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18Социология №6 2019
Взаимосвязь между религией и эволюцией через философские взгляды Канта, Гегеля и Вебер: критический обзор
Далал Бенбутриф
Целью статьи является критический обзор взглядов трех известных философов на отношения и конфликты между религией и развитием: Кант, Гегель и Вебер. В частности, в этом статьe будет разъяснено, что религия является конфликтом или возможностью для развития человека и общества, сосредоточив внимание на исламской религии. Ключевые слова: Религия; Развитие; Кант; Гегель; Вебер; ислам.
Introduction
Religion and Development relation is one of the most arguable phrases amongst philosophers. The major reason for the difficulty of this contest is that religion is something spiritual, but development is secular. Religion debates about human connections with the God and the world after the death, whereas, development is a means of making the human life improved, comfier and more legitimate. The main objective of this article is having a critical review on the famous philosophers' viewpoints of Kant, Hegel and Weber, on religion and development interactions and challenges, as lots of current philosophers and thinkers are referred theirs ideas and research to these three famous philosophers; some confirm theories of Kant, Hegel and Weber on relation and conflict of religion and development, some challenge these ideas and try to restore them, specifically, the Weber's discussion and conclusion on the contrast of Islam and development.
Kant Religious Theory
Kant, like many innovative theorists, considered religion through the structure of the rational theologies of Hume, Leibniz, and Wolff. These
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rational theologies intensely limited modern philosophy's capability to consider the formless field of religion beyond the doctrinal declarations of certain traditions; once philosophy recognized itself with pure reason, the discipline came to decrease religious thought to a body of dogmatic propositions that could be suitably reflected only from the supposedly universal a priori perspective of philosophy. Religions, to the extent that they propose a theoretical framework for their followers, could be seen just as a rival to, an exoteric form of, or inconsequential for a universal a priori philosophy. Kant's philosophy of religion demonstrates the lack of characterizing religion as a popularization or deflection of reason. Two questions face any critical conflict with Kant's philosophy of religion that help concentrate criticism on the fundamental problem of Kant's framing of religion. First, his collection of writings is too massive to be understood strongly and thoroughly. Second, modern readers cannot split their understandings from the complex history of the critical philosophy's reception, a problem shown by the sentiment implicit (and rarely explicit) in neo-Kantian works of 19th century, which certifies that it is not satisfactory to claim upon the necessity of going back to Kant. All depends upon the path in which we go back to him, and there are several paths of going back [1]. What may look primarily like an unusual move—looking first to interpretive schools of Kantianism instead of Kant himself—confirms fitting as this study's interest lies with the frequently accepted limits that Kant drew around how researchers can frame religion as an object of philosophical criticism. Advances that
begin from the practical philosophy, usually highlight the critical philosophy's consequences for religion. For many, Kant's philosophy easily destroyed traditional religious dogmas.
Though problematic, Kant's philosophy of religion has been massively influential. Its
fundamental application stems from its guarantee to create peaceful co-existence between distinct theoretical frames:
Many think Kant opened the knot of the relation between science and religion, rather than untying it, for his solution was to split them more sharply and entirely. Until now, as science is concerned, his influence lay in a novel and far more strict negation of the claims of knowledge in matters of religion. He displayed the mistakes in the traditional opinions for the being of God, for the presence of the soul, and for its freedom [2].
The assumption is instinctive: both philosophy and religion function best when kept separate, each free to present its unique impacts to human culture. Although, clearly interested in limiting reason to make room for faith, Kant stated philosophy as the only practical theory through which to understand experience. Many modern philosophers, theologians, and sociologists have problematized Kant's philosophy of religion while others have supported its spirit. By quickly surveying post Kantian theory of religion in Hegel, will demonstrate Kant's significance to modern philosophy of religion and the persistence of the dilemma found in the letter of his philosophy of religion.
