CC BY
16PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES
SPACES FOR PEOPLE, NOT FOR PROFIT: PUBLIC SPACES AND IDENTITY BUILDING IN POST-SOCIALIST CITIES
Kleyman M.
Zharkova E.
Department of Philosophy, Ivanovo State University of Chemistry and Technology,
Ivanovo, Russia
ABSTRACT
The article aims at examining the current trends of identity building in post-socialist cities, with a special focus on the case of Russia. In the urbanized and thus globalized world the need of building social identity complexity is increasingly arising, but this poses many challenges to existing social identities and, at the same time, emphasizes the need of dialogic universalism that includes the aspiration for universally valid ethics. However, this goal may be attained merely through the dialogue between all concerned parties, and urban public spaces may become an arena of that dialogue. The article examines the role of public spaces in building social identity complexity and providing a background for the emergence of universally valid ethics within the post-socialist cities, with the emphasis on the results of the comparative case study on the cities of Ivanovo and Yaroslavl in Central Russia.
Keywords: city; social identity complexity; dialogic universalism; public spaces; Russia; Ivanovo; Yaroslavl
Introduction
In 1882 Ernest Renan stated that 'nations are not eternal. They had a beginning and they will have an end. And they will probably by a European confederation' (Thiesse 1999). At the first glance, it seems that at the beginning of the 21st century this prediction is increasingly coming true, as most of the European nation-states are ceding part of their sovereignty upward to supranational agencies within the institutional framework of the European Union. But, on the other hand, today there is little evidence that the European nations themselves are fading away. Moreover, there are few signs of the emergence of any European identity coexistent with individuals' national and regional identities. According to Larry Siedentop, 'despite the new rhetoric of Europeanism, Europe has perhaps never been more divided by national cultures than at present' (Siedentop 2001, 131).
Yet, these tendencies extend well beyond the boundaries of the EU and the European continent, because every society and every culture throughout the world is increasingly challenged by internationalization of economy, policies, exchange and knowledge. The attempts to propose a pyramidal and centralistic model of building up the world system (such as, for example, the French model toward which the EU already tends) with the strict division between 'core' and 'periphery' (Wallerstein 1974; 1980; 1991) will inevitably entail the 'clash of civilizations' (Huntington 1996). While being intertwined with the current shift from government in hierarchies to governance in networks, the need of building up a polyphonic world system which can be occasionally somewhat chaotic, but which is much more democratic than the first one, is increasingly arising. But this inevitably poses many questions, already at the basic, theoretical level, such as: How to build social identity in the increasingly globalized world? What
are obstacles for implementing the principles of multi-culturalism? Why are the issues of multiculturalism increasingly challenging the development of many nations around the world? Are these problems really resulted from multiculturalism?
While attempting to answer these questions, one should take into consideration that the processes under scrutiny are fueled by urban growth. Cities have always been spatial projections of society (Lefebvre 1968, 64), but the current trends of globalization have produced the widespread of the lifestyle of the 'global city' around the world (Sassen 2001; Savitch and Kantor 2002). These processes helped nurture the thesis of convergence of different cultures caused by increasing 'standardization' of 'metropolization' models (Cohen 1996). However, other researchers have criticized such 'standardization' while pointing up the role played by inherited cultures and institutions (Shatkin 2007). Alongside the convergence/divergence effect, cities experience an ongoing tension between integration and disintegration, unity and disunity. On a cultural level, various interest groups make great efforts to cultivate a sense of shared community and pride in a city (Massey, Allen and Pile 1999). This increasingly produces the need of dialogic universalism that 'includes the aspiration for universally valid ethics, which, however, should be developed and established through the dialogue between all concerned parties' (Zalec 2012, 143). As it seems, urban public spaces may become an arena of such a dialogue.
The origins of urban public space are often traced back to the agora or, literally, a market place where people interacted in discussing the important issues of policies of the Greek city-states (Neal 2009, 5). But, on the contrary, the opportunity for public interaction in a 'city for profit' (Brenner et al. 2011) accelerated towards segregation (social, economic, cultural, ethnic),
is on the decline (Staeheli and Mitchell 2008; Madanipour 2003; Kohn 2004). At the same time, it has been suggested that the possible ways out of this situation would be in re-defining the role of public spaces as an arena of emerging grassroots democracy (Crawford 1995).
This article aims at discussing the possible ways of using the public spaces for people of different cultural backgrounds to search for the principles of universally valid ethics. Accordingly, the first part provides the discussion of the concept of solidary personalism regarded as a background of emerging social identity complexity within the increasingly multicultural cities (Roccas and Brewer 2002). The following section considers the characteristics of public spaces within the cities of Central and Eastern European countries under state socialism, which presented an attempt to provide an alternative to the economicist model of urban development, with the emphasis on the factors that caused the failure of this social experiment. The next part focuses on analyzing the issues on rapid societal 'capitalization' and their influence on the emergence of public spaces and social identity in the post-socialist cities in Russia, while presenting the results of the comparative case study on the cities of Ivanovo and Yaroslavl in Central Russia. The main findings and the questions still unsolved are presented in the concluding section.
