CC BY
50
Nazim MUZAFFARLI (IMANOV)
D.Sc. (Econ.), professor,
editor-in-chief of The Caucasus & Globalization
(Baku, Azerbaijan).
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT IN AZERBAIJAN
Abstract
This article analyzes the methodologies prevailing in the world for measuring religious freedom and the results of inter-country comparisons obtained on their basis. The range of religious freedom in Azerbaijan is assessed by comparing the number and severity of its legislative and practical restrictions with those of other countries of the region, particularly with those of the states of the Central Caucasus. The author regards the high religious tolerance of Azeri society confirmed by the rating studies of international analytical
centers as one of Azerbaijan’s comparative sociopolitical advantages. Azerbaijan’s main problems in religious development bring the author to conclude that a new strategy should be drawn up in this area, the basic idea of which he believes should be a gradual rejection of legislative and administrative methods for preventing religious fanaticism and a transfer to a higher level of its prevention based on using the creative force of religious values themselves and educating a new generation of clergy.
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I n L i e u O f a n I n t r o d u c t i o n: How can Religious Freedom be Measured?
Freedom of religion, which is one of the fundamental principles of political democracy, is much more difficult to measure than certain other human rights. For all intents and purposes, this is most likely because the concepts “freedom of confession,” “freedom of conscience,” “freedom of religion,” and so on are rather complicated in themselves and are not unequivocally defined in the scientific literature. The idea envisaged in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,1 which says that everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance (Art 18), can be taken as the general basis for such a definition. But these freedoms defy direct measurement by their very nature. So all the prevailing methodologies of inter-country comparisons of religious freedom are based, just like many other democratic freedoms, on work-back calculation. That is, in order to determine the range of religious freedom, we must establish the extent to which it is restricted in theoretical and real (legislative and practical) terms, as well as ascertain the number of times it is directly violated. This is the only way that full-fledged inter-country and interregional comparisons of the range of religious freedom can be made. Comparison of the range of religious freedom in states classified according to religious characteristics as such (“inter-religious comparisons of religious freedom”), when Muslim and Christian countries are compared with each other for example, is also based on this methodology. When using this methodology, researchers nevertheless come up against rather serious problems.
It would hardly be right to regard the restriction of the rights of believers in general as religious harassment. In other words, their rights are frequently violated not because they confess a particular religion, but for other reasons (political, ethnic, racial, etc.). Consequently, a violation of human rights can only be described as restriction of religious freedom if such rights were eliminated when an individual turned to a different faith.
Two aspects of religious freedom are usually distinguished—individual and community. Whereas the former reflects the freedom of each individual to confess the religion he chooses, wear religious attributes, or not follow any faith at all, the latter is related to the rights of groups of people (communities) to perform religious rituals in the way they choose, to set up prayer houses, hospitals, and other institutions, to put out printed matter, and to manage their own internal affairs.
The main difficulty here is how to determine the acceptable range of such freedoms. In other words, how to find the boundary beyond which they begin to turn into a real threat to national security—internal and external. We also need to decide how this acceptable range is differentiated in different countries and societies. It is also important to keep in mind the generally accepted restrictions of religious freedom. For example, there are many cases when parents do not allow their underage children to follow a different faith, which, however, cannot be qualified as a restriction of freedom of confession since internationally recognized standards permit parents to make such decisions.
These circumstances make inter-country comparisons of religious freedom even more difficult. All the same, the difficulty of such comparisons naturally does not exclude the essential possibility of
1 Adopted and declared by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948, available at [http://www.un.org/Overview/ rights.html].
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carrying them out, although it raises the degree of their conventionality. Even a fleeting glance shows that in some states the range of religious freedom is much higher than in others (for example, in Ireland or the Netherlands compared with Iran or North Korea). But strict scientific comparisons require assessment criteria that are universal for all countries, which, as already noted, is problematic due to inter-country sociocultural differences.
General Assessment of the Range of Religious Freedom
One of the most authoritative institutions for carrying out comparative analyses of the range of religious freedom is the Center for Religious Freedom (CRF),2 which positions itself as a human rights organization fighting against the persecution of people throughout the world for religious reasons. “It (Center for Religious Freedom.—N.M.) insists that U.S. foreign policy defend Christians and Jews, Muslim dissidents and minorities (italics mine.—N.M.), and other religious minorities.. .”3 This, objectively speaking, is a rather strange formulation since it presumes the protection of ordinary believers in some cases, and of dissidents and minorities in others.
