer's assertion that "There are hardly any good ways of causing trouble between other states without getting exposed, or at least raising suspicions in the target states" underscores the critical requirement of successful implementation for the bait and bleed strategy. In essence, he implies that maintaining the element of concealment is pivotal for achieving the desired outcome. However, in the realm of major power geopolitical competition, covert strategies are often susceptible to detection and suspicion by the targeted states. Moreover, when the target state realizes the existence of a trap, it becomes inclined to disengage, rendering the strategic implementation challenging to succeed. From my perspective, the more prudent choice in major power strategic competition lies in the realm of "open strategies", whereby overt strategic deployments are employed to corner rival states. This approach compels competitors into a situation where they have limited alternatives, forcing them to fall into the strategically preset trap from which they cannot easily extricate themselves.
Case Study
As a pivotal strategy in the pursuit of power, the Bait and Bleed strategy proves its efficacy in tricking rival states into initiating conflicts, which aligns with the operational logic of offshore balancing. This article will examine the real-world application of the Bait and Bleed strategy in the context of major power competition, focusing on two significant cases: the German reunification process and the evolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. These cases offer insights into how the Bait and Bleed strategy has been employed to shape the power dynamics among major nations.
German reunification and the start
of NATO's eastward expansion process
In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Western nations implemented the Bait and Bleed strategy in their dealings with the Soviet Union and subsequently Russia concerning the issue of German reunification. This strategic approach involved the Western powers offering assurances of re-
fraining from NATO expansion to the east in exchange for the Soviet Union's approval of German reunification. This maneuver effectively dismantled Russia's bargaining leverage against NATO's eastward expansion, thereby facilitating multiple instances of NATO's enlargement [12].
By the close of 1989, the upheaval in Eastern Europe had led to the weakening of Soviet control in the region, prompting Western leaders to focus on this area beyond the Cold War's boundaries. Divergent perspectives emerged between the United States and traditional European powers regarding the conception of the European security framework, particularly the feasibility of initiatives beyond the Cold War demarcation line, such as asserting influence within the power vacuum in Eastern Europe [2]. At this juncture, the U. S. administration under President G.H.W. Bush sought to transcend NATO's Cold War boundaries and maintain the organization's primacy in European security affairs by engaging in diplomacy to ensure NATO's retention of its dominant role. Simultaneously, West Germany was contemplating ways to secure Soviet concurrence for national reunification.
The collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the subsequent economic hardships confronting the Soviet Union created a pivotal context for West Germany to propose extensive support, valued in the billions of Deutsche Marks, as an incentive for Soviet approval of German reunification. Employing rational calculations, M. Gorbachev, then President of the Soviet Union, considered the pros and cons of allowing the reunification to proceed. While economic assistance could alleviate societal pressures, Gorbachev weighed this against the potential geopolitical "isolation" of Russia, which he deemed a significantly higher cost in comparison to the economic benefits. Notably, Gorbachev consistently underscored that permitting German reunification was contingent upon avoiding Russia's isolation [2]. In order to secure concessions from Soviet leadership regarding the reunification of Germany, Western nations orchestrated a series of commitments centered around the "no expansion of NATO" pledge. Various Western powers endeavored to elicit Soviet concessions by iteratively affirming their commitment to halting NATO's eastward expansion. This commitment was declared through a range of diplomatic declarations, negotiations, and public statements.
On January 31, 1990, H.-D. Genscher, the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, delivered a speech in Tutzing, West Germany. He emphasized that if the Soviet Union allowed German reunification; NATO would not expand to the east, and therefore would not approach the Soviet Union's borders [20]. On February 2, the West German Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher explicitly stated that NATO should exclude the expansion of its territory into the Democratic Republic of Germany or other Eastern European regions [13]. On February 6, during a meeting with the British Foreign Secretary D. Hurd, Genscher publicly asserted that "the Russians must be assured, for example, that if the Polish government were to leave the Warsaw Pact one day, they would not join NATO the next day" [2]. From February 7 to 9, the U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker presented conditions to M. Gorbachev, proposing that if Gorbachev permitted German reunification, the U. S. would agree that NATO's
jurisdiction would not move one inch eastward from its current position [24]. Baker further publicly announced during a press conference, "The United States has proposed not to allow NATO's expansion to the east in order to alleviate concerns about the security of the people in eastern Germany" [29]. On February 10, during a meeting in Moscow between West German Chancellor H. Kohl and M. Gorbachev, the reassurance that NATO would not expand to the east was reiterated, resulting in the Soviet Union's conditional acceptance of German reunification [4]. The West German Foreign Minister also pledged to E. Bahr that NATO would not expand to the east [24]. On February 13, the U.S. State Department informed its embassies, with the Secretary of State affirming that "the Soviet Union has clearly stated that we support the reunification of Germany within NATO, but we are willing to guarantee that NATO's military presence will not expand to the East" [15]. French President F. Mitterrand also expressed disagreement with NATO's enlargement on May 25 [4]. On May 31, President G.H.W. Bush assured M. Gorbachev that the Soviet Union would be integrated into the new Europe [25].
