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Denis KOTENKO
Ph.D. Candidate at the Altai State Pedagogical Academy (Barnaul, the Russian Federation).
SOME FEATURES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONFLICTS IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS AND
GEORGIA AT THE END OF THE 1980S-BEGINNING OF THE 1990S
Abstract
T
his article examines the special features of separatism in Georgia and the Northern Caucasus through the prism
of factors of political, territorial, and ethnic affinity that are instrumental in bringing together the radical forces in the region.
Introduction
The sovereignization processes set in motion by the disintegration of the Soviet Union led to the appearance of new radical elements that strove to seize power not only within their own national territorial entity, but also to achieve their once lost independence by taking advantage of Center's inability to manifest real political force.
When the struggle for independence becomes the be-all and end-all and the right to the nation's self-determination is placed higher than the state's territorial integrity, searching for allies in the same political situation and rapprochement with them becomes the only possible alternative of further existence.
In this article, I'll try to show the urgency of this problem for the Caucasus and how kindred and territorial interrelations among the ethnicities living there are influencing the political processes in the region.
Separatism during the Soviet System Crisis
Perestroika and the democratization processes that took place during the crisis of the Soviet system at the end of the 1980s assisted the nation-state building of the peoples living in Soviet territory.
During the crisis of the Soviet system, the "democratic wing" of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies headed by Boris Yeltsin began advocating the establishment of a democratic, legal state in Russia,1 which became a serious threat for preserving the Soviet Union. In order to prevent
1 See: A. Surkov, Chechnia v plameni separatizma, Volga Region Academic State Service Publishers, Saratov, 1998, p. 17.
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the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Union leadership placed the stakes on Russia's autonomies. The law adopted on 26 April, 1990 on dividing functions between the center and federation constituencies granted the autonomies full power in their territories.2 The call of the Union leadership to separatism was not only heard by the party leadership of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R., but also put into effect. The Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. adopted a Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Chechen-Ingush Republic on 27 November, 1990. The adopted declaration pointed out that even if the republic entered into treaty relations with other republics, or states, or an alliance of states, it would still "retain full power in its own territory."3
The Union analysts hit the bull's eye. The Russian autonomies, tempted by the law of 26 April, 1990, rushed to adopt their own declarations on state sovereignty, which paved the way to signing a new Union agreement. When it adopted the "Law on Autonomies," the Russian Federation found itself faced with real disintegration into dozens of individual state entities.
The dangerous process of sovereignization created by the Union Center gave Boris Yeltsin reason to declare in December 1990 at the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union: "The Union leadership is regrouping its forces in order to hold onto its previous position at all costs." Relying on the Russian Declaration on State Sovereignty, Boris Yeltsin promised the Federation constituencies maximum expansion of rights, but within the framework of the Russian Federation.
The stakes the Union leadership placed in its fight against Boris Yeltsin on the autonomies, which were to have the same status as the Union republics, caused the sovereignization processes to escalate out of control. The weakening of the political and ideological power of the Communist Party slowly led to the ensuing vacuum being filled with political forces propagating radical ideas. The new state-building that began during the collapse of the Soviet Union quickly exhausted the democratic ideas and moved separatism to the forefront.
Chechen Separatism
During political chaos, when the right to self-determination becomes more important than state integrity, new political players inevitably appear who, taking advantage of the situation, strive for power. In Chechnia's political life, along with the official administrative structures, sociopolitical movements began to appear that were in favor of national independence. In March 1991, the National Congress of the Chechen People (NCCP) adopted an address to Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush Republic Doku Zavgaev that justified the impermissibility of holding the referendum in the republic scheduled by the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet for 17 March, 1991 on the question of preserving the Soviet Union, referring to the absence of Chechen laws on referendum.4
The political crisis developed at lightening speed not only in the Soviet Union, but also in Chechnia. At the second NCCP congress in July 1991, Dzhokhar Dudaev became the leader of the movement and stated that Chechnia was not part of the Soviet Union or the R.S.F.S.R. The only legal power body was the executive committee of the NCCP headed by Dzhokhar Dudaev. The August coup of 1991 and the fight of the Russian president against the coup instigators gave the Chechen separatists the green light to seize power in the republic. The leadership of the republic headed by Doku Zavgaev, which was losing its influence, supported the August coup of the State Committee on the State of Emergency (GKChP) and this immediately deprived it of support from the Russian leadership. As a result of the seizure of power on 3 September, 1991, Dzhokhar Dudaev declared the overthrow of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic.