The CRF’s most well-known publications are the annual reports on religious freedom and persecution in the world (Religious Freedom in the World: A Global Report on Freedom and Persecution). At the time this article was written, the report for 2007 had not yet been published, so we had to content ourselves with its preliminary results.4 However it is pretty safe to say that they will appear in the final version of the report essentially unchanged.
The criteria by which the CRF carries out its inter-country comparative analyses on religious freedom have been drawn up on the basis of the International Pact on Civilian and Political Rights, the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, and the European Convention on Human Rights. In so doing, the Center keeps in mind that religious freedom (persecution) is not manifested “in pure form,” but somehow intersects with other human rights.
■ First, it is related to the unhindered activity of various structures such as churches, educational and humanitarian organizations, and so on.
■ Second, it applies to specific forms of worship services, clothing, proclamations, food, and so on.
■ And finally, third, violations of general human rights (or the rights of a group of people) can be classified as restrictions of religious freedom if they are made on the basis of an individual’s or group’s religious affiliation.
Not only in the last, but also in each of these three versions, freedom of confession intersects with other human rights. For example, being able to publicly declare one’s faith or religious convictions without fear of persecution is also an element of freedom of speech. In other cases, freedom of confession intersects with the freedom of press, associations, and gatherings. From this it follows that
2 Established in 1986 under the International Nongovernmental Organization “Freedom House” (U.S.). At present, it functions as an independent structural unit of the Hudson Institute (Washington, U.S.). The institute is an independent rightist-centrist research center that advocates such values as the market economy, individual freedoms and responsibility, and respect for cultures and religions.
3 See: [http://freedomhouse.org/religion/about/about.htm], September 2006.
4 For more detail on the conclusions of the 2006 report and the author’s comments, see: N. Muzaffarli, Reiting Azerbaidzhana, Kavkaz, Baku, 2006, pp. 77-83.
inter-country comparative analyses on the range of religious freedom inevitably have to deal with other freedoms and human rights.
The prevalence of “non-religious” motives in violations of freedom of confession does not change their nature; in this case, the end result is more important than the motive. If the government “persecutes” churches in the same way as it restricts the activity of political parties, nongovernmental organizations, or the mass media (for the mere reason that it does not want to have any public opinion centers in the state), this does not stop violations of religious freedom from being precisely that.
The general index of religious different freedom the CRF calculated for 111 countries of the world takes account of a wide range of different factors, including the number and severity of the restrictions existing in the country, as well as the harshness of the punishments imposed for failure to adhere to them. Each state is rated on a scale of 1 to 7 points. Those which receive 1-3 points are classified as free, those with 4-5 points are partially free, and those with 6-7 points are not free.
According to the classification of the world’s regions adopted in this research study, Azerbaijan is one of the “countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe” and in terms of its general range of religious freedom shares 17th-19th place with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan (see Table 1).
Table 1
Range of Religious Freedom in Countries of the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (2007)5
Ranking Country Rating Category
1-2 Hungary 1 Free
1-2 Estonia 1 Free
3-5 Latvia 2 Free
3-5 Lithuania 2 Free
3-5 Ukraine 2 Free
6-7 Bulgaria 3 Free
6-7 Rumania 3 Free
8-16 Armenia 4 Part. free
8-16 Georgia 4 Part. free
8-16 Kosovo 4 Part. free
8-16 Kyrgyzstan 4 Part. free
8-16 Macedonia 4 Part. free
8-16 Moldova 4 Part. free
5 Compiled according to: The Range of Religious Freedom, available at [http://crf.hudson.org/articledocs/ TheRangeofReligiousFreedom.doc], September 2007.
