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HORIZON 10 (1) 2021 : I. Research : K. Murata-Soraci : 61-76
ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ • STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY • STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE • ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES
https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2021-10-1-61-76
SICHÜBERLIEFERUNG:
RE-MOVING THE HISTORY OF BEING AS PRESENCE KIMIYO MURATA-SORACI
PhD in the Philosophy of Religion, Retired Professor of Philosophy. School of Global Studies, Tama University. 802 Engyo, Fujisawa, Kanagawa 252-0805, Japan. E-mail: soracik@gmail.com
How are we to responsively belong to tradition? This paper retrieves the concept of self-tradition (Sichüberlieferung) in Heidegger's magnum opus Being and Time (1927). We will take as a guiding light Heidegger's designation of a mode of his phenomenology as "phenomenology of the inapparent" expressed in the 1973 Zähringen Seminar. We will pay special heed to the function of the middle voice, neutrality of Da-sein, and tautology in the question of Being and history and bring to light the relation between authentic temporality and authentic historicity in a tautological turning of the selfsame. We will make a remark on the delay of Da-seins authentic historicity in the light of the "self-tradition" which marks Heidegger's non-metaphysical response to the heritage of metaphysics of presence. In the wake of the phenomenology of the inapparent, we will turn to Derrida's 2008 text The Animal that Therefore I Am to explore Derrida's different approach to free the "I am" from that of Heidegger's Dasein whose being is set in Jeweilig-Jemeinigkeit. We will show how Derrida's invention of animot enables him and us to speak with the voices of our non-human animal others and enables us to free ourselves from the fixities of presence of the present in our thought, language, and sensitivity. In a relay of the two philosophers' reading of us and their ways of self-overcoming of man as rational animal, we will learn to be in question and to learn to relate to one another without reducing one to the other and other to the one.
Keywords: repetition, ek-sistence, ecstatic temporality, authentic historicity, self-tradition, the middle voice, tautology, animot.
© KIMIYO MURATA-SORACI, 2021 HORIZON 10 (1) 2021
SICHUBERLIEFERUNG:
РАЗБОР ИСТОРИИ БЫТИЯ КАК ПРИСУТСТВИЯ
КИМИЙО МУРАТА-СОРАЧИ
Доктор по философии религии, профессор философии в отставке. Школа глобальных исследований, Университет Тама. 802 Энгё, Фуджисава, Канагава 252-0805, Япония. E-mail: soracik@gmail.com
Каким образом мы должны ответственно принадлежать традиции? Эта статья восстанавливает концепцию собственной традиции (Sichuberlieferung) в великом произведении Хайдеггера «Бытие и время» (1927). Мы принимаем за путеводную звезду обозначение Хайдеггером модуса своей феноменологии как "феноменологии неявленного", выраженное в Царингенском семинаре 1973 года. Мы уделяем особое внимание функции среднего залога, нейтральности Da-sein и тавтологии в вопросе Бытия и истории и проливаем свет на отношение между подлинной темпоральностью и подлинной историчностью в тавтологическом повороте тождественного. Мы делаем замечание об остановке аутентичной историчности Da-sein в свете «собственной традиции», которая намечает неметафизический ответ Хайдеггера на наследие метафизики существования. Вслед за феноменологией неявного мы обращаемся к написанному в 2008 г. тексту Деррида The Animal that Therefore I Am, чтобы исследовать подход Деррида к освобождению «Я есмь» от Da-sein Хайдеггера, чье бытие установлено в Jeweilig-Jemeinigkeit. Мы показываем, как изобретенное Деррида выражение animot позволяет ему и нам говорить голосами других живых существ, не являющихся людьми, и позволяет нам освободиться от фиксированности присутствия настоящего в нашей мысли, языке и чувствительности. В ретрансляции чтения двух философов о нас и их способах самопреодоления человека как разумного живого существа мы учимся ставить себя под вопрос и относиться друг к другу, не сводя одного к другому, а другого к одному.
Ключевые слова: повторение, эк-зистенция, экстатическая темпоральность, аутентичная историчность, средний залог, тавтология, animot.
Heidegger's 1927 magnum opus Being and Time (Heidegger, 1927) invites us to an experience (die Erfahrung) of reading a non-historiographical text. By shifting the primary domain of thinking from Bewufit-sein to Da-sein1 (Heidegger, 1996, 6), Heidegger carries us as reader to an outside of representational thought and language and the time-honored belief in homo zoon logon echon (Heidegger, 1996, 22). In and through ec-static passages of Da-sein's mortal temporality and historicity, the text moves us to "go all the way into" (erfahren) the root occurrence (geschehen) of life (Maly, 1993, 224).
We readers undergo gauntlets of confronting the inherited sense of human ways to be in tracing Heidegger's passage to the forgotten question of Being, which is the Sache sought again (re-peto) in Being and Time. On the threshold of our discovery of
Da-sein literally means there-being or to be there.
the relation between authentic temporality and authentic historicity in the text, let us hear from Heidegger how he understands his way of phenomenology.