2 See: The Law on the Division of Powers between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Subjects of the Federation, 26 April, 1990, available in Russian at [http://cominf.org/node/1142062416].
3 Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Chechen-Ingush Republic, 27 November, 1990, available in Russian at [http://constitutions.ru/archives/2915].
4 See: A. Surkov, op. cit., p. 60.
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So, in the struggle against the Russian leadership headed by Boris Yeltsin, the Union leadership suffered defeat by playing in favor of the autonomies and trying to bring their status up to that of the Union republics. In turn, the Russian leaders, in their attempt to take the initiative in the struggle for influence on the autonomies, played a decisive role in overturning the old authorities and bringing the radical elements to power. For example, in September 1991, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia Ruslan Khasbulatov actively encouraged the deputies of the republic's Supreme Soviet to carry out self-disbandment.5 As a result, both the Union and Russian leadership suffered defeat in the struggle for the autonomies. On 8 October, the NCCP declared itself to be the only power in the republic and on 27 October, 1991, it held an election for Chechen president. According to the results of the election, Dzhokhar Dudaev became president of the Chechen Republic. In his first decree, Dzhokhar Dudaev declared that on 1 November, 1991, the Chechen Republic became a sovereign state.
The arrival on the political scene of separatist political organizations and politicians on the wave of sovereignization of separate regions and ethnicities in the Caucasus made it imperative to search for allies in the region that were in a similar political situation.
Special Features of Separatism in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
The crisis of the Union system prompted the peoples living in Georgia to raise their national status. An assembly of representatives of the Abkhazian people on 18 March, 1989 in the village of Lykhny in the Gudauta District of Abkhazia adopted the Address of Representatives of the Abkhazian People to General Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet Mikhail Gorbachev, asking for its status to be changed from an Autonomous Republic to a Soviet Socialist Republic. According to the participants in the assembly, the formation of the Abkhazian S.S.R., equal in status to the Georgian S.S.R., was necessary since the Union, Union-republic, and republican systems of administration were hampering the socioeconomic, cultural, and political development of Abkhazia.6
At the same time, the problems that had accumulated in ethnic relations and the collapse of the Union system in Georgia encouraged consolidation of the Georgian population against the decisions of the Lykhny assembly.7 At a meeting held on 9 April, 1989 in Tbilisi, the activists of unofficial parties stated: "While Soviet power exists, we will not be able to abolish the autonomies of Abkhazia and South Ossetia."8 The calls for Georgia to secede from the Soviet Union led to a severe rebuff by the authorities, which resulted in the meeting being scattered by Soviet troops, leading to victims among its participants. The upswing in national self-awareness of the Georgian people was prompted by their desire to preserve a united Georgia during the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Against the background of statements to abolish the autonomies, the Soviet of People's Deputies of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region adopted a decision at an emergency session on 10 November, 1989 on transforming the South Ossetian Autonomous Region into an autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.9 In response to this, Zviad Gamsakhurdia's movement organized a multi-thousand march on the capital of South Ossetia Tskhinvali on 23 November, 1989. The march was unable to break into the city, the columns of Zviadists being halted on its outskirts by the police and city residents.
5 See: Ibid., p. 65.
6 See: Konflikty v Abkhazii i Iuzhnoi Osetii: Dokumenty 1989-2006, Compiled by M. Volonskiy, V. Zakharov, N. Si-laev, Russkaia panorama, Moscow, 2008, p. 92.