Table 1 (continued)
Ranking Country Rating Category
8-16 Russia 4 Part. free
8-16 Serbia 4 Part. free
8-16 Slovakia 4 Part. free
17-19 Azerbaijan 5 Part. free
17-19 Kazakhstan 5 Part. free
17-19 Tajikistan 5 Part. free
20 Belarus 6 Not free
21-22 Turkmenistan 7 Not free
21-22 Uzbekistan 7 Not free
The leaders of the group of 22 countries are Hungary and Estonia, which have the best possible rating. Ukraine is the only CIS country classified as free in the religious sense with a rating of 2 points and sharing 3rd-5th place. Most of the CIS countries, including Azerbaijan, are classified as partially free, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan round off the ranking with the worst possible rating.
In addition to regional classification, the CRF also groups countries according to the religious factor as such. The general conclusion drawn from these comparisons is that the range of religious freedom in states where Islam predominates is much lower than in others. Protestant countries have the highest range, followed by Catholic and then Christian Orthodox. Even the “worst” of the former have good ratings: Zimbabwe (5 points) and Tanzania (4 points), which, although they occupy the last places among these countries, are classified as partially free in the religious respect. Only Ireland and Hungary of the world’s non-Protestant states have the highest rating of 1 point.
Table 2
Range of Religious Freedom in Muslim Countries (2007)6
Ranking Country Rating Category
1-2 Mali 2 Free
1-2 Senegal 2 Free
3-8 Jordan 4 Part. free
3-8 Kosovo 4 Part. free
3-8 Kyrgyzstan 4 Part. free
3-8 Malaysia 4 Part. free
6 Compiled according to: The Range of Religious Freedom, September 2007.
Table 2 (continued)
Ranking Country Rating Category
3-8 Morocco 4 Part. free
3-8 Oman 4 Part. free
9-22 Algeria 5 Part. free
9-22 Azerbaijan 5 Part. free
9-22 Bahrain 5 Part. free
9-22 Egypt 5 Part. free
9-22 Indonesia 5 Part. free
9-22 Yemen 5 Part. free
9-22 Kazakhstan 5 Part. free
9-22 The Comoros 5 Part. free
9-22 Kuwait 5 Part. free
9-22 Libya 5 Part. free
9-22 Syria 5 Part. free
9-22 Tajikistan 5 Part. free
9-22 Tunisia 5 Part. free
9-22 Turkey 5 Part. free
23-27 Afghanistan 6 Not free
23-27 Bangladesh 6 Not free
23-27 Mauritania 6 Not free
23-27 Pakistan 6 Not free
23-27 Palestine 6 Not free
28-34 Iraq 7 Not free
28-34 Iran 7 Not free
28-34 Maldives 7 Not free
28-34 Saudi Arabia 7 Not free
28-34 The Sudan 7 Not free
28-34 Turkmenistan 7 Not free
28-34 Uzbekistan 7 Not free
Among the 34 Muslim countries studied only Mali and Senegal are classified as free and share 1st-2nd place (see Table 2). Seven states have the worst rating (7 points). Azerbaijan belongs to the group of countries that share 9th-22nd place and looks a little better in this rating than in the previous.
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But this is undoubtedly only because religious freedom in the Muslim countries in general is not that high.
As already mentioned above, the CRF analyzes not only legislative support (restriction) of religious freedoms, but also their actual status. Otherwise the range of religious freedom in Azerbaijan would be much higher. For example, Art 48 of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic guarantees every citizen freedom of conscience and the right to independently determine his/her own attitude toward religion, confess a particular faith either alone or in community with others, or not confess any religion at all, as well as express and share his convictions about his attitude toward religion. What is more, the Basic Law declares the separation of religion from the state and the equality of all confessions before the law, prohibits the promulgation and propaganda of religions that debase human worth and contradict the principles of humanity, and declares the secular nature of the state education system (Art 18).
These legal regulations are in complete compliance with the generally accepted international standards and, since they are itemized in the proper manner (that is, in keeping with the spirit of the Constitution) in other legislative acts, could form the basis for realizing religious freedoms.
The Center does not assess or rank governments, although their activity largely determines the religious situation. The real range of religious freedoms is established under the sum impact of a large number of diverse and at times contradictory factors. The role of the government in regulating the religious environment and specific religious processes is much more limited than in the political sphere.
The need to account for these and other specific features of religious freedom gave rise to the appearance of new approaches toward measuring it, which in turn made it possible to expand the possibilities of corresponding inter-country comparisons by making them deeper and more specific.
