CC BY
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Section 3. History and archaeology
Great Emblem of Ukraine”, the basis whereof was practically without changes formed by a design developed by employees of the Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in 1997. At this point, the project is under consideration of representatives of the special-purpose committee for state building and local self-government of the Supreme Council of Ukraine [12, 18].
Thus, during the XX century, together with the attempts to restore the Ukrainian statesmanship and formation of national symbols, there arose the issue of the part of Cossack traditions in such process. For the first time, such problem appeared in the era of the Central Council, but its representatives rejected using the coat of arms of Zaporizhian Host as a central element of new state heraldry. Much greater development was reached by such process in the reign of Hetman P. P. Skoropadsky, but according to archive sources, the great and privy state seals depicting the Cossack with musket, due to change of political regimens, remained only in project in the end. When the Directorate’s government came to power, the issue of restoring the tradition of using the emblem
of Ukrainian Cossack State came up in the course of reunification of West-Ukrainian People’s Republic and the Ukrainian People’s Republic. The Cossack with musket had to become one of the symbols of the united Ukrainian lands. However, just like in the previous period, the project was adopted only on paper.
Development of the process of including the Cossack with musket in state heraldry started anew after proclamation of our state’s independence. According to the Constitution of Ukraine, it is this element, which shall make a component part of the Great National Emblem of the country. Employees of the Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine developed a project, but as it gave rise to numerous remarks of both, specialists and common citizens, the draft law on the Great National Emblem of Ukraine still remains at the stage of review by the Special-Purpose Committee of the Supreme Council. Thus, just like in the period of the 1917-1921 national-liberation competitions, the issue of using the Cossack with musket in the state emblem still remains unsolved.
References:
1. Волга Л. Чому так важко народжуеться Великий Державний Герб?//Урядовий кур’ер. - № 80-81, - 2008.
2. Гай-Нижник П. П. З icropii створення державного герба та печатки Украшсько1 держави Павла Скоропадського//Ар-хiви Украши. - № 6, - 2001.
3. Гломозда К. Укра'шська нацюнальна символжа: походження, традици, доля. - К.: Академгя наук Украшсько' РСР, - 1989.
4. Гломозда К. Ю. кторичш геpбовi в^дзнаки та пpапоpовi барви Украши//Укра'шський ютор. журнал. - № 4-5, - 1990.
5. Гречило А. Проекти герба та печатки Укра'шсь^' держави Павла Скоропадського//Укра'шський аpхеогpафiчний щоpiчник. - Вип. 12, - 2007.
6. Грушевський М. Про геpбовi знаки Украши/М. Грушевський//Народная воля. - № 153, - 1917.
7. Дмитренко М., Савчук Ю. Великий i Малий Державш Герби Украши//Свггогляд. - № 1, - 2007.
8. Дорошенко Д. I. кторш Украши 1917-1923 рр. - Ужгород, - 1932.
9. Конституцгя Украши. - Х.: Фолю, - 2014.
10. Мозалевський В., Нарбут Г. До питання про державний герб Украши//Наше минуле. - Ч. 1, - 1918.
11. Про створення украшсь^' нацiонально-деpжавноi символжи у роки визвольноi боротьби (1917-1920 рр.)//Укра-шський юторичний журнал. - № 4, - 1999.
12. Рябоконь А. Уряд пропонуе Радi затвердити Великий герб Украши/А. Рябоконь//Газета по-украшськк - № 863, - 2009.
13. Сергшчук В. I. Нацюнальна символжа Украши - К.: Веселка, - 1992.
14. Цегельский Л. До питання украшського державного гербу//Украшське слово. - № 807, - 1918.
15. Цегельский Л. До питання украшського державного гербу//Укра'шське слово. - № 811, - 1918.
16. Центральний державний аpхiв вищих оргашв влади та управлшня Украши (далi ЦДАВО). - Ф. 1063. - Оп. 1. - Сп. 6.
17. ЦДАВОВ. - Ф. 1064. - Оп. 1. - Сп. 94.
Dalibor M. Elezovic, University of Mitrovica, Ph. D, Department of History, the Faculty of Philosophy E-mail: [email protected]
Seifert’s explication of historicism and the subject of research of historical science
Abstract: This paper considers the interpretation of historicism and historical method that was given by a philosopher of science, Helmut Seifert. For this philosopher, the subject of study of historical science is comprehensive, and
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Seifert’s explication of historicism and the subject of research of historical science
does not refer only to political history events, or the works of great men, but it refers to state institutions, churches, legal and economic systems, different languages that have become historical, all types of records and testimonies. The task of a historian (whom he compares with a criminologist), is to successfully discover the facts of the past, even when historical sources do not present them directly.