7 See: Gruzino-abkhazsky konflikt: 1917-1992, Compiled by K. Kazenin, Evropa, Moscow, 2007, p. 38.
8 Ibidem.
9 See: Konflikty v Abkhazii i Iuzhnoi Osetii: Dokumenty 1989-2006, p. 165.
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The rise in status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Socialist Republics would be a serious political challenge for Georgia with respect to establishing an independent state. The borders of the Georgian S.S.R. had not been legally regulated since the Agreement between Russia and Georgia of 7 May, 1920 was signed, and after the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia an unofficial administrative-territorial border formed between Russia and Georgia.10
On 25 August, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhazian S.S.R. adopted a Declaration on State Sovereignty, in which the Abkhazian S.S.R. declared state sovereignty.11 The Declaration adopted raised the republic's political status and paved the way for entering the Union Treaty and Agreement with the Georgian S.S.R.12
On 20 September, 1990, the Soviet of People's Deputies of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region adopted a Declaration on State Sovereignty, in accordance with which the status of South Ossetia was raised from an autonomous region to a Democratic Republic in the Soviet Union. Declaration of the sovereignty of the South-Ossetian Soviet Democratic Republic was a necessary condition for its further participation in the Union Treaty.13
In the throes of the fight for Georgia's independence, the authorities in Tbilisi took rapid steps to legally assess the changes in the republic's national-state and administrative-territorial structure. On 26 August, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian S.S.R. declared the Declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhazian S.S.R. of 25 August, 1990 to be null and void.14 The decision of the Soviet of People's Deputies of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region of 20 September On Sovereignty and the Status of South Ossetia was also deemed null and void.15 As a natural extension of these events, at the elections to the Supreme Soviet of Georgia held on 28 October, 1990, the "Round Table—Free Georgia" election bloc headed by dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia sustained an overwhelming victory.
The countdown began. On 16 October, 1990, the Soviet of People's Deputies of the South Ossetian Democratic Republic approved the decision it had made about transforming the South Ossetian Autonomous Region into the South Ossetian Soviet Democratic Republic16 and deemed the elections to the Supreme Soviet of Georgia in South Ossetian territory illegitimate.17
Bent on entering a Union Treaty that could extricate South Ossetia from the crisis in its relations with Georgia, the Soviet of People's Deputies decided to change the name of the South Ossetian Soviet Democratic Republic to the South Ossetian Soviet Republic,18 as well as to give it the right to participate in signing the new Union Treaty.19 By removing the word "Democratic" from the republic's name, the deputies counted on signing the Union Treaty on an equal footing with the other Soviet Republics. In order to approve the political status of South Ossetia as a Soviet Republic, elections were held on 9 December, 1990 to the Supreme Soviet of the South Ossetian Republic. The elections were boycotted by residents of Georgian villages.
The Supreme Soviet of Georgia assessed the elections in South Ossetia as infringement on the territorial integrity of Georgia and adopted a Law on Abolishment of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region on 11 December, 1990.20
South Ossetia represented a region with a population of 100,000 people, mainly populated by Ossetians, but with a large (30%) Georgian community. Since most of the population in the region
10 See: Konflikty v Abkhazii i Iuzhnoi Osetii: Dokumenty 1989-2006, p. 180.
11 See: Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic, 25 August, 1990, available in Russian at [http://www.apsuara.ru/portal/node/1013].
12 See: Gruzino-abkhazsky konflikt: 1917-1992, p. 64.
13 See: K. Tanaev, Osetinskaia tragedia, Evropa, Moscow, 2008, p. 265.
14 See: Konflikty v Abkhazii i Iuzhnoi Osetii: Dokumenty 1989-2006, p. 23.
15 See: Ibid., p. 24.
16 See: Ibid., p. 174.
17 See: Ibidem.
18 See: Ibid., p. 175.
19 See: Ibid., p. 176.
20 See: Ibid., p. 27.
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was Ossetians, it was difficult for Georgia to count on keeping South Ossetia within Georgia. So in the small hours of 6 January, 1991, police and Georgian national guard squads were brought into the capital of South Ossetia, Tskhinvali.
