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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
George TARKHAN-MOURAVI
Co-Director of the Institute for Policy Studies
(Tbilisi, Georgia).
SECURITY THREATS AND DE-SECURITIZATION OF CONFLICTS IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS
Abstract
This paper considers the prospects for and factors of conflict transformation in the Central Caucasus. It discusses such issues as the psycho-social roots of
the conflicts, (de)securitization, inter/intra-community dialog, and national projects as the key factors influencing the prospects for conflict transformation.
Introduction
The violent ethnotemtorial conflicts in the Central Caucasus1 are among the most unfortunate and distressing developments of the late Soviet and post-Soviet period. Apart from the many casualties, destroyed families, mass displacement, and ruined economy, these conflicts continue to pose the biggest threat to peace and prosperity in the region, while peaceful resolution of the conflicts remains a formidable challenge for those state actors who suffer from this ongoing no war/no peace situation and seek resolution or at least some improvement. However, there are actors and factors, both internal and external, that work toward preserving the status quo and toward further fragmentation of the region into opposing and irreconcilable entities. Since the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war and Russia's (as well as a few other remote states' and statelets') recognition of Abkhazia and South Os-setia, the situation has stabilized, on the one hand, while solutions are now even more remote than before, on the other.
However, we live today in situation that is full of unpredictable possibilities and mixed threats and opportunities that may change the region (and the world) in the mid-term perspective. It would be useful to consider the main threats to stability in the region, noting at the same time that some of the threats are paradoxically combined with opportunities and possibilities.
Security Threats and Related Processes
In the short term, the biggest threats to regional security are Russia's possible intervention in Georgia, the probability of which rose after Putin returned to Russia's helm as full-fledged president
1 With the author's consent, the term "the Central Caucasus" is used in this article instead of the widely-used term "the Southern Caucasus" (for more detail, see: E. Ismailov, "New Regionalism in the Caucasus: A Conceptual Approach,"
The Caucasus & Globalization, Vol. 1 (1), 2006).
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and may rise further after the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014, or in the wake of possible uncontrolled resumption of hostilities over Nagorno-Karabakh, in spite of the evident unwillingness of any of the sides to restart a conflict that cannot produce any positive results for anyone. Another factor that may have an impact on regional security in the short term is possible military action (by Israel and/or the U.S.) against Iran's nuclear facilities, which will trigger a dangerous reaction and possible repercussions for the whole of Iran's neighborhood.
However, there are also emerging mid-term threats that need time to grow and develop, such as Russia's failure to pacify the Northern Caucasus, which is currently facing an emerging spiral of destabilization. The real risk is related to the possibility of the instability spreading further to the south and involving both Georgia and Azerbaijan. However, both Russia's withdrawal from the region and extensive military action not only entail additional risks for the Central Caucasus, but also the possibility that the Russian leadership will become more motivated to improve relations with its southern neighbors, Georgia in particular. Such scenarios are also linked to the additional risk of radical Islam gaining a stronger foothold in the region, whereby this could apply to both the Northern and Central Caucasus (Azerbaijan and to some extent Georgia). The situation in Iran may also develop in a dangerous direction, whether with regard to the growing tension with Azerbaijan over Caspian oil, its military cooperation with Israel, and the threat of the greater Azerbaijan project, or simply due to the existence of nuclear weapons in the neighborhood that may also trigger a nuclear arms race in the Greater Middle East. And of course we should not forget the non-traditional security threats that are growing in significance, such as international terrorism, cyber warfare, and, according to astonishing recent revelations by Russia's leadership, even prohibited biological weapons.2
All of the above processes and threats will have an imminent impact on the state of the existing conflicts in the Central Caucasus, not necessarily triggering a renewal in hostilities, but either heightening tension or, in some scenarios, making the parties in the conflict more eager to seek a compromise. In order to better understand the possible developments, it is worth briefly considering at least some of the processes taking place in and around the Central Caucasus. Although the detailed directions, time frames, and immediate outcomes of these processes remain dependent on a horde of different internal and external variables, still it is possible to consider the most important trends and possibilities. It is also worth adding that the increasing geopolitical importance of the Central Caucasus may generate elevated risks.
