CC BY
25
30. Grechishkin, S.S. Arkhiv S.A. Polyakova [S.A. Polyakov's Archive], in Ezhegodnik rukopisnogo otdela Pushkinskogo Doma na 1978 god [Yearbook of the Manuscript Department of the Pushkin House 1978], Leningrad: Nauka, 1980, pp. 1-22.
31. David, Z.V. The Influence of Jacob Boehme on Russian Religious Thought. Slavic Review 21:1 (1962), pp. 43-64.
32. Smith, O. The Russian Boehme. An Introduction to Jacob Boehme: Four Centuries of Thought and Reception. New York & London: Routledge, 2014, pp. 196-223.
33. Boehme, J. Clavis Oder Schlüssel etlicher vornehmen Puncten und Wörter. Amsterdam: H. Betkius, 1662. 118 p.
34. Feuerbach, L. Geschichte der neueren Philosophie von Bacon bis Spinoza. Ansbach: Brügel, 1833. 400 p.
35. Boehme, J. Das Sechste Büchlein: Theoscopia, oder Die hochtheure Pforte von Göttlicher Beschaulichkeit. S.l. [Amsterdam?], 1731. 35 p.
36. Boehme, J. Der Weg zu Christo. Amsterdam, 1715. 272 p.
37. Koyre, A. La philosophie de Jacob Boehme. Paris: J. Vrin, 1929, XVII. 525 p.
38. Berdyaev, N.A. Iz etyudov o Ya. Beme. Etyud II [From the studies on Jacob Boehme. Part II], in Put', 1930, no. 21, pp. 34-62.
39. Moshe ben Maymon. Mishne Tora. Kn. 1: Seferra-mada. Varshava, 1881 (na ivrite). 121 p.
40. Semiphoras und Schemhamphoras Salomonis Regis. Wesel-Duiß burg-Franckfurth: A. Luppius, 1686. 24 p.
УДК 165.731(4) ББК 87.3(4:2)5-582
SOLOVYOV'S CRISIS AND POSITIVISM IN THE LATE IMPERIAL RUSSIA
THOMAS NEMETH Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia New York University E-mail: t_nemeth@yahoo.com
This essay demonstrates that Comtean positivism was already a known intellectual movement in Russia when Solovyov began his thesis, although he did not demonstrate any knowledge at all of its Russian proponents. Indeed, already by the time of his famed thesis defense, positivism had been the subject of an attack by prominent theologians. In particular, Kudrjavcev at the Moscow Theological Academy just weeks before Solovyov's thesis defense gave a talk in which he criticized Comte's philosophy of history along lines similar to Solovyov's. We also see, however, that despite his own remarks on positivism, Solovyov could not find a fitting allocation for positivism within his sweeping history of Western philosophy, thus jeopardizing the accuracy of that portrayal. While this may and should appear amazing to us in light of the final subtitle of the Crisis, «Against the Positivists», it is less so when we realize that in the serial publication of the work in the journal Православное обозрение it bore the quite different subtitle «Concerning Hartmann's 'Philosophy of the unconscious'». This latter subtitle is a more accurate indication of the argument in Solovyov's thesis. In other words, the principal aim of the Crisis was not to combat positivism, but all of abstract philosophy, Hartmann's being the latest and the final possible version of it. In the aftermath of his thesis defense, Solovyov demoted von Hartmann's significance in Western philosophy and promoted positivism, determining it to be a necessary but final word in Western development.
Key words: the history of Western philosophy, positivism of Auguste Comte, the Russian positivists, opponents of positivism, the criticism of positivism, the doctrine of E. von Hartmann.
«КРИЗИС» СОЛОВЬЕВА И ПОЗИТИВИЗМ В КОНЦЕ РОССИЙСКОЙ ИМПЕРИИ
ТОМАС НЕМЕТ Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia New York University E-mail: t_nemeth@yahoo.com
Показано, что позитивизм Конта был уже известным интеллектуальным движением в России, когда Соловьев начал работу над своей диссертацией, хотя он никогда не демонстрировал каких-либо знаний о его российских сторонниках. Отмечается, что уже ко времени его знаменитой защиты позитивизм был предметом нападок со стороны видных богословов: в частности, за несколько недель до защиты диссертации Соловьевым профессор Кудрявцев-Платонов выступил в Московской духовной академии с докладом, в котором, подобно Соловьеву, подверг критике философию истории Конта. Утверждается, что, несмотря на критику позитивизма, Соловьев не смог найти точного места для этого течения в своей масштабной картине истории западной философии. Обращается внимание на отсутствие подзаголовка диссертации - «против позитивистов» - в публикации произведения в журнале «Православное обозрение», где он имел совсем другое название - «О "философии бессознательного"Гартмана». Утверждается, что этот заголовок более точно отражает основную идею диссертации Соловьева, поскольку ее основной целью являлась борьба не с позитивизмом, а с абстрактной философией, в которой учение Гартмана было последним и завершающим. Дан анализ последующего этапа развития философии Соловьева, для которого характерна переоценка значения взглядов Гартмана, а также места и роли позитивизма в истории мысли. Сделан вывод о том, что в этот период Соловьев расценивает позитивизм как необходимое и завершающее слово в развитии западной философии.
Ключевые слова: история западной философии, позитивизм О. Конта, российские позитивисты, противники позитивизма, критика позитивизма, учение Э. фон Гартмана.
The appearance in 1874 of Solovyov's magister's thesis «Кризис западной философии», ignited a veritable firestorm of criticism in the secular press largely unseen previously for a work in philosophy. The thesis bore the innocuous and, at first sight, unambiguous subtitle «против позитивистов». Little, if any, notice was given to the fact that the bulk of the book, which had been published over the course of that year in the journal «Православное обозрение» («Orthodox Review»), bore the quite different subtitle «По поводу „философии безсознательнаго" Гартмана». How did this alteration escape the attention of the secular audience of the completed work? Were the serialized chapters even read outside the clerical estate? The subsequent reviews of the thesis made no issue of the change in subtitle. They also failed to inquire just which positivists Solovyov had in mind. We can reasonably conclude that the reviewers' silence indicates positivism was by then a well-known position in Russia. Unfortunately, that assumption itself, in turn, raises a number of questions: What is the relationship between the title and the subtitle? Did Solovyov regard these positivists
as those responsible, as causal agents, for this «crisis»? If they were responsible, in some manner, for it, why did Solovyov devote so much attention - indeed, the bulk of his thesis - to non-positivistic philosophy? In this essay, we briefly summarize the dissemination within Russia of positivism, albeit principally of the French, rather than the British, variety, and the reaction to it by other figures contemporary with Solovyov. We, then, examine Solovyov's evolving attitude toward positivism in the hope of shedding light on his youthful philosophical position and the very title of his work.