Keywords: historical science, historicism, Helmut Seifert (1927-2000), methodology, historical method.
History as a science develops in accordance with the social conditions of the epoch in which the individual creates, and thus, the interpretation of history is a process that lasts, and to which philosophers of history pay constant attention. One of the philosophers of science who improved the interpretation of history and the subject of its research is Helmut Seifert (1927-2000), a famous German philosopher and a researcher of scientific methodology. He is an author of several valuable studies of philosophy of science and hermeneutics. His work “Introduction to the Philosophy of Science,” which discusses the methodology of the humanities, historical method, and hermeneutics, was published in several editions, even after his death [1, 2].
Let us begin with Seifert’s interpretation of historicism and his question: “What is historicism?” Considering the basic assumption of historicism on respecting the autonomy of the past [10, 28], Seifert enters into the interpretation of his-toricism in a practical manner. If we asked a friend whether he would rather spend his holidays on an East Frisian island or eat rice chicken, he would probably look at us puzzled, and it would be similar with our next question, what he appreciated more: Mozart or an Airedale Terrier. If he even dignified that with a response, it would be something like this: the stated things cannot be compared whatsoever. All those things are nice in their own way — in fact, one could enjoy them all at the same time: for example, on vacation one could eat chicken fricassee or scratch a dog, and at the same time listen to Mozart’s symphony in G minor. By giving us this answer, our friend, without being aware of it, would explain to us what “historicism” is [1, 63].
Seifert states another option, instead of mentioned pleasant things — beautiful places for vacation, delicious food, precious family, good music — that we compare what we consider to be “historic equalities”: Roman and Prussian history, the characters and works of Alexander and Napoleon, Bach’s and Beethoven’s music, the Catholic and Protestant German tradition, and so on. Then, according to him, the thesis of historicism is as follows: all such historical equalities are mutually of “equal value.” He concludes that evaluating them mutually would be just as pointless as evaluating (comparing) a tourist destination with a good meal, or a noble dog with noble music. This seems somewhat acceptable, as long as it is about things that have nothing in common and therefore cannot be in direct competition with each other [1, 63].
Seifert potentiates the obviousness of problematization of this question when “similar” things should be compared in some way: two centuries as a whole, two important politicians, the works of two great composers, and so on. For example, when one hears the names “Bach” and “Beethoven,” he might be tempted to say: “Well, Beethoven lived a hundred years
after Bach, in that period music could have developed to such an extent that one could say that Beethoven’s music is better than Bach’s” — roughly, in the sense that a modern stereo system is better than an old gramophone. Another observer of history could, however, say: “What the ancient Greeks and Romans achieved is exemplary even for us today. It has never been achieved again, and we can do nothing better than to be oriented towards the models, which the ancient people established in politics, science and art.” Seifert is certain that understanding diversity, and equal values, as well (everything we have encountered throughout history), is not self-implied. This is a very late fruit of human insight, and for a long time — or rather, always, even in times of the seemingly inviolable rule of historicism — such conception of historical was in a tough competition with other conceptions of history [1, 64].
The main question of our interest in Seifert’s introduction to the philosophy of science is his interpretation of the subject of research of historical science. In historical science, the historical method is dominant, while other methods are included in it or support it. In addition, some general and specific methods and procedures occur as the methods of cognition, the logical basis of scientific research, whereas the basic research method is historical. Even Kant and Hegel (the two most important representatives of German classical idealist philosophy), with their works, had the most powerful influence on the orientation and research interests of historians. Kant believed that the principal subject of historical research is the state, because only in the state and by the state, humanity can prosper. Historical science has obtained its confirmation in Kant’s notion that the past can be understood only if historical phenomena are examined in their evolution and by the greatest number of diverse historical evidences. The task of historians, according to Humboldt, consists in connecting the general and particular, basing their research on specific historical methods [2, 363].
Seifert writes that the subject of research of historical science is “non-declaratively paraphrased as a product of mankind.” Thus, it would include not only known unique external events of political history, in terms of traditional teaching — understood as works of great people, but also, for example: institutions such as the state, church, legal and economic systems, as well as various languages that have become historical, all kinds of records, such as diplomas, acts, bills, notes, diaries, letters, devices, buildings, works of art of all genres, various literary and scientific manifestations — including things that are not “products of mankind” but so-called “nature” [1, 69-70].