In compliance with the Law on Local Administration during the Transition Period adopted on 29 January, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of Georgia also began eliminating the Soviet power bodies in Abkhazia, which according to the Abkhazian Constitution comprised the foundation of the political system. The local state administration bodies in the districts and cites were to be appointed by the Supreme Soviet of Georgia and headed by a prefect.21 The Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia assessed the appointment of the prefect of the Gali District as the first step toward eliminating the constitutional structures and then the statehood of Abkhazia.22 As a result, Georgia's striving to make Abkhazia an ordinary administrative-territorial entity prompted the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia to raise the question of establishing equal relations with Georgia.23
Expression of the people's will acquired great significance in the political self-determination of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Georgia. For example, the Supreme Soviet of Georgia abandoned the idea of a referendum on preservation of the Soviet Union, which was supposed to be held on 17 March, 1991, and scheduled a referendum on restoration of Georgia's independence on 31 March, 1991. As a result of the referendum held in Georgia on 31 March, 1991, its participants unanimously voted for the restoration of state independence. Based on the referendum results, on 9 April, 1991 the Act on Restoration of Georgia's Independence was adopted.24
The idea of building an independent Georgian state during crisis of the Soviet system met with resistance from the Abkhazians and Ossetians. The increase in national self-awareness and consolidation of the Georgian population with respect to preserving territorial integrity led not only to recognizing the role of the Georgians in the state, but also to a bloody conflict in South Ossetia and a political conflict in Abkhazia.
At the same time, at the referendum on preservation of the Soviet Union held on 17 March, 1991, 98.6% of the participants in the voting in Abkhazia25 and 99% of the participants in South Ossetia26 were in favor of preserving the Soviet Union. As we know, according to the official results of the referendum, 76.4% of the participants in the voting were in favor of preserving the Soviet Union.
So it can be concluded that the Soviet model of relations between the Center and the republics can largely be blamed for the worsening political situation in the country. Building republics according to the national, and not territorial attribute has always been a powerful lever of influence on their policy. At the end of the 1980s-beginning of the 1990s, this mechanism led to a breakdown in former political relations, as a result of which the authorities of the breakaway republics began to call for their independence. Since the new authorities did not have real support for reinforcing all the political changes that occurred, the breakaway regions of Georgia and the Northern Caucasus only had one alternative in the current conditions—to create their own state entity.
"Kindred" Separatism
A special feature that strengthened the plans for nation-state building of the breakaway Caucasian republics was the fact that the Abkhazians and Ossetians had kindred ties with the peoples of the North Caucasian constituencies of Russia, who actively supported the separatist strivings of their brothers.
21 See: Ibid., p. 39.
22 Ibid., p. 110.
23 See: Ibid., p. 109.
24 See: Ibid., p. 45.
25 See: Gruzino-abkhazsky konflikt: 1917-1922, p. 75.
26 See: K. Hajiev, Geopolitika Kavkaza, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, Moscow, 2001, p. 162.
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At the 3rd Congress of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (CMPC) held in Sukhumi on 1-2 November, 1991, representatives of the Abazin, Abkhazian, Avar, Aukhovek-Chechen, Darginian, Kabardinian, Lak, Ossetian (North and South Ossetia), Circassian, Chechen, and Shapsug peoples entered an Agreement on a Confederative Union of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus. In its practical activity, the CMPC announced the beginning of the restoration of the sovereign statehood of the mountain peoples of the Caucasus and declared the CMPC to be the legal successor of the Republic of the Mountaineers of the Northern Caucasian (Mountain Republic) formed on 11 May, 1918. According to this agreement, the CMPC had all the attributes of state power. The administration bodies were built on the principle of division of power27 and consisted of the Congress of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, the President, the Parliament, the Caucasian Communities, and the Arbitration Court.28 The power bodies were formed by delegating authorized representatives. The city of Sukhumi was chosen as the location (headquarters) of the ruling bodies of the CMPC.29
In terms of the content and nature of the Agreement on a Confederative Union of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus and Provisions on the Ruling Bodies of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, the CMPC replaced the state power bodies. In its activity, the CMPC not only tried to recreate the Mountain Republic, but also do this by means of Russian and Georgian territory. According to Chairman of the Confederation Parliament Musa Shanibov, transformation of the CMPC from a confederative union into a state entity was to occur as the Russian Federation continued to collapse.30
Chechnia also began to make claims on leadership in the struggle against Russia in the CMPC. In March 1992, an address was adopted at an emergency meeting of the Chechen parliament to the peoples of the Caucasus asking them to urgently unite to fight Russia and accelerate the creation of Caucasian armed forces.31 Such calls showed that Chechnia was demonstrating the same leadership qualities as it did during the 19th century Caucasian war against Russia.