1. Positivism in Russian Social Science and Philosophy
Positivism had a long history of penetration in Imperial Russia before Solovyov's famed thesis defense. Already as early as the reign of Nicholas I, a young literary critic Valerian Majkov urged the creation of a new, positivistically inspired social science. He, however, mentioned Comte by name only once in his writing1. More closely aligned to the positivist program was Vladimir Miljutin, a graduate of St. Petersburg University. Miljutin embraced Comte's view that human thought (наука) passed through three stages: the mythological, the metaphysical, and the positivistic. With his primary interest being economics, Miljutin saw the challenge as the construction of a political economics based on a small set of general laws2.
Enunciated during the repressive years of the 1840s, the impact of the above ideas could only have been quite limited. However, with the accession of Tsar Alexander II and his relaxation of the censorship, discussions of positivism began to appear in the popular media. Among the most notable of these was Pisarev's lengthy four-part article «Исторические идеи Огюста Конта» (1865-1866), in which he emphasized that human sociality is governed by natural laws just as is the material world3. Metaphysics, he maintained, particularly in the moral sphere, was employed as a weapon by political rulers to discretely reinforce their domination over others. Pisarev also expressed sympathy with Comte's philosophy of history. He realized, however, that Comte's writings alone failed to provide more than a broad outline for the needed science of society.
Pisarev's attitude was shared by a founding member of the revolutionary organization «Земля и Воля», Nikolaj Serno-Solovyovich, who in an article «Не требует ли нынешнее состояние знаний новой науки?» condemned abstract philosophy, as would Vladimir Solovyov a decade later, although for quite different reasons. As did Pisarev, Serno-Solovyovich believed that abstract knowledge in general helped the ruling class maintain their hegemonic role in society. Knowledge, particularly the natural sciences, had to have a practical intent. At present, a new science of society needed to be created, a science with such an intent but with a methodology adopted from natural science4.
1 См.: Майков В.Н. Общественные науки в России // Майков В.Н. Сочинения в 2 т. Киев, 1901. Т. 2. С. 3-49 [1]. See also Кареев Н.И. Основы русской социологии. СПб., 1996. С. 29-30 [2].
2 См.: Милютин B.A. Опыт о народном богатстве или о началах политической экономии // Милютин B.A. Избранные произведения. M., 1946. С. 358-444 [3].
3 См.: Писарев Д. Исторические идеи Огюста Конта // Русское слово. 1865, сентябрь. С. 43 [4].
4 Серно-Соловьевич Н. Не требует ли нынешнее состояние знаний новой науки? // Русское слово. 1865, январь. С. 127 [5].
Another who brought positivism to public attention was Ernst K. Vatson. His two-part piece in 1865 «Огюст Конт и политическая философия» provided detailed information on Comte's thinking on both the individual natural sciences and particularly on sociology5. The 1860s also saw the publication of John Stuart Mill's «Auguste Comte and Positivism» in a Russian translation («Огюст Конт и позитивизм») as well as a translation in 1865 of Mill's «System of Logic» («Система логики»). However, arguably the major figures to bring positivism to the attention of the general public were Petr Lavrov and Nikolaj Mikhajlovskij. Although neither of them was a consistent positivist by any means, the former held that scientific progress would lead eventually to an abandonment of religion and metaphysics. He also shared the positivist view (phenomenalism) that all we can know is natural phenomena, but he dispensed with the invocation of a Kantian «thing in itself» as unnecessary and metaphysical. Unlike the positivists, Lavrov did not believe the methodology of the natural sciences could simply be applied to the study of society, but he did share with the Russian positivists the belief that sociology had a practical purpose, namely to improve society, and with it the human condition. Like Comte and Lavrov, Mikhajlovskij professed an adherence to phenomenalism and treasured Comte's classification of the sciences.
In the early 1870s - thus, when Solovyov was a student - other figures championed a cautious positivism. For example, Sergej N. Juzhakov in four articles from 1872-1873 expressed his belief that Comte had demonstrated the applicability of the «general laws of life» to society and that truths of natural phenomena are also truths of social phenomena6. And also at this time a government functionary and governor, Pavel Lilienfeld, compared society to a biological organism. In his «Мысли о социальной науке будущего» (1872), Lilienfeld expounded his view that the study of the latter could directly help us understand the former, that the developmental process of the two are quite analogous to each other7.
Finally, we turn to virtually the sole defender of positivist philosophy within the Russian Empire, a figure whose name Solovyov would come to know at the time of his thesis defense, if he did not know it already. Although his position would change somewhat over the years, Vladimir Lesevich in his earliest philosophical publications up to 1874 maintained that all metaphysical claims were unscientific and as such were to be rejected8. What would, at least in the coming years, set Lesevich apart from virtually all other positivists, both those in France as well as Russia, was his familiarity with German philosophy, particularly with Kant, and his recognition that positivism must contain a critique of the human cognitive faculty9. That Lesevich must have been generally recognized by this time as a proponent of positivism is clear from his selection to be an opponent at Solovyov's thesis defense. What is especially striking about Lesevich's writings in comparison with Solovyov's is the sheer wealth of scholarship evident in the former and that is wholly lacking in the latter.
5 Ватсон E.K. Огюст Конт и политическая философия // Современник. 1865. No. 8. С. 11-12 [6].
6 Южаков С.Н. Социологические этюды: в 2 т. СПб.: Тип. М.М. Стасюлевича, 1891. Т. 1. С. 4 [7].
7 Л[илиенфельд] П. Мысли о социальной науке будущего. СПб., 1872 [8].
8 Лесевич В. Новейшая литература позитивизма // Лесевич В. Собрание сочинений. M.: Книгоиздательство писателей, 1915. Т. 1. С. 86-135 [9].
9 See in particular Лесевич В. Опыт критического исследования. СПб, 1877. С. 164 [10].
2. The Anti-Positivist Rebuttal
Our preceding presentation was by no means an exhaustive discussion of the impact of positivism in XIXth century Russia prior to the publication of Solovyov's Crisis. However, already from this brief sketch we see that positivism was a widely influential position within Russia and not just at the fringe of intellectual life then and there. Whatever we may say concerning its reception among the country's professional philosophers, of which there were very few, positivism in Russia promoted and penetrated the nascent social sciences of sociology and psychology. In fact, there can be little doubt that it helped launch them in the first place. Many of the figures discussed above sketched positivistic philosophies of history within their respective works, even though that was far from their central focus. In each instance, the respective philosophies of history were intended primarily to buttress their social theories and how society, they believed, should develop.