According to Seifert, what most people through the usual teaching of history receive is a stereotype: that history is the sum (whole) of “histories,” external events, and works of great men. This understanding does not come by itself: moreover,
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Section 3. History and archaeology
it is somehow imposed by science. In fact, the specialization of sciences has led to the state in which some scientists are prone to a narrowed conception of “historical science" As one of the problems of historical science, Seifert states the fact that the term “historical science” usually implies only a part of “historical sciences" In fact, it implies historical sciences studying “political history” and fields that are immediately adjacent to them, such as history of the church, history of law, economic and social history. According to this narrowed sense, “historical science” does not include so-called “philologies” and the science of art, i. e. those disciplines that concern with history, languages, literature, and art — the history of science, technology, medicine, and so on [1, 70-71].
According to Seifert, even some fields whose content directly belongs to the history of science have seceded from “historical science” in the narrow sense. Those are: chronology, the science of sources, paleography, the study of documents and acts, shields, seals and coins. There is a controversy here: do these fields of study still fall under “historical science” — or are they actually independent sciences? Obviously, this does not have much in common with our broad understanding of “history of science.” How is it possible that, for example, paleography and the study of acts are not a part of historical science, but the history of medicine and the history of art are? [1,71].
According to Mirjana Gross, in historical science today, the term method has a different meaning; there are various types of methods: biographical, comparative, typological, method of generalization, quantitative, causal, intentional, and generic, as well as the method of understanding and narration. She concludes that “ [...] the term historical method means either one of these procedures, or all of them together” [2, 363-364].
Such narrowed conception of historical sciences, which does not include the doctrine of sources and of laws, will of course have fatal consequences. Seifert states that “naive understanding of students, who think that “history” is what the history books retell about Bismarck” “are satisfied with the finished product of presenting a historical theme.” In fact, “history” is not composed of already told stories that only have to be retold. Rather, “history” is an entire contexture of manmade products, which we have to reconstruct on our own by using the available material, critical analysis, and interpretation [1, 71].
For Seifert, history is not what the writers of history: annalists, chroniclers, biographers, memoirists, historiographers, novelists, authors of textbooks, present in mutually dependent commentary. Rather, history is the past (all the way until the point that we call the present), which we have to decipher from millions of different testimonies — regardless of the fact whether interdependent stories exist for a particular field or not. Ahasver von Brandt depicts this state of affairs precisely with the following words: “We would know almost nothing about medieval economic history if we were only referred to (retold) sources” [1, 71-72].
The practice favors Seifert’s consideration of historical research. It is known that, in research, nothing can be done without the analysis and synthesis, abstraction, concretiza-tion, generalization, and other logical-cognitive methods and procedures, including qualitative research. Even Marc Bloch believes that, in studying history, there are often moments when this study requires an interdisciplinary approach [7, 126; 6, 400-401; 9, 75-78; 10, 331; 4, 20-21]. According to Jürgen Kocka, in modern historical science, there is a need for the use of other complementary methods [3, 17-18].
Seifert’s comparison of methods of studying history is particularly illustrative when he compares them with the work of detectives from crime novels. Accordingly, the perpetrator does not talk about what he did, at best he remains silent. In an unfavorable event, he tries to mislead his pursuers by false statements and fabricated traces. The detective’s task is to gradually reconstruct the crime process, following the smallest clues, traces, signs and indications — always being aware of the fact that someone wants to trick him. Seifert emphasizes that a historian works similarly. His task is to successfully discover the facts of the past, even when they are not directly presented to him by historical witnesses. Namely, he examines his material even in case of problems whose solutions, in advance, are not subject to the purpose of the material [1, 72].
Seifert’s interpretations of the subject of research of historical science are still in use, and his contributions to the philosophy of history and historical methodology have influenced the development of modern historiography.
References:
1. Seiffert Helmut. Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie 2. Zweiter Band: Geisteswissenschaftliche Methoden: Phänomenologie - Hermeneutik und historische Methode - Dialektik. - München: C. H. Beck, - 2006.
2. Gross Mirjana. Suvremena historiografija: korijeni, postignuca, traganja. Zagreb: Novi liber, Zavod za hrvatsku povijest Filozofskog fakulteta Sveucilista u Zagrebu, - 2001.
3. Kocka Jürgen. Sozialgeschichte in Deutschland seit 1945 Aufstieg - Krise - Perspektiven, Gesprächskreis Geschichte (Bd. 47), - Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Historisches Forschungszentrum, - 2002., - P. 1-37.
4. ДелетиЬ Здравко. Истраживаае истор^е. - К. Митровица. - 2014. - 345 p.
