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10
O. Pavlov,
Ph. D. (Hist.)
REASONS FOR AN ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE WEST AND RADICAL ISLAM
A couple of years ago such an alliance would have seemed incredible and undesirable for any side. The United States was waging a bitter war with "al Qaeda," the Taliban, and terrorists, including those in Islamic guise. Islamic parties based their policies on anti-Americanism and anti-western sentiments, calling for solution of all problems on the metaphysical basis of the Koran and Sunna.
Today, slightly more than a year and a half later, after the beginning of the disturbances in the Arab world, which were called the "Arab spring" by the West, the existence of such alliance does not need confirmation. All the same, it looks abominable and incomprehensible. The outrage in the Islamic world caused by the film "Innocence of Muslims" distributed in the Internet in mid-September 2012, and the assassination of the U.S. Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens in Benghazi on September 11, 2012, again demonstrated the abnormal character of the West's "friendship" with radial Islamists.
For those who are unfamiliar with the subject we should note that when radical Islamists began to gain power in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, who had only recently been considered in those very countries and in the civilized West as terrorists, diplomats and politicians in the United States and the European Union would repeat that that was a "natural process, that Islam would overcome radicalism, and Islamists, under the impact of the obligations they had assumed in the course of the electoral process, would steady down, reconcile themselves with the existence of the opposition, and begin to adhere to the standards and rules of western democracy. Emphasis was laid on the fact that the radical Islamic forces came to power by legitimate means and therefore
there was no reason to fear them. It was better than stagnation under the rule of the former dictators. In other words, the aim was nothing, and movement to democracy - everything.
The rosy picture painted by western political alchemists began to darken soon after the beginning of the events in Syria in spring 2011, when western states, primarily, France and Britain (not without support of the United States), rendered considerable aid to Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar in the attempt to overthrow the dictatorial regime of Bashar Asad. Prior to that, the West "overlooked" the proclamation of the Sharia law to be the foundation of the legislation in Libya. It reacted just as phlegmatically to the onslaught of Salafists and other radical elements on government bodies in Tunisia. Stormy protests in France against the destruction of the mausoleums of Muslim saints in Timbuktu in July 2012 by the Salafist grouping "Ansar ad-din" (very close to "al Qaeda") in Mali died down very rapidly, and little was left of the desire to send French troops there; only protests and gestures of despair at UNESCO remained.
An expert on Syria is well aware of the fact that in that country, just as it is the case of Egypt, there has never been any well-organized opposition to the ruling regime except the "Muslim Brothers." The Syrian "Brothers" have been preparing and conducting in deep secrecy terrorist acts against the power of the Alawites for over thirty years, but scored no success up to now. Their ideology and actions were analyzed by the well-known expert and former secret agent Alain Chouet in the right-wing French newspaper "Le Figaro" of September 6, 2012. The Sunna majority, though dissatisfied with Bashar Asad's regime, has for a long time adhered to the idea that it was not for them to be allied with such radical elements. The poly-confessional society in Syria was much more secular than in many Arab countries, although in the 1990s Islamization processes began to develop among the Sunnites, which
caused serious apprehensions of representatives of other confessions, above all Christians, who began to enlarge the areas of their compact habitation.
Naturally, the main sponsors of the rebels in Syria knew about this, just as those regional actors helping them, who either give refuge to these radically-minded people (incidentally, Turkey has done this to the Chechen terrorists), or supply the militants with money and weapons, which were in abundance in Libya after the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi.
However, knowledge about those who rules the roost in the patchy Syrian opposition has not stopped its western sponsors. Washington has made a clumsy attempt to camouflage assistance to the armed rebels in Syria by sending specialists to Turkey who were supposed "to filter assistance" and prevent it from falling into the hands of "al Qaeda." In recent months, from the spring of 2012, the rebels' base has been noticeably radicalized, and now it is less and less oriented to the liberal slogans of the Syrian National Council or the leaders of the Syrian Army of Liberation. But this does not change anything in the policy of western countries. The West's aid to the radical Islamic groups continues.
Certain Russian experts, like, for example Sh. Sultanov (the newspaper "Zavtra"), put forward a version that western support of the "Muslim Brothers" is connected with the fact that political Islam is today a political force without alternative, and the "Brothers" themselves are the most moderate in the entire spectrum of Islamic organizations.
Explaining why Washington stakes on "moderate fundamentalists," as he terms them, Sh. Sultanov singles out four factors: first, it is precisely the "Muslim Brothers" who are the most open spokesmen of the trend of increasing Islamization in this region,
possess a developed infrastructure, and have a powerful social support and experience in a prolonged political struggle.
Secondly, in his view, the United States is striving to arrest the further radicalization of "Islamic revival" with the help of the "Muslim Brothers" and prevent the coming to power of extreme Salafists, Jihadists and Taqfirists.