Social identity complexity, solidary personal-ism and the emergence of urban public spaces
As Jane Jacobs stressed in a well-known article, a multiplicity of cultures are increasingly characterizing the urban space (Jacobs 1993). These processes inevitably produce the need of the emergence of social identity complexity within urban communities.
The concept of social identity complexity (Roccas and Brewer 2002) is a theoretical construct that refers to an individual's subjective representation of the interrelationships among his or her multiple group identities. Social identity complexity reflects the degree of overlap perceived to exist between groups of which a person is simultaneously a member. Given the recognition that urban residents inevitably belong to multiple social groups with multiple corresponding social identities (Milgram 1970) an important question to be addressed is how individuals combine these group identities when they define their subjective in-group. More specifically, do multiple group memberships lead to more inclusive or less inclusive in-groups, when compared to single group identities?
To address these issues, scholars and politicians are increasingly referring to the concept of multicultur-alism, which is usually regarded as the cultural diversity of communities and the policies that promote this diversity (Zarate, Levy and Kramsch 2011). As a descriptive term, multiculturalism is the simple fact of cultural diversity and the demographic make-up of a
1 When the Dutch film producer Theo van Gogh, in collaboration with the Somali-born writer Ayaan Hirsi Ali, pro-
duced the film Submission, which criticized the treatment of women in Islam, he faced with the threats of Islamic fundamentalists and, finally, he was murdered on 2 November 2004. But, at the same time, many liberal politicians, both in
specific place, such as, for instance, the cities. As a prescriptive term, multiculturalism encourages ideologies and policies that promote this diversity or its institu-tionalization. In this sense, multiculturalism produces a society at ease with the rich tapestry of human life and the desire amongst people to express their own identity in the manner they see fit (Bloor 2010).
'The preservation of the largest possible number of cultures (the largest possible cultural diversity)' (Zalec 2012, 151) is thus regarded as a main characteristic of multiculturalism. This presupposes that every culture is intrinsically good, and any attempt to criticize the distinct characteristics of a culture is inevitably regarded as a threat to the basic principles of multicultur-alism1. As it seems, these premises entail a society increasingly becoming similar to the well-known Nozick's machine (Nozick 1974). But, in contrast with Nozick's thought experiment, people are allowed to do what they could want not in simulated reality, but in everyday life. For instance, though in Europe home violence is considered as a serious criminal offence, this could be advocated if committed inside the Islamic communities, as, according to the widespread stereotypes, home violence is an inherent part of the Islamic culture. Therefore, Islamic communities are increasingly becoming out of the internal legislation of the countries where they reside.
This situation, however, is resulted not from mul-ticulturalism in a broad sense, but from leveling multi-culturalism based on nihilism and instrumentalism. According to Bojan Zalec, nihilism is a condition of an individual, a group, society, culture that is based on leveling everything. But, as in practice nihilism is impossible, it usually transforms into some kind of instru-mentalism, meaning the attitude that does not regard a particular person or social group as a goal, but, at best, just as a means (Zalec 2011a, 29)2. Nihilism and instru-mentalism are considered as the opposites of solidary personalism. The term 'solidary personalism' was firstly introduced by Bojan Zalec (cf. Zalec 2011a). It presupposes that persons are in principle equal regarding their right to cultivate their singularity or individuality. The main aim of a personalist is the flourishing of every person. At the same time, the aim of adjective 'solidary' is to stress the relational and participatory nature of a person (Zalec 2011b, 105-6). As Bojan Zalec states, persons are essentially relational beings and must be treated in their concrete situation and historical perspective. Solidarity means not just a kind of economic solidarity but mutual participation of persons on their lives including all their aspects. The central moment of such solidarity is intellectual solidarity (cf. Hollenbach 2003), the participation on the experience of the other (Zalec 2011a, 32). Yet - on the other hand - it is crucial that we recognize that there are limits of inter-personal solidarity: 'Solidarity - participation in
the Netherlands and abroad, accused Theo van Gogh of violation of the basic principles of multiculturalism (Coughlan 2004).
2 For example, particular religious communities such as an Islamic community in Europe are regarded just as a means to gain a support during the elections by politicians or to maximize their profits by entrepreneurs.
the life of the other - can however be only partial. The belief that we can reach total participation is dangerous and destroys approaching of the other as the other /.../ and provides contexts for instrumentalization and manipulation' (Zalec 2011b, 106), as it occurred, for instance, in Central and Eastern/Southeastern Europe under state socialism.
Consequently, solidary personalism provides a background of criticism of leveling multiculturalism based upon the idea that every culture is intrinsically good, as well as upon the ignorance of the historical context and the current situation of the development of a distinct culture. In this context, dialogic universalism may be considered as an opposite of leveling multicul-turalism (Zalec 2012). From the perspective of dialogic universalism, every culture must be treated in its concrete situation and historical perspective. Culture by itself cannot be intrinsically good or intrinsically bad; however, any culture potentially contains both constructive and destructive elements. As Erich Fromm (1973) argued, in a world in which violence in every form seems to be increasing, every culture may provide a support for human destructiveness while advocating violence against all regarded as 'bad' or 'wrong'. The main goal of dialogic universalism is thus flourishing the constructive elements and minimizing the destructive elements of any culture. This increasingly produces the need of 'universally valid ethics, which, however, should be developed and established through the dialogue between all concerned parties' (Zalec 2012, 143). It demands a lot of adjustments, reconciliations and dialogues. In this context, it is absolutely incorrect to put a blind eye, for example, on the widespread of home violence committed against women in Islamic communities. But, at the same time, we should put an emphasis on the constructive elements of the Islamic culture, such as, for instance, respect for and taking care of elderly (whereas in the Western world old people are, in fact, often excluded from a society), which may be worth in searching for the foundations of universally valid ethics.