Just as positivism had its proponents, it also had numerous detractors. Although little noticed by casual readers of the Crisis today and virtually unknown to Western readers, Solovyov's diatribe against positivism in the mid-1870s was far from unique. In fact, several were arguably more erudite, though less dramatic and opinionated than his own. One such discussion occurred in an entry in the third volume of Silvestr Gogockij's notable «Философский лексикон», published in 1866. Gogockij rebuked Comte for his theoretical reliance on physical laws alone to explain not merely all empirical phenomena, but even moral ones as well. That which is inexplicable in terms of such laws, Comte called «metaphysical» and, as such, were dismissible. Gogockij could not abide Comte's cherished aim to reduce everything, including the ethical realm, to empirically established rules, principles, and laws. Thus, on the one hand, Comte believed morality could be explained scientifically, but, on the other hand, he rejected it out of hand10.
Another critical presentation of Comte's positivism came in the very year of Solovyov's thesis defense. In his «Обзор философских учений», Petr I. Linickij, who taught at the Kiev Theological Academy, declared that the sensualist theory of cognition is the basis, the necessary assumption, of positivism. A clear and precise thinker, Linickij provided a definition of sensualism. It is the view that «the sole source of our cognition is external sense experience, and the scope of our knowledge is limited to facts accessible to external observation (a rejection of inner self-observation as a means of cognition)» [12, с. 108]. Thus, with this definition, philosophy, being concerned with empirical phenomena and the determination of general laws, is identical to science. What Linickij, in particular, rejected is the positivist portrayal of humanity's intellectual development in terms of historical stages. The positivistic law of such development is, essentially, merely an unfounded opinion. The positivists claim, without any basis, that each of the three
10 While I believe this short sketch of Gogockij's criticism of positivism is clear enough, Mozgovaja reminds us that Gogockij's лексикон, as well as other works, were written «for a student audience, and therefore it is very difficult to find in them the position of the author himself». Мозговая Н.Г Позитивизм и Киевская духовно-академическая философия: на примере творческого наследия Ор. Новицкого и С. Гогоцкого // Соловьевские исследования. 2007. Вып. 14. С. 155 [11].
stages follows a necessary temporal progression. We can clearly see this from the fact that Comtean positivism, though disclaiming the theological and the metaphysical stages, cannot free itself of religious and metaphysical concepts. Indeed, Comte himself, Linickij claimed, recognized the need for an institution performing the manifest function of a church by establishing a «religion of humanity», which had all the characteristics of a religious cult. In Linickij's eyes, Comte rejected the search for first causes, because such a quest would, perforce, be a transgression beyond the bounds of experience, but at the same time Comte resorted to concepts of a metaphysical character11. Although Linickij gave every indication of taking this as a point against the validity of the positivistic philosophy of history, we would remind Linickij, if that were possible, that his observation of Comte's inconsistency may be due to a personal weakness in Comte's individual psychological makeup and not necessarily a failure in positivist theory as such.
Finally, although it appeared only in 1875, Kudrjavcev-Platonov, a professor at the Moscow Theological Academy, gave a talk in October 1874 - and thus roughly seven weeks before Solovyov's famed thesis defense - on the topic «Religion and Positive Philosophy». In this presentation - at least in the form it has come down to us - Kudrjavcev remarked that in its essential characteristics positivism is not a unique philosophical doctrine. Comte and Hegel, for example, share remarkably similar philosophies of history. Both argue that religion is nothing but a transitional form of knowledge and as such a «lower» form than philosophy. However, both also contend that in time religion will pass to this higher form. The difference between Comte and Hegel is merely that for Hegel the higher and final form of knowledge is his own absolute idealist philosophy, whereas for Comte it is his positivism12. In this, the reader cannot help but notice the remarkable similarity with Solovyov's position in the Crisis. Kudrjavcev recognized that for Hegel and Comte all philosophies prior to their own were necessary, though transitory, stages in intellectual history. We can easily observe that Solovyov shared the same position, substituting his own viewpoint, which he called «concrete thought», as the telos of that history.
Kudrjavcev, of course, was interested in defending religion against what he perceived to be Comte's denigratory evaluation of its role and concerns in human life. Comte failed to see that it was more than merely a cognitive method, although that is certainly part of religion's significance. As for positivism itself, it speaks of three cognitive methods, but in Kudrjavcev's estimation they are not methods, but cognitive spheres. The laws of thought and our cognitive methods are the same across all the spheres. Theology, philosophy and natural science represent three different but compatible worldviews. They have as their respective concerns three different cognitive objects. Because they have different objects and offer different worldviews, it is not impossible for them to co-exist at the same time, indeed within the same individual. Already with Aristotle, we see a philosopher deeply concerned with metaphysics, but also concerned with science13. Moreover, in Kudrjavcev's view, there is no basis for Comte's claim that
11 См.: Линицкий П. Обзор философских ученый. Киев, 1874. С. 116 [12].
12 Кудрявцев-Платонов В.Д. Религия и позитивная философия // Кудрявцев-Платонов В.Д. Сочинения. Сергиев Посад, 1892. Т. 2, вып. 1. С. 324 [13].
13 Там же. С. 333.
the theological stage represents a lower level of intellectual development than the metaphysical. Again, the example of Aristotle is sufficient evidence to dispense with this assertion. Some investigators direct their inquiries at one level of knowledge, while others at another.
3. The Minor Role of Positivism in the Crisis
Our presentation above shows that by the time of Solovyov's magistefs thesis defense, positivism in general was an international intellectual movement recognized as such within Russia and had already attracted a number of figures to its dissemination over several decades. Given Solovyov's overall position at the time and his general, quite favorable attitude toward metaphysics, it should not be surprising that he would attack positivism to some degree. However, the final subtitle of the Crisis, «Against the Positivists», certainly appears to have been an afterthought, a last minute addition. We would expect given the title and this subtitle that the thesis would be an examination of how positivism, if not in Comte's incarnation, then at least in the form espoused by John Stuart Mill or by Comte's somewhat wayward disciple Emile Littre, led to the final «crisis» of Western philosophy along with the author's proposed remedy of the situation. Yet, we find none of that. Indeed, the original subtitle had nothing at all to do with positivism. In its original form in the journal «Православное обозрение» serialized over the course of 1874, the Crisis bore the subtitle «Concerning Hartmann's 'philosophy of the unconscious'». The text, with which we are familiar, does indeed present the history of modern (Western) philosophy as leading to von Hartmann's worldview and saw von Hartmann's stand as the culmination of what Solovyov would portray as abstract thought. Thus, we cannot accept S.M. Luk'janov claim, made so many years ago, that the Crisis was clearly «directed against the positivists»14. If it was, it missed the mark; if it was not, it bore an irrelevant subtitle.