Three Indices of Religious Freedom
In 2007, along with the general ratings according to the 7-point scale, the CRF placed the results of more detailed inter-country comparative analyses on religious freedom carried out by analysts from Pennsylvania State University (U.S.) on its website for the first time.7 They were construed on the calculation of three indices:
■ Social regulation of religion index—SRRI
■ Government regulation of religion index—GRRI
■ Government favoritism of religion index—GFRI
—The first index measures religious restrictions established (or applied) by society itself (by the representatives of other confessions or society as a whole, its national culture in the broad sense) on the activity of certain religious groups, including on their performance of religious rituals. Here such factors are taken into account as negative social attitude toward “other” religions, public condemnation of a change in faith, and negative perception of attempts to recruit people to one’s faith. This index is also lower if the predominant
7 The methodology and study results were first published in detail in an article by B. Grim and R. Finke (see: B.J. Grim, R. Finke, “International Religion Indexes: Government Regulation, Government Favoritism, and Social Regulation of Religion,” Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion, Vol. 2, 2006, available at [http://www.religjournal. com]).
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confessions do not allow the spread of new ones or public movements are against particular religions.
—The second CRF index measures legislative restrictions of religious freedom, as well as restrictions caused by the state’s policy and targeted administrative measures carried out in the country. The specific indices include the following: a prohibition on missionary activity, restrictions on any religious propaganda that aims to recruit new supporters and on citizens’ rights to change their confession, and interference in citizens’ private rights to engage in religious worship. The index worsens if there is no legislative protection in the country of the freedom of confession, if the government does not show the proper respect for religious freedom, and if the policy it conducts does not promote its expansion.
—Finally, the third index is used to determine the degree of state protection in favor of one or several religious to the detriment of others, which would be the same as expanding the religious freedom of some groups by infringing on others. Such favoritism is primarily indicated by the existence of an official state religion in the country. Whether or not there is a imbalance in financing different confessions is also taken into account, including with respect to subsidizing religious education, building and maintaining churches, the clergy, the press, as well as certain charity organizations, religious rituals, and missionary associations.
The annual reports by the U.S. State Department on religious freedom (U.S. State Department: International Religious Freedom Report) comprise the factual basis for calculating all three indices.8 They consist of country reports, each of which has several sections: (i) introductions (general assessment); (ii) “religious demography” (that is, the structure of the country’s population according to religion); (iii) state of religious freedoms (including legislative support, restrictions and direct violations of religious freedom, coercive change in religious affiliation, anti-Semitism, positive changes in observing religious freedoms); (iv) social violations and discrimination in the religious sphere; (v) U.S. state policy in the religious sphere in the country in question.
Moreover, the State Department reports are in a text form and do not allow quantitative intercountry comparisons to be carried out, although such are extremely beneficial for other political and analytical purposes. The authors of the indices coded the information contained in them and made them measurable with the help of mathematical statistic methods. Some of the results they obtained are presented in Table 3.
According to the Government Regulation of Religion Index, Azerbaijan is an outsider in the ranking (it is 20th among 22 countries), ahead of only Turkmenistan and Belarus, while in terms of the Government Favoritism of Religion Index it is among the five most advanced countries, and it occupies the middle 11th-15th position in terms of the Social Regulation of Religion Index. Noticeably lagging behind the two other Central Caucasian states in terms of GRRI, Azerbaijan is ahead of them with respect to the other indices, whereby it has a significant advantage in terms of GFRI. This means that the government in Azerbaijan exercises stricter regulation over religious relations than the governments in Georgia and Armenia, but in so doing, in contrast to them, it does not conduct a clear protectionist policy in favor of one particular religion to the detriment of others.
A no less important aspect of inter-country comparative analyses on religious freedom is Azerbaijan’s more favorable index (compared with Georgia and Armenia) on the regulation of religious relations by society itself. Armenia shares 18th-19th position with Macedonia in terms of this index, whereas Georgia is among the outsiders (in 20th place). It should be kept in mind that this indicator is the main index of religious tolerance immanently inherent in a particular society.