Hegel, Philosophical reason, and Consummate Religion
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Researchers normally view Hegel, in comparison to Kant, as presenting a more clearly "religious" philosophy. Lowith went so far as to describe Hegel as an absolutely Christian philosopher: With his understanding of Christianity as a complete and at the same time an entity, linked historically with the world and the state, Hegel is the last Christian philosopher before the disruption between philosophy and Christianity. This crack was seen and made final from two contradictory directions by Feuerbach and Kierkegaard [3]. This claim is not exceptional, but it is odd for highlighting continuity so strongly between Hegel and earlier "Christian" philosophy, rather than follow academic philosophical theology. While Hegel developed a strong philosophy of religion, it organizes within hypotheses that problematize religion, much like Kant's philosophy of religion.
The interpretive challenges of Hegel's huge and technical collection of writings can be restricted by concentrating on the rising attention; he gave to religious thought throughout his career. While Hegel rejected religion in his earliest works, he later developed a different philosophy of religion as he figured out the full significance of religion for the articulation of a separate philosophical science. This later point of view earns attention, especially as it offers insight into how Hegelianism has been broadly perceived as a problematic substitute to the Kantian philosophy of religion:
Kant is assumed the terminator of metaphysics, while Hegel is viewed as the philosopher who gave back to metaphysics the rights that Kant had rejected it. Hegel just completed
Kant's work. The principle that faith is knowledge, the hostility to Holy Scripture carefully hidden under the attendance of respect, the rejection of the very possibility of any other involvement in truth than that which science offers; all these adequately testify to the goal that Hegel had set for himself [4].
Hegel's alternative to Kantian philosophy of religion earns full attention, but here emphasis will be narrowed to demonstrating that he repeated the Kantian mistake of affording no true voice to religious theory independent of philosophical comment.
Hegel considers Christianity as a vital symptom that provides determinate form to the abstraction religion. In spite of this role, he pays not much attention to the real elements of Christian practice, even as he considers them an important phase of human mindfulness. Hegel never explains what philosophy adds to religious consciousness; he declares only that:
In religion the fact has been shown as far as its content is concerned; but it is another issue for this subject to be present in the form of the concept, of thinking, of the concept in uncertain form. Hence, the philosophical design of the Christian religion adds nothing to the belief unless one accept that philosophy alone is fit to understanding and planning what religion is about. The dialectical development of philosophy through religion needs a noteworthy difference through which philosophy could be determined and become more conscious of its own character and restrictions: an only formal difference means that religion assumed by philosophy, becomes outdated when
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philosophy appears and religion demonstrates unable of delivering a mutually determining other for philosophy.
Neither the Kantian nor Hegelian understanding of religious theory permits a definite theoretical interpretation of experience that does not eventually decrease to philosophy. As Kant and Hegel are defining representatives of the restrictions of modern philosophy, their philosophies of religion show a pervasive issue within modern scholarship on religion that cannot be simply avoided, even after it has been defined; following Kant's presentation of religion as a promoted formulation of moral principles, various disciplines have similarly approached religion as something to be rationalized and understood through philosophical norms. The philosophy of religion, as a discipline that takes not religion as its object, but the confluence of cultural forces involved in questions linked to several ways of being mindful, needs the assistance of several viewpoints in order to arrive at an agreeable definition of religion. So long as philosophy adopts religion as an object yet leaves religious theory as an incomprehensible quantity with no legal independence, philosophy would be incapable to close its explanations; once philosophy admits the separate viability of religious thought, it must declare that its interpretations can never be closed.
Of at least equal effect has been Kant's attempt to evaluate religion as necessarily based on morality, although there is similarly considerable conflict about the accuracy and the consequences of Kant's status. A general opinion is that Kant effectively reduces religion to
morality without remainder. Thus, Kant's work acts as an essential step in releasing humanity from the control of authoritarian and ritualistic religion. Other opinions look at Kant's consideration of religion as non-reductive and therefore corresponding religion a scale and value distinctive from morality. However, the term morality will not be recognized from ethics. Philosophers have taken various distinctions between the two at different times (like Kant and Hegel). But the term moral represents practice or habit, and it is a translation of the Greek philosophy, which implies roughly the same thing, and is the origin of the term ethics. In current non-technical use, the two terms are similar, although ethics has a little more flavor of theory and has been linked to the prescribed practice of several careers. In any case, this application will presume that morality is a set of habits that form how we think about, and how we must live. The word religion is much challenged. Religion is a system of faith and practice that agreeing a binding relation to human being. This does not yet provide a particular principle of religion, since the notions of divinity are so diverse, and human interactions with divinity are formulated so variously that no such principle is visible even within Western thinking. Possibly, it is best to realize religion as a term for a group of belief/practice mixes with a family closeness to each other, but no set of essential and enough situations tying them together.
