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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Jannatkhan EYVAZOV
Ph.D. (Political Science), Deputy Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus, Executive Secretary of the Central Asia and the Caucasus Journal of Social and Political Studies
(Baku, Azerbaijan).
RUSSIA IN CENTRAL EURASIA: SECURITY INTERESTS AND GEOPOLITICAL ACTIVITY
Abstract
T
he author investigates the specifics of Russia’s security interests in Central Eurasia, in particular, the degree to which
they are generated by the macroregion’s geopolitical conceptualization in post-Soviet Russia and the mechanisms used for their realization.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new independent states in its stead created a more or less autonomous Central Eurasian political space.1 At the same time, the security relations among the Central Eurasian states have been developing under the considerable pressure of exogenous stimulators or, rather, the geopolitical activity of the external actors. It is not my aim here to discuss which factors (either exogenous or endogenous) prevailed in the development of the regional security system in post-Soviet Central Eurasia. The macroregion obviously remains an object of geopolitical activity of the neighboring powers driven by security considerations, the level of involvement being geared to the scope of their interest.
Post-Soviet experience convinces us that the Russian Federation at all times (even during domestic crises and foreign policy weakness) remained an active player in Central Eurasia. I have posed myself the task of clarifying the reasons why Russia remains interested in the macroregion, what the specific features of its security interests are, and how they crop up in its geopolitical activity.
The Determinants of Russia’s Security Interests in Central Eurasia
Russia’s security interests in Central Eurasia are more functional than those of any other Eurasian power. And geographic proximity, as the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) puts it,2 is one of the fundamental but not the single factor that explains this.
1 Here I rely on the new conception of Central Eurasia and Central Europe suggested by E. Ismailov that divides the political structure of Central Eurasia into three post-Soviet regions: Central Europe—Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine; the Central Caucasus—Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia; and Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan (for more detail, see: E. Ismailov, “Central Eurasia: Its Geopolitical Function in the 21st Century,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 2 (50), 2008, pp. 7-29).
2 See: B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. Second Edition, Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, Colorado, 1991, p. 191.
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■ First, Russia is the only power that has land borders with the three Central Eurasian regions (its land border in Central Europe is 2,535 km long; in the Central Caucasus 1,007 km; and in Central Asia 6,846 km). This geographic fact serves as the foundation for all other components of the Russia’s interdependence with the three regions (including the ethnic, confessional, cultural-linguistic, and ideological components), as well as the idea about this part of the post-Soviet space as a source of positive/negative external impact on Russia’s national security.
■ Second, because of the long history of a single state and due to migrations inside it a large number of Russians whose security belongs to the sphere of Russia’s security interests found themselves beyond the Russian borders in the newly independent states. On the whole, 25 million Russians3 remained outside Russia when the Soviet Union fell apart; irrespective of their official status this remains an important factor of Russia’s relations with its post-Soviet neighbors. Today, there are sizable Russian diasporas in all countries of the Central European, Central Caucasian, and Central Asian regions, the largest of them found in Ukraine (17.3 percent of the total population), Kazakhstan (30 percent); Belarus (11.4 percent), Kyrgyzstan (12.5 percent), Uzbekistan (5.5 percent), Azerbaijan (1.8 percent), and Georgia (1.5 percent).
■ Third, the practically uninterrupted (about 200-year long) Russian domination in these regions, along with social and economic ties, contributed to a certain social-perceptual construct in post-Soviet Russia “of Russia’s special interests and role in the so-called near abroad.” This found its reflection in the foreign policy conception related to the “near abroad” confirmed by a decree issued by President Yeltsin of 14 September, 1995 On Adoption of the Strategic Course of the Russian Federation with the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Dmitry Trenin has offered the following highly important opinion: “The Russian presence is common to all the new geopolitical constellations. European Russia, naturally, is part of the new Eastern Europe. Central Asia, which includes Kazakhstan, contains a significant Eastern Slav element. Transcaucasia is inseparably linked with the Northern Caucasus, which is an integral part of the Russian Federation. Thus, if there is any one country that can still view the other fourteen ex-republics as its periphery (albeit not a homogeneous one), it is Russia.”4
From time to time, Russia’s domination in this part of the world was accompanied by its stronger international position and great power status, which served as a sort of historical justification of a corresponding tradition in today’s Russia illustrated, among other things, by the “near abroad” conception. It comes as no surprise that throughout its post-Soviet existence this power has been actively involved in keeping this space under control. The efforts of all the other forces to integrate into or even compete with it in some of its parts were regarded as a threat to Russia’s interests.