As it seems, the ideas of Albert Schweitzer may provide a good example of searching for the back-groung of dialogic universalism. On the one hand, Schweitzer, unlike many European politicians at the beginning of the 21st century, stated that the European culture was of Christian origins, and the ideas and practices of liberalism in Europe (which may be regarded as a constructive part of the European cultural heritage) were initially intertwined with the Christian ethics. In this sense, he considered his work as a medical missionary in Africa to be the response to Jesus' call to become 'fishers of men'. But, on the other hand, Schweitzer was one of the harshest critics of Western colonialism, and, in this context, he regarded expansionism and racism as destructive elements of Western cultures3 (Schweitzer 2010). Albert Schweitzer believed that ethical values which could underpin the ideal of true civilization had to have their foundation in deep thought
and be world- and life-affirming. He therefore embarked on a search for ethical values in the various major religions and worldviews accessible to him. Finally, he decided that the only thing the people around the world are really sure of is that they live and want to go on living (Brabazon 2005). Consequently, the principle of the Reverence for Life (Schweitzer 2009), which is rooted back not only to Christian humanism, but to non-Western religious thought, in particular, the Jain principle of ahimsa (non-violence), may form an ethical background for cultivating dialogic universalism within a society (Barsam 2008).
In this context, dialogic universalism may provide a robust framework for the emergence of social identity complexity, which can foster the development of superordinate social identities and global identity (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Dialogic universalism permits a person to be proud of his or her mother culture, but, at the same time, to admit that this culture inevitably possesses destructive elements. In this sense, a person is open to dialogue with those who present other cultures. Furthermore, if an individual voluntarily chooses living outside his or her mother country, he or she must respect for cultural heritage and traditions of his or her new country of residence. For instance, immigrants moving to European countries should accept that European identity is liberal and of Christian origins (Zalec 2012).
In the increasingly urbanized and thus globalized world urban public spaces, or places in a city or in a town which are generally open and accessible for all people, may be regarded as important local intersections where economic, political and social relations are revealed and played out (Habermas 1989). These places play a crucial role in the emergence of social identity. For centuries such places as, for instance, Trafalgar Square in London, Stephansplatz in Vienna or Nevsky Avenue in Saint Petersburg have produced a unique atmosphere of these cities and attracted many visitors from around the world. In Pierre Nora's sense, they present the examples of places where memories and traditions relay on the material 'sites of memory' (Nora 1996). In other words, the emergence of urban public spaces is interlinked with the issues of urban character, or, more precisely, moral climate which includes the shared perceptions of how moral issues should be addressed and what morally correct behavior is (Victor and Cullen 1988; Novikov 2003). Just as personal ethics often affects what an individual will do when faced with moral dilemmas, a moral climate guides what a social group, for example, urban community, and its constituents will do when faced with issues of conflicting values. Since most urban communities can be thought of as 'open systems', affected by and affecting the external environment, moral climate defines these communities in both its internal and external relationships. In Foucault's sense, moral climate is knowledge, meaning that people judge their surrounding world according to a certain regime of truth, which tells them right from wrong, good from bad or ours from theirs (Foucault 2000).
3 As it seems, the ideology and practices of German Nazism present the extreme forms of this destructiveness.
While climate in its initial sense affects, for instance, the manner of wearing, building houses or leisure, moral climate also may be examined in terms of its effect on human behaviour. The question is if this behaviour means the preparedness for dialogue with those who represent the alternative lifestyle or point of view in the sense of solidary personalism. In such a case, people are encouraged to be tolerant and open towards any form of O/otherness, while developing social identity complexity. This implies a variety of public spaces in response to the concerns of various social groups, but, at the same time, it does not mean exclusion, segregation and fragmentation, while the motto of unity in diversity is regarded as being of the most importance to provide sustainability and resilience of urban development. In such a case, alternative public spaces are considered as being crucial in producing the sense of community4 (Miller 2004, 420).
But, on the other hand, moral climate within some urban communities may produce strict individual obedience to commonly shared rules, both formal and informal, without any doubt about their legitimacy. Hence, any alternative worldviewis blamed. In such a case, public spaces are made and used in a way of excluding the groups of people that are considered as being endangered the homogeneity of the predominant social, ethnic or religious group. In such a case, the process of stigmatization may be considered, in Milgram's sense, as the main characteristic of moral climate within urban communities (Milgram 1970).