In the 1973 Zähringen seminar, Heidegger named his mode of phenomenology "a phenomenology of the inapparent" with a draw of "tautological thinking" (Heidegger, 2003, 80). What sort of phenomenology is "a phenomenology of the inapparent"? Tö-aürö-Xöyoq. What sort of thinking is tautological thinking? How does a tautological design of repetition between thinking and saying relate to a phenomenon, a phe-nomenologist's method, and the -logy of phenomenology? These questionable questions strike our mind because tautological thinking appears counter-intuitive and odd to us moderns. For in our everyday context, the Greek word auroq of the tautology is ubiquitous; a few citations of the usage such as autonomy, automatic, and automobile betray sufficiently a common understanding of auroq as self, the same, or by virtue of itself with a proviso the same means identical. Thus, we most likely intuit tautology as "a mere parroting (Wiedersagen)" without a spirit of critical thinking and we tend to cast it aside as an idle production of redundant saying (Courtine, 1993, 245). Our common take of tautology presupposes line-ups of a primacy of identity, an availability of world-time with bearings of homogeneity, constancy, and linearity, and a yardstick of before/after in order to locate occurrences in the earlier and later as well as the interval in reference to the coming of beings before ourselves as agency.
In contradistinction to the common view of the same, Heidegger understands tautology as "belonging together" and underscores that it can happen only between things that exist in their irreducible difference (Heidegger, 1984, 88). In the wake of thing's "core movement (auTou)" of ek-sistence and of ec-stacy which is disclosed in consonance (Zusammenstimmung) with a way "just as they are(aut«0 the same as belonging together, remarks Heidegger, yields no viewpoint from which to further speculate on or to dialecticize for a whole of the originary given (Heidegger, 1984, 88). In the selfsame, a thinker becomes homeless, as it were. The self who enunciates and translates what was already said fall catastrophically from his specific living context at a time of repetition and yet at the same time comes to arise together with a coming of what was already said. What is said comes to and upon the thinker from the future, from the possible, which delivers a double possibility of projection to the thinker and to what was already said. As we will see shortly in Heidegger's conceptions of primordial temporality and self-tradition (Sichüberlieferung) in his magnum opus, the future seems to take a primacy in the tautological thinking and saying. TautoXoysw in the sense of the repetition of the same seems to operate on a letting-go of the autos as a bestower of meaning on the part of both the thinker and the given in terms of a claim for authority; a mutual self-disclaiming of agency therewith an infinite postponement
of self-ground and identity seems to make a room for each other's re-birthing (re-naissance) to be there in the world with ownmost potencies. It seems that the reciprocal delay of the self as agency brings about a non-mediational gathering between thinking, speaking, and what is already said. The selfsame hands itself down to itself at such a moment of repetition; in effect, the thinker's rewording stems directly from the Sache selbst "as originally apprehended" (Courtine, 1993, 246). Heidegger's view of tautology differs from a common view and practice of translation as rewording which is based on the system of signification. Seen from these preliminary exposures, we can glimpse that the phenomenology of Being and Time tracks down to the non-apparent origin (genesis) of thing's presencing (Anwesen) and tends to de-present the voice as such regarding the inherited views of being and time. With attentiveness (Aufmerken) to the vital importance of the delay of the autos in Heidegger's phenomenology, let us now return to Being and Time.
In the section 7, Heidegger determines the concept of phenomenon and of phenomenology on the basis of the Greek phainesthai (lit. to show itself) which is the middle voice of phaino (Heidegger, 1985, 81). The middle voice which Heidegger recalls from its lost usage in Western culture speaks of a self-enactment of thing (Scott, 1987, 68). Since the middle voice bears out an occurrence which is neither initiated nor received by anyone, it marks a pre-sense of both literal and figurative language and, as we will show, that Da-sein's neutrality is bound to the character of the middle voice. Since the middle voice is counter-intuitive to us moderns, let me cite another Greek middle voiced word XavOavo^ai or emlavdavo^ai which means "to forget" and which relates, by the verbal stem lad-, to altfdeia, unconcealment (Unverborgenheit) (Heidegger, 1992b, 25-28; 1984, 108-109.) For us to understand a middle voiced happening of forgetting, we must envision it beyond man's reflexive, cognitive activity of failing to retain something which was present at some point in the past. We must heed an experience of forgetting as a non-subjective and non-objective "sending" (Schicken) of arising-not arising borne in a unifying emergence (Anwesen) of the twofold, that is, forgetting-and-forgotten (Scott, 1996, 210). Or we may just say: forgetting forgets. In Being and Time, Heidegger inscribes a series of middle voiced words such as "time times," "call calls," "anxiety is anxious," and "world worlds" to highlight a non-subjective-and-non-objective disclosure of life at its root occurrence and to find a way for us to belong to the past in the light of presencing thus from a wholly other origin than presence.