As is well known, the pages of Solovyov's «Introduction» to the Crisis were not the first to be written, but among the last. The first chapter of what became his thesis appeared in the January 1874 issue of the largely theological journal «Православное обозрение» («Orthodox Review»). There, at the start in Chapter One, Solovyov tells us, that in contrast to positivism, which arose from and with the exhaustion of philosophical doctrines, each claiming to be the absolute truth, a new metaphysics has appeared. On the one hand, positivism held that «higher questions of thought» - what these are he does not say nor why they are «higher» - could not be resolved and, thus, to pose them would be absurd, presumably, a waste of time and effort15. However, this newly emerged metaphysics demonstrates that these «higher questions» can neither be simply dismissed nor set aside. The questions must be answered despite the effort required. In order to evaluate the philosophical significance - and tenability - of this metaphysics, we must investigate the development of Western philosophy since Kant,
14 Лукьянов С.М. О Вл.С. Соловьев в его молодые годы. Материалы к биографии. Книга первая. Петроград: Сенатская типография, 1916. С. 403 [14].
15 Соловьев В.С. Кризис западной философии (против позитивистов) // Соловьев В.С. Полн. собр. соч. и писем в 20 т. Сочинения. Т. 1. М.: Наука, 2000. С. 55 [15].
with which its author, von Hartmann, himself sees his ideas linked and as the culmination of that development. Solovyov did not elaborate precisely why we must place von Hartmann's views in their historical setting in order to determine that significance (философское значение). Also left unsaid was whether this alleged culmination is logical, historical or merely contingent. In any case, Solovyov, then, proceeded to a discussion of German Idealism. But it is important for us to recognize that were we to offer an opinion of the general thesis of Solovyov's book on the basis of its first pages -and, thus, Solovyov's initial intent in early 1874 - we would say that the «crisis of Western philosophy» is a result of the failure of von Hartmann's attempted revival of metaphysics. In short, Solovyov viewed positivism in January 1874 as playing nothing more than a secondary role, another way station or stop, along the road that is the historical development of Western philosophy.
After discussing the movement from Kant to Hegel, Solovyov comes by way of, to be charitable, what we can call «non-linear thinking», to the claim that materialism passes into positivism and the materialists' empirical realism led to Comte's empirical criticism16. Precisely how Solovyov understood «empirical criticism» remains unclarified, but we do know that (a) «criticism» was, for Solovyov and much of XIXth century philosophy, another term for Kantianism, and (b) Solovyov - as did many others in XIXth century Russia - took Kantianism to be a phenomenalism, i.e., the «position that only phenomena are accessible to us, whereas their essence is absolutely uncognizable» [15, с. 59]. On this basis, we can conclude that, for Solovyov, Comte preached a form of phenomenalism much as did Kant17. However wrongheaded we may feel his interpretation of Kant to be, more astonishing is his immediately following claim that materialism also entails an epistemological phenomenalism. Since materialism says that thinking is a physiological process and that thinking is qualitatively quite different from things existing independently of our thought, our cognition can have no objective significance18.
We find confirmation of our inference that, for Solovyov, phenomenalism was merely one feature of positivism following his remark on Comte's «empirical criticism»19. A question remains, though, as to the nature of this phenomenalism. Is it epistemological or ontological? He wrote, «A phenomenon is opposed to what is independent, to what is in itself. ... It is a representation in consciousness. <...> Positivism, starting exclusively from the external empirical domain, considers all other
16 Соловьев В.С. Кризис западной философии (против позитивистов). С. 71. Note here that Solovyov writes «passes» (переходит) in the first instance, thereby leaving open whether he is alleging a logical or a historical transition takes place. In the second instance, however, he writes «was provoked» (вызван был), thereby eliminating the ambiguity in favor of an understanding of the transition as an historical event.
17 The careful reader will note the oddity of Solovyov's expression here. He had been remarking on the uncognizability of the Ding an sich in Kant's philosophy but wrote, «Therefore, the positivists, along with Kant, assert ...». Why did Solovyov mention «the positivists» here at all? And if he wished to do so, since his concern here was Kant, he should have written, «Therefore, Kant, along with the positivists, assert.». See: Там же. С. 59.
18 Of course, on this basis, unbeknown to Vladimir Ulyanov, his famed «Материализм и эмпириокритицизм» was a defense of phenomenalism, and, hence, of idealism!
19 Unfortunately, the secondary literature, following Solovyov's hasty and inexact remarks, too often treats phenomenalism as identical with positivism instead of as merely one feature of it.
content of consciousness to be empty abstractions without any reality. Comte says that the only cognition to have reality (i.e., expresses a real phenomenon) is one that can be reduced to the data of the external senses» [15, c. 72]. Regrettably, these statements do little to resolve our quandary. One can argue that Solovyov saw Comte as an epistemological phenomenalist, since the former held that for Comte genuine cognition consists of data from external senses. The very use of the word «external» implies an opposition to what is internal. However, does not ontological phenomenalism collapse the former into the latter? On the other hand, in the sentence immediately preceding our extended quotation above, Solovyov contrasted the independently existing being of materialism to the external phenomenon of positivism. Thus, if Solovyov was consistent and materialism is itself an epistemological phenomenalism, then the contrast is tenable only if positivism is a form of ontological phenomenalism. Our final confirmation of positivism's ontological phenomenalism can be found in the appendix to the Crisis, where Solovyov wrote, «The fundamental principle, or essence, of positivism consists in the fact that for us nothing exists besides observed phenomena as external facts» [15, c. 151]. Since, according to Solovyov, positivism maintains, as a matter of principle, that true or genuine knowledge originates from external experience, but it also preaches, owing to its variety of phenomenalism, that what we view as external is merely a bundle of sense perceptions that we take to be external, we have a contradiction. The resolution of this situation, coupled with other issues, led Western philosophy onward to Schopenhauer and then von Hartmann.