Discontent with the policy of the Russian government also spread in North Ossetia. The Osse-tians demanded that representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Defense immediately arm them, otherwise they threatened to take weapons by force in the contingents deployed in the republic. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of North Ossetia Akhsarbek Galazov said that if the war in South Ossetia was not stopped, the Supreme Soviets of South and North Ossetia would hold a joint session in Vladikavkaz or Tskhinvali and declare the creation of a united Ossetia—an independent state outside Russia, in so doing breaking the federative agreement.32
The situation in North Ossetia was also complicated by the activity of the CMPC, which decided to manifest itself as a real political force capable of resolving the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict. President of the CMPC Musa Shanibov asked the Georgian side to cease fire, warning of the possibility of armed forces being brought into South Ossetia. "Our appearance in Vladikavkaz is the last warning," said Musa Shanibov. "A voluntary squad will enter Tskhinvali not to help one of the warring sides, but to perform a peacekeeping role."33
Aggravation of the political situation in the Caucasus, when the CMPC appeared on the political scene as a real player capable of resolving any political problems without Russia's interference, scared the Russian democrats and forced them to take rapid measures to stop the conflict. Blood spilling in South Ossetia was stopped, but the problem itself was not resolved, since a war broke out, this time in Abkhazia.
27 See: Agreement on a Confederative Union of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus of 2 November, 1991, available in Russian at [http://www.nasledie.ru/oborg/2_4/0002/agnk_17.html], 18 July, 2012.
28 See: Provisions on the Ruling Bodies of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus of 2 November, 1991, available in Russian at [http://www.nasledie.ru/oborg/2_4/0002/agnk_16.html], 18 July, 2012.
29 See: Agreement on a Confederative Union of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus of 2 November, 1991.
30 See: A. Surkov, op. cit., p. 117.
31 See: A. Kazikhanov, "Chechnia prizyvaet sozdat kavkazskuiu armiiu," Izvestia, 10 March, 1992, p. 1.
32 See: A. Kazikhanov, "Rossiia opazdyvaet k sobytiam v Iuzhnoi Osetii," Izvestia, 29 May, 1992, p. 2.
33 A. Kazikhanov, "Severnaia Osetiia: situatsiia kontroliruetsia," Izvestia, 16 June, 1992, p. 1.
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After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Provisional Supreme Soviet of Georgia made a decision in February 1992 to transfer to the Constitution of the Georgian Democratic Republic of 1921, in which relations with Abkhazia were not defined. Moreover, the Georgian authorities said that relations with Abkhazia would temporarily, until a new model was developed, be built on the former principles. Taking into account political reality, Abkhazia asked Georgia to restore broken state relations on a new equal basis.34
On 14 August, 1992, the troops of the Georgian State Council began a military operation against Abkhazia. Adopting Abkhazian conditions on equal relations could lead to not only Abkhazia, but also other regions of Georgia demanding such privileges, which might bring about the collapse of Georgia. Guided by the aim of preserving Georgia's territorial integrity, the Georgian leadership decided on military interference.