Historically, the importance of these regions for Russia’s security is associated with the traditional stability of its power there and its military-political relations with other powers. This is especially true of Central Europe and the Central Caucasus; the comparatively more acute perception of the dangers coming from them is explained by the fact that for geopolitical reasons (even in the period of Russia’s strong domination there) they remained the empire’s less stable periphery. During the periods of weakness of the Russian Empire it was the Caucasus and Central Europe that emanated centrifugal tendencies. During the 1917 disintegration it was these regions that fiercely opposed re-
3 See: Ch. King, N.J. Melvin, “Diaspora Politics. Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy and Security in Eurasia,” International Security, Vol. 24, Issue 3, Winter 1999-2000, p. 118.
4 D. Trenin, “Russia’s Security Interests and Policies in the Caucasus Region,” in: Contested Borders in the Caucasus, ed. by B. Coppieters, Vubpress, Brussels, 1996, p. 91.
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integration; it was there that independent states appeared. In this respect Central Asia was a much calmer region.
In the 17th-20th centuries the three regions were involved to different degrees in Russia’s military-political rivalry with other powers (Central Europe—France, Germany, Austria-Hungary; the Central Caucasus—Turkey, Iran, Great Britain; Central Asia—Great Britain). The former two constituted the main corridors of military expansion against the Russian state. The strongest memories are obviously connected with Central Europe: the invasion of Napoleonic France in 1812 and Hitler’s Germany in 1941.
In the south Russia was threatened by the Ottoman Empire:5 “Russians have always perceived its southwest tier ... as a possible invasion route to Russia. Given their traditional fear of encirclement, the Russians have always been acutely aware that the Black Sea and the Caucasus are critical strategic approaches to their homeland and to their important industrial areas and energy resources.”6 The Caucasus has been and remains one of the few peripheries that rose in riots during Russia’s relative domestic weakness, which caused a rapid degradation of its control and, as one of the consequences, stepped up the activities of regional and world powers.
Geopolitical Perception of Central Eurasia in Post-Soviet Russia
When democratic Russia came onto the stage and the balance of power in the global political structures changed, Russia’s awareness of vulnerability from the “West” and “Southwest” was not only preserved, it was replenished with problems created by the contacts with the Muslim and Chinese worlds in Central Asia. Politicization and securitization of vulnerabilities and the great power traditions strengthened (and at times stimulated) Russia’s sociopolitical consolidation. Russia’s control over and domination in its former periphery were regarded as extremely important in its efforts to diminish vulnerability and regain its real great power status.
CentralEurope. In Central Europe this was realized through the Kremlin’s continued domination in Ukraine. A. Utkin has the following to say on this score: “Taken separately, Russia and Ukraine are average early-industrial powers, while together they form a critical mass that starts rapidly gaining weight in Eastern and Central Europe and in Northern Eurasia as a whole. To balance out this power, which also attracts Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Moldavia, Armenia, Tajikistan and, some time in future, Georgia and all Central Asian states into its orbit, Western Europe will need the United States. This explains why the United States has chosen Kiev out of all the CIS capitals as its main target.”7 This is explained not only by Ukraine’s geographic location and the ensuing political advantages but primarily by its ethno-confessional, demographic, economic, and military-industrial specifics and potential as a really large European power. This is the second largest post-Soviet country as far as its population size and military-industrial and military-political potential are concerned; it borders on Russia and EU on land and on sea and it is a Slavic and Orthodox country.
5 For 240 years, starting in the 17th century, the Ottoman and Russian empires fought over ten wars, of which the Caucasus was the main theater of war (for more detail, see: Russko-turetskie voyny 1676-1918, ed. by A.E. Taras, AST Publishers, Harvest, Moscow, 2000).