One of the key processes may be the imminent democratization of political life in all the Central Caucasian states. After initial democratization during the early post-independence period when certain tendencies developed toward authoritarianism (although to different degrees in each of the Central Caucasian states), there are now signs that all three countries will follow the global trend toward greater maturity of society and more democracy. This is linked to the increasing attraction of Western models of governance and the prospects for more integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, augmented by U.S. and EU polices in this area and respective "soft power." While in Georgia and Azerbaijan such tendencies are relatively explicit, Armenian society considers itself part of Western civilization, while the speed of its gradual shift toward the West is dependent on its relations with Turkey and Russia's potentially waning relative influence.
One of the important processes taking place in those conflicts where Russia's involvement is crucial is the gradual weakening of the siege psychology among the population due to guaranteed
2 For example, on 22 March, 2012 Russian Defence Minister Serdyukov declared in the presence of prime minister and president-elect Putin his agency's intention to develop "genetic weapons" among other non-traditional armaments, this being in striking contradiction to The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (which, ironically, entered into force around the same date—37 years ago, on 26 March, 1975) (see: "V.V. Putin provel soveshchanie po realizatsii zadach, postavlen-nykh v ego predvybornykh statiakh v kachestve kandidata na post Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii," 22 March, 2012, available at [http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/18490/]).
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Russian protection, on the one hand, and growing irritation with Russia itself, which is demanding more and more concessions (especially in asset-rich Abkhazia) and intervening in all areas of political and economic life, on the other. Some signs of such irritation can be seen in the failure at the elections both in Abkhazia and South Ossetia of all the presidential candidates nominated by the Russian government (Shamba, Bibilov, and Medoev). There was an even stronger public reaction in Abkhazia to Russia's demands to transfer it property rights to the most valuable health resorts and other assets, to move the border south so that Russia could incorporate territories such as the Aibga settlement, and to close the Russian military health resort, which would lead to mass unemployment. Other powerful irritants include different interpretations of history, specifically Russia's role in the eviction of the Abkhazian and Circassian muhajirs, or statements by Russian officials and pro-government journalists about Russian-Abkhazian problems (deprivation of Russian citizens of property rights, corruption and criminality, etc.). While protests are more muted in South Ossetia, there are already indications that dissatisfaction with Russia's de facto rule there is causing disappointment and frustration. The last blow was dealt by the appointment of Russian "special representatives" to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, notorious Krasnodar governor Tkachev and North Ossetian leader Mamsurov, respectively, which was considered a mock to the presumed sovereignty of the two territories.
Still another important development relates to what is happening in Russia itself and its relations with other big actors—the U.S., China, the EU, and India. Much will depend on what happens in the Russian economy and society in the next couple of decades, particularly with respect to demographic degradation,3 social unrest caused by the frustrated middle class,4 and the imminent increase in unrest in the Northern Caucasus.5 As already noted above, the Northern Caucasus is also a strong factor of unpredictability, not in the sense of what will happen, but rather—when. And of course, still another important factor of relative unpredictability is the notoriously volatile oil prices that have an enormous impact on the economic and therefore also social situation in Russia, since its economy is increasingly dependent on the export of raw materials. However, apart from the internal problems that Russia may experience in the years to come, tension is emerging in its relations with other countries. Many experts are pessimistic about the future of the "reset" in relations between Russia and the U.S./ NATO, particularly in light of the disagreements over European missile defense that led to worrying Russian threats to move tactical missiles to Kaliningrad along with other actions that cause serious concern in the West. Still another unknown is Russia's future relations with its southeastern neighbor—China, which, notwithstanding the claims of mutual friendliness, represents a looming threat to Russia's geopolitical influence and even security, even after Russia ceded the disputed territories (a total of 337 square kilometers along the Russian-Chinese border) back in 2005.6
Much has been said about the possible risks to Central Caucasian security related to the possible military action by Israel and/or the U.S. against Iran's nuclear facilities. These threats may be created
3 "Since 1992, Russia's human numbers have been progressively dwindling. This slow motion process now taking place in the country carries with it grim and potentially disastrous implications that threaten to recast the contours of life and society in Russia, to diminish the prospects for Russian economic development, and to affect Russia's potential influence on the world stage in the years ahead" (N. Eberstadt, "Drunken Nation: Russia's Depopulation Bomb," World Affairs, Spring 2009) (see also: N. Eberstadt, Russia's Peacetime Demographic Crisis: Dimensions, Causes, Implications, The National Bureau of Asian Research, May 2010; St. Sievert, S. Zakharov, and R. Klingholz, The Waning World Power, Das Berlin-Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung, 2011).