Thirdly, he thinks that the American strategists rely on the possibility to use the "Muslim Brothers" potential for opposing the spreading of the regional influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Lastly, the countries where the "Muslim Brothers" come to power become closely tied to the global system created and led by the United States. This is why it has mechanisms and possibilities of proper influence.
Unfortunately, this analysis is correct but partly. Indeed, the United States has certain possibilities to influence the "Muslim Brothers," but they are not limitless.
As to the first two arguments of Sh. ultanov, they are dubitable and can seriously be disputed. The fact that the "Muslim Brothers" are a powerful transborder and transnational organization using the principle of work of the western masonic societies and created with the support of the western (British) special services does not mean that the United States should rely on them. For this purpose there should be coincidence of aims and tasks, which is not so in this case. Otherwise the United States and the old western colonial powers would have supported the Arab nationalists as the most influential force in the region during the Soviet period. But this was not the case, inasmuch as the aims and tasks did not coincide. This is why the very fact of the influence of the "Muslim Brothers" is not the reason for their alliance with the United States.
As to the second argument, it looks dubitable, too, in the eyes of Middle East experts. There are ideological differences between the "Muslim Brothers" and Salafists, indeed. The former are more pragmatic and cynical in reaching their aims, and they often camouflage them as common democratic ones. They have mastered the liberal discourse of pluralistic democracy well enough, and it is actively used for drawing both western and autochthonous liberal elites to their side. The parties and groupings they organize can bear the most diverse names - HAMAS, the "Party of Freedom and Justice," etc. But this does not mean that there is an insurmountable gap between them and Salafists, Jihadists, Taqfirists and "al Qaeda." Otherwise there could not have been such close cooperation between the "Muslim Brothers" and Salafists, as was the case in the course of the "Egyptian revolution," when Salafists repeatedly helped the "Brothers" and actively supported them especially in backward rural districts.
The experience of HAMAS in Gaza has shown that despite maneuvers and negotiations with the secular nationalistic FATH movement, the HAMAS is not going to renounce its monopoly on power (Salafists openly talk of the need for it). Although they constantly talk of democracy, just as the Bolsheviks did in their time.
Of course, cohesion of the camp of radical Islam is supported by the presence of the common enemy - the secular regime of Bashar Asad, but after its abolition differences between the two factions of fundamentalists can flare up with renewed force. But these differences will not be on the subject of a democratic model which should be built, as has usually been the case of Europe - in an argument, say, between socialist and right-wing liberal parties. The main argument will be about the form of a caliphate to be built on the ruins of the secular national states, the place of the center of that caliphate, and its head. Does the United States understand it? The aim of the United States
proclaimed by George Bush, Sr. was the promotion and development of democracy in the region, but not the creation of theocratic states. Or does Washington understand it now as it is suggested by the "Muslim Brothers?" Or are the right-wing nationalists of Europe right in asserting that the western elites have come to terms with Islamists in exchange for cheap oil in the crisis period and refusal from anti-western terror?
Thus, if the arguments of Sh. Sultanov, a very authoritative expert who knows the region well enough, are valid, or partly valid, what is the real reason for such a strange alliance which has cost the U.S. Ambassador in Libya his life?
We can hardly have a definite answer today. The U.S. policy in the region looks too whimsical and contradictory. On the one hand, Washington kills Osama bin Laden, and on the other, is arming his followers in Syria.
There are two versions: either the West commits a strategic error, or it uses, or tries to use, radical political Islam in its interests, which would help it take the "right side of history," as the U.S. Department of State thought at the initial stage of the developments of the "Arab spring." Or both are correct.
This author stands closer to the view of the well-known Russian public and religious figure Geidar Jemal, who noted in his recent interviews that if the West was going to use the "Muslim Brothers" for abolishing the obsolete dictatorial regimes (something like it was once done in Afghanistan when Soviet troops were driven out from there), it succeeded in doing this because the aims of "police batons" and Islamists coincided tactically. But later, as further developments have shown, their ways parted. The United States and its western partners should demonstrate the construction of liberal democracy in the countries where the "Arab spring" has triumphed, but the Islamists have
their own program pursuing other aims. The assassination of the U.S. Ambassador in Benghazi may, probably, become the "moment of truth" after which support of radical Islamists can hardly be depicted as support of democratic processes in Arab countries, and it will be harder still to implement them.
If U.S. support of radical Islamists continues, then it would be possible to believe another, conspiracy, version. According to it, everything what has been going on in the Middle East during the past two years is a result of the actions of the world's financial-political elites, which prod Washington, and London and Paris along with it, to bring the globalization processes to the logical end; to complete the destruction of national sovereign states in Eurasia with the help of radical Islamists (in this their aims coincide with those of the Islamists), create the situation of chaos in which it would be easier to prolong the life of the dying dollar, and prevent the formation of a really multipolar world based on big regional blocs of states possessing their own strong regional currencies capable to throw a challenge to the present currency-financial system. This is why the present "Arab revolutions" are aimed not against Arab dictators, but against the Eurasian Union and China taking shape before our very eyes.