6 A.L. Karaosmanoglu, “The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1, Fall 2000, pp. 203-204.
7 A.I. Utkin, Mirovoy poriadok XXI veka, Eksmo Publishers, Moscow, 2002, pp. 395-396.
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The loss of Ukraine as a country which Russia controlled and its moving away cannot be compensated for by any other country of the former Soviet periphery not to mention of Central Europe. Neither the “united state of Russia and Belarus” nor control over Moldova achieved through the support of Transnistria can produce an effect comparable to control over Kiev when it comes to restoring Russia’s former status and ensuring its security. One can agree with Zbigniew Brzezinski who has written: “The appearance of an independent Ukrainian state not only challenged all Russians to rethink the nature of their own political and ethnic identity, but it represented a vital geopolitical setback for the Russian state . a Russia that retained control over Ukraine could still seek to be the leader of an assertive Eurasian empire, in which Moscow could dominate the non-Slavs in the South and Southeast of the former Soviet Union. But without Ukraine and its 52 million Slavs, any attempt by Moscow to rebuild the Eurasian empire was likely to leave Russia entangled alone in protracted conflicts with the nationally and religiously aroused non-Slavs.”8
Mr. Brzezinski has described as still valid the geopolitical logic born in the early years of the new post-Soviet world order. Since the early 2000s, when the Russian Federation began building up its economic and military-technical potential, it has also been stepping up its efforts to prevent Ukraine’s integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures; it is also working toward restoring its former domination. These efforts are growing increasingly obvious. It is equally clear that this is Russia’s most important geopolitical interest in the sphere of long-term security.
What is known today as the Black Sea Navy issue—the scope of Russia’s naval presence in the Black Sea—has been cropping up in the relations between the two countries much more frequently than the other potentially conflicting issues. This is one of the key components of Russia’s geopolitical interest in Ukraine, closely connected with several others (including territorial) questions. I have in mind the Crimea and its Russian population.
Russia’s Black Sea Navy is stationed at two main naval bases (in Novorossiisk in Russia and Sevastopol in Ukraine). For many years the Crimean naval base and its infrastructure remained the main one. The agreements within the so-called Big Treaty (the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between the RF and Ukraine), relating among other things to the deployment of the Russian Navy in Ukraine9 and signed in 1997, will expire in 2017. After the 2004 Orange Revolution Kiev stepped up its efforts to draw closer to the West and join NATO. It frequently states that it does not intend to prolong the agreements.10 In fact, the agreements can be revised on the strength of certain points.
Ukraine wants to get rid of Russia’s military presence as promptly as possible; the involvement of Russia’s Black Sea Navy in the military actions against Georgia in August 2008 became another argument in favor of cutting short Russia’s presence in Ukraine. From the point of view of the current developments and the allied relations with Georgia the decision of the Ukrainian officials to change the rules for the Russian naval forces11 was justified by the fact that Russia used its military forces stationed in Ukrainian territory against Georgia. Konstantin Eliseyev, Deputy For-
8 Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, New York, 1997, p. 92.
9 It includes agreements on the status and conditions of the deployment of the Black Sea Navy of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, on the parameters of the division of the Black Sea Navy between the two countries, and on the mutual settlements entailed in the division of the Black Sea Navy and the deployment of the RF Black Sea Navy in Ukraine.
10 See: V. Lysenko, “Rossia odnoznachno svyazala Bolshoy Dogovor i soglashenia po Chernomorskomu Flotu,” Evraziiskiy Dom, 21 July, 2008, available at [http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/expert.xml?lang=ru&nic=expert&pid= 1646].
11 On 10 August, 2008 the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine issued a statement about the possibility of the ships of the
Russia’s Black Sea Navy involved in the military operation in Georgia being prohibited from returning to Sevastopol. On
13 August President Yushchenko issued decrees on the new procedure for crossing the state border by the military, ships, and aircraft of the RF.
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eign Minister of Ukraine, came forward with the following statement: “We cannot accept the ships of the RF Black Sea Navy temporarily stationed in Ukrainian territory being used in an armed confrontation.”12
Russia’s desire to preserve its military presence in Ukraine is not limited to the need to retain its military-strategic domination or to balance out the Black Sea navies of Turkey or NATO no matter how important these aims are. This problem should be discussed in the context of Russia’s claims to the Crimea because of its mainly Russian population.13 The irredentist feelings in the Crimea are strong enough to affect the relations between the two countries even though, as distinct from the case of Transnistria, these feelings are still mainly latent. At the same time, not only the Crimea but also certain members of the Russian establishment are cast doubts on the 1954 decision to transfer the peninsula (that was part of the R.S.F.S.R.) to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This is what Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov, who described the transfer as “illegal and therefore null and void,” had to say on this score: “.in 1954 when the Crimean region was by an act of voluntarism transferred to the Ukrainian S.S.R. none of the documents—neither the decision, nor the decree, nor the laws of the Union and Russian structures—contained any mention of Sevastopol and its transfer.”14
Russia exploits the “Crimean issue” and the Russian population living on the peninsula (and elsewhere in the republic for that matter) as an instrument to keep Ukraine at a certain distance from the West. The Ukrainian domestic developments on the eve and during the Orange Revolution clearly demonstrated that this instrument could be used to bring the pro-Russian elite to power. This became especially clear during the 2004 presidential election that developed into the second “color revolution” in the post-Soviet space. The Kremlin openly supported Viktor Yanukovich, who ran for the presidency from the Party of the Regions with a predominantly Russian and Russian-speaking electorate.