The assurances from Western countries, including the United States, of "no NATO expansion to the East" and "not isolating the Soviet Union" had a direct impact on the subsequent policy direction of the Soviet Union. In the context of unprecedented social contradictions and immense pressures, M. Gorbachev had reason to believe that allowing German reunification in exchange for the strategic commitment of "no NATO expansion to the East" and substantial economic assistance was worthwhile. Importantly, the Soviet Union could use this as an opportunity to ease its competitive relationship with the United States, potentially yielding numerous latent benefits. Under the influence of the West's inducement, the Soviet Union ultimately acquiesced to German reunification led by West Germany. German reunification served as a significant bargaining chip for the Soviet Union in its confrontation with NATO. Had Gorbachev achieved a substantial compromise through German reunification, Chancellor Kohl might not have necessarily rejected it. However, it is regrettable that the commitments made by Europe and the United States to the Soviet Union regarding the no-NATO-expansion plan were merely verbal pledges and were not backed by any legally binding agreements with the Soviet Union [2]. Additionally, Gorbachev also signed agreements for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Russia, resulting in the loss of a potent bargaining chip that could have compelled NATO to come to the negotiation table. This decision completely stripped the Soviet Union of its initiative in the negotiation process with NATO.
The ultimate goal of Western politicians' commitments to halt NATO's eastward expansion was to secure concessions from the Soviet Union regarding the issue of German reunification, rather than to genuinely foster equal and peaceful relations with Russia. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Yeltsin government led Russia towards a pro-Western orientation. However, the United States persisted in its intention of NATO's eastward expansion. To prevent excessively provoking Russia and to encourage the swift withdrawal of Russian troops from Berlin, NATO successively established the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council, agreed to the Russia-NATO Founding Act, and implemented the "Partnership for Peace" strategy. These measures aimed to alleviate Russia's suspicions of isolation on a psychological level and send false signals of strategic appeasement and goodwill to Russian leaders. The intention was to make B.Yeltsin believe that the "Partnership for Peace" initiative was a manifestation of Europe and the United States fulfilling their earlier promises regarding NATO's expansion to the East.
On August 31, 1994, all Russian military forces in Germany were completely withdrawn, marking the disappearance of a crucial bargaining chip for Russia in countering NATO's eastward expansion. On December 1,1994, the NATO Council in Brussels released a statement officially commencing negotiations for NATO's eastward expansion and indicating that such expansion would complement the enlargement of the European Union. In September 1995, NATO issued the "Feasibility Study on NATO Enlargement" and proposed the construction of a new framework for European-Atlantic security. It can be argued that the United States did not initially intend to incorporate Russia into NATO or even grant it a special position within the European security framework, as Russia remained a geopolitical and ideological competitor to NATO. With Russia having lost substantial leverage on the NATO eastward expansion issue, despite presenting compromise proposals such as the "French model" and the "East German model", these suggestions did not receive particularly positive responses. From then on, NATO embarked on a history of three rounds of eastward expansion.
The Russia-Ukraine Conflict
and the Bait and Bleed Strategy
Since the beginning of the 21st century, despite occasional periods of "thawing" in US-Russia relations, the two countries have ultimately treaded a path of containment and confrontation. The roots of this trend lie not only in the structural contradictions and geopolitical conflicts between the two nations but also in the threat-based identity perceptions that have evolved through their longstanding competition. Former US Secretary of State H. Kissinger once remarked that "Russia is always an essential factor in the world order... but also a potential threat to the world order" [22]. Driven by structural contradictions, geopolitical conflicts, and threat perceptions, containing and weakening Russia has been a consistent theme in US foreign policy. The core concern for the US government has been how to diminish Russia's share of power without depleting its own strength.