Rendering in the middle voice, Heidegger defines his way of phenomenology as apophainesthai ta phainomena: "to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself" (Heidegger, 1996, 30). We notice that his way of showing involves a form of a double letting be and a tautological turning of the selfsame-self-dis-
closure of thing's coming to appear-in-disappearing. The question of Being, which is to be sought through a different legein of the middle voice and its work of showing, is already at the outset of investigation thrown into a perpetual polemos between questioning and Being since neither side can occupy a place of either a cause or an effect; being anchorless, the question of Being is being in question and moves to find a pathway solely by the grace of a double letting be and by virtue of the phenomenologist's heedful correspondence to the self-disclosure of thing.
In a way, the middle voice plays a pharmakon-like role in Being and Time. The middle voice escapes from the fixities of human as the rational animal, "the subject of events" and history, the antagonistic stance of subject-object binarism, truth as adequation and accuracy, privilege of judgement, constitution, and evidence, ideality; it opens a region of the possible to Heidegger to think and speak of the finitude of human and time without substantive basis. By the same token, the middle voice keeps the origin of finite self-disclosive lives out of reach from anyone's control; givenness of things remains first of all and for the most part inapparant for sight. This forecasts not only an impossibility of founding the ontological truth but also calls him into a relentless repetition of a combat with the tradition which has been accustomed to think finitude (living-dying) in relation to some figure of transcendence. The middle voiced work of showing requires him to wrench the Being-self-showing occurrence-of beings from what is said generally about beings in their Being so as to save a possibility not only for humans to be truly but also for our common heritage and memory from the smears of dissimulation, deformation, and indifference.
Heidegger names this spiritual combat "destructuring" (Destruktion) (Heidegger, 1996, 20). In his 1956 essay Was Ist Das-Die Philosophie?, Heidegger speaks of destructuring more positively. Destructuring (Abbauen) aims at appropriation (Aneignung), not at demolishing of tradition (Heidegger, 1956, 22). In Being and Time, Heidegger states:
The elaboration of the question of being must [...] become historical in a disciplined way in order to come to the positive appropriation of the past, to come into full possession of the most proper possibilities of inquiry. The question of the meaning of being is led to understand itself as historical [.] as the provisional explication of Da-sein in its temporality and historicity. (Heidegger, 1996, 18)
Destructuring strives to make things light (lichten) by removing the burdens of overdue misconceptions about the way to be, that is, Zu-sein. With attentive care (Rücksicht) for an apriori past ("always already") of the "transcendence pure and simple" presence of life-death, destructuring strives to clear (lichten) all the way through
a passage of transmission of the meaning of finitude so as to let things belong rightly to the past and to the future by re-moving history in alignment with a non-historical dimension of life.
By virtue of self-transcendence (ek-sistence), the figure of Da-sein incorporates both stems of historicity and history. When we referred above to the 1973 Zahringen seminar, we mentioned Heidegger's decisive shift in Being and Time of a foothold of inquiry from consciousness to Da-sein, and made a remark that the customary designations of man as the homo animal rationale, the ego, the subject, the individual, das Mann, and der Mensch no longer bespeak fittingly the being of Da-sein. Let us hear Heidegger's designation of Da-sein:
The existential spatiality of Da-sein which determines its "place" for it in this way is itself based upon being-in-the-world. The over there is the determinateness of something encountered within the world. "Here" and "over there" are possible only in a "there," that is, when there is a being which has disclosed spatiality as the being of the "there." This being bears in its ownmost being the character of not being closed. The expression "there" means this essential disclosedness. Through disclosedness this being (Da-sein) is "there" for itself together with the Da-sein of the world [...]. It is cleared in itself as being-in-the-world, not by another being, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing [...]. Da-sein is its disclosure. (Heidegger, 1996, 125)
Due to the essential character (Geschlecht)2, Da-sein differs fundamentally from living beings including a stock (Geschlecht) of human species, Vorhandenheit, and Zuhandenheit because these beings lack, unlike Da-sein, the roots of historicity in their history (Histoire) and in the accounts (Histoire) of their histories. By implication, Da-sein transports us back to a universal source of myriad lives of things gathered merely from the standpoint of man in the line of their historical generations and declines (genesis-puthora). Perhaps, Da-sein is a figure of the first bearer, in Heidegger's corpus, who plays a Hermes-like role to announce the forgotten question of being (and the forgotten word Geschlecht) in the history of humanity and to guide our way of recollection towards the enigmatic genesis with which to re-member a just form of co-belonging with the other. At this juncture, it is interesting to recall that the Greek verb gignomai, which means "to become," bears the enigmatic change occurring silently and inapparently in a transition from non-being to being and also indexes the enigma of genesis since the gignomai shares with the word genesis the same root (Das-tur, 1994, 33). Also, the middle voiced ginesthai, as in pQopa ylverai3, speaks of a
For polysemic meanings that this word carries, see (Derrida, 2008, 7).