1 These reports are open for public perusal and available at [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf].
Table 3
Ranking of Countries of the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe according to SRRI,
GRRI, and GFRI (2007)
Indices GRRI GFRI SRRI
Countries Ranking Index Ranking Index Ranking Index
Armenia 15 6.111 11 5.500 18-19 8.167
Azerbaijan 20 8.611 4-5 1.500 11-15 6.834
Belarus 22 9.445 4-5 1.500 5 2.667
Bulgaria 8-9 2.222 6 1.667 7 4.167
Hungary 1-6 0.000 7 2.167 6 3.500
Georgia 1-6 0.000 21 9.334 20 8.667
Kazakhstan 16-18 6.945 13 6.167 11-15 6.834
Kosovo 7 1.389 8 2.667 11-15 6.834
Kyrgyzstan 13 4.722 3 1.000 17 7.667
Latvia 1-6 0.000 12 5.834 1-3 0.000
Lithuania 11-12 3.889 14-15 6.500 4 0.668
Macedonia 11-12 3.889 18-19 8.000 18-19 8.167
Moldova 10 3.611 9-10 3.167 8 5.500
Russia 14 5.556 14-15 6.500 10 6.667
Rumania 8-9 2.222 22 10.001 21-22 9.334
Serbia 16-18 6.945 16-17 7.500 16 7.500
Slovakia 1-6 0.000 16-17 7.500 1-3 0.000
Tajikistan 16-18 6.945 1-2 0.000 9 5.834
Turkmenistan 21 9.167 20 8.834 11-15 6.834
Uzbekistan 19 7.500 18-19 8.000 21-22 9.334
Ukraine 1-6 0.000 1-2 0.000 11-15 6.834
Estonia 1-6 0.000 9-10 3.167 1-3 0.000
It can easily be noticed that in some cases there are very significant differences among the various indices for one and the same countries. For example, Azerbaijan occupies 4th-5th place in terms of GFRI, but is 20th in terms of GRRI; Belarus is in 4th-5th and 22nd place, respectively; Georgia, which is among the world leaders in terms of GRRI, holds 20th place in terms of SRRI; Kyrgyzstan is one of the regional leaders in terms of GFRI (3rd place), while it is only in 17th place in terms of SRRI; Lithuania, vice versa, occupies a rather high position in terms of SRRI and a low one in terms
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of GFRI; Rumania, which shares 8th-9th place with Bulgaria in terms of GRRI, is an outsider both in terms of GFRI and SRRI; Slovakia is a leader in the world ranking in terms of GRRI and SRRI, while is occupies only 16th-17th position in terms of GFRI, and so on.
The thing is that the tougher the restrictions generated by society itself, the predominant religion in it, or the various religious groups and organizations expressing, according to the government, present and future state interests, the more lenient policy a state may conduct with respect to religious restrictions in order to achieve its goals. When a state conducts an essentially protectionist policy regarding a particular faith, there is naturally less need to introduce general restrictions on religious freedom. Consequently, when a state improves its rating with respect to a particular index, even if this means a drop in another, it is a question of choice of priorities at the present moment and for the future.
Another extremely important aspect of the problem must be kept in mind. There are several factors that objectively cause the restriction of certain religious freedoms in advanced countries. In contrast to political and, particularly, economic freedoms, religious freedoms are unbinding and do not always promote democratic development; on the contrary, they sometimes hinder this. Even the most progressive measures from the global (universal) perspective can be interpreted as infringement of the religious rights of certain groups of citizens. For example, although the fact that state structures or head nongovernmental religious administrations restrict the activity of sects that potentially have elements of radicalism and extremism lowers the country’s religious freedom rating, it is nevertheless necessary (at least temporarily).
Approximately the same thing applies to the participation of religious figures in political life. Azerbaijan’s state structures are intercepting attempts to politicize religion, including the organization of political religious parties or the use of churches (mosques) for engaging in political propaganda. They do not permit religious humanitarian organizations to function in the country if there is reason to suspect them of being related to extremist and, particularly, terrorist centers. Sometimes it ends in the deportation of foreigners whose activity the government regards as propagandizing religious extremism. Of course, the state must be extremely careful when incriminating anyone (including foreigners) of religious radicalism. Even if such suspicions are fully substantiated, they could be perceived as religious persecution and lower the country’s corresponding rating.