Russia’s continued military presence in Ukraine can be described as a political rear of sorts that helps the Kremlin maintain the pro-Russian vector in the country and the gap between the two parts of Ukrainian society. This can be likened to the actual role of the Russian military in the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova. What is more, Russia’s continued military presence in the Crimea might make it harder for Ukraine to join NATO since the Russian Navy will be regarded as the military contingent of a third country in the territory of the aspirant state.
The Central Caucasus and Central Asia. Post-Soviet Russia is equally concerned with its military vulnerability and the threats coming from the Central Caucasian and Central Asian sectors. Efficiency of Russia’s control over the Northern Caucasus is the main factor that determines Russia’s involvement in the Central Caucasus. The wave of ethno-political conflicts that swept the Northern Caucasus in post-Soviet times exacerbated Russia’s awareness of its vulnerability in this part of the Caucasus (which officially remained under Russia’s control). The Osset-Ingush and Russo-Chechen conflicts, as well as the instability in Daghestan developed into armed clashes. Today, when power in the Kremlin has been stabilized and Putin’s Russia has acquired economic strength these conflicts are still smoldering. And the metropolitan’s control in the Northern Caucasus can hardly be described as stable.15
12 A. Mamonova, “Sevastopol kak novaia michen, ili Pochemu ChF ne mozhet vernutsia v Krym,” Sey Chas, 11 August, 2008, available at [http://times.liga.net/articles/gs013775.html].
13 Russians comprise over half of the population.
14 “Luzhkov: Reshenie o peredache Kryma Ukraine—nepravomochnoe i yuridicheski nichtozhnoe,” Vlasti. Net,
12 July, 2008, available at [http://vlasti.net/news/15818].
15 The suppression by the Russian army of the resistance in Chechnia and Daghestan during the second Chechen war did not bring the desired stability. Subversive activities aimed at overturning Russia’s power in the Northern Caucasus are still going on. On 3 July, 2008, speaking at a sitting of the RF National Antiterrorist Committee, Director of the FSS of Russia A. Bortnikov said that since the beginning of 2008 activities of 80 heads or active members of illegal armed units had been cut short in the south of Russia; over 30 terrorist acts had been prevented; 130 homemade bombs had been confiscated together with about 900 kilograms of explosives and 600 units of firearms. Despite this the Southern
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It was asserted that the separatist movements in the subregion were stimulated by external forces ranging from “the West that wants to divide Russia” to “the Muslim countries of the Middle East seeking to establish the Emirate in the Northern Caucasus.” The latter looked more plausible in view of the financial support of all sorts coming from Muslim funds and organizations to the North Caucasian rebel movement.
In fact, the mounting instability in the Northern Caucasus forced the Russian authorities to treat the role the Central Caucasus played in ensuring Russia’s security seriously. A. Utkin has written on this score: “Russia’s position is objectively undermined by the fact that anti-American Iran and pro-American Turkey have established themselves in the Transcaucasus; the same applies to the U.N. and OSCE peacekeepers and observers. Russia needs the Transcaucasus as a shield against the stormy sea of the Islamic world. The smaller North Caucasian nations should be protected against foreign encouragement of their self-assertion: this is one of Russia’s vitally important interests. They should be isolated from the United States and its local allies and clients.”16
The situation in the Northern Caucasus is closely connected with Central Asia, another part of Russia’s southern flank. The instability of Russia’s power in the Northern Caucasus may develop into a real threat to Russia’s entire so-called Southern Muslim Belt, which may “turn the Muslim republics of former Greater Russia into an alien body that pulls apart the living tissue of a monolithic coun-try.”17 From this it follows that because of the geopolitical specifics of the Caucasus and Central Asia the degree of Russia’s domination in the former directly affects its ability to control the latter. This presupposes a close connection between the regions that does not depend on the degree to which their states might feel secure but is extended to the neighboring powers. One can say that the interconnection between the Caucasus and Central Asia is much stronger than between them and Central Europe.
