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Section 14. Philosophy
Section 14. Philosophy Секция 14. Философия
Makuhin Petr Gennadevich, Omsk state technical University, Omsk, Russia Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Associate Professor, «Philosophy and social communications»
E-mail: petr_makuhin@mail.ru
Re-thinking of the issue of scientific status of philosophy in the context of post-positivist criticism of justificationism
Abstract: The change of the image of science from classic to neo-classic that took place in XX century gives more grounds to view philosophy as a science, also due to the fact that realization of the absence of close dependence between theoretical provisions of science and data of the experiment overcomes empiricistic justificationism.
Keywords: justificationism, verity of philosophical and scientific knowledge, verification, positivism, neopositivism, post-positivism.
At the intersection of centuries-old traditions of understanding of two questions constantly reproduced on new basis about the degree of scientific character of science and wisdom as a property of knowledge in general, there is an issue of effectiveness of claims of philosophy with regard to scientific character and verity of its statements (a variant of its solution, based on the neo-classic image of science, presented by us in [1, 2]). In spite of the fact that as a result of re-thinking of classic image of science in 40s of XX century, the latter characteristics cannot be considered as identical (i. e. verity cannot play the role of a criterion of scientific character, otherwise one would have to remove all contradicted, fully or partly, theories from the history of science, which were nevertheless important for scientific development). Up till now, the science is perceived by mass consciousness as «a kind of understanding that proves the verity ofits statements by way ofexperiment». Obviously, such approach does not allow considering philosophy as a science, which was clearly expressed since the beginning of the new time in the context of which philosophy became conscious of itself (and was viewed «from the side», particularly, by scientists) as a required completion of scientific understanding on the one side, and it was something different compared with the science (see more about this contradiction [3]) on the other side. This difference was also seen in the inability of philosophers to apply empiric methods based on the direct interaction with the object of research due to the conduct of observation, experiment and measurement.
The most consistent criticism of philosophy in this aspect was undertaken by neo-positivism (within the frames of which logic positivism developed by the members of«the Vienna Circle» M. Schlick, O. Neurath,
F. Waismann, K. Gödel, R. Carnap, H. Reichenbach, A. Ayer etc. gained special development; hence, neopositivism in the whole is often identified with logic positivism), which, according to N. S. Yulina, «urged «revolutionary» transformation of philosophy and ultimate breaking of its subject, methods and functions, calling the validity of existence of any metaphysics in question» [4, 268], because any metaphysic statements cannot be verified in an experimental way (herewith, the issue of the latter «is, in fact, a question of the fate of the traditional subject of philosophy in the conditions of scientific and technical revolution and social and spiritual transformations related to it») [4, 249]). This requirement of negotiation of metaphysics, «cure» from this «lingual disease of mind» as it was called by
L. Wittgenstein (whose logical researches influenced the ideas of «the Vienna Circle» significantly: M. Schlick called metaphysics, «at the very least, poetry, but not philosophy»; R. Carnap called it «a set of nonsense statements», O. Neurath said that «the representatives of metaphysics mislead themselves believing that their opinions express anything at all»), was related to the need of narrowing theoretical level of science to empiric one with a necessity to verify as well as physicalize, i. e. narrowing all languages of science to the language of physics as the most verified science, according to this
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approach. In other words, logical positivism took the idea of classic positivism about empiric grounds of knowledge to the edge, calling scientific only those statements, which can be narrowed to «protocol statements» (the content of which is based on immediate observations). This position is also called empiricist kind ofjustificationism; we will view the latter in detail as it forms a position in the methodology of science, according to which «the basis of scientific knowledge can be formed by intuitive and self-obvious wisdoms, axioms, inborn or a priori ideas (rationalistic justificationism)» or «firmly established facts» (empiricist justificationism)» [4, 637].
A known modern philosopher A. G. Dugin, using a different transcription of this term, indicates that «radical positivists are the supporters of traditional justificationism), i. e. scientists and philosophers of science convinced of the fact that «true scientific universal theory can be irrefutably evident» [6, 20-21] with the help of inductive experiment. This canonically positivist approach, according to him, «is sometimes ... described as «verificationism», conviction in the ability to «verify» a scientific theory or hypothesis with the help of an experiment, correspondence to a clear-cut set of atomic facts and strictly predictable deterministic situations» [6, 21]. A. G. distinguishes logical positivists H. Reichenbach and other members of the Vienna circle as outstanding representatives of justificationism.