This variant may seem fantastic to many people, but the appearance of the film-provocation "Innocence of Muslims" is in line with the aim of plunging the region of the Middle East and North Africa into chaos and religious obscurantism. However, the crude nature of this clumsy provocation proved harmful to its authors and only instigated anti-American sentiments in the region. The money invested in the large-scale anti-Russian campaign in the Middle East under the slogan "Russia - the enemy of the Arab nations" (it is financed by Saudi Arabia) seems to have been wasted, inasmuch as
large-scale anti-American manifestations in the region and beyond it continue unabated.
In any case, no matter who and what stands behind the policy of western support of radical political Islam, it becomes ever more evident that in the confrontation between liberal post-modernism and the metaphysics of one of the most dynamic religions the former is losing, which can be seen by the illogical actions of the western political class.
Political Islam, which has long been mustering its strength for a fight against secular society with its values, is now strong as it has never been. Its spokesmen have ably been using the anti-imperialist vocabulary of nationalists and communists and their slogans. The main thing is that they have well learnt the slogan of another radically-minded political figure - Vladimir Lenin, who said: "The imperialists themselves will give us a rope on which we shall hang them." But, apparently, people in Washington have long forgotten Lenin's works. It's a pity...
"Blizhny Vostok, arabskoye probuzhdeniye i Rossiya: Chto dalshe? "Moscow, 2012, pp. 131-136.
CONTENTS OF «RUSSIA AND THE MOSLEM WORLD» BULLETIN FOR 2013 № 1 (247)-12 (258)
N 1
Vasili Belozerov. Specific Features of the Geopolitical Picture of the Modern World; Yuri Dorokhov. The Role of Information Policy in Deradicalization of Daghestan Society; Arkadi Dubnov. Tashkent Goes, Problems Stay; E. Denisov. Central Asia as a Region of International Politics. 78
Mikhail Vinogradov. A Look Beyond the Outskirts. (Foreign Policy as Seen by the Russian Elite Farther Than at Their Departments); Boris Aksyumov. Ideological Foundations of Religious-Political Extremism and Terrorism in the North Caucasus; Rafik Usmanov. Modern Political Process in the Caspian Region in the Context of International Relations. (View from Moscow); Ibragim Ibragimov. Foreign Policy of Azerbaijan; Shamshadin Kerim, Aliy Almukhametov. Islam in Contemporary Kazakhstan; G. Shulga. Culturology Aspect in Formation of United Eurasian Space: View from Tajikistan; Rafik Sayfulin. How Myths Are Born? Tashkent View on CSTO and Central Asia.
N 3
N. Shmelev. What Russia Needs Today from the West; Rinat Mukhametov. Russian Muslims and Foreign Policy. (Can the Islamic Factor Become Essential); S. Filatov. Power and Religion in the Republic of Bashkortostan; B. Aksyumov, D. Lavrinenko. The Ethno-Political Prerequisites for Extremism in the North Caucasus; Rustam Khaidarov. Interaction of Religion and the State in Tajikistan: Problems and Prospects; Murat Laumulin. Virtual Security of Central Asia.
N 4
Dmitri Trenin. Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation; Yana Amelina. Nationalism or Radical Islam (Political Realities of Tatarstan); Magomed Daduyev, Said-Hamzat Nunuyev. Ethnic and Religious Extremism as a Threat to National Security in Post-Soviet
Society. (On Materials of the North Caucasus); Aider Bulatov. Islam in the Crimea: From Tragic Past to Contemporary Problems; E. Borodin. Kyrgyzstan in the Context of World Economy and Politics; Alexander Shustov. Islamization of Central Asia (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan).
N 5
Aleksei Kiva. Demonstration Effect in the Conditions of Globalization (On the Example of Events in Arab Counties); Muslimat Gabibova. Confessional and Secular Factors in the Republic of Daghestan at Present; Cities and People: Socio-Cultural Transformation in Kazakhstan; E. Borodin. A Clan Character of the Structure. of the Kyrgyz Republic; Abdullo Khakim Rahnamo. Private Religious Education in Tajikistan: Present Situation, Problems and Conclusions; Kerim Khas. The Position of Turkey and Russia in the Context of Cooperation in the Eurasian Region.