The general argument of the Crisis is too familiar to recount in detail here. Solovyov's work is virtually a diatribe against what he took to be the dominant trend in Western philosophy, namely, its penchant for rationality and abstract analysis. Allegedly tracing this movement throughout modern philosophy, Solovyov came to his own day. It is remarkable that he had absolutely nothing to say about the nascent neo-Kantian movement, which, with its formalistic interpretation of Kant, could conceivably have fitted well into his portrayal of Western thought. That Solovyov progressed from Kant to the other German Idealists and then to Schopenhauer and von Hartmann with extended discussions of their thought in Chapters Two and Three shows that at least when those chapters were being written Solovyov had already said in Chapter One all he had intended to say about positivism. With regard to his central claim, positivism is of interest only as a form of phenomenalism, which he believed he had dealt with exhaustively already in his discussion of Kant. Chapter Four takes us from Hegel through Feuerbach and the young Hegelians with not a single word about positivism. In Chapter Five, we find John Stuart Mill mentioned. Solovyov had previously in Chapter One labeled Mill as a positivist, but the introduction of Mill in this later chapter is as a representative of «the empirical tendency», and, more specifically, of the final stage of empiricism, not as a representative of positivism20.
20 For the characterization of Mill as a positivist, see: Соловьев В.С. Кризис западной философии. С. 72; for Mill as a representative of the final stage of empiricism, see там же, c. 125. In his 1875 review of the «Кризис», Strakhov recognized that Solovyov had painted an overly simplistic picture of the relationship between positivism and empiricism. See: Страхов Н. Философские очерки. СПб., 1895. С. 379 [16].
Admittedly, Solovyov devoted an appendix to Comte's theory of the three phases in human intellectual development. This appendix appeared in the final printed version of his thesis as well as in the November issue of «Православное обозрение»21. What is of interest in this appendix is neither Solovyov's discussion nor his totally predictable criticism of Comte's philosophy of history. Solovyov recognized that Comte believed theology, metaphysics and science were three historically successive phases. Moreover, the former realized that for Comte the general scientific method entails the limitation of human cognition to external phenomena, relations and laws, i.e., to phenomenalism. Of course, Solovyov rejected Comte's claim that science can alone explain everything and prove to be intellectually satisfying as well as his account of the nature of religion and metaphysics22. But, along with Kudrjavcev, he also rejected Comte's claim concerning the historical succession of the three phases. Not only can there be no talk of succession, but also no talk of substitution: «In fact, from the very start of humanity's intellectual development we find religious faith, philosophical speculations and positive observations existing simultaneously in their respective spheres» [15, с. 148]. Solovyov ended this appendix, writing, «the pretension of positivism to be the universal worldview is completely unfounded» [15, с. 152]. Thus, he believed that with his appendix he had successfully shown the inadequacy of Comte's philosophy of history. In this respect, if the Crisis were intended from the start to be a refutation of positivism and, therefore, to be «against the positivists», this appendix alone would have sufficed. That alone has significance for understanding the thesis, but the reader will also note that, although Solovyov did refer in this appendix to positivism as a phenomenalism, he never even attempted to situate Comte's positivism within his outline of the history of Western philosophy. That is, he never mentioned where to place Comte in the historical line leading from Kant to von Hartmann. Although Mill is referred to in the appendix as a positivist, Solovyov had Mill's role in history as an empiricist, as the culmination of a line extending from Bacon through Locke onward. Comte, on the other hand, does not enter the discussion as an empiricist and certainly not as the culminator of any line. Are we to infer that Comte, owing to his phenomenalism, is to be «sandwiched» or squeezed somehow into the development of empiricism? Solovyov never said so, and there is no spot in Solovyov's cherished triadic scheme for Comte. If we accept Solovyov's account(s) of history, Comte is an orphan. All the more startling, then, is Losev's statement that Solovyov's depiction of the transition from Hegel to positivism is impeccable (безупречно). To be precise, there is no transition from Hegel to positivism23.
21 In his letter of 8 September 1874 to Vladislavlev, Solovyov wrote that he planned two appendices: one on Comte's positivism and the other on Schelling's positive philosophy. Both were «ready in manuscript». See: Соловьев В.С. Кризис западной философии. Примечания. С. 267. However, the planned appendix on Schelling never appeared and based on the testimony of the Crisis's editor may never have been written. If that is the case, then it is just as possible that the appendix on Comte was also not yet written by 8 September, but only planned.
22 Там же. С. 147.
23 Лосев А.Ф. Владимир Соловьев и его время. M., 2000. C. 175 [17]. Losev next, in depicting this supposed transition, wrote that the reaction to a Hegelian transformation of everything into pure thought («мыслимость») is «quite natural» («вполне естественной»). To say a train of thought is «natural» is a far cry from saying it is impeccable.
Finally, in turning to the «Introduction» to the Crisis, we find many of Solovyov's best-known expressions and themes. It also happens to be the only section of the completed book that did not appear separately in a journal. Based on that and the content of this «Introduction», we can state with confidence that it was of comparatively late origin. Whether written in early 1874 or late in that year is of little importance, though, for our purpose here. In its opening lines, Solovyov claimed that, unlike positivism, he believed all of abstract philosophy belongs to the past. Positivism itself claims that the speculative current in Western philosophy has passed and ended, but not the empirical current, of which it is the ultimate and fullest expression. For Solovyov, positivism is insufficiently and inadequately radical. Rather, both the speculative and the empirical currents of abstract philosophy have passed24. Thus, accepting these opening words, Solovyov's principal target was not positivism, but all of abstract philosophy, von Hartmann, being, in his own eyes, its final expression25. The supposed «crisis» in Western philosophy is neither caused nor even represented by Comtean positivism, which is but a supporting actor in the drama that is Western philosophy. Since much of the «Introduction» is concerned with tracing the development of Western metaphysics from scholasticism to Kant, positivism plays no role there. Positivism is also not so much as mentioned in any of the seven theses Solovyov read out at the start of his Crisis defense, although he did mention empiricism and rationalism in the first four26.
On a biographical note, we should recognize that Solovyov displayed only a modest acquaintance with positivist tracts. As for representatives of positivism, he explicitly mentioned only Comte, Littre, Mill and Spencer and rarely referred to their works directly. It is impossible to determine to what extent he had actually read them, as opposed to reading about them in secondary sources. Nor can we say whether Solovyov knew anything about the history of positivism in Russia. None of the authors we saw earlier in this paper is so much as mentioned in the Crisis. Even assuming he was largely disinterested at this time in politics, could he have been unaware of Lavrov and the «going to the people» movement in 1874 inspired by Lavrov's writings? Surely, he must have heard of that largely student movement and thereby had his attention drawn to Lavrov. And what of Kudrjavcev, whose public talk on Comte took place on 1 October? Since the final subtitle of the thesis is so incongruous with its text, is it possible that Solovyov at the last moment changed the subtitle to the one we know as a result of learning of, possibly even attending, Kudrjavcev's talk?