Addressing the history of understanding of «theoretical burden of experiment» and a circumstance that empiric data of science is in fact a result of rational convention of scientists by post-positivism, first of all, let’s view the ideas of I. Lakatos. In the work «Falsification and methodology of scientific research programs» he justified the thesis that «the values of the verity of statements of «observation» cannot be defined categorically: no factual suggestion can be evidently grounded by the experiment» [7, 283]; theoretical statements can be concluded only from other theoretical statements but not from the facts. Moreover, the very idea «to try to prove suggestions referring to the indications of feelings is same as to prove one’s rightness «banging the table with a fist»» [7, 283-284]. On the basis of that, I. Lakatos also criticizes classic justificationists, who «reckon that scientific knowledge consists of evidently grounded statements» [7, 276] and «accept only evidently grounded theories» [7, 288], and falsificationists, who «put «contradiction» on the forefront» [7, 308] — «the progress of science is slowed
down by justificationism and naive falsificationism» [7, 332]. However, since the growth of sciences is the increase of chaos, construction of the Tower of Babel [7, 299], «the scientists and ... philosophers preferred justificationist illusions not to be dragged into this nightmare» [7, 299].
Among those scientists of the XX century, who struggled with «justification^ illusions», there was, first of all, A. Einstein with his thesis that empiric facts «only remind of, suggest a theory, but don’t impose it». Clarifying this, he wrote that «the ultimate task of a physical scientist lies in discovering more general elementary laws from which it would be possible to logically conclude the picture of the world. However, there is no logical way of discovering these elementary laws» [8, 154], i. e. «there is no logical way following which we could go from sensory perception to principles lying in the base of theoretical»» [8, 154]. Hence, «the only way to achieve them is intuition that helps see the order hidden under the external manifestations of different processes» [8, 154]. He returns to this ideas several times; for instance, in a letter to M. Solovine he writes that there is «logical way» leading from «immediate data of our sensation experience» to «theoretical axioms» — «there is only intuitive (psychological) connection, which is constantly «renewed»» [9, 570]. In the remarks to articles as of 1949, he indicated that «logical system of notions is physics only because its notions and judgments are in the required compliance with the world of sensation experience» [10, 307], which make the doubts of the scientist between the following extremes inevitable. On the one side, any natural scientist «tries to connect ... notions with the world of sensation experience» [10, 307], but on the other side, «realizes that there is no logical way from empiric data to the world of his notions. Then, his approach becomes more realistic, because he starts realizing logical independence of the system built by him» [10, 307].
Summarizing the above said, let’s indicate that if justification^ program of construction of science did not allow recognizing philosophy as science because of uncertainty of connection of its statements with empiric level, then the Duhem-Quine thesis (indicating the absence of unique dependence between theoretical provisions and data of experiment) that generalizes the criticism of this program deprives this criticism of philosophy’s scientific status of the power of conviction.
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References:
1. Makuhin, P. G. Modern Russian debate on the scientifc status of philosophy in the context of truth as characteristic of philosophical knowledge//European Applied Sciences, December, 2013, 12 - pp. 114-115.
2. Makuhin, P. G. Attempt of apologetics of philosophy scientism in the light of revising the truth as a property of scientififi c knowledge: the problem ofverififi ability and falsififi ability//Paradigmata poznani, № 2, 2014, - pp. 39-42.
3. Makuhin, P. G. Jose Ortega y Gasset as a philosopher in «in partibus infidelium» in the context of a problem of contradiction of self-consciousness of the new European philosophy//«The Second International Congress on Social Sciences and Humanities». Proceedings of the Congress (19 May, 2014). «East West» Association for Advanced Studies and Higher Education GmbH. Vienna. 2014. pp. 268-271.
4. Yulina, Ya. S. The problem of science and metaphysics in the American philosophy of XX century//Philosophy in the modern world. Philosophy and science. Critical essays of bourgeois philosophy. - M.: Nauka, 1972. - P. 249-297.
5. Porus, V. N. Justificationism//New philosophical encyclopedia: 4 volumes. V. 1. - M.: Mysl, 2010. - P. 637.
6. Dugin, A. G. Evolution of paradigm basics of science/A. G. Dugin. - M.: Arktogeya-Tsentr. - 2002. - 418 p.
7. Lakatos, I. Falsification and methodology of scientific research programs//Kuhn, T. S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. - M.: LLC «Izdatelstvo AST», 2003. - P. 273-453.
8. Einstein, A. Prologue//Collection of scientific works: 4 volumes. V.4. Articles, reviews and letters. Evolution of physics. - 1967. - P. 152-155.
9. Einstein, A. Appendix. Letters to Maurice Solovine//Collection of scientific works: 4 volumes. V.4. Articles, reviews and letters. Evolution of physics. - 1967. - P. 545-575.
10. Einstein, A. Remarks to articles//Collection of scientific works: 4 volumes. V.4. Articles, reviews and letters. Evolution of physics. - 1967. - P. 294-315.
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