In The Anaximander Fragment, Heidegger elaborates on genesispthoran as the enigma of presen-cing which carries forth one with the other without reducing one to the other and the other to one (Heidegger, 1984, 30).
2
3
simultaneous counter-movement of coming-to-be-passing away of the self-showing life. Thus, when the word is addressed in the middle voice, the accent of the enigma regarding the enigma of origin shifts to the aporetic simultaneity of the opposites (Scott, 1996, 210). In any case, it has become clear to us that Da-sein is neither a worldless ego nor a tissue of transcendental ideality. Heidegger underscores that Dasein is the being of which we ourselves are (Heidegger, 1996, 39). Then, who are we really? How do we relate to Da-sein?
Da-sein's transcendence takes place as loss. Heidegger states:
Da-sein means: being held out into nothing. Holding itself out into the nothing, Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole. This being beyond beings we call "trans-cendence." If in the ground of its essence Da-sein were not transcending, which now means, if it were not in advance holding itself out into the nothing, then it could never be related to beings nor even to itself. (Heidegger, 1993, 103)
Da-sein finds itself being always already thrown into a specific historical context. Da-sein also finds itself always already dwelling in entanglement with (bei) people and things nearby, and loses its mind and heart in taking care of many concerns (Heidegger, 1996, 351). Its primordial implacement in the world shows a phenomenon of co-appearance between Da-sein, others, and "being-in-the-world." Even if the ec-static stroke of Dasein's origination remains both ineradicable and indeterminable to itself, Da-sein is already historical at the expense of its primordial thrownness. The equiprimordial co-appearance between Da-sein's ek-sistence, Mitsein, and being-in-the-world indicates that Da-sein is, unlike a figure of ipseity, strewn (Streuung) by the intrinsic possibility with multiple others it bears; it is not a simple unit of singularity. Da-sein never relates to one object (Derrida, 2008b, 19). Its ownmost past of the being-thrown (geworfen) does not take place in a horizon of the present-time line. By the same token, thanks to Da-sein's self-transcendence, the world is removed from a familiar view of a subsisting container-like substance, and time too becomes unfixed from that of an infinite succession of nows in which things take their roots of de-generation. The boundary of horizon too gets expanded from an enclosure in man's interiority to a historical place of dwelling opened by Da-sein's transcendence. The abiding mode of "in-being" also is cast out of the stolid and objective presence to the affective involvement with the given with habitual familiarity (Heidegger, 1985, 158). In the History of the Concept of Time (1925), Heidegger elucidates the sense of horizon and of the specificity of the Jeweiligkeit (Jemeinigkeit replaces it in Being and Time) by recalling etymological linkages between "bin" and "bei" and between "in-nan" and "ann" (Heidegger, 1985, 158).
In a way, Da-sein's self-transcendence defines Da-sein "to be it itself" (Zusein), nothing besides. In coming to light, Da-sein stands out (t) here unadorned and threadbare and presents its being-here as being-possible. To be it itself, Da-sein becomes modified and textured wherever and whosoever assumes it and gives it a voice by addressing to it and from it "I am." We notice that several traces of the selfsame, doubling, and delay in the specific instantiation of Da-sein into "I," or "You," or any "one." We shall call it translation (Übersetzung) and tradition (Überlieferung). Since the transcendence of Da-sein occurs non-mediatedly, anyone who assumes it at any given time and in place embodies in an intimate immediacy the essential character (Geschlecht) of the Zu-sein. In each translation and transference of Da-sein, self-relation is purely bound to a non-mediational handing down of the "being-thrown" (Geworfenheit) between a non-identifiable giver and a non-identifiable receiver. The "and" of a giving-and-taking of nothing other than the being-possible is like an event (Ereignis), like a sending of a gift of life which appears to be taking place impersonally in any Da-sein's self-relation. "This originary givenness is a sending" (Dastur, 1990. 114) and a handing down of the possibility-to be it itself-to itself beyond the twofold of donner/donated and beyond a temporal measure (^¿rpov) of before/after. As Derrida points out, Da-sein's primordial thrownness lights up an alternative mode of "radical passivity" because the "being-thrown" is not yet submitted to the alternatives of "activity and passivity" (Derrida, 2008b, 21). We note in passing that Heidegger's choice of the neuter word Dasein appears in accord with the middle voice and its destructuring function that it plays in the question of Being, and the neutrality of Dasein sign-als the alterities of the "radical passivity" and the "self-tradition."
In each specific case (je) of Da-sein translation, "I am" (Ich bin) appears to utter "by twos" in sharing a call (Ruf) of an unlocatable origin (genesis) of my there-being with an identifiable mouth of my (t) here-being. "I" speak unawarely with a non-coincidental voice which is quivering in a deferring-differing beat. Do we hear afar the Derridean movement of differance? In the absence of identifiable ground (Ab-grund) thereby without universal guidelines for ways of being, each Da-sein is called to transport on its own terms one's share of the non-coincidental voice and of possible ways to be (t)here differently from one another insofar as it remains there-being. "Mea res agitur"4 (Heidegger, 1992a, 8E).