4. Solovyov Contra Lesevich
Lesevich served as one of the examiners at Solovyov's thesis defense presumably owing to an already established reputation as a proponent and defender of positivism. Following that event, Lesevich wrote a lengthy review of the thesis for the journal «Отечественные записки» that appeared in the first issue of 1875. Although Lesevich
24 See: Соловьев В.С. Кризис западной философии. С. 39.
25 Там же. С. 58.
26 Там же. С. 241.
demonstrated therein his erudition, it is not, at least in his reading of Solovyov's thesis, among his more insightful writings. Unlike Solovyov, Lesevich displayed a great familiarity with the German philosophical scene of the day. Unlike Solovyov, Lesevich saw the emergence of German neo-Kantianism. To his credit, he recognized that von Hartmann's ideas by no means exercised a hegemony in the West, and, thus, he, in effect, challenged Solovyov's contention that von Hartmann represented the culmination of Western thought. Lesevich writes: «Positivism, as Solovyov imagines it, does not exist; Hartmann's crisis 'against' Comte and positivism does not exist; the crisis within positivism does not exist. Finally, a crisis in the scientific direction of Western philosophy again does not exist» [18, c. 446]. Lesevich also derided Solovyov for his unfamiliarity with the major secondary histories of philosophy, and those he did appear to know had «a contingent character and are a strange concoction» [18, c. 447].
To his discredit, Lesevich either did not read Solovyov's Crisis or, at least, did not read it very carefully. For Lesevich did not recognize so much as the fundamental claim in Solovyov's book. The former stated that Solovyov alleged the impossibility of additional metaphysical systems after the appearance of positivism. Lesevich also hinted that the very appearance of von Hartmann's philosophy itself in Germany constituted a crisis for positivism, rather than a symptom of a crisis within Western philosophy. If that indeed was Solovyov's intention, Lesevich continued, Solovyov «did not know what he was saying» [18, c. 433]. The «crisis», in Lesevich's reading of Solovyov Crisis, is a result of the universal dominance of positivism over Western minds being replaced by a similar dominance of von Hartmann's philosophy.
Even the casual reader of the Crisis, let alone Solovyov, would recognize that the above points do not represent the position affirmed in that work. We need not dwell on these errors here. However, Solovyov did publish his remarks on Lesevich's misunderstandings, pointing out the obvious, but also making a few clarifications. As we observed in our summary of Solovyov's stand toward positivism, he affirmed, in his reply to Lesevich, a distinction between positivism as a philosophical system and positivism as an anti-metaphysical direction27. He did not clarify, however, where positivism «fits» into his sketch of the development of Western thought. He affirmed that the subtitle «against the positivists» referred, not to the word «crisis», but to the entire title, in other words that the book was intended as an attack on positivism. However, how could he do otherwise without admitting an error on his part? Clearly, he had to indicate that Lesevich's understanding was wrong, but Solovyov could not rescind the cover page of his work after its publication. More importantly, I believe, Solovyov did add that the subtitle served «only to supplement the title and is an inessential supplement»28. The words are so unimportant that if someone objected to them, the subtitle should be stricken for one's peace of mind. I take this to be an affirmation that Solovyov was having «second thoughts» on its applicability, perhaps even recognizing that he had made a mistake in expression or by including it.
27 См.: Соловьев В.С. Странное недоразумение (Ответ г. Лесевичу) // Соловьев В.С. Полн. собр. соч. и писем в двадцати томах. Сочинения. Т. 1. М: Наука, 2000. С. 185. [19].
28 Там же. С. 186 (Примечание 2).
5. von Hartmann's Demotion and Comte's Elevation
Solovyov's reply to Lesevich appeared immediately afterward in early 1875 in the journal «Русский вестник». In March of the following year, he secured a job in St. Petersburg on the Academic Committee of the Ministry of National Education. That month also saw the appearance in the Ministry's own journal of Solovyov's first article of what became the five part «Философские начала цельного знания». In it, Solovyov reassessed and broadened his conception of humanity's historical development. Not unlike some positivists, he saw humankind and society as analogous to a living organism. Keeping to his unsubstantiated triadic scheme, Solovyov divided human life into three spheres, only the second of which concerns us here, viz., knowledge. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that he now significantly diminished von Hartmann's role. No longer did the latter stand at the summit and final stage of Western, i.e., abstract, philosophy. Whereas Solovyov saw Schopenhauer and his successor (продолжатель) von Hartmann as understanding the great significance of mysticism, Solovyov specifically assigned that role to the summit of the creative sphere ^фера творчества), not as we might expect from the Crisis, to the sphere of knowledge, in which Solovyov had placed abstract philosophy29. In short, Solovyov «demoted» the philosophers of pessimism from their lofty perch in Western thought. And since Solovyov now in 1877 saw mysticism as the «supreme principle of the entire life of the general human organism» (верховного начала всей жизни общечеловеческого организма), von Hartmann must play a dissimilar, though highly valued, role in our historical development, independent of such geographical divisions as East and West.
As did Comte, Solovyov claimed, albeit with nuanced differences, that human history, along with thinking, must pass through three stages. However, the characteristic feature of intellectual Western development is the successive detachment of each of the three stages from an initial confused unity. By the medieval period, philosophy and empirical science were still a unity but had separated from theology. Solovyov held that in his day science was stepping forward as distinct from philosophy and was exhibiting a pretension to absolute supremacy over the other two, now obsolete stages. The explicit expression of this pretention was so-called positivism and, most importantly, for us «represents in its sphere the necessary final word of Western development»30. Of course, Solovyov refused to accept that Western civilization represented the ultimate stage of human development. It is merely a transitional phase. However, we see from this that he had reconsidered his stance in the intervening period since his magister's work, by accommodating and elevating positivism to a far higher role than it previously occupied. Regrettably, Solovyov paid no attention to positivism in the remaining four parts of the «Философские начала» and consigned the very mention of von Hartmann's name to a single footnote.
29 Соловьев В.С. Философские начала цельного знания // Соловьев В.С. Полн. собр. соч. и писем в 20 т. Сочинения. Т. 2. М.: Наука, 2000. С. 197 [20].
30 Там же. С. 207.
6. Conclusion
At the time when Solovyov was composing his magister's thesis, both the French and the English varieties of positivism were known intellectual currents in Russia and had domestic adherents and opponents. Yet for whatever reason, he revealed no knowledge at all of the Russian-language literature. Focusing on Comte and, to a significantly lesser degree, Mill and Spencer, Solovyov derided them for their opposition to metaphysics. However, he did this separately from the main argument of his book, which sketched the development of modern Western philosophy and its alleged inadequacies at each stage of that development. His omission of positivism as a transitional moment in the evolution of philosophy was as a result of his inability to account for it as a historical phenomenon within his overall argument. In this sense, his thesis was, by no means, «against the positivists», as it proclaimed. However, Solovyov should have recognized that this inability to allocate a historical position for it jeopardized the cogency of his argument. The subtitle of his work appears to have been a last minute change for unknown reasons from the ongoing subtitle of the serialized individual chapters, possibly in an attempt to deflect attention away from his failure. Whatever the case, within approximately two years he recognized the magnitude and significance of positivism's influence and adjusted his philosophy of history accordingly. In his «Философские начала», he, as it were, vindicated the subtitle of his thesis ex post facto.