We must define another currently important Kant's idea. He stated that it is difficult to realize the spirit of humanity without carful study of the ability of faith. Kant stresses the
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ontological level of mentioned ability (religiosity) within the human being soul. The proof for this statement looks to be the general historical process. In spite of all the historical theoretical and realistic efforts to show the failure of religious consciousness and worldview and ultimately to destroy it, the fact of religion still survives and performs an important act in the moral instruction and preservation of morality. Additionally, after all, the Kant's highlighting on the problems of religion and their irreconcilability to church-religion worth attention in general. Hegel's theoretical version of connection between morality and religion provides following related ideas:
The difference between the positive and subjective religion; consideration of phenomenon of the traditional religion; the difference between morality and ethical life, which allow historical study of the connection between morality and religion.
Weber, religious theory
Weber: Religion and Development
Religion is a widespread and universal organization which is greatly rooted in human beings. It is not only a strict organization but also applies a huge impact upon all other organizations. Several sociologists and anthropologists were enchanted by the spiritual side of religion. Weber so was no exception. What Weber was involved in the sociology of religion was not religion on daily life, on political, governmental, economic and moral actions in different historical circumstances that he attempted to recognize and eases to order. His research declares that religion which
is founded on cultural demands of human has now added new aspects to human life and human development. Weber indicated that the protestant institution and its ethics have performed an essential role in the development of their economy. This concept of weber has been brilliantly described in his extremely admired book, "Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism" (1905). His research declares that how far religion can affect the economic behavior of its followers. Weber's major worried was to what extent religious theory of the world of existence have affected the economic behavior of many societies and specifically the western civilization. Weber declares that Calvinist sect of protestant Christian religion has greatest impacts on the development of capitalism. Corresponding to him, it was the thoughts and beliefs world view of human civilizations that led the way their supporters acted, even in the economic sphere. Religion imposes specific principles of behavior. It's in agreement with these principles that supporters direct or orient their actions.
Weber considered the world religions as cultural phenomena or cultural objects that began under specific historical circumstances and developed into particular kinds of structures that consist of respective dogma, law, attitudes, and traditions. Religious dogma took on a rationalist structure that was to put an end to idolatry and legend. Weber was not of the view that religion was only a type of opium for the masses but regarded it as something that improved discipline the masses from brutality and anarchy. Religion offered the people a sense of meaning. For
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Weber there is a rationality in the shape of religion in contrast to magic and mythology.
Weber: Islam and Development
In Weber's viewpoint the character of a people's religion and religious organizations is historically one of the most significant issues in defining its political outlook, whether it develops a liberal tradition or not [5]. He declared that in the Islamic zones of the Middle East, many of the fundamentals of capitalism were absent. In the particular case of Islam, the emphasis was on the political military and economic nature of Islamic civilization as a patrimonial type of domination with prebendal feudalism as its foundation. In attitudinal words, Islam appeared to Weber in an entirely hedonistic spirit, particularly about women, comforts and land. Therefore, he achieved the conclusion that Islam contrasted with Puritanism. A picture of the Weberian structure of Islam might be attempted from two wide viewpoints: Islamic ethic, and patrimonialism of later Islam:
Islamic ethic: Weber indicates that rational law, independent cities and political solidity were entirely missing in Islam. However, he does not look to connect the absence of capitalism in Islam to the lack of the requirements identified by him. On the opposite, he lists two elements in charge for avoiding Islam from evolving naturally. The monotheistic Islam of Mekka was unsuccessful to develop into an ascetic worldly religion as its major carrier was a warrior band. The subject of the religious idea was altered into a set of values similar to the everyday needs of this warrior band. The spiritual aspect of Islam as
a belief approach with stress on salvation was transformed into the secular quest for everyday benefits. The outcome was that Islam became a religion of accommodation instead of transformation. Next, the original message of monotheism was exposed to change under the effect of Sufism, which organized for the emotional and orgiastic requirements of the masses. As a result, Islam was dragged in two contradictory directions by these two groups. The warrior group dragged Islam in the direction of a military ethic; and the Sufis in that of spiritual flight. Both the paths of Islam, demonstrating a bifurcated Islamic ethic failed to produce, as Weber will have us believe, the prerequisites congruent with the rise of rational capitalism.