Parenthetically, we would like to insert a few lines of clarification regarding the relation between authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) and inauthenticity (Uneigentlichkeit) in
"I am what is being enacted" or "I am that which concerns me." These translations are provided by William McNeill who is the translator of Heidegger's The Concept of Time (Heidegger, 1992a).
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Being and Time. Their relationship is a modified reversal on the basis of the primordial givenness of life sent-and- relayed impersonally in the wake of transcendence. Da-sein's everyday comportments of stupor (Benommenheit)5 and dispersion in curiosity and realization of its concerns show Da-sein is dwelling nowhere and having no-mind of its own. Common discourse is the case at point. Everyday manner of "I-speak" truncates an "I's" word-ing from an inarticulable other of its own voice and does not emerge as the "One of coming together passing away" (Scott, 1996, 210). This disintegration tears away contemporaneously not only an "I's" but also word's power of presentifying the given as it is. Both "I" and "word" in a simple act of saying lose the evocative power and access to the originary disclosure of the given that is sent carefreely and neutrally by way of the transcendence and the translation of Dasein to the unnoticeable stroke of disintegration, mechanistic repetition, by parroting, overhearing, and overusing, of the handed down truths and practices about human ways to be in the world, which exacerbates the exhaustion, dispersion, and decline (Courtine, 1993, 246). In our view, repetition (Wiederholung) is to call Da-sein's mind and spirit back from the disorientation and to reawaken Da-sein to the past event of self-transcendence and to let Da-sein heed the enigmatic simultaneity of disappear-ing-appearing as the necessary knot of the "and" that crosses over authentic historicity "and" authentic temporality. In-authenticity comes to pass and unfolds in and with authenticity which fully saturates, as the passing moments, everyday modes of dwelling, and extends itself along with inauthenticity; conversely, since in-authenticity de-velops in, with, and out of authenticity and envelopes the given potency to be, there stands before any Da-sein always already a possibility of the retrieval (Wiederholung) of the potency and of letting one another's life orient properly. A possibility remains outstanding for anyone to ignite a fire of care for the emergence of life and for belonging to the apriori past. Thus, we underline that the relation between authenticity and inauthenticity is not couched in an antagonistic opposition. Neither the Verfallen nor the Schuldigsein connotes tones of moral fallenness and condemnation in Being and Time. Let's return to the transcendence.
Heidegger names Da-sein as the mode of [our] being-"to-be-it-at-its-time" (Heidegger, 1985, 153). His designation of Da-sein interconnects thoroughly the way to be with the way to temporalize. We have mentioned that the German word erfahren indicates an experience of going all the way in and with the Sache. We have become aware of the inadequacies of thinking in terms of present-based time and its temporal
5 The word Benommenheit Heidegger uses to designate Da-sein's everyday comportment of absorption will be designated as a basic character of the non-human animal in a sense of alogon.
measure of before and after, language of substance and intentionality, and linearity of predicative grammar in order for us to become transparent with/in thrownness. How are we then to be our own time and how are we to own time? We shall now turn to Heidegger's conception of the primordial temporality and the notion of self-tradition (Sichuberlieferung) and proceed to discern how Heidegger attempts to rejoin authentic temporality and authentic historicity by avoiding a trap of the former to be the root upon which the latter rooted.
Some may misperceive Da-sein's self-transcendence as if Da-sein is an autonomous self-moving being. Da-sein's ek-sistence is always already moved (Bewegtheit) by the equiprimordial, not sequential, ecstases of time (Heidegger, 1996, 302, 321). As section 65 of Being and Time inscribes in the heading, temporality is the ontolog-ical meaning of care (Sorge) (Heidegger, 1996, 350). And yet, temporality cannot be said to be a "what" because it is not a being: "The phenomenon of toward., to., together with. reveal temporality as the ekstatikon par excellence. Temporality is the primordial "outside of itself" in and for itself. This we call the phenomena of future, having-been, and present, the ecstasies of temporality" (Heidegger, 1996, 302). Accordingly, the three ecstases give the sens of temporalization (Zeitigung) for Da-sein's existential structures (understanding, disposition, discourse and fallenness): the future as ahead-of-itself and anticipation for understanding, the having-been for disposition, and the present for discourse and falling. They give the direction of a "whereto" of path breaking, and chart a horizontal scheme and by their unitary release open something like a horizon (Heidegger, 1996, 333).