Once realized this factor urges Russia to reestablish its control (at least de-facto) over the postSoviet Central Caucasian states. This was seen as a shield against the threats from both directions of Russia’s southern flank. As distinct from Central Europe, Russia’s involvement in the other two Central Eurasian regions was based on both traditional (military threat or encroachments on Russia’s great power status by third countries) and transnational threats (international terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking, and migration). Russia explained its involvement there (in the military sphere, in particular) by the need to fight these new challenges to mankind. In fact, Russia is manipulating with the traditional instruments designed to ensure its security: ethnopolitical conflicts in the territory of the region’s countries, support of separatists, reliance on alliances, economic levers (the “liberal” empire methods),18 and domination in the energy sphere.
Geopolitical Mechanisms of Russia’s Security Policy in Central Eurasia
Judging by the current military doctrine of the Russian Federation, the armed conflicts in the areas bordering on Russia and their potential negative impact on Russia’s territory are regarded as the
Federal Okrug remains an epicenter of terrorist activities; 80 percent of the terrorist acts occur there (see: I. Dolmatov, “Geopolitika i terrorizm na Severnom Kavkaze,” Edinoe Otechestvo, 18 July, 2008, available at [http://www.otechestvo. org.ua/main/20087/1844.htm]).
16 A. Utkin, op. cit., p. 400.
17 Ibid., p. 403.
18 The Liberal Empire conception Russia has armed itself with to restore its influence in the new independent states through economic expansion deserves special mention (see: A. Chubays, “Missia Rossii v XXI veke,” Nezavisimaia gaze-ta, 1 October, 2003). Its outlines can be seen in Armenia where Russia bought Armenian enterprises for its debts. A similar attempt was made in Georgia where Russia tried to obtain control over its energy system (for more detail, see: V. Pa-pava, F. Starr, “In the Caucasus, a ‘Neo-imperial’ Russian Revival,” The Daily Star, 20 January, 2006).
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main foreign threat to the Russian state.19 There is a certain discrepancy between the officially declared and practically realized approaches. To a great extent, the main ethnopolitical conflicts in the new independent Central Eurasian countries were encouraged by Russia.20
To correctly assess the situation we should correlate the threats described above with the others that are causing concern in Russia and that emanate from Central Europe, the Central Caucasus, and Central Asia. The Russian Federation relies on its national security conception and its military doctrine to perceive them as threatening its political, economic, and military influence in the world. These threats are seen as leading to strengthening the military-political blocs and alliances and NATO’s eastward enlargement, the appearance of foreign military bases and large military contingents in direct proximity to Russia’s state borders,21 and creating (or building up) military formations that might upset the existing balance of power close to the RF state borders, as well as training and equipping armed formations and groups in other countries designed for subversive activities in Russian territory.22
In other words, throughout the entire post-Soviet period Russia remained concerned about the possibility that the former Soviet republics (the three Central Eurasian regions in particular) might become a military-political toehold of sorts for the competing centers of power (the West in the first place) used to gradually weaken Russia and limit its foreign policy capabilities.
When Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania joined the European Union and NATO the zone of Russia’s direct contact with the West increased by about 791 km, a fact that naturally exacerbated the already acute awareness of Russia’s military vulnerability and the inferiority of its political post-Soviet status. This, in turn, forced Russia to add vigor to its opposition to potential developments of this kind elsewhere in the periphery. It concentrates on Central Europe and the Central Caucasus because, due to their historical, cultural, and civilizational ties with Europe and the relative high pace of modernization and Westernization, the states in these regions are regarded as the most acceptable candidates for integration into the Euro-Atlantic structure. What is more, some of them openly announced that they intended to join NATO. Ukraine has moved further than its Central European neighbors along this road: since 2005 it has been involved in an Intensified Dialogue with NATO.23 If Ukraine joins NATO Russia will lose considerable military-technical, economic, and other parameters while its geopolitical Eurasian potential will shrink. The zone of its direct contact with NATO will be pushed eastward by over 1,300 km and will be wider by 1,576 km.
In the Central Caucasus Georgia and Azerbaijan maintained intensive contacts with NATO for different reasons; their progress in this respect was also different. This could not but affect Russia’s
19 See: Voennai doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 21 aprelia 2000 goda, available at [http://www.nationalsecurity.ru/ library/00003/00003concept1.htm].
20 I have in mind Russia’s unofficial support extended to the separatist movements in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Moldova: Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria (for more detail, see: B. Coppieters, “The Politicisation and Securitisation of Ethnicity: The Case of the Southern Caucasus,” Civil Wars, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2001, pp. 74-75; A. Malashenko, “Postsovetskie gosudarstva Yuga i interesy Moskvy,” Pro et Contra, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2000, pp. 42-43; S.E. Cornell, R.N. McDermott, W.D. O’Malley, V. Socor, F.S. Starr, Regional Security in the South Caucasus: The Role of NATO, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Washington D.C., 2004, p. 16; S.E. Cornell, “Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XX, No. 4, Summer 1997, p. 12; A.I. Utkin, op. cit., pp. 400-401; A. Morike, “The Military as a Political Actor in Russia: The Cases of Moldova
and Georgia,” The International Spectator, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3, July-September 1998, available at [http://www.ciaonet.
org/olj/iai/iai_98moa01.html], 13 December, 2007).