The restriction of the rights to election of religious figures can also be regarded as an infringement on religious freedom. As we know, in compliance with Azerbaijani legislation, they have the right to elect, but not to be elected to the Milli Mejlis (the country’s parliament). This restriction periodically gives rise to fervent discussions in society, particularly on the eve of elections. In 2005, the Central Elections Committee of the Azerbaijan Republic refused to register most of the Muslim leaders who wished to ballot for deputy, although the courts subsequently cancelled some of their decisions. This fact clearly shows society’s ambiguous perception of this kind of re-striction.9
All the types of religious freedom restrictions mentioned above have the right to exist as long as they are not the state’s strategic policy, but merely temporary measures aimed at eliminating precedents of religious fanaticism, radicalism, and extremism from public life during the establishment and strengthening of statehood. Such restrictions die out as the country acquires systemic political stability and a sufficiently high level of economic power.
It would be logical to calculate the sum country index of religious freedom from the total of the three above indices. Since, having a very obvious correlation among them,10 SRRI, GRRI, and GFRI
9 It is interesting that E. Abramov, a representative of a religious community of Mountain Jews, was registered without a problem and subsequently elected as a deputy. This circumstance was grounds for unregistered Muslim figures to accuse the government of injustice.
10 The correlation among these indices is analyzed in relative detail in the abovementioned article by B. Grim and R. Finke.
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mutually supplement each other and assess, although in different aspects, the same thing—the religious situation in the countries of the world. But unfortunately this is not done: calculation of SRRI, GRRI, and GFRI, on the one hand, and the range of religious freedom according to the 7-point scale, on the other, are separate analyses, which was confirmed by the CRF experts in personal correspondence with the author of this article. There are serious reasons to believe that the CRF studies would be more systemic if they calculated the overall index of religious freedom, for example, as an average weighted value of the three indices.
Azerbaijan’s Pros and Cons
As the classification of Muslim countries regarding the range of religious freedom shows, as well as from the opinions of many experts on theology and religious freedom, Azerbaijan is among the most tolerant of the states in which Islam is the predominant religion.
For example, when speaking at a seminar on The Role of Islam in Forming Tolerance in the Southern Caucasus (June 2004), German ambassador Klaus Grewlich noted the unique model of religious relations in Azerbaijan that allows religious communities not simply to live side by side, but also to actively interact. “Azerbaijan’s model of interrelations between the state and religion,” he emphasized, “could be exported to other countries. Religious tolerance and patience are your fortune.”11 Patriarch of Rome Bartholomew I spoke in almost the same vein, noting that state-religious relations, as well as relations between the traditional and non-traditional faiths in the Azerbaijan Republic, are exemplary: “I am satisfied with the level of tolerance here,” he said. “In Azerbaijan, each person can confess his/her faith and perform rituals as he/she wishes.”12
Religious tolerance of this level is so uncharacteristic of contemporary Muslim states that we classify it as Azerbaijan’s comparative sociopolitical advantage.
There are more than 350 state-registered religious communities functioning in the country, thirty of which are non-Islamic (Protestant, Russian Orthodox, Jewish, Molocan, Krishnaite, and Bahai). The number of people who traditionally follow Shi‘ite-style Islam is a little higher than the number of Sunnis. It is extremely important that over the lifespan of many generations of people, all of these various confessions have come to berth in Azerbaijan in a very friendly and peace-loving way and no significant problems have been registered in their interrelations.
It is extremely symbolic that, in a show of prudence, the head of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of the Caucasus Sheikh ul-Islam A. Pashazade only participates in any religious and secular undertakings in the company of the spiritual leaders of the country’s Russian Orthodox and Jewish faiths. The constant dialog, cooperation, and friendship between them is evaluated as extremely positive not only by the local, but also by the foreign community.13
But despite such a high level of tolerance, the religious environment in the country is not free from problems that are profound and acute enough to deserve special attention and the specifics of which are such that their resolution cannot be left to the monopoly of religious figures and state structures. This requires the public’s broad participation.
Keeping this in mind, in November 2001 the author of this article sent a special communiqué to the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of the Caucasus (SAMC), the State Committee for Work
11 See: [http://azerbaijan.az/_GeneralInfo/_TraditionReligion/_traditionReligion_r.html].
12 See: Ibidem.
13 In 1994, the author of this article had the occasion to see how greatly their joint arrival at a conference in Madison (Wisconsin, U.S.) on the sociopolitical processes in Central Asia and the Caucasus affected the international auditorium that gathered there.