At the turn of the century, Russia faced severe internal divisions and economic crises, necessitating a stable external environment for internal reforms and consolidation. Faced with the risks of NATO expansion and potential isolation from the West, V. Putin attempted to adjust domestic and foreign policies in exchange for Western political trust. He sought to improve relations with the West, secure reliable assistance in economic transition and market access, alleviate security pressures, and seek greater strategic maneuverability [9]. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Russia recognized that counterterrorism
had become the focal point of the Bush administration's national security strategy. In response, Russia aimed to shift traditional geopolitical disputes with the West through cooperation on counterterrorism and other non-traditional security issues [7]. This approach aimed to attract Western attention away from its isolation of Russia, potentially leading to a moderation or alteration of that process. Relations between Russia and the West experienced a temporary thaw during this phase. However, President Putin remained committed to preserving Russia's status as a major power, with an objective of gradually restoring its global influence. This deepened US anxiety about Russia's potential resurgence. Within the US political sphere, Russia's imperial history raised concerns of external expansionism and nationalism. Strengthening defense against Russia became imperative to safeguard US national security interests and prevent Russia from potentially posing a threat [21]. This paper argues that the genuine intentions of the US towards Russia can be discerned through the successive editions of the "National Security Strategy Reports" released by various US administrations.
Based on assessments of the external strategic environment, the Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations each hold distinct perceptions of the security threats facing the United States. For instance, the Bush administration, post-9/11, prioritized terrorism as the foremost national security threat, later combining terrorism and weapons of mass destruction as focal targets. The Obama administration, navigating the financial crisis, emphasized the diversification ofsecuritythreats to the United States. The Trump administration formally categorized challenges from Russia and China as the primary security threats, heralding a resurgence of great power competition. The Biden administration's ascent witnessed an intensification of great power competition and a more pronounced global trend towards confrontational blocs. Despite differences in emphasis among these successive US administrations' security strategies, their ultimate goal remains preserving the international order under US leadership — that is, maintaining America's global primacy. In other words, sustaining a balance of power within the Russian and European continental regions and preventing Russia from challenging the prevailing global order constitute the core objectives of US European policy. Competitions across numerous domains such as geopolitics, ideology, and global influence have led the United States to progressively deepen its perception of Russia as a "competitor". This directly impacts the formulation of US policies toward Russia, and the articulation of containment strategies is grounded in this threat perception. US containment efforts vis-à-vis Russia encompass several measures. These include weakening the distribution of Russian power, pushing for NATO expansion to constrain Russia's strategic space, employing economic sanctions to curb Russia's development, employing color revolutions to erode Russia's alliances, and eroding Russia's traditional sphere of influence.
Given its geopolitically pivotal location in east Europe, Ukraine holds the strategic value in the power struggle between the United States and Russia [17]. As NATO's eastward expansion continued, Ukraine and other countries became transition zones between Russia and NATO. Due to its unique geo-
graphical position, Ukraine emerged as a strategic focus for the United States in its efforts to prevent Russia from becoming a potential hegemony. Through means such as the Orange Revolution, the United States actively supported pro-Western forces in Ukraine, aiming to continuously diminish Russia's influence and establish a policy of containment against Russia in the geopolitical sphere. Despite Russia repeatedly emphasizing its red line against "Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO", the United States continued to provoke Russia. The ousting of Ukrainian President V. Yanukovych in 2014 directly escalated tensions in Russia-Ukraine relations, with the involvement of Western countries behind the scenes. To safeguard its national security and geopolitical interests, Russia robustly intervened in the Ukrainian situation, leading to Crimea's annexation into Russia following a public referendum.
Western nations express dissatisfaction with Russia's assertive behavior, especially causing heightened security concerns among Eastern European countries and neighboring states, deepening their perception of the Russian threat. Meanwhile, the United States actively propagates the Russian threat narrative, exploiting Europe's historical fears of Russia to generate antagonism. This strategy involves implementing diverse sanctions and political isolation against Russia, continuously eroding its regional influence. However, given Russia's significant role as a major energy supplier to Europe, cooperation in energy and other sectors continues to exist. During the Trump administration, which prioritized "America First", there was a mild improvement in German-Russian relations, and strategic efforts to isolate Russia started to lose their effectiveness. Since the inauguration of the Biden administration, there has been a clear understanding that non-military means are unlikely to alter the power dynamics in the region. Instead, protracted conflicts can reshape the isolationist coalition against Russia, effectively weakening Russia and upholding the United States' leadership position in Europe.