As it seems, the widespread of the lifestyle of 'global cities' around the world (Sassen 2001) provides nurture for levelling multiculturalism based on the con-sumerist culture with its emphasis on hedonistic over-consumption. In such a case, the idea of good life (or, in Albert Schweitzer's sense, the Reverence for Life) is increasingly substitutes to that of goods' life (Mumford 1989). For instance, urban public spaces are increasingly invaded by car drivers, and, at the same time, pedestrians and cyclists are excluded from them. As a result, public spaces in the society aimed, first of all, at maximizing profits, are increasingly representing a 'placeless world' (Evans et al.2011, 72). Instead of social identity complexity, these processes result in the identity crisis. Caught between two or more social groups, people usually experience feeling of being marginalised. They are not fully a part of either group, and unless insulated by the emotional support system of a cohesive sub-community, they will most likely end up having an emotionally stressful life (Milgram 1970, 160-162). In this context, the claims of 'the right to the city' (Lefebvre 1968) and 'city for people, not for profit' (Brenner et al. 2011) extend well beyond the academic debates within the frameworks of critical urban theory.
In the second half of the 20th century countries throughout Central and Eastern/Southeastern Europe were hurled headlong into a social experiment aimed at providing an alternative to this development. But the question is if this experiment was really successful.
Public spaces and identity building in the cities under state socialism
The term 'state socialism' is used in reference to the economic systems of Estern/Souteastern and Central European communist states because of the dominant role state planning played in their systems (Ellman 1989, 17). The everyday reality of state socialism was impacted heavily by under-urbanization meaning the growth of jobs outstripped the growth of population (Szelenyi 1996). The fact that the Marxist-Leninist movement was distinctly urban-oriented is relevant to understanding the nature of the subsequent urbanization that occurred in most of the Central and Eastern/Southeastern European countries under state socialism. The aggressive pursuance of economic development via industrialization was largely responsible for an explosion of urban growth aimed at creating the 'egalitarian city' (Weclawowicz 2002). According to Tosics (2003), the neglected role of urban rent and other market mechanisms during socialism meant a lower level of socio-spatial segregation. Szelenyi (1996) suggests that socialist cities were characterized by less diversity (especially regarding services), less inner-city density resulted from liberal use of space in planning, and less marginality (as social extremes were less common). He argues that the experience of urbanity under state socialism may be considered as a result of under-urbanization. However, Smith (1996) argues against the idea of a distinctly socialist city. Yet, he agrees that there were sections of the city that were distinctly socialist. Older cities, like, for example, Moscow or Prague, were only partially changed while using the existing infrastructure and built environment (Gentile and Sjoberg 2006; Smith 1996). But, as all Central and Eastern European countries had suffered due to the Second World War, there was a need to reconstruct many cities like, for example, Warsaw that had practically been razed to the earth during the 1944 uprising. At the same time, there were completely new cities (often built up around a particular industry) that developed under socialism and might be considered as distinctly socialist, single-enterprise cities where 30% or more of the population is employed in one enterprise (Iyer 1997).
At the same time, urban planning in Communist countries was subject not only to the state socialist economies, but to the ideological constraints of Stalinism, which, according to Charles Bellinger, may be better understood in terms of Kierkegaard's concepts of anxiety and stadia of existence (Cf. Bellinger 1992, 2001, 2010 cited in Zalec 2014, 445). According to Kierkegaard, anxiety means fear of what we desire (and, vise versa, we desire what we fear). Therefore, anxiety may be considered as 'sympathetic antipathy and antipathic sympathy' (Kierkegaard 1980, 42). Bellinger thus interprets Stalinism as an extreme pathological example of pharisaism which presents the ethical stadium and anxiety before evil, because it is based on the idea that egoistic, aesthetic individuals must be
4 One of the examples most referred to is Critical Mass ride, when people are coming together and asserting their right to
get their own space, such as the bicycle lanes regarded as an alternative to the predominant car culture (Carlsson 2002).
excluded in order to cleanse society of negative elements and that it can progress towards the utopia. While being a future-oriented ideology (in contrast with Hitler's Nazism which was oriented towards the pre-Christian German past), Stalinism aimed at attacking the shadow of the past, i.e., an immature egoistic person. The killing of it is in fact an answer to Stalinist's own incompleteness and (moral) fallibility (Zalec 2014, 448).
As it seems, these characteristics may be crucial for the understanding of identity building strategies under state socialism. On the one hand, the creation of a new, emancipated human being was proclaimed as a goal of the Communists and, in this sense, Stalinism pretended to provide an alternative to the economicist instrumentalism of the capitalist society. But, on the other hand, as in practice this goal is unattainable, every person can be potentially excluded from the society and considered (at best) just as a mean to reach the goal of creation of a new human being. In this sense, Stalinism presented the extreme form of instrumentalism. At the same time, the idea of 'proletarian internationalism' leveled every culture, while regarding the cultural heritage (at best) just as a means to create a new human being; otherwise cultural traditions (for example, those rooted back to any religion) must be annihilated. In fact, as the Communists purported to rule in the name of the urban working class (proletariat), while initially claimed to have created socialist states that was 'dictatorship of the proletariat' (Fitzpatrick 1993), a 'true proletarian' was regarded as a pattern of the formation of the new, 'communist' type of personality. The nominally favored class status of proletarians was a guarantee to provide opportunity for social advancement. For example, the fact that one's parents were 'proletarians' was regarded as crucial upon his or her application for a privileged position within the ruling class of nomenklatura (Djilas 1983). At the same time, the extensive development of centrally planned economy, in the manner of the dawn of the industrial era, attracted many low-skilled workers from the countryside who were forced to move in the cities because of the collectivization of their lands. As a result, moral climate within many urban neighbourhoods produced conformity with the hegemonic underclass norms including authoritarian aggression, anti-intellectualism, superstition and stereotypy, strong belief in state power and 'toughness'. At the same time, any trait which did not correspond with this ideal became a basis of social exclusion, often in the form of imprisonment and physical extermination. In this context, public spaces within the cities were regarded as the important instruments of identity building strategies, which were based on the strict opposition of 'ours' ('proletarians') and 'theirs' ('bourgeoisie') and thus opposed the very idea of dialogic universalism.