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with Religious Formations, as well as to all the country’s clergy, which touched upon the most urgent problems of religious development. The questions raised in the communiqué aroused quite a widespread response, which shows a real need for their public discussion.14
Subsequently, both the SAMC and the State Committee generally supported the recommendations put forward in the address, publicly stating that they would exert efforts to implement them.15 But, despite the significant progress the country has achieved in the religious sphere during the years of independence, many problems are still acute.
One of them is the change of faith by some citizens. Viewed broadly, the fact in itself is nothing unusual, but Azerbaijan’s public opinion reacts rather severely to such transformations.16 It stands to reason that the acceptance of Islam and its rejection give rise to directly opposite emotions. All the same, the main “internal” religious problem occupying the minds of the Muslim majority is the stratification within Islam itself and the spread in recent years of trends that are non-traditional for the country.
This process began at the end of the 1980s when “neo-missionaries” began to find their way into Azerbaijan, mainly radical Shi‘ites, Wahhabis, and Nursites. The country, which was in the throes of a struggle for independence and experiencing difficulties with the transition to a new socioeconomic system at that time, opposed these external and internal missionaries with public condemnation, which was inevitably accompanied by demands to toughen up the restrictions on their activity established by the law, right down to deportation from the country. Public opinion was inclined to criticize the state bodies and nongovernmental structures responsible for the religious sphere for not clamping down sufficiently on the activity of religious figures promulgating Islamic trends that are non-tradi-tional for Azerbaijan.
In the almost 20 years that have passed since then there have been no radical changes in public opinion, or in the behavior of the corresponding government structures and nongovernmental administrations, unless we mention that the demands have become even tougher than before.
Meanwhile, the fundamental question is why some Azeris are rejecting traditional Islam that has stood the test of time in order to embrace Tariqahs that are alien to the country. The socioeconomic difficulties the people are experiencing and the financial aid certain neo-missionaries offer citizens are usually given as the reasons for this. This position is not entirely convincing, keeping in mind, first, the subsidies are very small and, second, the fact repeatedly confirmed by history that financial difficulties are more inclined to bring people closer to their religion than separate them from it. So the true question is what way are these new trends attractive to believers.
On closer examination, it turns out that they do not have anything essentially different from traditional Islam. Evidently the answer to the above question should be sought in the fact that the new-sprung missionaries are more insistent and consistent than the country’s clergy and promulgate general Islamic values, trying to present themselves as the only true Muslims.
For example, there is nothing unusual in someone calling on Muslims to be simple and modest in designing their memorial headstones: this religious-moral regulation has been preached by Islam since the beginning. But when the centers of traditional Islam are not energetic enough in their opposition of festive and pompous headstones, they are somehow allowing the fact that such tombstones are in compliance with Islamic values (at least this is how most believers perceive it) and are “voluntarily” giving the initiative to “religious dissidents.”
14 See, for example: “Nazim Imanov Addresses the Clergy,” Ekho, 10 November, 2001; “Nazim Imanov Suggests Testing ,” Zerkalo, 10 November, 2001; “Nazim Imanov Addresses the Administration of Muslims of the Caucasus,” Sharg, 10 November, 2001 (in Azeri), etc.
15 See, for example: “Haji A. Pashazade Welcomes the Address of Nazim Imanov,” Eni Musawat, 16 November, 2001 (in Azeri).
16 Such condemnation of some citizens changing their faith is, as mentioned above, one of the factors that has an impact on the Social Regulation of Religion Index.
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Dozens of similar examples can be given, and all of them give the unprejudiced analyst more reason to believe that taking the initiative and being progressive (advanced) in propagandizing general Islamic values are almost the only effective antidotes against “religious dissidence” and the introduction of non-traditional radical-extremist trends in the country.