During the course of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the United States has played a significant role. Firstly, the U. S. has consistently provoked Russia's security concerns. While well aware that Ukraine's NATO membership is a strategic red line for Russia, the U.S. has continued to provoke Russia through verbal assurances and actions, contributing to Russia's heightened sensitivity. Such sensitivity can easily lead to incorrect decisions, especially in specific contexts. As Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov stated in an interview, the U.S. and NATO have ignored Russia's security interests and turned Ukraine into a tool to contain and provoke Russia [30]. Secondly, the U.S. has continuously supported Ukraine against Russia rather than facilitating negotiations or easing relations. For instance, on February 23, 2021, U.S. Defense Secretary Austin promised to "stand up against Russia's aggression" during talks with Ukrainian Defense Minister Taran. The U.S. has repeatedly promised Ukraine, luring it with the prospect of NATO membership and pushing Ukraine further into direct opposition with Russia, intensifying Russia's security concerns. In reality, the U.S. has not shown any intention to have Ukraine join NATO, as it has never been prepared for direct conflict with Russia. Lastly, there was a certain degree of misjudgment on Russia's part regarding its own strength
and the level of support Western countries were providing to Ukraine. Before the Russia-Ukraine conflict erupted, U.S. aid to Ukraine was only $328 million, and Western countries claimed to want to avoid war with Russia. In this context, there was a significant power disparity between Russia and Ukraine, leading many, including Moscow, to believe that Russia might quickly and decisively win and gain power. However, Ukraine had received diverse support from Western countries since the Crimea crisis, with the U.S. alone providing over $4.6 billion in general assistance to Ukraine, including both security and non-security funds [1]. The U.S. also offered three $1 billion loan guarantees and provided a series of complex military assistance programs, enhancing Ukraine's defense capabilities. After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, U.S. military assistance to Ukraine reached $46 billion, and Western countries including Germany have been providing military aid to Ukraine, allowing Ukraine to maintain a degree of restraint against Russia on the battlefield.
From the perspective of the United States, the continuous support provided by Western nations to Ukraine serves as an effective means of constraining Russia within the theater of conflict, thereby achieving the long-term attrition of Russian power. At present, Moscow has certainly become aware of this strategic maneuver as a potential behavioral entrapment orchestrated by the United States. However, Russia is unlikely to capitulate to the relinquishment of its current policy due to the imperative of accountability to its electorate. Furthermore, it is evident that the United States harbors an aspiration to exploit the Russo-Ukrainian conflict to the fullest extent possible, with the objective of diminishing Russia's potency through the perpetuation of bloodshed, thereby enhancing its relative strength. The viewpoints expressed by M. McFaul, former U. S. Ambassador to Russia, during the Munk debate with Mearsheimer, provide corroboration for this assertion [27].
Conclusion
Since the Biden administration took office, the United States, in its pursuit of maintaining hegemony and dominance in the international system, has actively employed an alliance strategy tethered to its so-called values, while simultaneously containing and suppressing China and Russia [8]. In the absence of waging war, the U.S.'s strategies for power acquisition hold substantial research value. Among these strategies, J. Mearsheimer defines the bait and bleed strategy as one of the significant strategies through which the U. S. seeks power and global hegemony, yet he does not elaborate on the theoretical framework of this theory. This article, integrating interdisciplinary knowledge, refines the conceptual interpretation and theoretical framework of the bait and bleed strategy, categorizing its implementation into two modes: temptation and provocation. Within this context, "bait" not only serves as a lure but can also act as a provocation, both strategies capable of entrapping rivals in a trap meticulously pre-set by the baiter at an opportune moment. When bait exists as a means of temptation, decision-makers, burdened by internal and external crises, often opt for strategic compromise in exchange for bait that appears to alleviate
their immediate predicaments, inadvertently falling into a trap cunningly laid in advance by the baiter. Conversely, when bait serves as a means of infuria-tion, states lacking a sense of security and possessing a heightened perception of threat readily fall into a security dilemma with their supported competitors, and may even resort to warfare, thereby initiating a prolonged depletion oftheir own resources. On the other hand, "bleed" underscores the notion of resource consumption, particularly in a protracted manner. In 1990, the United States and Western countries successfully exchanged the promise of NATO not expanding eastward and substantial economic aid for M. Gorbachev's agreement to the unification of Germany. Subsequently, a series of policies were implemented to psychologically reduce suspicions of Russia's isolation and strategically appease the Yeltsin government, convincing it that NATO was honoring its previous commitments. However, in 1994, following the withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany, the process of NATO's eastward expansion officially commenced, signifying the successful implementation of the first mode of the bait and bleed strategy. Since the onset of the 21st century, the United States has persistently utilized color revolutions to erode Russia's traditional sphere of influence, deliberately ignoring Russian security demands. It has actively promoted NATO's eastward expansion, squeezing Russia's strategic space, and ultimately forcing Russia to opt for a special military operation to preserve its national survival and security interests. The United States and its NATO allies are trying to constrain Russia on the issue of Ukraine through continuous military and economic aid, aiming to deplete Russia's comprehensive national power. This represents the implementation of the second mode of the bait and bleed strategy by the United States. In conclusion, the bait and bleed strategy indeed serves as a strategic tool for the United States to maintain its global hegemony.