4 See: L. Ovcharova, "Russia's Middle Class at the Centre or on the Periphery of Russian Politics," ISS, 16 February, 2012, available at [http://www.iss.europa.eu/fr/publications/detail-page/article/russias-middle-class-at-the-centre-or-on-the-periphery-of-russian-politics/]; C. Rice, "The Promise of Russia's Urban Middle Class," Washington Post, 9 March, 2012, available at [http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-russias-urban-middle-class-can-bring-an-end-to-putinism/2012/03/08/gIQA1FL1zR_story.html].
5 See, e.g.: A.C. Kuchins, M. Malarkey, S. Markedonov, "The North Caucasus: Russia's Volatile Frontier," CSIS, March 2011, available at [http://csis.org/files/publication/110321_Kuchins_NorthCaucasus_WEB.pdf].
6 [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=30445].
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not simply by the massive flows of refugees across borders that could destabilize the region, but might be related more seriously to Iran's actions against those states that are supportive of Western allies and Israel, particularly Azerbaijan and Georgia. The worsening of Iran-Azerbaijan relations found its recent expression in strengthened Azerbaijani-Israeli military cooperation, trade in armaments, and especially the latest news of Israelis gaining access to military airfields in Azerbaijan.7
Roots of the Conflicts
The processes briefly outlined above are having a profound influence on security in the Central Caucasus, a region that can justifiably be considered a "regional security complex" due to the interdependence among security, the economy, and politics in each of the three Central Caucasian states. It is therefore not surprising that these processes will have an even more profound impact on developments with respect to the three suspended conflicts—Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Osse-tia. Indeed, it is against the above-described background that the Central Caucasian conflicts exist and change, even although they may sometimes be labeled as frozen.
In order to better understand the direction of change, first let us discuss the key roots of these violent conflicts. Violence here has been generated, managed, exploited, and ultimately suspended in ethnopolitical antagonism, but not without external manipulation. However, the conflicts are developing and changing gradually and over time it may become even more difficult to withdraw the societies out of their state of conflict and set them on the road to peace.
Now, if we try to approximately describe the key causes of the conflicts in the region, we can assume that there are three main factors leading to conflict. These are fear, resentment, and hope. Let us try to consider these phenomena in more detail.
When talking about fear, it is not necessarily the fear of physical threat, although this should not be excluded either, and indeed security and safety are often the key issues at stake. Still, in some conflicts it may also be the fear of becoming irrelevant in one's own land, becoming extinct as a nation, losing group/ethnic identity and political power, undergoing demographic decline, or losing control over resources/land. The history, or the memory, of past repression and violence creates especially fertile ground for fear—these events could happen again, or be even worse. The situation of chaos and unpredictability is particularly conducive to the emergence of various fears, which can also be easily manipulated by the leaders. As Lederach noted almost two decades ago: "Where there is deep, long-term fear and direct experiences of violence that sustain an image of the enemy, people are extremely vulnerable and easily manipulated. The fears in sub-group identities are often created, reinforced and used by leaders to solidify their position and the internal cohesion of the groups behind them. Deep polarization and sharp divisions are, in fact, functional for increasing cohesion, reducing ambiguity, and decreasing internal criticisms of leaders."8
However, the memory of past grievances is causing not only fear, but also another rather strong feeling, that of resentment.9 Communities may develop such mutual resentment and enemy images
7 See: "Izrail poluchil dostup k azerbaydzhanskim aerodromam," Lenta.ru, 29 March, 2012, available at [http:// lenta.ru/news/2012/03/29/access/].
8 J.P. Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, United States Institute for Peace, Washington D.C., 1997.
9 About the related term—ressentiment, coined initially by Nietzsche in his Genealogy of Morals (1887) and later developed by Max Scheler (Ressentiment, 1912), Liah Greenfield and Daniel Chirot write: "Ressentiment refers to a psychological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy and hatred (existential envy) and the impossibility to act them out, which in many cases leads to the 'transvaluation of values'" (L. Greenfeld, D. Chirot, "Nationalism and Aggression," Theory and Society, Vol. 23, No. 1, February 1994, p. 84).