5 However, the situation started to be somewhat different in the late 1950s, when the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev emphasized the need to address the problem of overcrowding within kommunalkas by ordering the mass production of apartment buildings using standardized, factory produced materials (Robinson 2009, 3). They were typically five-stories high and rectangular-block buildings. During the last
As all urban space was owned by the state, it was used to valorize the totalitarian state and the rule of Communists (Argenbright 1999; Engel 2007). For example, a common tactic by officials was to rename streets (as well as cities and towns) and alter monuments showing that 'the control over symbolic space is especially important' (Forest and Johnson 2002, 528). Consequently, there was no possibility to demonstrate any alternative lifestyle within the existing public spaces. At the same time, the officials often denied the possibility of the existence of private spaces under state socialism (Engel 2007), and housing policy in the Soviet Union from the mid 1920s through the late 1950s provides a good example of that. As rapid industrialization inevitably resulted in overcrowding and housing shortages, most families were forced to share the apartments, while commonly using kitchen, bathroom and toilet facilities (Gentile and Sjoberg 2006). One of the main purposes of establishing the communal apartments (Russian: kommunalka) was promoting equality and social cohesion and eliminating residential segregation. In reality, however, these apartments were characterized by the lack of privacy and total control over individuals. Moral climate within communal apartments was often characterized by populist envy, strong belief in state power and intolerance towards any form of O/otherness5. It seems likely that, as in 1952 one of the numerous communal apartments in Leningrad, as Saint Petersburg was being named from 1924 till 1991, became a birthplace of Vladimir Putin, the way of living within this kommunalka impacted heavily on his personality formation, and later this became crucial in pursuing his career as the Soviet KGB officer and as the post-Soviet politician.
At the same time, new socialist cities were often regarded as places to form a principally new kind of city and building an identity of a new human being. For example, as Szczepanski (1993) argues, while establishing the new socialist city of Nowa Huta, the Communist authorities considered it as an opposite to neighboring 'bourgeois' Krakow. The characteristics of these cities included distinct public spaces consisted of monotonous blocks and geometrical grids of streets. The open public space was abundant and consisted of urban squares, parks and boulevards. In addition, there were also vast expanses of 'poorly differentiated open space' between buildings (Engel 2007, 296), as well as a number of smaller public spaces and various facilities for sports and recreation. In general, in socialist cities the public spaces were open and accessible (Alden and Crow 1998); however, the variety of activities in such spaces was strictly limited and focused mostly on official demonstrations and recreation. While being mono-functional, such places were predominant within the cities that had no pre-socialist characteristics (Engel 2007, 296). In this context, Krakow may be regarded as
couple of decades of Soviet era, 'system buildings' which were bigger and taller apartment blocks became the apartment building norm (Alden and Crow 1998; Argenbright 1999; Smith 1996).
a city where the characteristics of socialist city were less striking than in Nowa Huta, though in some areas of Krakow one can find public spaces that may be regarded as being distinctly socialist, too.
After the demise of state socialism this spaces have been deeply transformed. On the one hand, they were affected by the rapid societal 'capitalization' and the widespread of the consumerist culture. But, on the other hand, these processes have produced the identity crisis, when many people, though often being imbued with the idea of goods' life, feel nostalgia for the 'good old days' of the Communist past. This often results, among others, in the attempts to restore the old elements of public spaces. For example, not long ago in Slovenia the Office of the Mayor of Ljubljana decided to name a new street after the Communist leader of the former Yugoslavia Tito. However, this gave rise to protests, and finally the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia unanimously decided that the decree of the new naming of a street after Tito must be cancelled, since it is in disagreement with the constitutional principle of the respect for human dignity (Trontelj 2012, 28).
As it seems, the case of Russia provides a particularly interesting backdrop for examining these processes.
Public spaces and identity building in the Russian cities after state socialism
As Russia was a birthplace of the economic system of state socialism and Stalinist ideology, from the late 1940s through the late 1980s Russian cities were regarded as a model for planning socialist cities throughout Central and Eastern/Southeastern Europe. After the demise of Communism, however, the spread of capitalism tout court in Russia has been increasingly interlinking with searching for a distinctive national identity.
The research, which is based on the case study design, provides an attempt to examine the attitudes towards building up and using of public spaces and their impact on identity building within the cities of Ivanovo and Yaroslavl in Central Russia. The distance of 117 kilometers which divides these cities is relatively short, especially if one takes into consideration the enormous size of Russia's total area. Ivanovo and Yaroslavl are centers of the neighboring regions (oblasti) of Russia which possess the similar characteristics of natural environment. But this inevitably entails the question that can be expressed as follows: Do these similarities produce the similar characteristics of a social kind?