Currently, the unilateral sanctions against Russia, initially predicated on human rights and democratic values, are transitioning into comprehensive and multi-dimensional sanctions, encompassing financial, energy, and technological sectors [6]. The Biden administration, in concert with certain allies, has formulated a sanctions regime that spans these domains. Against this backdrop, contemplating ways to mitigate the ongoing depletion of Russian power due to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and the European and American sanctions becomes a matter of paramount importance. In fact, the structural contradictions and geopolitical conflicts between the United States and Russia, coupled with their mutual strategic perception as competitors, dictate that the policy of containment and isolation of Russia by the United States and Western societies is unlikely to undergo a shift in the short term. Under such circumstances, a transformation in Russia's foreign policy becomes inevitable. In the " Concept of Foreign Policy ofthe Russian Federation" approved on March 31,2023, Russia's latest foreign policy objectives include leveraging multilateral diplomatic mechanisms to ensure Russian interests are considered, and consolidating the position ofthe Russian Federation as one ofthe responsible and influential independent centers in today's world [19]. This signifies that Russia will
actively develop diversified diplomatic relations and join other friendly countries in promoting the establishment of a multipolar international order. Against this backdrop, the "pivot to the East" is no longer just an option, but a necessity. If executed well, it will enhance Russia's position in future global affairs [14]. The Pivot to the East strategy is one of Russia's crucial strategies for developing diversified diplomatic relations. It's an important choice in responding to Western isolation and the transformation of the international order, and it holds significant relevance for Russia's economic recovery and the maintenance of its relative power. To a certain extent, it is also a necessary means to further dismantle the U.S.-led hegemonic order amidst the changing power dynamics of the international order [3].
СПИСОК ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
1. Баранов В.П.Украина — НАТО: Проект анти-Россия // Военная мысль. 2022. №1. С. 78—85.
2. Горохов А., Васильев К. Договоренности о нерасширении НАТО на восток подтверждаются архивными источниками // Русская политология. 2022. № 1(22). С. 30—40.
3. Караганов С. Мы наблюдаем появление нового мира в момент его создания // Global Affairs. URL: https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/poyavlenie-novogo-mira/ (дата обращения: 11.5.2023).
4. Михаил Горбачев и германский вопрос: Сб. документов. 1986—1991. М.: Весь Мир, 2006.
5. Ван Мин, Ся Шэнгуан, Ли Юэхун. Бутун иньюцзи хэ юбуки дуй шиин де юша сяогуо [Действие различных аттрактантов и ловушек-мин-ловушек на настоящих мух] // Чжэцзян нонгье кэсюэ [Журнал сельскохозяйственных наук Чжэцзянаs]. 2023. № 4. С. 917—920 (на китайском языке: Ж^Г, З^Ш.
Шп^ШШЙШШЗШ!!. 2023, 04: 917—920).
6. Сунь Чэнхао, Чжэн Лефэн. Байден чжэнфу дуй чжэн яньцзин де теджен, дуньинь цзи сянду [Эволюция политики администрации Байдена в отношении России: особенности, мотивации и пределы] // Донгбейя лунтан [Форум Северо-Восточной Азии]. 2023. № 2. С. 98—114 (на китайском языке:
язшда ЙАШШЙМЙЯЕ, ¿ЙНЗШЙ. ш±тш, 2023,02:98—114).