Список литературы
1. Майков В.Н. Общественные науки в России // Майков В.Н. Сочинения в 2 т. Киев, 1901. Т. 2. С. 3-49.
2. Кареев Н.И. Основы русской социологии. СПб.: Изд-во И. Лимбаха, 1996. 368 с.
3. Милютин ВА. Опыт о народном богатстве или о началах политической экономии // Милютин ВА. Избранные произведения. M., 1946. С. 358-444.
4. Писарев Д. Исторические идеи Огюста Конта // Русское слово. 1865, сентябрь. С. 42-69.
5. Серно-Соловьевич Н. Не требует ли нынешнее состояние знаний новой науки? // Русское слово. 1865, январь. С. 125-136.
6. Ватсон E.K. Огюст Конт и политическая философия // Современник. 1865. № 8. С. 276-300.
7. Южаков С.Н. Социологические этюды: в 2 т. СПб.: Тип. М.М. Стасюлевича, 1891. Т. 1. VIII. 278 с.
8. Л[илиенфельд] П. Мысли о социальной науке будущего. СПб., 1872. VI+403 с.
9. Лесевич В. Новейшая литература позитивизма // Лесевич В. Собрание сочинений. M.: Книгоиздательство писателей, 1915. Т. 1. С. 86-135.
10. Лесевич В. Опыт критического исследования основоначал позитивной философии. СПб.: Tip. Стасюлевича, 1877. XI+295 c.
11. Мозговая Н.Г. Позитивизм и Киевская духовно-академическая философия: на примере творческого наследия Ор. Новицкого и С. Гогоцкого // Соловьёвские исследования. 2007. Вып. 14. С. 150-159.
12. Линицкий П. Обзор философских ученый. Киев: Тип. С.Т. Еремеева, 1874. 255 с.
13. Кудрявцев-Платонов В.Д. Религия и позитивная философия // Кудрявцев-Платонов В.Д. Сочинения. Сергиев Посад, 1892. Т. 2. Вып. 1. С. 320-350.
14. Лукьянов С.М. О Вл.С. Соловьеве в его молодые годы. Материалы к биографии. Книга первая. Петроград: Сенатская типография, 1916. 441 с.
15. Соловьев В.С. Кризис западной философии (против позитивистов) // Соловьев В.С. Полн. собр. соч. и писем в 20 т. Сочинения. Т. 1. M.: Наука, 2000. C. 38-153.
16. Страхов Н. Философские очерки. СПб.: Тип. Бр. Пантелеевых, 1895. 544 с.
17. Лосев А.Ф. Владимир Соловьев и его время. M.: Молодая гвардия, 2000. 650 с.
18. Лесевич В.В. Как иногда пишутся диссертации // Лесевич В.В. Собрание сочинений. M.: Изд. Ю.В. Леонтович, 1915. Т. 2. С. 427-449.
19. Соловьев В.С. Странное недоразумение (Ответ г. Лесевичу) // Соловьев В.С. Полн. собр. соч. и писем в 20 т. Сочинения. Т. 1. M.: Наука, 2000. C. 183-190.
20. Соловьев В.С. Философские начала цельного знания // Соловьев В.С. Полн. собр. соч. и писем в 20 т. Сочинения. Т. 2. M.: Наука, 2000. C. 185-308.
References
I. Maykov, VN. Obshchestvennye nauki v Rossii [Social Sciences in Russia], in Maykov, VN. Sochineniya v 2 t., t. 2 [Works in 2 vol., vol. 2], Kyiv, 1901, pp. 3-49.
2. Kareev, N.I. Osnovy russkoy sotsiologii [Fundamentals of Russian Sociology], Saint-Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo I. Limbakha, 1996. 368 p.
3. Milyutin, VA. Opyt o narodnom bogatstve ili o nachalakh politicheskoy ekonomii [An Essay on a Nation's Wealth or Principles of Political Economy], in Milyutin, VA. Izbrannye proizvedeniya [Selected works], Moscow, 1946, pp. 358-444.
4. Pisarev, D. Istoricheskie idei Ogyusta Konta [The historical ideas of Auguste Comte], in Russkoe slovo, 1865, sentyabr', pp. 42-69.
5. Serno-Solov'evich, N. Ne trebuet li nyneshnee sostoyanie znaniy novoy nauki? [Does the current state of knowledge require a discipline?], in Russkoe slovo, 1865, yanvar', pp. 125-136.
6. Vatson, E.K. Ogyust Kont i politicheskaya filosofiya [Auguste Comte and political philosophy], in Sovremennik, 1865, no. 8, pp. 276-300.
7. Yuzhakov, S.N. Sotsiologicheskie etyudy v2 t., 1.1 [Sociological Studies in 2 vol., vol. 1], Saint-Petersburg: Tipografiya M.M. Stasyulevicha, 1891, VIII, 278 р.
8. L[ilienfel'd], P. Mysli o sotsial'noy nauke budushchego [Thoughts on a Social Science of the Future], Saint-Petersburg, 1872, VI+403 p.
9. Lesevich, V Noveyshaya literatura pozitivizma [Contemporary literature of positivism], in Lesevich, V Sobranie sochineniy [Collected Works], Moscow: Knigoizdatel'stvo pisateley, 1915, vol. 1, pp. 86-135.
10. Lesevich, V Opyt kriticheskogo issledovaniya osnovonachalpozitivnoy filosofii [An Attempt at a Critical Investigation of the Fundamental Principles of Positive Philosophy], Saint-Petersburg: Tip. M.M. Stasyulevicha, 1877. XI+295 р.
II. Mozgovaya, N.G. Pozitivizm i Kievskaya dukhovno-akademicheskaya filosofiya: na primere tvorcheskogo naslediya Or. Novitskogo i S. Gogotskogo [Positivism and the philosophy of the Kiev theological academy: on the example of the creative heritage of Or. Nowicki and S. Gogotskogo], in Solov'evskie issledovaniya, 2007, issue 14, pp. 150-159.