Being currently a home of 409,277 residents (Ivanovo-online 2015), Ivanovo was created by merging the old flax-processing village of Ivanovo (first documented in 1561) with the industrial borough of Vozne-sensky Posad in 1871, and, as a consequence, until 1932 its official name was Ivanovo-Voznesensk. Because of its textile manufacturing industry, the city earned the sobriquet of the 'Russian Manchester' during the 19th century (Cookson 2002). By the early 20th century, it competed with the Polish city of Lodz (being also a part of the Russian Empire at that time) for the title of the primary textile production centre in Europe. As the workers' living conditions were appalling, the
strikes were frequent, and Bolsheviks gained the mass support in Ivanovo-Voznesensk. As a result, after the 1917 Revolution the Communist authorities were trying to turn Ivanovo into a model of a socialist city, or a 'city of the future'. Hence, the outcomes of the Soviet model of urbanization in Ivanovo were perhaps more obvious in comparison with many other Russian cities and towns. For example, unlike in the neighboring big cities of Vladimir, Kostroma or Yaroslavl, there are more elements of urban infrastructure and sections of the city that may be regarded as a socialist legacy, to mention among others, many buildings which present the highlights of the constructivist architecture of the 1920s and the 1930s. These buildings, as well as those presented the neoclassical design of the late Stalin's era, are characterized with a much grander scale than those in most cities and towns of Central Russia. At the same time, most churches and monasteries were demolished, whereas in the neighboring cities the situation was somewhat better, as there many churches and monasteries were preserved, because they were recognized by the authorities as a cultural heritage.
The results of these processes were the opposite. On the one hand, Ivanovo has gradually become one of the largest university centres in Russia with nine public universities and about 40,000 students (Ivanovo-online 2013). But, on the other hand, the structure of the local economy has not been considerably changed, while being based mainly on the dominance of the textile industry. During the Soviet era the extensive development of this industry attracted many low-skilled workers from the countryside. To deal with the identity crisis, urban newcomers often restored principal traits of face-to-face social relations. These processes inevitably awaken a strong sense of community (Freudenburg 1984, 697-705).
In the post-Soviet era the crisis in the local monostructural economy led to high unemployment rates and tremendously deteriorating social conditions. In spite of the improvement of the situation in the mid-2000s, resulted from the rising oil prices and the steady increase of the living standards in Russia as a whole, the current economic situation launches most urban dwellers on a career in low-wage services. This resulted in maintaining the traditional mono-industrial structure of the local economy. Consequently, Ivanovo is being currently developed as the 'textile cluster' of Russia (Mah 2012). But, unlike in the Soviet era, most fabrics are produced in numerous small sweatshops, whereas the large factory buildings are turned into the enormous shopping malls. As a result, people are increasingly moving to Moscow to seek for higher paid jobs (Ermo-layev and Ilchenko 2004).
The case of Yaroslavl, which is currently a home of 600,200 residents (Yarcom 2015), presents a distinctly different story. Having been known since 1010, this city was initially situated at the crossroad of the traditional pathways of Russian merchants. Hence, its cultural tradition has been flexible to different lifestyles of various social and professional groups, while encouraging the city dwellers to accept the constructive elements of other cultures. In the national sense, many innovative practices and novelties have been introduced
in Yaroslavl, such as, for instance, the first Russian professional theatre established in 1750 by Fyodor Volkov. The development of the city was boosted by the liberal reforms initiated by the Emperor Alexander II after the abolishment of serfdom in Russia in 1861. These reforms gave an impetus to the appearance of the middle class in Russia, and Yaroslavl became one of the centres of this process. During the Soviet era the Communists tended to consider Yaroslavl as an 'unreliable city' due to the anti-Bolshevik uprising that broke out in July 1918. Consequently, though, like any other Russian city, Yaroslavl was involved into the Communist social experiment, it was not nevertheless considered as a right place to develop a model of a socialist city. At the same time, during the Soviet era the diversified structure of the local economy, which was traditional for Yaroslavl, was continued to be developed, because the authorities considered it as a basis for the development of military-related industries. In the Soviet Union these industries attracted the most educated and qualified labour force, and, paradoxically, this situation might be regarded as crucial in maintaining the traditional openness to innovations and creativity in Yaroslavl during the Soviet era. At the same time, the rich cultural (for example, architectural) heritage of the city has been preserved. The sections of the city that may be regarded as distinctly 'socialist', such as, for example, the residential area of Bragino in the northern part of Yaroslavl, gained peripheral positions in the city's built environment.
In the post-Soviet era the numerous economic and social problems of Yaroslavl (such as the gap between affluence and poverty or high crime rate, alongside the terrible air pollution produced by heavy industries using 'dirty' technologies) are affecting the development of the city. But, at the same time, Yaroslavl, like Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Samara, Yekaterinburg and some other cities, is today perceived as one of the most probable places in Russia to provide a good quality of life (Belyayeva and Fyodorova 2010). The data obtained from the recent survey research probably support this assumption. The majority of 214 students involved in this survey research in Yaroslavl (64 percent) do not want to move from this city after their graduation, like the young people from other relatively 'prosperous' cities of Russia, including Moscow and Saint Petersburg. At the same time, individuals, who were born in Yaroslavl, are increasingly avoiding the low-paid and low-skilled jobs, and leave them to the migrants from the economically deprived regions of Russia, as well as to those from other former Soviet republics (Kleyman 2007, 163).