Islamic autocracy: The second viewpoint of the Weberian concept of Islam is gained by detecting the stress put on the political and economic structure of such later dynasties as the Abbasid, Mamluk and Ottoman, and this construction falls under Weber's overall reflection of patrimonial bureaucracies. This sort of financial and political formation depended on the occupation of new properties which were then used to maintain central bureaucracy. The political formation hinged on a complicated balance of social forces characterized by the King, the military, the ulama and the mass. Numerous dynastic coups made political balance precarious, but amazingly the fundamental form of society was left intact. The main political paradox of the political structure of Monarchism in Weber's view was the king's overall reliance on the military, which all too often proved unreliable. The king took the power and kept his monopoly of power by reducing the development of
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independent organizations and groups within the patrimonial society. Also, potentially independent social parties were selected or incorporated into the military. The lawyers, the ulama mostly, the businessmen, were all state officials and emerged out of the imperial household. Therefore, a society organized unsuccessful to develop the independent organizations, which Weber saw in Europe facilitating the growth of capitalism.
Weber also stated this political structure failed to develop a rational and formal law as the perfect sacred law was subservient to the state and to political expediency. Likewise, cities in Islamic society never developed beyond a military camp and a place of government business. These cities similarly did not deliver an appropriate environment for the development of independent burghers and businessmen. Totally, the political system emphasized such values as imitation and denial of innovation. Hence, it was not attitude or ethic of Islam that influenced against the creation of prerequisites for capitalism; the inhibiting factor was the political status of the merchant class versus the dominant military-bureaucratic classes in Islamic civilizations [6].
Discussion
Weberian Islam: A Critique
The first thing for critiquing the Weberian structure of Islam is that he did not make any real effort to clarify the interfertility between these two viewpoints. The Islamic ethic is built from a survey of 17th, Islam in Mecca and Medina. The evaluation of autocracy was correlated with the development of a military bureaucracy under the Umayyad dynasty and its
fulfilment under the Ottoman dynasty. One possible reason for the failure to link these two separately strong views is that, as Turner indicates, Weber thought that a religion was permanently stamped by its early history, mostly by its original carriers [7], but evidentially this is a mistake. All religions of the world undertook changes as carrier and time changed. Next, the build of Islamic ethic is objectively wrong on two matters. In the first place, for reasons of his perfunctory approach, Weber marked over urban and commercial features of the early as well as later Islamic civilization. As Prof. Montgomery Watt has demonstrated, Islam appeared in a fundamentally commercial and urban environment of Mecca and flourished in the oasis settlement of Medina [8]. Much of the theological basis of the teachings of Islam is taken up with the troubles of commercialism and the very terminology of the Quran is plentiful with commercial notions. Most Islamicists would agree that the Mohammed prophet's holiness (Mohammed) is completely adapted to urban life [9].