7. Сюй Чжисинь. "9-11 шицзянь" хоу пуцзин дуй сифан чжэнсе де чжунда бяньхуа [Изменения политики Путина по отношению к Западу после «9-11»] // Оучжоу Яньцзю [Китайский журнал европейских исследований]. 2002. № 2. С. 7—15 (на китайском языке: ft&ir. "9 -11 *#" ^»Ш^ШЗШЙЙШ*^. ВДШЙ, 2002, 02: 7—15).
8. Цзинь Канронг, Тао Рукун. Мэйго дуй чжун и "шуан чжихэн" де чжаньлюэ сюаньцзе [Стратегический выбор США «двойной системы сдержек и противовесов» в отношении Китая и России] // Дунбэйя сюэкан [Журнал исследований Северо-Восточной Азии]. 2023. № 4. С. 22—36 (на китайском языке: ^ЙЖ,
"Ш\Ш" ШИ&й». тштъ, 2023, 04: 22—36).
9. Цзян И. "Вендинг хусянь" юй пуцзин вайцзяо чжаньлюэ гоусян [«Дуга стабильности» и дипломатическая стратегическая концепция Путина] //Чжун гун тяньцзинь шивэй дансяо сюэбао [Журнал партийной школы Тяньцзинь-ского комитета Коммунистической партии Китая]. 2002. № 3. С. 71—75 (на ки-
тайском языке: *!£. "Ш^Ш" ^Ш^ЙШ&ЙШ. ФЙ^^ЙЗШ^е, 2002, 03: 71—75).
10. Цзян Пэн. Лянцзи цзинчжэн бэйцзин сядэ "бяньюань юбу" чжаньлюэ цзи ци сяоюн фенси [Стратегия «захвата Римленда» в контексте биполярной стратегической конкуренции и анализ ее полезности] // Шицзе Цзинцзи ю Чжэнчжи [Мировая экономика и политика]. 2021. № 4. С. 113—134 (на китайском языке: ЙЯЙ. Mffi^ttSTW "ЙШШ' ШШПШНШ. 2021, 04: 113—134).
11. Чэнь Лин, Хуан Хао. Ванлуо юбуши рукин фан ю мо син де шеджи [Разработка сетевой модели защиты от вторжений на основе Honeypot] // Цзису-аньцзи инъен [Компьютерные приложения]. 2005. № 9. С. 2074—2077 (на китайском языке: ШЙ, i+HHUSffl, 2005, 09: 2074—2077).
12. Чжэн Юй. Элуоси ю бэйюэ: конг "хэпин хуобан цзихуа" дао мадели фэнхуэй [Россия и НАТО: от «Партнерства во имя мира» к Мадридскому саммиту] // Элуоси донгоу чжунья яньцзю [Российские, восточноевропейские и центральноазиатские исследования]. 1997. № 6, С. 64—70 (на китайском языке: ШЭ. тштт. М ИЩЩМгё. 1997, 06: 64—70).
13. Baker/Genscher Meeting. February 2, February 3, 1990 // U.S. Department. URL: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16112-document-01-u-s-embassy-bonn-confidential-cable (дата обращения: 10.09.2023).
14. Bordachev Т. Russia's Turn to the East: Between Choice and Necessity //Valdai Club. URL: https://valdaiclub.com/alhighlights/russia-s-turn-to-the-east-betwe-en-choice/ (дата обращения: 18.09.2023).
15. Briefing on U.S.-Soviet Ministerial, February 13, 1990 // State Department Freedom of Information Act. URL: https://foia.state.gov/Search/Results.aspx7search Text=Brieang%20on%20U.S.-Soviet%20Ministerial&beginDate=&endDate=&pub-lishedBeginDate=&publishedEndDate=&caseNumber= (дата обращения: 11.09.2023).
16. Brockner J., Rubin J.Z. Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts: A Social Psychological Analysis. N.Y.: Springer Verlag, 1985.
17. Brzezinski Z. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. L.: Hachette UK, 2016.
18. Carr E.H. The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919—1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.
19. Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation // Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. URL: https://mid.ru/cn/foreign_policy/founding_ document/1860586/ (дата обращения: 10.11.2023).
20. Elbe F, Kiessler R. A Round Table with Sharp Corners: The Diplomatic Path to German Unity. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 1996.
21. Kissinger H.A. Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century. N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 2002.