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due to the feeling of historical injustice, betrayal, repression, and victimization that this, while it may have certain justification in history, is frequently manipulated by nationalist or populist leaders in order to mobilize support for themselves or their political agenda. Resentment and fear are also related to other feelings—desire of revenge and mistrust. Indeed, absence of trust clearly has a pivotal role to play not only in the emergence of a violent conflict, but is also the biggest obstacle to attempts to achieve its mitigation. As Lederach wrote: "Roots [of conflict lie] in long-standing distrust, fear, and paranoia, which are reinforced by the immediate experience of violence, division, and atrocities. This experience, in turn, further exacerbates the hatred and fear that are fuelling the conflict."10
Finally, and somewhat paradoxically, hope is another strong mover in a conflict. Hope of achieving the desired goals (be they political dominance, secession, autonomy, or territory) is frequently coupled with the belief that "now" is the right moment to start a conflict, or expand it in a certain direction, otherwise the window of opportunity may close. And again, chaos and unpredictability are conducive to developing such hopes, sometimes illusionary, and it is not accidental that all the Caucasian conflicts exploded when the constricting, although order-maintaining, Soviet authority weakened and then disappeared, opening up such perceived windows of opportunity to almost all consolidated population groups. However, in order to feel hope, leaders need to offer the communities that they try to mobilize if not elaborated national projects (secession/sovereignty or irredentism, in the case of the Central Caucasus), then at least some short-term but attractive goals of military or political victory. Hope, one has to admit, plays its role not only when a conflict is starting, but usually it is the hope, or illusion, that time is working for the benefit of one or another party that leads to procrastination of any steps toward conflict resolution.
Ways of Conflict Transformation
If it is true that the internal factors of conflicts are related to such psychological phenomena in mass consciousness as fear, resentment, and hope, it is working with these emotional phenomena and related indoctrinations that may make it possible, if not to resolve the conflicts, at least to guide them in a more manageable and positive direction. Or, alternatively, when leverage is limited, it may appear possible by observing public attitudes and values within this emotional scheme to predict the direction of transformation.
However, that would mean looking at some crucial components that contribute to such change. These are national projects/nationalist ideologies; the perception of security and threats; the level of inter-community communication and trust; mechanisms and intensity of external manipulations; and more maturity and realism in interpreting processes and events. Let us briefly review these dimensions of conflict transformation.
National projects both of secessionist territories and the Central Caucasian states are still influenced by the legacy of the nationalist concepts of late perestroika and the early 1990s, which, in turn, are modeled by collectivistic ethno-nationalism, as Liah Greenfield and Daniel Chirot have formulated it, and so are especially conducive to demonizing the enemy.11 Therefore the opposing processes that may reduce tension between the sides are aimed at replacing collectivistic ethno-nationalism with individualistic civic nationalism/patriotism, while raising public awareness about reality and one another would lead to de-demonizing of the "other."
10 J.P. Lederach, op. cit.
11 "The very definitions of ethnic nations presuppose a double standard of moral (or humane, decent, etc.) conduct. The tendency to 'demonize' the enemy population, considered to be a necessary condition for 'crimes against humanity,' is built-in to ethnic nationalism, for enemy populations within them are not necessarily defined as humanity to begin with" (L. Greenfeld, D. Chirot, op. cit.).
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Another related phenomenon that contributes to seeing the world in a somewhat immature way in black and white colors is what prominent psychologist Vamik Volkan labeled as "group regression," analogous to the Freudian regression concept. He not only stressed the role of a charismatic (or other) leader in the formation of national consciousness, but also the impact of a deep (and prolonged) social crisis on the ways society reacts to the challenges of state-building, as well as on the actual process of a nationalist discourse. Both these factors play an important role in the political life of the Central Caucasian societies. Volkan writes: "Large-group regression after a society has faced a massive trauma—involving drastic losses of life, property, or prestige, and/or humiliation by another group—reflects the efforts of a group and its leader to maintain, protect, modify, or repair their shared group identity... In general, I regard well-functioning democratic societies as non-regressed and totalitarian societies as regressed. However, societal regression can occur in democratic societies as well—for instance, after massive trauma or humiliation, or under regressed, excessively paranoid leaders..."12
As noted above, antagonism between communities is also rooted in fear, which, in turn, is rooted in seeing the world and developments as full of threats and dangers, when any event is regarded with suspicion as endangering security. For example, a well-known journalist and blogger Michael Vail writes the following about Abkhazian society: ".. .watching [the] behavior of the active part of Abkhazian society in the global network one unwittingly comes to a conclusion that they all still live in fear. And this fear is caused by various factors. Some are afraid of Georgians, some—[of the] Russian security services, some—of their own compatriots... Living in fear has become [the] normal state of Abkhazian society."13
Vail's forecast is rather pessimistic: "As time passes, the situation changes, but reasons to be afraid do not become less. And the more Moscow extends its paws into Abkhazia, the more that fear will intensify. Fear of one that just yesterday was considered to be a friend and hourly is becoming the most hated enemy. And fear even to admit all this. And at that time a saying comes to mind—'waiting for death is worse than death itself' and this exactly describes the current state of the Abkhazian so-ciety."14
However, at least in the case of Abkhazia, while there are emerging new reasons for fear—that long-cherished sovereignty and ethnic dominance may remain an illusion, there are other factors that weaken siege mentality and fear as security concerns becoming less relevant due to military protection by Russia. Similar developments are taking place in South Ossetia, even though Nagorno-Karabakh may still be demonstrating the contrary.