To summarize, we can conclude that, though medium-sized cities, like Ivanovo, inevitably loose in importance when compared with bigger metropolitan areas, like Yaroslavl, that are usually ranked in higher positions (Giffinger et al. 2010, 311), these cities have
been selected for the comparative case study not only due to the short distance between them, but because of the different role of socialist legacy in their development. In this regard, it is not possible to refer to both cities as distinctly socialist, because they were established before the 1917 Revolution. But, at the same time, in comparison with Yaroslavl, Ivanovo possesses much more characteristics that may be regarded as a socialist legacy.
The question of what methods are the most reliable to evaluate the effect of the predominant attitudes towards building up and using the public spaces on identity building is likely of the most relevance in examining these issues. As the preferential treatment and cooperation between individuals and groups are in many respects based on non-tangible assets, they cannot be measured in terms of using purely quantitative research methods. For instance, moral climate within urban neighborhoods entails the predominant narratives of the particular communities, that can be examined in terms of using not only quantitative, but qualitative analysis of data obtained. In this context, content analysis methodology may be regarded as an appropriate methodological approach (Berelson 1971), as this method enables researchers to draw 'replicable and valid inferences from the data to their context' (Knip-pendorf 1980, 21).
This study is based on the content analysis of commercials regarded as a kind of predominant narrative of capitalist 'global cities' (Sassen 2001) which inevitably impact on the patterns of producing commercials in medium-sized and small cities and towns. However, in these places locally produced commercials presented the mixture of the culture of the 'global city' and the local cultural traditions, and, as it seems, that inevitably demonstrates the main patterns of identity building. In the cities after socialism the commercials may also be regarded as markers of post-socialist urban transformation. In terms of state socialist planned economy there was no need to advertise good and serviced due to the absence of economic competition. But the demise of state socialism boosted the development of these industries, and nowadays commercials are the inherent part of the culture of the post-socialist city. For instance, in 2015 in the case cities of Ivanovo and Yaroslavl, respectively, 44 and 122 advertising firms were run (Ivanovo-online 2015; Yarcom 2015).
A total of 9.6 and 10.1 hours of top-ranked programs broadcast on local television networks in Ivanovo and in Yaroslavl, correspondingly, has been recorded from September 2011 through November 2012. For this study, commercial time was defined as all non-program time included advertisements, promotions for TV programs and theatre performances, and public services announcements. The summary of study sample is presented in Table 1.
Table 1
Summary of study sample
City Total commercials, N (%) Advertisements for products, n (%) Promotions for TV programs, n (%) Promotions for theatre performances, n (%) Public service announcements, n (%)
Ivanovo 875 (100) 604 (69) 166 (19) 35 (4) 70 (8)
Yaroslavl 962 (100) 529 (55) 183 (19) 163 (17) 87 (9)
For scanning the commercials, the content analysis addresses not the characteristics of goods and services advertised, but the manner of speech and behaviour of individuals who advertise these goods and services. Assuming that these individuals demonstrate, sometimes unconsciously, the commonly shared patterns of behaviour produced by the shared perceptions of what constitutes ethical behavior, and the process of how ethical or moral issues will be dealt, the study considers sets of words, actions and personal roles presented in commercials. The study examines these characteristics as an outcome of the moral climate which impact on identity building within urban neighbourhoods. The special emphasis is put on analyzing the patterns of building up and using of public spaces presented in commercials, as well as on their (possible) effect on identity building processes.
Most of the total commercials (82 %) broadcast on television networks in Ivanovo present male characters. Their vernacular, manner of speech and behavior make them looking like people from a modest education and social background who achieved rapid wealth during Russia's chaotic transition to a market economy. These people demonstrate that they have succeeded in business not because of individual achievement, knowledge and creativity, but rather due to luck, while being included into the vast network of informal, close-knit interpersonal relations. Money and status symbols are prominently displayed by them in commercials, and, in this context, these characters are similar to those of 'New Russians' that are perceived as arrogant nouveau riche and gaudy, conspicuous consumers with poor taste (Robinson 2009, 6). The cult of easy-earned money (khalyava), which is characteristic the criminal groups (Kleyman 2011), is widely presented in the commercials. In this context, the sense that a better life is simply not attainable through legitimate means may be regarded as a characteristic of the underclass norms (Devine and Wright 1993). Insolence and toughness are showed as socially desirable traits of 'smart' people. At the same time, the trends of societal 'capitalization' here seem to interlink with the attitudes dated back to the Russian peasant community (obshchina). Patterns of social achievement and life success are based on following rigid stereotypes about gender roles, social statuses or age, mixed with those produced by the consum-erist culture. For example, the electronic media present mainly sex-typed images of female and male personality and behaviour to maintain the idea of male (muzhik) dominance, which is characteristic of traditional machismo. A real muzhik must be krutoy, i.e., owe a luxurious dwelling, drive an expensive motor car, visit prestigious billiard clubs, restaurants, and the like. Only 18 % out of the total of commercials in Ivanovo present
female characters, whereas the female personality is shown mainly as a symbol of sexual attractiveness to confirm wealth and prestige of her male partner. Therefore, to become successful, individual must follow the consumerist lifestyle maintained with traditional mechanisms of social control, when everybody knows about everybody, and everybody knows that.