21 See: Kontseptsia natsionalnoy bezopasnosty Rossiiskoy Federatsii ot 10 ianvaria 2000 goda, available at [http:// www.nationalsecurity.ru/library/00002/00002concept3.htm].
22 See: Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoy Federatsii ot 21 aprelia 2000 goda.
23 See: “NATO Launches ‘Intensified Dialogue’ with Ukraine,” available at [http://www.nato.int/docu/update/
2005/04-april/e0421b.htm].
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attitude toward these countries. S. Cherniavskiy has written the following on this score: “Russia’s foreign policy line in the Transcaucasus is designed to maintain the existing balance of power and to prevent the emergence of military structures of non-regional states in proximity to our southern borders.”24 Russia’s concern is aroused by Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s intensified military-technical cooperation with NATO, stage-by-stage adaptation of their armed forces to NATO’s standards, and their willingness to let the Alliance use their territories and infrastructure.25 At the same time, out of the three Central Caucasian states Georgia alone has made public its intention to join NATO and has moved further than the others in this direction.26 This explains the continued tension in Russian-Georgian relations.
The political developments across the post-Soviet space offer enough evidence of the fact that Russia’s fears about the mounting influence of other powers in the new independent states and NATO’s enlargement eclipse the threat of armed conflicts along Russia’s borders and other transnational challenges (reflected in Russia’s security-related documents). One of the geopolitical instruments employed to prevent the main—external—threat to Russia’s security is provoking conflicts and maintaining frozen conflicts.
Russia is fanning separatist sentiments in the Crimea and Transnistria to preserve its influence and extend its components (including armed forces) in Ukraine and Moldova as well as to postpone, to the greatest degree possible, their integration into Western structures. Russia employed similar methods in the Central Caucasus. It was the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that forced the Georgian leaders to join the CIS and agree on Russia’s continued military presence on its territory.27 “After the military defeat of 1993 (in Abkhazia.—J.E.) the Georgian leaders had to announce that without cooperation with Russia Georgia would face disintegration and ruin. In 1994 Georgia joined the CIS and the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty.”28
The more intensively the Georgian leaders cooperated with NATO the more obvious Russia demonstrated its manipulative capabilities on Georgian territory: it distributed Russian passports among people in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; it moved in units of the 58th army in response to Tbilisi’s attempt to restore control over the breakaway territories; this is also evidenced by the Russian-Georgian military clashes in August 2008 and the campaign for recognizing independence of these Georgian territories.
Azerbaijan’s military defeats of 1993 in the conflict with Armenia were also largely orchestrated by Russia. They forced Azerbaijan to join the CIS29 and later complicated its cooperation with Turkey and NATO.
It should be said that Russia effectively preserved its grip on Georgia and Azerbaijan (as the more pro-Western among the Central Caucasian states) by manipulating the ethnopolitical conflicts; it did the same in the ethnopolitical alliances, which from the very beginning were obviously pro-Russian.
The so-called frozen (yet potentially volatile) post-Soviet conflicts keep the door to the hot stage open. They also keep the separatists of Moldova and Georgia, as well as Armenia (the sides that scored preliminary victories in the conflicts thanks to Russia’s military-technical support),
24 S. Cherniavskiy, “The Caucasus Vector of Russian Diplomacy,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5, 2000,
p. 94.
25 See: Ibidem.
26 Georgia since 2006 has been involved in the “Intensified Dialogue” with NATO (see: “NATO Offers ‘Intensified Dialogue’ to Georgia,” available at [http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/09-september/e0921c.htm], 18 February, 2008).
27 I have in mind the Russian military bases in Georgia that were not removed until 2008, as well as the peacekeeping units stationed along the Georgian-Osset and Georgian-Abkhazian lines.
28 K.S. Hajiev, Geopolitika Kavkaza, Mezhdunaronye otnoshenia Publishers, Moscow, 2001, p. 304.
29 See: S.E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers. A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, Curzon Press, 2001, p. 357.