The terms "securitization/desecuritization of the level of tension existing in relations" and "security"—in the sense in which the latter is related to the securitization/desecuritization phenomenon—are borrowed from the conceptual toolkit of the so-called Copenhagen School of Security Studies.15 According to this perspective, security is a socially constructed, inter-subjective, and self-referential practice as it emerges "not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such."16
Still, security is not just a social construct, such as e.g. ethnicity or identity in general. Indeed, there is a component of social construction that contributes to perceived security, and there is an ever-
12 V.D. Volkan, "Large-Group Identity: Border Psychology and Related Social Phenomena," Man and Human Interaction, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2003, pp. 49-76 (see also his: "September 11 and Societal Segression," Man and Human Interaction, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2001, pp. 196-216; "Ethnonationalistic Rituals: An Introduction," Mind and Human Interaction, No. 4, 1992, pp. 3-19).
13 M. Vail, "Moscow Abolished 'Independence' of Abkhazia," StratRisks, 20 March, 2012, available at [http:// stratrisks.com/geostrat/4776].
14 Ibidem.
15 See: B. Buzan, O. Wffiver, and J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1998.
16 Ibidem.
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present objective component of security, which can be assessed and at least theoretically considered as measurable. Security, as perceived by the members of a group/community, is rooted in the results of information about possible security threats and risks, which may be an understatement or an exaggeration of real, objective security—which can be expressed in the probability or risk of the realization of respective threats. Thus, while security to a great extent is a social construct as it emerges when an issue is presented (fully justifiably or not) as posing an existential threat to a designated "referent object" (traditionally the state, but also an institution or a community), justifying the use of extraordinary measures to handle it, legitimizing the use of force and other means are only legitimate when dealing with "security matters." According to this logic, securitization of an issue implies moving it into the area of thinking and planning appropriate when dealing with existential threats. Consequently, de-securitization takes place when a particular issue is removed from the security agenda, because it is no longer defined in security terms, and the use of extraordinary means, perceived as legitimate, is abandoned.
Post-conflict societies are strongly securitized not only in terms of issues, such as political status, deported populations, or military threats, but also in terms of relationships between groups, or between victims and perpetrators. However, when a conflict is suspended or frozen, possibilities rather than actualities start to dominate the political security imagination and planning, and frequently issues become unnecessarily securitized, with respective implications—fear, irrational hostility, authoritarianism, and growing antagonism. Realistic assessment and analysis of threats, awareness, openness, and public debate may lead to de-securitization of a conflict. Equally, reduced existential threats, when realistically interpreted, will do the same. If the security situation in at least some of the Central Caucasian conflicts has changed, as argued above, Russian security guarantees in Abkhazia and South Ossetia may indeed lead to the waning of the siege mentality among the population and eventually to actual de-securitization of the conflicts. The same may happen in Karabakh, provided the international community finds an acceptable model of international peacekeeping. Therefore, democratization and maturing of society that lead to more public debate and openness, as well as respect of human rights, the rule of law, individual liberties, and political pluralism, will necessarily cause a certain amount of de-securitization of a conflict, thus facilitating communication and building mutual trust.
However, after a violent conflict has developed, as it has in the Central Caucasus, its perpetuation in suspended or frozen form and its further dynamics continue to involve all the above factors, although their relative and absolute intensity or even object may gradually change, leading to transformation of the conflict. Indeed, the Central Caucasian conflicts may require more than de-securiti-zation, reframing of positions, and the identification of positive outcomes—insofar as the national projects of the parties in conflict are incongruent, and their positions irreconcilable. The very structure of the parties and their relations are currently embedded in a pattern of conflict that extends beyond security concerns. Conflict transformation should therefore become a process of engaging in and transforming relations, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of mutual hostility and an uncompromising stance.