A wealthy macho is thus presented as an invader of public spaces within the city, and the main weapon of this invasion is a car. In this context, 'car-friendliness' may be regarded as a main pattern of building up and using public space. 75 % out of the total commercials present main characters as car drivers. 65 % of them openly motivate people to drive their cars everywhere, even if they will very likely be stuck in traffic jams. The motor cars by themselves are regarded not as vehicles, but rather as markers of the social status of krutoy, while demonstrating consumerist attitudes in their roughest forms. 23 % out of the total commercials more or less openly stigmatize pedestrians who are presented as 'poor people' or 'losers'. As a result, motor cars are increasingly invading the most of public spaces within the city. There is no escape from them, as there was no escape from the space of the Soviet kommu-nalka. At the same time, pedestrian zones and bicycle lanes, or spaces which provide alternative lifestyles, are not demonstrated in the commercials. In a broader sense, public spaces are presented as places where everybody must obey to the strict informal rules, while looking utterly like his or her neighbour. In practice, it means that everybody must show off wealth and prestige of krutoy. In this sense, like 'enforced equality' of the Soviet era, this 'enforced consumerism' may be regarded as a basis of social exclusion of 'others', and this manner of identity building likely constrains the emergence of social identity complexity based on dialogic universalism.
At the same time, the commercials broadcast on television networks in Yaroslavl present a different situation. 45 % out of the total commercials show male characters; consequently, 55 % out of them present the female characters. At the same time, 78 % out of the total commercials seem to be stylistically neutral, while demonstrating no preference regarding the vernacular, manner of speech and behaviour. Ones show, more or less openly, that individual achievement, personal autonomy, knowledge and openness to innovations seem to be socially desirable traits of individuals. For example, unlike in Ivanovo, the media present no sex-typing images, and there is no idea of male or female dominance. The commercials usually welcome new ideas, innovation and creativity. Alternative lifestyles are not opposed, but, rather, encouraged as being useful for in-
dividual achievement, as well as for sustainable development of urban community. For example, as shown in Table 1, promotions for theatre performances are broadcast on local television network in Yaroslavl more often than in Ivanovo. Hence, the patterns of behaviour presented in the commercials in Yaroslavl, encourage people to be open to dialogue with those presenting alternative lifestyles.
Consequently, the patterns of building up and using of public spaces are somewhat different from those presented in the media in Ivanovo. Only 42 % out of the total commercials present the consumers of goods and services as car drivers. At the same time, a car is presented rather as a symbol of personal authonomy, but not as that of power and prestige. 37 % out of the total commercials show the main characters as walking through the vast pedestrian zone developed in the centre of Yaroslavl. In reality, it can be considered as an alternative space crucial in preventing traffic difficulties and air pollution. 21 % out of the total commercials, including most public service announcement and some of advertisements, encourage people to use public transport networks. Hence, it would be possible to suppose that the predominant patterns of building up and using of public space provide a background for the emergence of inclusive identity building strategies. Though, due to their very nature, the commercials demonstrate the lifestyle of the consumerist society, it seems nevertheless that in Yaroslavl many of them provide a background for the emergence of social identity complexity based on dialogic universalism.
Conclusion
The analysis of the historical context and the current trends of the emergence of public spaces and their impact on identity building may support an idea that the urban scene in Russia is distinctly fragmented. In Yaroslavl the elements of public spaces which may foster the emergence of social identity complexity based on dialogic universalism have been preserved. On the contrary, the cultural milieu of Ivanovo presents much more elements of the Soviet legacy which are currently intertwined with those of the consumerist culture. This results in the widespread of identity crisis which constrains the emergence of social identity complexity and the possibility of dialogic universalism.
Nevertheless, it is hardly possible to say about the strict cultural division between Ivanovo and Yaroslavl. For example, most of the students who live and study in Ivanovo demonstrate tolerance and openness towards dialogue with those who present alternative lifestyles. But the majority of them report that after their graduation they would leave Ivanovo for other cities (Kleyman 2007, 163).
In this context, the issues of the predominant urban identity, as one of the factors impacting the emergence of social identity complexity within the city, may be regarded as crucial in changing this situation (Evans et al. 2011). Despite the official support of the single identity of Ivanovo as 'the textile city', already in the Soviet era its mono-industrial character was started to change towards becoming the important university centre, and this may be regarded as a constructive element of local cultural tradition. Searching for new, multiple identities
that are more or less relevant to the current situation (for example, the identity of 'the academic city' alongside the traditional identity) may help in discussing community needs and community development potential.
In this context, the article has limitations. It may be regarded only as a starting point of the ongoing case study. It will imply considering arts, events and creative industries as drivers in urban regeneration (the analysis of the current development of Yaroslavl may support this idea). The data for further study of these issues is currently collected mainly by interviews within different social groups in Ivanovo and Yaroslavl. The work is also concentrated on providing policy-advice to initiate safe-guard and support the spaces of arts, culture, civic life and innovation activities in post-socialist cities.
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