One of the most excruciating problems is the insufficient, according to public opinion, financial transparency of religious organizations and churches. It is not even a matter of financial unscrupulousness in the religious sphere, but of the public’s real concern over this. Society cannot respect the calls of its religious leaders to embrace faith and moral purity if it is not absolutely sure of the honesty, decency, and unselfishness of these leaders themselves. Ensuring complete transparency of the budgets (revenue and spending) of churches and religious organizations can play an invaluable role in preventing the spread of non-traditional Tariqahs in the country.
It stands to reason that the separation of religion from the state does not in itself mean that all interaction between them stops or, even more, that the state cannot support the development of religious values in society.
One of the main areas of this support can and should be cooperation in educating a new generation of religious figures who are far from superstition, fanaticism, and radicalism, who have not only religious, but also fundamental secular knowledge, and who understand the political, economic, and civilizational processes going on in the country, region, and world. Too many Azeri young people are studying the fundamentals of Islam abroad today, which is quite a significant channel of foreign intervention in religious life.17 The country should educate most of its religious figures itself. This is extremely difficult and most likely impossible without active state interference.
Moreover, the state should render assistance for organizing scientific-practical undertakings (conferences, symposiums, and so on) to study and promulgate general Islamic rules and values, publish and disseminate progressive religious literature, write textbooks on religion, and assist religious enlightenment in general. These and similar problems should not be ignored by referring to the separation of religion from the state. On the contrary, a preventive policy and precise definition of the state’s position on all the urgent issues of religious development are needed.
Carrying out the last two recommendations might at first lower the Government Favoritism of Religion Index. But this can be avoided if the state distributes the resources provided for this purpose fairly among the main religions of the country. Fairness in this case must and should be interpreted as distribution of resources in proportion to the number of people who confess different religions. The fact that most of the country’s residents are Muslims does not at all mean that the state can disregard the education of the Christian and Jewish clergy, the upkeep of non-Islamic churches, and religious enlightenment among religious minorities. A fundamental principle of the democratic structure of society is that all the country’s citizens have equal rights, including regardless of their belief, and the right to count on equal support from the state.
C o n c l u s i o n
The most important thing is for the state to draw up and publicize its own development strategy for the religious sphere. To sum up the above, the main idea of this strategy can be formulated
17 With the assistance of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of the Caucasus, a little more than 500 people are studying abroad. According to experts’ estimates, a total of around 2,000 young people are acquiring a religious education and, correspondingly, upbringing abroad, but this figure is not confirmed by official sources. This may not seem that many for a state with a population of close to 9 million, but we should keep in mind the correlation between the number of future religious figures who are acquiring their education within the country today and those acquiring it abroad.
as a gradual rejection of legislative and administrative methods for preventing religious fanaticism and a transition to the next, higher level of its prevention based on the use of the creative force of religious values themselves (primarily traditional general Islamic values), as well as on educating a new generation of comprehensively educated, honest, and deeply respected clergy.
It is very important in terms of the range of religious freedom that the country strive not for a perfunctory increase in its rating, but for a harmonious interweaving of religious rights and freedoms into the secular state structure, consistently excluding the possibility of any forms of radicalism and extremism arising on its territory.
Aysel ALLAKHVERDIEVA
Master of Law, Ph.D. Candidate at Dublin University (Dublin, the Republic of Ireland)
TOLERANCE AS THE BEDROCK OF CONFESSIONAL AND SOCIOCULTURAL HARMONY IN AZERBAIJAN
Abstract
The author bases her conclusion that the experience of many centuries of peaceful coexistence of different ethnic groups and confessions in Azerbaijan
can provide answers to the challenges of the globalizing world on her detailed analysis of the past and present of religious tolerance in this country.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the age of globalization, which has accelerated all aspects of human development, the rising and gradually internationalizing wave of violence and permanent ethnic and religious conflicts made it clear that all social forces worldwide should pool their efforts to try to restore civil peace and sociocultural harmony. Since the late 20th century this task has been coming to the fore in everything the international community has been doing to fully tap the potential of peaceful coexistence among peoples and religions mankind has accumulated throughout the centuries. There are regions, which, due to unique historical circumstances, became crossroads of civilizational, ethnic, and confessional cooperation and acquired a unique and harmonious social climate.
It can be justifiably said that Azerbaijan is one such historical zone of religious and ethnic tolerance, a country with many centuries of dialog among peoples and confessions behind it. Azerbai-