A summary of Islamic economy recommends at least three ideas: respect for private property, advertising of a free market of exchange of goods and services and decreasing the rich and poor gaps. There appears to be three tactics for gradually reaching these goals. First, Islam stresses the work ethic, devotion to one's calling and enjoying the fruits of one's labor. Like Weber's 'Protestant ethic' (1904), Islam demands for hard work in order to get a living and take care of one's family, instead of sacrificing the world or surviving on handouts, donations and charity. But unlike the Protestant ethic,
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Islam does not certainly take material success in this world as a sign of God's approval of what one is doing. Furthermore, much as Islam stresses hard work, it is opposed to materialism, opportunistic profiteering and apparently unending pursuit of wealth and an obsession with this. Second, while favoring attainment of property and open market economy, Islam forbids the process of dishonestly earning money quickly and easily, or unnecessary collection such as gambling, hoarding and dealing in interest. Islamic banks deal in profit and loss sharing rather than interest, something thought to be quite possible [10], and in which there is a growing interest among Muslim and non-Muslim economists alike. Third, since sources of unnecessary gathering of wealth are rejected by Quranic prevention, distribution of wealth is facilitated by Islamic folkways (such as voluntary acts of charity, kindness and hospitality), as well as through explicit Quranic commandments of inheritance (4:7, 11) and the poor tax or zakat. Therefore, juxtaposed against relevant facts of Islamic economic life it shows that the Islamic society undoubtedly fulfilled at least one of the Weberian prerequisites, that is,
"commercialization of economic life".
In the second place, Weber's claim that the warrior ethic had a destructive transformative effect on the character of Islam is minimally tenable, and at the same time, factually an exaggeration. Indeed, the warrior group was one of the parts of the converts to Islam; and, as H. Gibb categorizes and recognizes three such social groups in terms of their commitment of Islam [11]. The first is the honest converts who agreed totally
with the spirit of Islam and who showed absolute duty to the Prophet. The second group included the businessmen of Mecca for whom Islam did not restrict their economic freedom; and they indicated commitment to the utilitarian objectives of Islam. The third group was characterized by the Bedouin warriors whose observance to Islam was brought about either by the promise of booty or by military threat.
The second part of the Weberian construct of Islam is, as Professor Turner mentioned, open to criticism on several grounds [7]. Weber failed to make allowance for the persistent disagreement between the virtuous and their rulers. Weber was also incapable to identify the social solidarity of Islamic cities which focused on the law schools and criminal groups. But such criticisms on matters of detail aside the core of the Weberian thesis that autocracy stunted the development of Islam along capitalist lines holds an undeniable ground, and which is also demonstrated by current research.
Conclusion
Numerous main theoretical ideas of Kant and Hegel, which can be utilized productively in the modern explanation of the problem of connection between morality and religion, can be subsequently indicated. Kant's assumption of religion as a link between the perfect morality and everyday life of human becomes applicable at present. It is highlighted that religion, alongside the law, most suitably apply the idea of moral perfection in the world. Presently, due to a shortage of morality and the constant search for the methods to conserve, develop and strength it, the Kant's assumption of
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religion as a way between morality and the world is worth to be considered. The contrast between positive and subjective religion stresses the need of a reflexive approach to the idea of religion. By this receipt, Hegel expresses his theoretical attachment to Kant's positions, continuing his critique of nonreflexive exterior liturgical religiosity. The initial Hegel's model of folk religion is one of the most popular statements in the history of philosophy for theoretical basics of national self-identity.
Generally, Max Weber was not interested in Islam as a religion. His emphasis was on the Islam that was opposing to capitalism. He did not deliver full-blown study outputs on Islam; and his commentaries on Islam look to be a kind of sociological buddy for his assessment of the Protestant ethic. He left his study on Islam unfinished. However, Islam seems to be essentially vital to his overall effort against the sociology of religion.
Religion and development relationship through philosophical perspectives of Kant, Hegel and Weber; A critical review
Dalal Benboutrif, Ural Federal University
The aim of the paper is critical reviewing three famous philosophers' perspectives about relations and conflicts between religion and development: Kant, Hegel and Weber. In particular, this paper is going to clarify that religion is a conflict or an opportunity for the development of human and society, by focusing on the Islamic religion. Keywords: Religion; Development; Kant; Hegel; Weber; Islam
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