N 6
Yevgeni Primakov. Images of Russia and the World without Ideology; Nikolai Spassky. The Decline of Europe and Prospects of Russia; Victor Avksentyev, Valery Vasilchenko. Problems of Federalism in the Context of Ethnopolitical Process in the South of Russia: Political & Legal Aspects; Boris Gandarov. Ethnic Factor in the Development of Islam in Modern Ingushetia; E. Kulpin-Gubaidullin. A Small Nation in Different Ethnic Surrounding in the Post-Soviet Area; M. Tashiyeva. Ethnopolitical Conflicts: Their Features in the Kyrgyz Republic and Ways to Resolve Them; A. Kazantsev. Whither Central Asia: Changing Roles of Global Players in Perspective up to 2020.
Y. Boiko, E. Sadykova. Provinces of Special Importance; D. Mulyukova. Formation and Development of Regional Political Myths in Modern Russia; Indira Kadimova. Specific Features of Political Modernization in the Republic of Daghestan; Alim Temirbulatov. Geopolitical Factors of Influence of the Caspian Region in Assessments of U.S. Experts; Georgi Rudov. Central Asia in Strategic Concepts of Russia; Valentin Bogatyrev. The Least of All Evils; Ekaterina Borisova, Sergei Panarin. Security Contradictions on the Example of Water and Energy Problems of Central Asia; Aziz Niyazi. The Development of Uzbekistan in 2012 and Plans for 2013.
N 8
Tatyana Samsonova. Formation of Civil Culture in Modern Russia; A. Martynenko. Muslims of Mordovia: Problems of Overcoming Internal Conflict; Oleg Tsvetkov. "Chercessian Problem" in Political Processes; V. Vasilenko, V. Malyshev. Islamic Extremism in the North Caucasus; R. Nazarov, V. Aliyeva, S. Ganiyev. Monitoring the Ethno-Political Situation. The CIS Countries. Uzbekistan; Jawed Zafar. Geopolitics of U.S. Walking out from Afghanistan; S. Nikolayev. Dilemma of "Values and Interests" in U.S. Policy in Central Asia.
N 9
Vladimir Yegorov, Olga Savina. Common Cultural-Civilizatory Foundation as a Factor of Reintegration of Post-Soviet Community; Abdulbari Muslimov. Socialization of the Umma. Direct and Indirect Mechanisms; M. Astvatsaturova. Spiritual Board of Muslims of
Stavropol Territory; Nuradin Khanaliyev. Islam in Political-Cultural Matrix of North Caucasian Peoples; T. Chabiyeva. Religious Identity of Young People and the Wahhabi Trend in Ingushetia; Samat Kumyspayev, Guldariga Simukanova. The Role of Religion in the Educational System in the Context of Globalization: Kazakhstan's Experience; Yevgeni Borodin. The Place and Role of Kyrgyzstan in the Modern World; L. Vasilyev. The Geopolitical Situation in Central Asia; Dina Malysheva. The "Arab Spring" as Seen by Russian Scholars.
N 10
Sergei Karaganov. Russia in the Changing World; Victor Avksentyev. Regional Specifics of Modern Religious "Renaissance" in the South: Conflict or Dialogue; A. Unusova. Muslims of the Urals-Volga Area in Early 21st Century; E. Arlyapova. Mobilization Potential of Islam Yesterday and Today; Raushan Sartayeva. Specific Features of Problems of Socio-Cultural Development of Kazakhstan; L. Khoperskaya. Monitoring of the Ethno-Political Situation in the CIS Countries. Kyrgyzstan; The Roles and Actors Will Change in the Global "Kabuki Theater".
N 11
T. Maliyeva. Ideology and Religion in Post-Soviet Society; T. Fatkulin. The Arab World in Russian Foreign Policy: Methodology of Approaches from Regional Position; Mikhail Topchiyev. Specific Features of State Policy in Regulating Confessional Relations in a Poly-Ethnic Region (on Example of Astrakhan Region); M. Abdullayeva. Islamic Education in Present-Day Daghestan; I. Savin. Monitoring Ethno-Political Situation: Kazakhstan; Yevgeni Borodin. Relations
between Russia and Kyrgyzstan at the Present Stage; Elena Ionova. Turkmenistan and Problems of Regional Security; Aleksei Malashenko. Interests and Chances of Russia in Central Asia.
N 12
Dmitri Trenin. The Fourth Vector of Vladimir Putin; Elvira Maiboroda. Ways and Methods of Depoliticization of Ethnicity in the South of Russia; Andrei Syzranov. Russia's Policy in Fighting Islamic Extremism in the Volga Region Late 1990s - Earle 2000s; Andrei Baranov. Politicization of Islam in the Present-Day Crimea Conflictological Aspect; Dmitri Egorov. The Role of Central Asia in the World Political System The "Big Jame" in Central Asia in XXI Century; Aleksei Malashenko. Turkmenistan: Has There Been a Thaw?; Vitaly Vorobyov. A Sum of Converging Interests Should We Fear Growing Chinese Influence in Central Asia; O. Pavlov. Reasons for an Alliance between the West and Radical Islam.