Since each temporalization carries out enrapturing in and of itself, the future, the having-been, and the present have in themselves a wholeness (Heidegger, 1996, 321). Each ecstasis does not derive from the other, and yet as a constitutive player of the unity of temporality, each ecstasis becomes de-distanced and mutually co-dependent. Thus, the enrapt unity of temporality is not "a simple 'primordial ground'" (Heidegger, 1996, 124). To make the matter further perplexing, he underscores that primordial time is the future, despite stating that the three ecstases appear to carry an equal weight and value in "'the work'" (Zeitigung) of time (Zeit)" (Dastur, 1990, 67). This giving the future a primacy of time draws a decisive marker of transition in Being and Time. Heidegger states:
.Da-sein can come toward itself at all in its ownmost possibility and perdure the possibility as possibility in this letting-itself-come-toward-itself, that is, that it exists. Let-ting-come-toward-itself that purdures the eminent possibility is the primordial phenomenon of the future. If authentic or inauthentic being-toward-death belongs to the being of Da-sein, this is possible only as futural..., the coming in which Da-sein comes toward
itself in its ownmost potentiality-of-being. Anticipation makes Da-sein authentically fu-tural in such a way that anticipation itself is possible only in that Da-sein, as existing, always already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its being in general. .Only because Da-sein in general is as I am-having-been, can it come futurally toward itself in such a way that it comes-back. Authentically futural Da-sein is authentically having-been [...]. In a way, having-been arises from future." (Heidegger, 1996, 299)
Future is no longer a not-yet-actualized-now nor a past, bygone now. In and through the originary movement of unified rapture, "the present 'arises' from or is held by a future that has-been," and Heidegger calls this unitary primordial phenomenon "temporality" (Heidegger, 1996, 300). In other words, ecstatic temporality is the apriori past of the present-oriented world-time and the ekstatikon of temporality pulses and animates at the heart of time. Primordial temporality is co-originary with world-time; the latter dissimulates the former (Derrida, 2016, 267). Rapturous maturation of the three ec-stases opens the Da of Da-sein and of the world, which means both time and Da-sein are finite. "As historical, Da-sein is possible only on the basis of temporality. Temporality temporalizes itself in the ecstatic-horizonal unity of its raptures" (Heidegger, 1996, 362). Neither images of eternity and God nor narratives which are transcendent to the ekstatikon of temporality are there. Equiprimordial ecstatic temporality leads Heidegger to depart from the legacy of time passed on by St. Augustine (Confessions, Book XI), Kant's I-think and the transcendental schematism of imagination, Hegel's absolute spirit, and Husserl's living present. If a rapturous and carefree self-loss of temporality makes possible Da-sein's ek-sistence, how can we mortals find the necessary nexus for a wholeness of life stretched between birth and death?
Heidegger lets us find the hold by resolutely taking over the ownmost possibility of death and by affirming the ownmost facticity of originary thrownness. How? As we shall see, it involves a tautological retrieval of the equiprimordial (gleichursprünglish) temporality and a resolute turning that corresponds to the rapturous self-disclaiming movement of temporalization. In the tautological turning of re-moving the primordial time and moving with it, authenticity takes place as becoming transparent to the being-thrown with no-ground of self-certainty and yet thrown with immeasurable possibilities and absolute freedom. There is no hold other than the ecstatic temporality that Da-sein has in a world to turn to for the discovery of a possible solution to how to own a wholeness of its fragmentary, finite life. The way of attaining authentic self-transparency (Heidegger, 1996, 299) shifts a route from understanding to disposition and takes a form of reticent attestation to Da-sein's self-constancy (Selbstständigkeit) of nullity or no-self ground which Heidegger calls "being-guilty" (Schuldigsein)
(Heidegger, 1996, 282). For we notice that the call of conscience, Angst, Vorlaufen of being-toward-death, and the moment of anticipatory resoluteness are configured in the middle voiced turning so as to turn around the axis of ensnarement (inauthentic-ity) and enrapturement (authenticity) of there-being.
We notice that ecstatic temporality enables Heidegger to interlace the counter-moments of living and dying, calling forth and calling back, or running ahead and running back in an imitation (mimesis) of the equiprimordial rapture of time. Call of conscience, anxiety, and the moment of resoluteness come to pass, all of sudden, out of nowhere and without a voice (Heidegger, 1996, 338) and hits Da-sein (Heidegger, 1996, 186). The radical passivity of Da-sein pervades these experiences. There is no show of phenomenality in these crucial nexuses during which Da-sein receives back resolutely and takes over as "mine" the ownmost no-relational possibility of death and on the basis of the future Da-sein retrieves authentic possibility to be, that is, the being-thrown, and becomes authentic "what it already was inauthentic" (Das-tur, 1990, 68). By intimating the opposite ends-birth and death- of non-belonging, Dasein stretches and is stretched (erstreckt sich selbst) in consonance with the rapturous stretching (Sicherstrecken ) of primordial temporality and comes to stand wholly in non-belonging (Schuldigsein) (Heidegger, 1996, 357-358).This movement of self-stretching is a middle-voiced re-moving with the sameness of primordial temporality. Da-sein comes back to own the selfsame thrown potency and "the power of its finite freedom" (Heidegger, 1996, 351). Da-sein comes to own its historicity.