5. Elezovic Dalibor. Historians in The Age of Digitization of Archival Documents, The First International conference on development of historical and political sciences in Eurasia, 21th September, - 2014, - Vienna: “East West” Association for Advanced Studies and Higher Education GmbH, - P. 8-10.
6. Suvakovic Uros. On Exceeding of Division for Qualitative and Quantitative Researches in Conteporary Scientific Methodology. Srpska politicka misao, - no. 4, - 2011, - P. 395-420.
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The criticizm of the policy of “militray communism” applied in Soviet Armenia by the social-political thought...
7. Susnjic Buro. Metodologija: kritika nauke. - Beograd: Cigoja stampa, - 2005.
8. МилиЬ BojHH. Социолошки метод. - Београд: Завод за уцбенике и наставна средства, - 1978.
9. Bloch Marc. Apologija historije ili zanat povjesnicara. - Zagreb: Srednja Europa, - 2008.
10. Тош Цои. У трагану за исторром. Цилеви, методи и нови правци у проучавану савремене исторре. - Београд: Clio, - 2008.
11. Бродел Фернан. Списи о исторри, - Београд: Српска книжевна задруга, - 1992.
12. Браjзах Ернст. Историографра: стари век, средни век, ново доба. - Београд: Clio, - 2008.
Stepanyan Khachatur Rostomi, Candidate of historical sciences, ASPU after Kh. Abovyan, Docent of the Chair of the History of Armenia E-maij: [email protected]
The criticizm of the policy of “militray communism” applied in Soviet Armenia by the social-political thought of Armenian Diaspora (1920-1930s)
Abstract: The social-political thought of Diaspora highly criticized the policy of militray commuism of the newly sovietized Armenia in 1920-1930s. The reapplication of cruel experience that was failed in Russia was a real nonsense for Armenia that was destroyed after the wars. Moreover, the explanations for the expropriations have no justification.The policy of military communism in Armenia that was facing serious social-political period also had its consequences.The representatives of the social-political thought of Diaspora were of the same opinion that it was the main reason for February revolution.
Keywords: Soviet Armenia, militray communism, Bolshevik, social-political thought of Armenian Diaspora.
On November 29, 1920 after the defeats of the Armenian army in the Turkish-Armenian war Armenian militray revolutionary committee formed in Baku entered Ijevan accompanied by the Soviet army and announced the downfall of Dashnak Government and the Sovietization of Armenia. Armenian Revolutionary Committee together with the help of Soviet Russia promised to restore the country’s destroyed economy and build a new life.
On December 2, 1920 the treaty of Yerevan was signed between Russian SFSR authorized representitive Boris Le-gran and representatives of the Armenian government Dro and Hambarcum Terteryan. The treaty provides a peacful transition of the power from the Dashnkas to the Bolsheviks. The principles of the transition of the power were established as follows: The power in Armenia was temporarily given to the military revolutionary committee till the congress of councils which included 5 communists and 2 left-dashnak representatives; the members of Armenian Revolutionary Federation and non-bolshevik socialist party would not be subjected to persecution for their earlier struggle against the communist party and the Soviet Russian guaranteed the independence of Soviet Armenia [1, 101-102]. However, the newly formed Bolshevik party didn’t fulfill its obligations.
Armenian communists didn’t have their own development plan for the country so they repeated the Russian experience and the most vivid example of it was the practice of “military communism" policy.
Military communism was based on rationing of food stuff. Only some part of the food stuff would be left for the villagers (for eating and as a seed), and the rest would be seized for state needs. All the factories, workshops and means of production would be nationalized. Despite the fact that the policy of military communism was not justified in Russia the newly formed Armenin Bolshevik government decided to apply it in Armenia [2, 21].
Expropriations were carried out in villages with the direct participation of people’s commissariat and local revolutionary committee for the reason of helping the Soviet army. The central committee of the Communist party of Armenia urged the villagers to deliver bread for the Red army with their own vehicles [3].
It should be noted that there was no consensus of opinion in the policy of military communism of the communist government of Armenia. The president of the Armenian revolutionary committee Sargis Kasyan was against applying the economic policy of Russia in Armenia.
Despite the internal disputes Armenian Bolsheviks started to apply the policy of military communism that had failed in Russia. Expropritaions were handled in the roughest way without taking into account the peculiarities of the country and the people. Armenian communists applied various methods and techniques of ravage and plunder within a short period under the name of the so-called expropriation.
In the social-political frames of the Armenian diaspora the issue of militray communism applied in Armenia became
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