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dependent on Russia. K. Hajiev has offered the following comment on Abkhazia’s dependence on Russia: “.. .it looks at the Russian military contingents stationed in the region as practically the only guarantee of its independence. Abkhazian sovereignty is de facto ensured by the presence of the Russian peacekeepers on its borders.”30 The same fully applies to the regimes of South Ossetia and Transnistria.
Despite its internationally recognized statehood Armenia (still involved in a conflict with Azerbaijan) is no less dependent on Russia’s military-political support. Even without the Nagorno-Karabakh problem Armenia’s relations with its neighbors would have remained potentially highly conflic-tive. Its strained relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey for which Armenia should blame itself pushed it into Russia’s military-political embrace.
The Russian diasporas and the holders of Russian passports in the post-Soviet states constitute an important element of their security interdependence with Russia.
The Russian Federation has issued several fundamental foreign policy documents that registered its obligation to defend the interests of Russian citizens abroad. Such are the Military Doctrines of the RF of 199331 and 2000;32 the Decree of President Yeltsin of 14 September, 1995 mentioned above;33 the national security conception,34 as well as Russia’s foreign policy conception of 2000.35 The recent events in Georgia confirmed that this interest is strong enough to maintain Russia’s activity, military activity included. President Medvedev confirmed this interest in his “five principles” formulated as a follow-up to the Russian-Georgian crisis of 2008; he also confirmed that Russia had “special” zones of interests (spheres of influence)36 first formulated as the “near abroad” conception.
The Kremlin used the need to protect the people of South Ossetia (90 percent of whom are Russian citizens) who lived in the area outside Tbilisi’s control as the pretext for moving its forces into Georgian territory in August 2008. Before launching the military operation in Georgia President Medvedev stated: “Last night, Georgian troops committed what amounts to an act of aggression against Russian peacekeepers and the civilian population in South Ossetia. Civilians, women, children, and old people are dying today in South Ossetia and most of them are citizens of the Russian Federation. In accordance with the Constitution and federal laws, as President of the Russian Federation it is my duty to protect the lives and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they may be.”37
The question of whether the above can be described as the real cause of the Russian-Georgian hostilities or one of them, a smokescreen to conceal the real aims, a pretext to achieve them, or something else deserves our attention. There is every reason to believe that the real cause was geopolitical rather than humanitarian: Russia was merely looking after its security interests and moved forward to
30 K.S. Hajiev, op. cit.
31 See: S.D. Bakich, The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation: Three Tests of Continued Viability, Paper prepared for the 13th Annual Graduate Student Symposium, University of Virginia, VA, Charlottesville, 4-5 April, 1997, available at [http://www.virginia.edu/~crees/symposium/bakich.html]; R. Sokolsky, T. Charlick-Paley, NATO and Caspian Security: A Mission Too Far? Washington, 1999, p. 25.
32 See: Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoy Federatsii ot 21 aprelia 2000 goda.
33 See: Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoy Federatsii ot 14 sentiabria 1995 goda No. 940 “Ob utverzhdenii strategichesko-go kursa Rossiiskoy Federatsii s gosudartvami-uchastnikami Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv,” available at [http:// www.mosds.ru/Dokum/dokum_rosUZ940-1995.shtml].
34 See: Kontseptsia natsionalnoy bezopasnosty Rossiiskoy Federatsii ot 10 ianvarya 2000 goda, available at [http:// www.nationalsecurity.ru/library/00002/00002concept4c.htm].
35 See: Kontseptsia vneshney politiki RF ot 28 iunia 2000 g., available at [http://www.nationalsecurity.ru/library/ 00014/index.htm].
36 See: P. Reynolds, “New Russian World Order: The Five Principles,” BBC News, 1 September, 2008, available at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7591610.stm].
37 Statement on the Situation in South Ossetia, 8 August, 2008, available at [http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/ 2008/08/08/1553_type82912type82913_205032.shtml].
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
confirm its control over the breakaway Georgian territories (South Ossetia and Abkhazia), to prevent Georgia’s NATO membership, to warn other CIS countries wishing to join the Alliance, and to extend the stretch of the Black Sea coast under its control. Even if defense of the Russian citizens in Georgia was nothing more than a pretext and a political smokescreen, the case of the Caucasus testifies to the fact that these arguments can come handy under certain circumstances.
In the light of the above I want to touch upon another element of Russia’s security system. I have in mind its military presence in the other new independent states. The Russian-Georgian crisis has shown that Russian troops stationed in the new independent states are an instrument that can be used any time to ensure Russia’s security interests in Central Eurasia. This is true of the units deployed at official military bases and the peacekeepers in the conflict zones in Georgia and Moldova. During its military operation against Georgia Russia used both the peacekeepers (stationed there since 1992) and the warships of the Black Sea Navy based in Ukraine.