Da-sein's attaining authentic self-transparency on the basis of the future gives back possibilities of reformulation to the cultural heritage wherein Da-sein finds itself thrown and nurtured; thus, Da-sein's retrieval takes over at once both Da-sein's own chosen possibility and the possibility pre-given by the past others of a common cultural memory and practice (Heidegger, 1996, 351). Since Da-sein is intrinsically Mitsein, Da-sein's resolute attestation of "being-guilty" opens Da-sein's responsiveness to the other in such a way that Da-sein frees one another from "what already was inau-thentic." In the moment (Augenblick) of insight, sending a gift of letting-be to the other in all spatio-temporal directions happens. Resolute Da-sein is enabled to respond to a deeper call of respect and solicitude for one another's thrown finitude; such responsiveness is purely pre-sentiment e-merging spontaneously prior to personal identity and prior to the heritage of divine laws, civil laws, and human rights. Da-sein's re-orienting itself in the past of ek-sistence and belonging properly to non-belonging lets Da-sein enown (ereignen) its "most proper possibility (die eigenste Möglichkeit) of the impossibility" and transfigures every Da-sein into a mortal who assumes and attests the living (phenomenological) truth (aletheia) of non-appearance beyond the human
subject's judgment, logics, and question (Heidegger, 1996, 242). Here, we see the trace of what Heidegger has named his phenomenology, namely as the "phenomenology of the inapparent". The intimate relation between the possibility and the impossibility of death brings back also the rhythm of the lost middle voice to our ear, the "nontransitive" step ("a-pas") of which the " -ance" of différance remembers (Derrida, 1972, 9). In anticipation of death, every Jemeinigkeit is let to stand in neither the subjective nor objective position; no one is reduced to a situation of other than itself. Freely giving-and-taking of the possibility to be itself thereby freely sending to one another nothing other than a possibility of letting "be-it-at-its-time" means to give a gift of authentic historicity. And yet, as we shall see shortly, Derrida loosens the knot of death, language, and Da-sein which bears a marker of the border between the mortal Da-sein and the living beings of non-Dasein and animals in Heidegger's question of Being.
In the bare roots of transcendence, Da-sein assists the other's historizing (Geschehen) and affirms one another's singularity and difference by giving anyone equal shares of freedom and respect for the ability to be. Da-sein sends each other a gift of self-stretching (sich-erstreckung). At the same time, the responsive letting-be lets the world dawn with bottomless reserve of freedom, resistance, and possibilities for re-creation of the world as a common place of dwelling by mortals who are mindful of the necessity of crossing over the Present as and from the past of the future, and thus we find the necessity of aligning our history of the Present with the inapparent non-historical dimension. The middle of the middle voice as well as that of the neutrality of Da-sein stretches to draw a space of inviolable freedom and of originary kinship (Geschlecht) among the finite beings and surprisingly brings back a monumental importance to the heritage through a task of destructuring.
And yet, as we have seen, Da-sein is not, in a final analysis, the carrier of the historical repetition (Erwidert) and transference of the intellectual and spiritual heritage to which it belongs with the other. Authentically, there is no eigen in the authentic historicity of Da-sein (Derrida, 2016, 164-165). For it is the unified rapture of the equi-primordial temporalization of the three ecstases that engenders without a telos, without a return, a fire of life to be possible and hands itself down itself from the future (á-venir) which is assumed as the past of the future by Da-sein's transcendence to a historical horizon of the present. Heidegger names Sichüberlieferung this self-stretching disposition of time with simultaneity of loss and gain, termination and opening of life, that conditions the very possibility of a self-showing occurrence of life. Heidegger designates "fate" (Sichicksal) for the essential character of the self-tradition of which and upon which Da-sein's authentic historicity and its anticipatory resoluteness and a history in general turn to recoil either in an tautological imitation of bearing
together with the other that comes to linger in one's fold as lingering with the other in the unifying emergence or in a dissimulation without an enigmatic simultaneity of passing-arising in coming to presence of thing. Heidegger states:
Only a being that is essentially futural in its being so that it can let itself be thrown back upon its factical There, free for its death and shattering itself on it, that is, only a being that, as futural, is equiprimordially having-been, can hand down to itself its inherited possibility, take over its own thrownness and be in the Moment for "its time." Only authentic temporality that is at the same time finite makes something like fate, that is, authentic historicity, possible. (Heidegger, 1996, 352)
Although Heidegger is able to de-present and de-such the present oriented senses of life and the world in Being and Time, his privileging of human Da-sein in the question of the meaning of being unveils a remnant of humanism. We have indicated that Da-sein's ownness in the account of authentic historicity comes to be overturned and ends up deferred due to the notion of self-tradition. The text never intends to establish an ethics and yet on the bases of the middle-voiced conception of self-tradition, something like the "original ethics" of which Heidegger talks about in Letter on Humanism is already unterwegs, though in germination. For he wonders "if and how the being of animal is constituted by a time" (Heidegger, 1996, 317). Why not let our animal others be themselves at their time? How can we learn to think, to speak of, and to relate with proper sensibility to our animal others, not just as their speakers and/or using the label of asinanity (bêtise) to discriminate others of our human kind? Are we as torch bearers of the tradition called philosophy called to make a stretch of Heidegger's different legein? If the life of non-human animals can be understood by neither categories which apply to Vorhandenheit nor to Da-sein, what then is their life and living really? They are not pure things at hand, not tool-like instruments, nor existence like Da-sein. How are we to let the unknown other speak on their terms and let them be? In a lineage of Heideggerian care, we should like to turn now to Derrida's 2008 essay The Animal That Therefore I Am and see how Derrida carries forward the Heideggerian question of Being and of language beyond a limit of humanism. Let us witness a moment of historical repetition.