The conflict that began in Abkhazia led to acute aggravation in the Northern Caucasus. The CMPC accused Russia of supporting the Georgian troops that invaded Abkhazia. The CMPC's address to the world community, organizations for the protection of human and national minority rights, the leaders of Western and CIS countries, and the League of Islamic States said that, relying on their superiority in armored vehicles and aviation, as well as on the Russian airborne regiment deployed in Abkhazia, the Greater and Lesser empires (the Russian Federation and Georgia) had set themselves the goal of squelching the island of freedom and national statehood in the Caucasus (first Abkhazia and then the Chechen Republic) and, in so doing, closing off the mountain peoples of the Caucasus from freedom and sovereignty.35
The statements by the CMPC about the imperial ambitions of Russia and Georgia show that this war was perceived as a continuation of the struggle for independence begun by the Caucasian war of the 19th century. During the Caucasian war, the Georgian population of the region actively promoted further reinforcement of the Transcaucasus as part of Russia, integrating its elite into the military-estate and economic structures of the Empire and becoming a considerable social bastion of the Russian state in the region.36
The image created of Russia and Georgia as empires striving to conquer the free peoples of the Northern Caucasus and Abkhazia caused the leaders of the separatist elements to take more decisive steps. The leaders of the CMPC, alarmed by the situation in Abkhazia and striving to show that their organization was a real political force, announced that volunteers would be sent to Abkhazia to carry out combat activity and called for denouncing the Federative Agreement with Russia.37
Abkhazia became a political arena where the future Chechen warlords won popularity and authority. Particular mention should be made of Shamil Basaev who, in his own words, "decided to come with the boys to fraternal Abkhazia to fight against the Georgian politicians who have unleashed war with the blessings of the Russian politicians."38 Shamil Basaev fought more for Chech-nia's political interests, striving to defend the independence of his republic on "alien ground."
For such figures as Basaev, Abkhazia was one of the stages in the new Caucasian war that had to be stopped in order for the Caucasian peoples to resolve their internal problems without the participation of a third side, that is, Russia and Georgia. Basaev's statement showed that the separatists were trying to unite and prevent Russia and Georgia from having a political influence on the Caucasus. The common political interests in strengthening independence based on a confederative state turned the conflict in Abkhazia into a common cause for the residents of the breakaway regions of Georgia and the Northern Caucasus. The national composition of the participants fighting in Abkha-
34 See: Gruzino-abkhazsky konflikt: 1917-1992, pp. 80-81.
35 See: Konflikty v Abkhazii i Iuzhnoi Osetii: Dokumenty 1989-2006, p. 236.
36 A. Tsutsiev, Atlas etnopoliticheskoi istorii Kavkaza (1774-2004), Evropa, Moscow, 2006, p. 18.
37 See: Konflikty v Abkhazii i Iuzhnoi Osetii: Dokumenty 1989-2006, pp. 238-238.
38 Belaia kniga Abkhazii. Dokumenty, materialy, svidetelstva. 1992-1993, Compiled by Iu. Voronov, P. Florensky, P. Shustova, Moscow, 1993, available at [http://www.apsnyteka.narod2.rU/v/belaya_kniga_abhazii/glava_2_voina_v_
abhazii_v_publikatsiyah_i_dokumentah/index.html], 19 July, 2012.
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zia confirms these convictions: Chechens, Ingush, Adighes,39 Ossetians, Kabardinians, Balkarians, Circassians, and Karachays.40
The ethnic factor was of immense significance in the conflict in Abkhazia because the Abkhazians are ethnically close to the Kabardinians, Adighes, Shapsugs, and Circassians, and all of these peoples form the single Abkhaz-Adighe ethnicity. Since they had common ethnic and historical roots, these kindred peoples could not ignore the conflict in Abkhazia, and the ideas of independence within the framework of the future state only intensified the desire of the volunteers to participate in the war.
The factor of ethnic solidarity and support was manifested in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict. The ethnoterritorial contradictions between North Ossetia and the Ingush Republic formed in the summer of 1992 led to an armed conflict over the Prigorodny District of North Ossetia. The week-long war ended in more than 600 losing their lives and more than 40,000 losing their homes.41 The Ir team from South Ossetia fought on the side of North Ossetia.