22. Kissinger H.A. Diplomacy. N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 2012.
23. Mearsheimer J.J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Updated Edition. N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003.
24. Memorandum of Conversation, Record of Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and James Baker. February 9, 1990 // National Security Agency. URL: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16117-document-06-record-conversation-bet-ween (дата обращения: 11.09.2023).
25. Memorandum of Conversation, Record of conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush. May 31, 1990 //White House. URL: https://nsarchive. gwu.edu/document/16135-document-21-record-conversation-between (ggaTa o6pame-hha: 12.09.2023).
26.Morgenthau H.J. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1985.
27. Munk Debate: Russia-Ukraine War. 2022. May 12.
28. Plous S. The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1993.
29. Press Conference of James Baker Following U.S.-USSR Ministerial Meetings in Moscow, February 9, 1990 // Department of State. URL: https://nsarchive.gwu. edu/document/16115-document-04-memorandum-conversation-between (ggaTa 06-pameHHA: 13.09.2023).
30. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Interview with Xinhua News Agency // Xinhua Net. http://www.news.cn/world/2022-04/30/c_1128610657.htm (gaTa o6pameHHfl: 08.11.2023).
31. Staw B.M. Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action // Organizational behavior and Human Performance. 1976. N 16. S. 27—44.
REFERENCES
1. Baranov V.P. 2022. "Ukraine — NATO: The anti-Russia Project". Military thought, no. 1, pp. 78—85. (In Russ.)
2.Gorokhov A., Vasiliev K. 2022. "Agreements on non-expansion of NATO to the east are confirmed by archival sources". Russian Political Science, no. 1 (22), pp. 30—40. (In Russ.)
3. Karaganov S. 2022. We are witnessing the emergence of a new world at the moment of its creation. Available at: https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/poyavlenie-novogo-mira/(accessed: 12.21.2022).
4. Mikhail Gorbachev and the German question: Collection of documents. 1986—1991. 2006. Moscow, The Whole World, pp. 350—365. (In Russ.)
5. Wang Min, Xia Shengguang, Li Yuehong. 2023. Bu tong yinyouji he youbu-qi dui shiying de yousha xiaoguo [The booby-trap effect of different attractants and traps on fruit flies]. Zhejiang nongye kexue [Journal of Zhejiang Agricultural Sciences], no. 4, pp. 917—920 (Hfc, WPt,
Mttmrn, 2023, 04: 917—920). (In Chin.)
6. Sun Chenghao, Zheng Lefeng. 2023. Baideng zhengfu dui e zhengce yanjin de tezheng, dongyin ji xiandu [The Evolution of Biden Administration's Policy toward Russia: Features, Motivations, and Limits]. Dongbeiya luntan [Northeast Asia Forum], no. 2, pp. 98—114 (iMeU, ^SSJgJS.
2023, 02:98—114). (In Chin.)
7. Xu Zhixin. 2002. "9-11 shijian" hou Pujing dui xifang zhengce de zhongda bianhua [The Changes of Putin's Policy towards the West since the "9-11"]. Ouzhou yanjiu [Chinese Journal of European Studies], no. 2, pp. 7—15 (ii*f/f. "9'11^#"
»3ra;iri0C«M**3&tt. RJHIWSS, 2002, 02: 7—15). (In Chin.)
8. Jin Canrong, Yao Rukun. 2023. Meiguo dui zhong e "shuang zhiheng" de zhanlue xuanze [U.S. Strategic Choice of "Double Checks and Balances" against China and Russia]. Dongbeiya xuekan [ Journal of Notheast Asia Studies], no. 4,
pp. 22—36 ^Btt+fli MWHftftg. 2023, 04:22—36).
(In Chin.)
9. Jiang Yi. 2002. "Wending huxian" yu Pujing waijiao zhanlue gouxiang [The "Arc of Stability" and Putin's diplomatic strategic concept]. Zhonggong tianjin shiwei dangxiao xuebao [ Journal of the Party School of Tianjin Committee of the Communist Party of China], no. 3, pp.71—75 2002, 03: 71—75). (In Chin.)
10. Jiang Peng. 2021. Liangji jingzheng beijing xia de "bianyuan youbu" zhanlue jiqi xiaoyong fenxi [The "Rimland Entrapping" Strategy in the Context of Bipolar Strategic Competition and Its Utility Analysis]. Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [WorldEconomy and Politics], no. 4, pp. 113—134 (gffi. MSfc^UHftTM Sit" titmmHmS, 2021, 04: 113—134). (In Chin.)