In The Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida gives us his neologism "Animot." By this word, Derrida invites us to a way of self-overcoming of the rational animal. So, what is "animot"? This word is made of two different French words, the plural of animal (animaux) and the word "mot" for word (Derrida, 2008a, x). When written, it evidently betrays that it is fabricated by a human animal (i.e., Jacques Derrida). When spoken, it has the plural animaux; when heard within the general singular, this word evokes unaccountable diversity of animals which our long-standing usage of "the animal" has cov-
ered over (Derrida, 2008a, x). Derrida seeks to displace the monolithic category of "the animal" (Derrida, 2008a, 23) and to help him and us become aware of a self-violence and disregard for the life of the other which we unaware are or not, committing whenever we speak and write the word "animal." He lets us redefine autobiography as "the trace of the living for itself, being for itself, the auto-affection as memory or archive of living" (Derrida, 2008a, 47). With an "animot, the "I" of the autos" loses its clear voice of ipseity and speaks of multiple voices of the living animal kinds. Here, we have a very different approach to the "I am" (Je suis) than that of Da-sein oriented in an "I am" of homo and in a Jeweilig-Jemeinigkeit in the quest-ion of authenticity and of self-overcoming of representational thought, language, and sensitivity.
"Ecce Animot," says Derrida (Derrida, 2008a, 41). In the history of Western philosophy, the singular limit between the human and the animal has been kept and circulated in the realization of human ways to be in the world. As a philosopher, Derrida is keenly aware that no philosophers in the heritage have reflected on their presumption of humanity and their blind use of "the general singular that is the animal" and voiced against the violent way of gathering, homogenizing, and grouping-together of myriad lives of things (ta panta) in the world under the general singular name "animal." Like the word pharmakon, the word "animal" has functioned to make flourish a body of communal and individual belonging by denying, weeding off, or repressing what we humans perceive most threatens living and by using the poisonous for auto-immunity. In this process of self-immunization for the sake of human life, we have forgotten what living is and who we and others really are. We humans are the event of history. If history essentially belongs to the future as Heidegger has discovered through the question of the meaning of being via Da-sein, we must meditate on the originary given of our animal others on the basis of the future. Do we who believe to be the authors of life story and the researchers and compilers of historiographies know the density of universal self-loss attached to the lightness of a word-pair of "humanity" and "animality"?
Derrida does not aim at a restoration of the relationship between the human and the animal by a simple reversal of the opposition by giving back to the animal the deprived qualities-speech, reason, experience of death, mourning, cuisine, clothing, lying, laughing, crying, pretense of pretense, respect, technics, institutions, culture, and so forth; a list could go on. According to Derrida, the canon of philosopher-authors from "Aristotle to Heidegger, from Descartes to Kant, Levinas, and Lacan" (Derrida, 2008a, 27) has repeatedly denied these qualities to animal. But, those qualities and capacities are not so much a matter of metaphysical opposition than a question of difference. Thus, let me cite the nucleus of Derrida's critical response (Erwidert): "It also means asking whether what calls itself human has the right rigorously to attribute
to man, which means therefore to attribute to himself, what he refuses the animal, and whether he can ever possess the pure, rigorous, indivisible concept, as such, of that attribution" (Derrida, 2008a, 135).
It is the presumption of humanity that obliterates our tracking and following of finite life with the other. To be able to say and write "Here is who I am" without anxiety, we philosophers are called to remember the impossible Heideggerian truth that no self, no life, no writing comes to take place before the world and without passing through the generous sending of the finite other and of time's self-tradition in the coming of beings. In the resonance of the no-word of differance and in the exteriority of archi-writing in the heritage of Being and Time, all sorts of animals appear to speak of "animot" and stand out of the general category. Animot is a letter beyond humanism. In the resounding of animot, all animals are let to come to a-rise from a future of memory.
Acknowledgements. I would like to dedicate this article to Dr. Harriet Wilkins in honor of friendship.
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