12. Linitskiy, P. Obzor filosofskikh uchenyy [Survey of Philosophical Doctrines], Kyiv: Tip. S.T. Eremeeva, 1874. 255 p.
13. Kudryavtsev-Platonov, V.D. Religiya i pozitivnaya filosofiya [Religion and positive philosophy], in Kudryavtsev-Platonov, VD. Sochineniya [Works], Sergiev Posad, 1892, vol. 2, issue 1, pp. 320-350.
14. Luk'yanov, S.M. O Vl.S. Solov'eve vego molodye gody. Materialy k biografii. Knigapervaya [About Vl. Solovyov in his Younger Years. Materials for a Biography. Book One], Petrograd: Senatskaya tipografiya, 1916. 441 p.
15. Solov'ev, VS. Krizis zapadnoy filosofii (protiv pozitivistov) [The Crisis of Western Philosophy: Against the Positivists], in Solov'ev, VS. Polnoe sobranie sochineniy i pisem v 20 t. Sochineniya 1.1 [Complete Works and Letters in 20 vol. Works vol. 1], Moscow: Nauka, 2000, pp. 38-153.
16. Strakhov, N. Filosofskie ocherki [Philosophical Essays], Saint-Petersburg: Tipografiya Br. Panteleevykh, 1895. 544 p.
17. Losev, A.F Vladimir Solov'ev i ego vremya [Vladimir Solovyov and His Time], Moscow: Molodaya gvardiya, 2000. 650 p.
18. Lesevich, VV Kak inogda pishutsya dissertatsii [How dissertations are sometimes written], in Lesevich, VV Sobranie sochineniy [Collected Works], Moscow: Izdanie Yu.V Leontovich, 1915, vol. 2, pp. 427-449.
19. Solov'ev, VS. Strannoe nedorazumenie (Otvet g. Lesevichu) [A strange misunderstanding (Reply to Mr. Lesevich)], in Solov'ev, VS. Polnoe sobranie sochineniy i pisem v 20t. Sochineniya t.1 [Complete Works and Letters in 20 vol. Works vol. 1], Moscow: Nauka, 2000, pp. 183-190.
20. Solov'ev, VS. Filosofskie nachala tsel'nogo znaniya [The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge], in Solov'ev, VS. Polnoe sobranie sochineniy i pisem v20 t. Sochineniya t. 2 [Complete Works and Letters in 20 vol. Works vol. 2], Moscow: Nauka, 2000, pp. 185-308.
РЕФЕРАТ
Показано, что позитивизм Конта уже был известным интеллектуальным движением в России, когда Соловьев начал работу над своей диссертацией, хотя он никогда не демонстрировал каких-либо знаний о его российских сторонниках. Уже в 1840-х гг. Валериан Майков, литературный критик, и Владимир Милютин, молодой экономист, начали изучать философию истории Конта. Двумя десятилетиями позднее радикалы Д. Писарев и Н. Серно-Соловьевич выражали согласие с контовским критическим анализом метафизики. Однако уже ко времени знаменитой защиты диссертации Соловьевым позитивизм был предметом нападок со стороны видных богословов. В частности, за несколько недель до защиты диссертации профессор В.Д. Кудрявцев-Платонов выступил в Московской духовной академии с докладом, в котором он, подобно Соловьёву, подверг критике философию истории Конта. Ранняя критика позитивизма остается фактически неизвестной западным читателям Соловьева, а вместе с тем его резкая критика позитивизма в середине 1870-х годов была далеко не уникальной. Обращает на себя внимание фрагмент вступления к третьему тому известного «Философского лексикона» Сильвестра Гогоцкого, изданного в 1866, в котором автор критиковал Конта за стремление объяснить не только все эмпирические явления, но и моральные исходя из физических законов. В сочинении «Кризис западной философии» Соловьев, обращаясь в большей степени к Конту, нежели к Миллю и Спенсеру, высмеял позитивистов за их враждебное отношение к метафизике. Однако Соловьев сделал это, отстранившись от основной идеи своей книги, в которой рассматривалось развитие современной западной философии и ее недостатки на каждом этапе этого развития. При общем весьма благоприятном отношении Соловьева к метафизике его критика позитивизма не является неожиданной. Появившийся позднее подзаголовок к названию сочинения -«против позитивистов» - представляется запоздалой идеей, дополнением, сделанным в последнюю минуту, тем более что в публикации в журнале «Православное обозрение» оно имело совсем другое название - «О "философии бессознательного" йртмана». Если бы сочинение «Кризис западной философии»
изначально было задумано как опровержение позитивизма и, как следствие, направлено «против позитивистов», «Приложение» к диссертации («Теория Огюс-та Конта о трех фазисах умственного развития человечества») было бы существенным. Согласно первым словам «Введения», основной идеей книги Соловьева был критика не позитивизма, а абстрактной философии, в которой учение Гартмана является последним и завершающим. Предполагаемый «кризис» западной философии ни вызван, ни представлен позитивизмом Конта, который является лишь актером второго плана в драме под названием западная философия. Так как заключительный заголовок диссертации не соответствует тексту, Соловьев, возможно, в последний момент изменил его на тот, о котором мы знаем из речи Кудрявцева. Лесевич выступал в качестве одного из оппонентов на защите диссертации Соловьевым предположительно благодаря уже сложившейся репутации сторонника и защитника позитивизма. После этого события Лесе-вич написал большой обзор диссертации для журнала «Отечественные записки», который появился в первом выпуске за 1875 г. В своем ответе Лесевичу Соловьев подтвердил различие между позитивизмом как философской системой и позитивизмом как антиметафизическим направлением. Он не уточнил, однако, какое место занимает позитивизм в его очерке о развитии западной мысли. Он подтверждал, что заголовок «против позитивистов» относится не к слову «кризис», а ко всему названию. Другими словами, идея книги была заключена в критике позитивизма. Как он мог поступить иначе, не признавая ошибку со своей стороны? Очевидно, что он должен был указать на ошибочность понимания Лесевича, но Соловьев не мог отменить обложку своей работы после ее опубликования. Более важным является, на наш взгляд, указание Соловьева, что заголовок служил «лишь дополнением к заглавию, и дополнением несущественным». Позднее в первой части книги «Философские начала цельного знания» он переоценил и расширил свою концепцию исторического развития человечества, уменьшив роль учения Гартмана и повысив значение позитивизма. Соловьев отметил, что наука сделала шаг вперед, в отличие от философии, и претендовала на абсолютное превосходство перед двумя другими, теперь уже устаревшими стадиями. Явным выражением этой претензии был так называемый позитивизм, который, и это - главное, «представляет собой необходимое заключительное слово в западном развитии». В сочинении «Философские начала цельного знания» Соловьев подтвердил заголовок своей диссертации ex post facto.