11. Chen Ling, Huang Hao. 2005. Wangluo youbushi ruqin fangyu moxing de sheji [Design of Network Honeypot-Based Intrusion Defense Model]. Jisuanji yingyong [ComputerApplications],no. 9,pp.2074—2077(P$;g, pSliSi^ii^Aif MilHiMiSit i+HmSffl, 2005, 09: 2074—2077). (In Chin.)
12. Zheng Yu. 1997. Eluosi yu Beiyue: cong "heping huoban jihua" dao madeli fenghui [Russia and NATO: From "Partnership for Peace" to the Madrid Summit]. Eluosi dongou zhongya yanjiu [Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies ], no. 6, pp. 64—70 (nm. i^mmm^x^^miM" nj^imnit^.
1997, 06: 64—70). (In Chin.)
13. Baker/Genscher Meeting. February 1, 1990. Available at: https://nsarchive. gwu.edu/document/16112-document-01-u-s-embassy-bonn-confidential-cable (accessed: 10.09.2023).
14. Bordachev T. 2022. Russia's Turn to the East: Between Choice and Necessity. Available at: https://valdaiclub.com/alhighlights/russia-s-turn-to-the-east-between-choice/ (accessed: 18.09.2023).
15. Briefing on U.S.-Soviet Ministerial. February 13, 1990. Available at: URL: https: //foia. state. gov/ Search/Results .aspx?searchText = Brieang%2 0on% 20U. S. -Soviet%20Ministerial&beginDate=&endDate=&publishedBeginDate=&published EndDate=&caseNumber= (accessed: 11.09.2023).
16. Brockner J., Rubin J.Z. 1985. Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts: A Social Psychological Analysis. N.Y., Springer Verlag.
17. Brzezinski Z. 2016. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostra-tegic Imperatives. London, Hachette UK.
18. Carr E.H. 2001. The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919—1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
19. Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. March 31, 2023. Available at: https://mid.ru/cn/foreign_policy/founding_document/1860586/ (accessed: 10.11.2023).
20. Elbe F., Kiessler R. 1996. A Round Table with Sharp Corners: The Diplomatic Path to German Unity. Baden-Baden, Germany, Nomos.
21. Kissinger H.A. 2002. Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century. New York, Simon and Schuster.
22. Kissinger H.A. 2012. Diplomacy. New York, Simon and Schuster.
23. Mearsheimer J.J. 2003. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Updated Edition). New York, W.W. Norton and Company.
24. Memorandum of Conversation, Record of Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and James Baker. February 9, 1990. Available at: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/ document/16117-document-06-record-conversation-between (accessed: 11.09.2023).
25. Memorandum of Conversation, Record of conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush. May 31, 1990. Available at: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/docu-ment/16135-document-21-record-conversation-between (accessed: 12.09.2023).
26. Morgenthau H.J. 1985. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. N.Y., McGraw-Hill.
27. Munk Debate: Russia-Ukraine War. 2022. May 12.
28. Plous S. 1993. The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making. New York, McGraw-Hill.
29. Press Conference of James Baker Following U.S.-USSR Ministerial Meetings in Moscow. February 9, 1990. Available at: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/ 16115-document-04-memorandum-conversation-between (accessed: 13.09.2023).
30. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Interview with Xinhua News Agency. 2023. Available at: http://www.news.cn/world/2022-04/30/c_1128610657.htm (accessed: 08.11.2023).
31. Staw B.M. 1976. "Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action". Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, pp. 27—44.
ТРАНСЛИТЕРАЦИЯ
1. Baranov V.P. Ukraina — NATO: Proekt anti-Rossiya //Voennaya mysl'. 2022. № 1. S. 78—85.
2. Gorohov A., Vasilev K. Dogovorennosti o nerasshirenii NATO na vostok pod-tverzhdayutsya arhivnymi istochnikami // Russkaya politologiya. 2022. № 1(22). S. 30—40.
3. Karaganov S. My nablyudaem poyavlenie novogo mira v moment ego sozda-niya // Global Affairs. URL: https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/poyavlenie-novogo-mira/ (data obrascheniya: 11.5.2022).
4.Mihail Gorbachev i germanskij vopros: Sb. dokumentov. 1986—1991. M.: Ves Mir, 2006. S. 350—365.