The problem of interrelation and interdependence of the conflicts in Georgia and the Northern Caucasus gradually became the trump card in the policy against Russia and Georgia in the region. Basaev accused Russia and Georgia of causing the Ossetian-Ingush conflict and said that, in his opinion, "the Ossetians and Ingush could come to terms themselves, in a peaceful and civilized way."42
The interrelation and interdependence of the conflicts in the Caucasus was well noted by Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze. "One separatist movement gives rise to another. If there had been no Abkhazian war, there would have been no Chechen war," said he.43 In other words, conflicts in the territory of the breakaway regions of Georgia and the Northern Caucasus could not exist independently and, due to their territorial and ethnic affinity and common political interests, peoples striving for independence and to build their own nation-state entity could only uphold their ideas and interests together.
The example of the political and territorial interests of Chechnia is the most vibrant. When the republic essentially became independent from Russia, against the background of the war in Abkhazia it began to call on the North Caucasian republics to join together to fight Russia, furthermore sending the residents of its republic to Abkhazia to fight. Chechnia viewed the war in Abkhazia as part of the struggle for independence from Russia, and the fighting experience gained there allowed the Chechen insurgents in the future to successfully act in the future against the troops in Russia in the war that had already begun in Chechnia itself.
We believe that the ethnic factor was one of the decisive issues in the conflicts in Georgia and the Northern Caucasus. For example, people from the Northern Caucasus participated in the hostilities in Abkhazia and Ossetians from North Ossetia went to South Ossetia; then people from South Ossetia helped their "relatives" in North Ossetia in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.
The interrelation and interdependence of the conflicts in the Caucasus also explains the fact that the Russian and Georgian armies were unable to destroy the separatist movements in the region. The military is not to blame for this at all since it was not faced with a specific enemy, but with peoples whose rights had been infringed upon in the years of the Russian Empire and Soviet power.
Historically, the interrelation among the conflicts in the Caucasus was manifested in the fact that the fight for independence was perceived as a continuation of the struggle for independence that started during the Caucasian war.
39 See: Belaia kniga Abkhazii. Dokumenty, materialy, svidetelstva. 1992-1993.
40 See: N. Akkaba, "Severokavkazsky faktor v abkhazo-gruzinskom konflikte," APSNYPRESS, 25 May, 2012, available at [http://apsnypress.info/analytic/6359.html], 19 July, 2012.
41 See: A. Tsutsiev, op. cit., p. 87.
42Belaia kniga Abkhazii. Dokumenty, materialy, svidetelstva. 1992-1993.
43 Quoted from: N. Broladze, "Eduard Shavardnadze: 'Poseem mir, nozhnem blagopoluchie,'" Nezavisimaia gazeta, 15 July, 1996, p. 3.
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Conclusion
The democratic trends that gained momentum during the collapse of the Soviet Union failed to become a reality. Radical ideology and separatism quickly came to replace the democratic ideas.
In the absence of real political power in the Caucasus capable of curbing the radical forces, the ideas of independence led to separatist movements looking for support beyond their republics among kindred peoples in the same political situation. Due to the territorial and ethnic kinship of the people living in them, the military conflicts in the breakaway regions of Georgia and the Northern Caucasus could not exist independently. Ethnic and political solidarity motivated the Caucasian peoples, who could only defend their interests, ideals, and territorial integrity with weapons in hand. The common political interests in fighting for independence helped the breakaway regions of Georgia and the Northern Caucasus to arrive at the idea of creating a common state based on Russian and Georgian territories.
In such conditions, the Chechen factor became pivotal largely because the Chechens perceived the war as a continuation of the struggle for independence since the time of the Caucasian war. Chech-nia gradually became the leader of the rebel movement in the Caucasus.
The interrelation and interdependence of the conflicts in the Caucasus became the main special feature determining their great sociopolitical consequences for the region in the future.
Tied by multiple kindred bonds, historical friendship, and common political goals, the peoples of the Caucasus will always react sensitively to political events that occur in any of the Caucasian regions. In such conditions, the authorities of the regional states must pursue a well-balanced policy keeping in mind the opinions of all the national groups. The conflicts in the Caucasus have still not been resolved largely due to the absence of such a policy.