Although the common approach to conflict resolution rightfully focuses on state or para-state actors, both national and international, as well as intergovernmental organizations and coalitions, the role of non-state actors should not be underestimated, although their work is often slow and less visible. As mentioned above, effective conflict transformation requires a heightened level of intercommunity communication and trust. As soon as de-securitization of relations takes place, new possibilities emerge for intensifying inter-community communication. Of course, there are traditional channels of informal communication facilitated by civil society and INGO actors, but as a rule this involves a very limited number of civil activists and the impact, however important, is rather slow, competing with other processes that may have a shorter characteristic time cycle. Still, civil society actors are occupying an increasingly central place in view of the high degree of complexity of the Central Caucasian conflicts, when governments do not show much innovation or willingness to com-
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promise and have become key players in promoting human rights and respect for minorities, generating an intercommunity dialog, and searching for new solutions. At the same time, we should keep in mind that civil society agents are not detached from the specific contexts in which they act, and their involvement is not always effective or even positive.
One of the key concepts relevant to reestablishing communication and trust between communities is social capital or, more specifically, what is called "bridging social capital." The lack of trust that is endemic within the conflict environment enables the perversion of social capital leading to an increased breakdown in social cohesion. Social capital is instrumental, indeed essential, for managing the tension that arises between communities, while if such bridging social capital is non-existent, along with overly strong bonding social capital within antagonistic groups, the proclivity for violent conflict is increased, and its transformation hindered.17 Again, there is a certain difference between the three Central Caucasian conflicts in that in the case of South Ossetia and Abkhazia this bridging social capital is much stronger than in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh and is based not simply on the existing kinship networks, but also on personal ties and positive memories. It is exciting to observe the increasing importance of new channels of inter-community communication, involving mostly young people, which are web-based social networks that are becoming strong agents of conflict transformation.
Communication between communities is important, but equally important is public debate on conflict-related issues within communities that contributes to more maturity of broadly understood (civil) realism in interpreting processes and events, the limitations of the existing approaches, and promises of alternative paths. Public debate gives people a tool for interpreting and reacting to reality; it is an important device in transforming perceptions, behavior, and social constructs, political actions, attitudes, and values, thus creating strong conditions for influencing the perceived and then created new reality. In the Central Caucasian conflicts, as elsewhere, the protagonists are driven by rival visions of the past, and both the inter-communal dialog and intra-communal debate are major tools designed to bring positions closer together. In the protracted conflicts between the parties in the Central Caucasus, historians and other scholars themselves are acting as combatants, interpreting and manipulating the facts to make them fit their world vision. Therefore, public debate about the past, and particularly about one's own mistakes and misdeeds, constitutes an important part of the construction and reconstruction of discourses that may lead to conflict transformation. However, it is not only the debate about the past that is important, rather the debate about the future and about possible common interests and shared goals, which are the key for reconciling national projects and visions. In the case of the Central Caucasus, this may appear as integration into the Western civilizational area.
One more important aspect of conflict transformation, although also the least predictable, is the role of external powers. As this issue may require a separate discussion and lengthy analysis, it can be assumed that while some external powers are exerting significant efforts to maintain the status quo (as for example in the case of the current Russian leadership), others are trying to contribute more constructively, applying mainly soft power, to channel conflicts in a more positive direction. While it is difficult to talk of specific time frames, the general logic of geopolitical dynamics creates moderate optimism that constructive approaches will gradually gain more leverage.
Conclusion
Summing up the above, we can conclude that while there is little probability that the three open Central Caucasian conflicts will be resolved any time soon, the process of conflict transformation is
17 See: R. Bowd, "Burning the Bridges and Breaking the Bonds: Social Capital and its Transformative Influence in Relation to Violent Conflict," Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2011, pp. 37-62.
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ongoing, even though the direction of this transformation may change depending on the circumstances, and certain factors of this transformation need to be kept in mind. Among the most important aspects of this transformation are such processes as de-securitization and softening of the enemy image and resentment between parties; carrying out reality checks, admitting past mistakes, and promoting a public debate over conflicts; reconsidering national projects keeping in mind the emerging reality and trends; searching and finding areas for cooperation and positive sum game between parties; and strengthening existing bridges and communication between communities.