The war shed new light on the fact (which otherwise seemed unimportant) that the Russian military units deployed in other countries are an object of Russia’s security interests and its instrument. The Military Doctrine of the Russia Federation describes the main military threat as “attacks (armed provocations) against Russian Federation military installations located in the territory of foreign states as well as against installations and structures on the Russian Federation State Border and on the borders of its allies. and in the World Ocean.”38 Georgia seems to be the first example of the fact that the above was not a declaration; there is an interest that initiates action. The thesis of an attack on the Russian peacekeepers was used to move the 58th Russian army into Georgia.
Table 1 offers information about Russia’s military contingents in the countries of Central Europe, the Central Caucasus, and Central Asia. The largest Russian contingents are stationed in Tajikistan and Armenia since both countries are vitally important for maintaining and spreading Russia’s influence across the Central Caucasian region to the Middle East and across Central Asia to South Asia. These two segments of the southern belt are the most vulnerable to the activities of other powers and transborder extremist groups.
The Black Sea Navy and its military-technical potential and infrastructure in Sevastopol are the main military instruments of Russia’s influence in Central Europe.
Besides, there is a so-called Unified Air Defense System within the CIS functioning under the 1995 agreement signed in Almaty. However, some CIS countries (Azerbaijan, Moldova, Turkmenistan and Ukraine) are keeping away of it. The system presupposes joint control over the air space, however Russia is playing first fiddle. Its parts (rocket launchers Osa, Buk, S-75, S-125, S-200 and S-300, and fighter aviation) are stationed in Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan.
Russia’s military contingents play certain power and political functions and should, therefore, be taken into account when assessing the geopolitical processes in Central Eurasia. Irrespective of their official status and the powers stemming from their deployment in other countries they are motivated by the security interests of the Russian Federation in the macroregion. The latest events in Georgia have confirmed this.
The history of independence of the Central Eurasian states reveals that the functions of the Russian military contingents described above ranged from balancing and intimidation (the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan), as well as separation of the sides to preserve the status quo (the frozen conflicts in Georgia and Moldova), to open involvement in military operations against these states or all sorts of non-state groups (Russia’s military operation against Georgia and the use of the 201st motor rifle division in the inner Tajik conflict and against extremist groups on the Tajik-Afghan border).
[http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/991009-draft-doctrine.htm].
38
Table 1
Military Contingents of the Russian Federation in Central Eurasian States
Military Potential
Total Main Types of Military Equipment
No. State Object's Place and Status Number of the Military Tanks Infantry fighting vehicles/Armored personnel carriers Artillery Aircraft Naval combat vessels
1. Armenia Military base in Gumri 3,170 74 344 70 18 —
2. Azerbaijan — — — — — — —
3. Belarus — — — — — — —
4. Georgia Peacekeeping forces in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts 1,500 5
5. Kazakhstan — — — — — — —
6. Kyrgyzstan Military base in Kant 500 — — — 25 —
7. Moldova Peacekeeping forces in Transnistria 1,199 — 214 — 7 —
8. Tajikistan Military base 201 in Dushanbe 5,500 120 350 190 9 —
9. Turkmenistan — — — — — — —
10. Ukraine Naval base in Sevastopol (Headquarters of the Russia's Black Sea Navy) 13,000 — 102 24 74 30
11. Uzbekistan — — — — — — —
S o u r c e: The Military Balance 2008, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2008, pp. 177, 190, 214, 221-222.
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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
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I n L i e u o f Conclusion
Russia’s security is closely associated with the Central Eurasian states for geographic and historical reasons and the ensuing threats and vulnerabilities, as well as the great power traditions. For this reason, even during the period of its post-Soviet weakness Russia largely remained the most active geopolitical actor in Central Eurasia.
Its ideas about security interests in the macroregion are more geopolitically conditioned than those of the other powers. Russia securitizes the factor of Central Eurasia mainly in the context of its geopolitical relations with the other centers of power involved in the macroregion (the United States and its NATO allies in particular). This means that Russia wants to retain its domination there or, at least, prevent other powers from moving in with their stable elements of influence that could be used to limit Russia’s capabilities in the supra-regional geopolitical rivalry. In fact, all other interests (economic, energy, humanitarian, and conflict settlement) are only part of the wider geopolitical interests and at times are used as geopolitical instruments.
