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obliged to German philosopher F. Schleiermacher. Shpet notes the importance of Schleiermacher's recognition of the relationship of hermeneutics and thinking. But, as the philosopher suggests, Schleiermacher stops in front of the problem of «understanding as it is, and meaning as it is». What is interpreted is understood by Shpet in a more complicated manner than by Schleiermacher. «What is interpreted must not be quite alien to us, but it must not be quite ours » [1, 320] — Shpet said. Hermeneutics as the art of understanding, as Shpet considers, should not be only reduced to the external, positive interpretation. He insists on the fact that avoiding of purely philosophical perspective is unfavorable for any scientific research.
The disadvantage is the ambition to reduce the problem of understanding to psychologism. Shpet reveals this disadvantage in the works of many thinkers who studied the problems of hermeneutics. We must study not only the problems of grammar and psychology, but also try to understand the «surroundings and relationships ofnature, and finally a historical event, institutions and morality, states and activities in the national spirit. It is this type of interpreting that seems especially important for us» [1, 360] — the philosopher thinks.
Great attention is paid by Shpet to the development of ideas about hermeneutics in the works of the German philosopher Dilthey and the German historian I. G. Droysen. Dilthey's merit, according to Shpet, is in the fact that he demonstrated the importance of hermeneutics for the consideration of history and all the sciences about spirit. «For modern justification of sciences of spirit it is hermeneutics that gives a starting-point of the highest value» [1, 382], noted Dilthey. But Shpet is not satisfied with Dilthey's bright psychological setting in the understanding of hermeneutics as a science of an inner experienced reality, although Dilthey in the development of problems of hermeneutics goes further than Schleiermacher, addressing the problem of intercommunion of the internal and the external (in this connection it is worth to recall the famous Dilthey's words that «the human spirit speaks from the stones of marble, from musical sounds, gestures, words and writ-tings, deeds, economic organizations and institutions») [1, 384]. Thus, Dilthey turned to the problem of language and expanded the
art of understanding to the philosophical generalizations. But according to Shpet, Dilthey did not understand fully the importance of considering the problems of a sign. For Shpet a sign and a word are the main facts of the development of culture and the solution of the problems of hermeneutics and our «coming in» into culture depend on their understanding. And not accidentally the ideas of hermeneutics are closely associated with the development of semiotics and structuralism.
The depth and the compactness of a thought and manners of its exposition by Shpet admire us. In a few words or lines he could express both his attitude to all sorts of philosophical ideas and his own point of view. You can only imagine what heights the philosophical thought in Russia would have reached, if there had not been known tragic events.
Modern are Shpet's words about the necessity of comprehension of true vital essence, hidden behind the surface of sensual and rational experience. The Russian philosopher considered it necessary to be able to see and to understand the meaning ofwhat is happening both in life and in science and philosophy. And now, to all who doubts the need to study and to know philosophy and believes that its role in our world is extremely low, it is worth recalling the words of one of the most brilliant Russian thinkers: « Philosophy is designed not to solve the tasks of a physicist or a historian but to show him his own roots, starts and to bring the universal base under huge modern knowledge» [1, 39].
And it's not just that Shpet was much ahead of his time, developing the ideas and principles extremely important for modern philosophical thought. His ideas are often much more productive than the modern philosophical concepts of postmodern and post-structuralistic persuasion. Not getting into philosophical relativism, so characteristic for the «postmodern sensitivity», he, at the same time, operates by very flexible techniques of philosophical analysis and philosophy design, gives brilliant samples of generalized philosophical analysis of the specific, complex phenomena.
The principles of modern hermeneutics developed by him are not out of date nowadays but they retain a great potential for further development.
References:
1. Shpet G. G. Mysl I slovo. Izbrannye trudy. - Moscow: Rosspan, 2005. - 688 p.
2. Shpet G. G. Sochineniya. - Moscow: Pravda, 1989. - 603 p.
Chernyakova Natalia, Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Northern People Institute E-mail: [email protected]
Rationality as an attribute of sociality
Abstract: It's asserted in the article that the idea of different "types of rationality" leads to the methodologically inappropriate increasing of the number of such types. In the opinion of the author the real differences in thoughts or ways of existence are embodiments of one and the same rationality as an attribute of the social mode of human existence. Keywords: rationality, types of rationality, irrationality, attribute of sociality.
The idea of different "types of rationality" has been devel- science, religion, art, policy, etc. Indication to the special "type of oped in the 20th century in a lot of philosophical and humanitar- rationality" is treated today as an essential basis for understanding ian contexts. It will not be exaggeration to say that by the early any other differences between the subjects of culture or the results 21st century this idea has acquired the status of a methodological of their activities [See: 1; 2; 3; 5; 6; 7].
principle in researches not only of the history of culture as a whole, The use of the term "rationality" in science has always been a
but of the essence of its separate phenomena, such as philosophy, part of the ideological self-assertion of science as the "higher", the
Rationality as an attribute of sociality
"best", the "most effective", etc. type of knowledge. For scientists themselves as for positivists and neopositivists, who expressed just scientific self-consciousness, scientific knowledge is the only actual knowledge and scientific knowledge only can appropriate the status of "rational". Unlike the use of such a direct estimates as "good" or "bad", using of the terms "rational" or "irrational" gave an appearance of a special disinterestedness, objectivity and adherence to some universal criteria of reason that are embodied just in scientific knowledge. All the other forms of knowledge: mundane, philosophical, humanitarian, artistic, religious — were declared to be irrational simply because they are not scientific.
For all non-scientific forms of knowledge and for all critics of positivistic and neopositivistic philosophy and methodology of science the meaning of the "problem of rationality" was reduced, ultimately, to two issues: (1) are nonscientific forms of knowledge as rational, as science, and (2) what are the specific features of scientific rationality itself? To the extent that the research of non-scientific forms of knowledge required going beyond the logical and methodological problems of science, the context of discussions about "rationality" was becoming increasingly broad and the content of issues — more philosophical and culturelogical. Anthropological studies have shown that in the context of "ours/theirs" the term "rationality" are always marks (and at least partially — masks) simple value judgments: "It is good (because we like it), and so — it is rational", "It is bad (because we don't like it), and therefore — it is irrational". And no matter how sophisticated the logical or methodological analysis of scientific cognition would be the opposition "rational/irrational" always retained deep cultural and historical meaning as an expression of "good/bad" estimation of a particular element or form of knowledge. Ultimately, representatives of all branches of philosophical and humanitarian knowledge came to the conclusion that alien and incomprehensible from our own criteria of reasonableness should be recognized just as related to some sort of "different type of rationality".
It seems paradoxical, but in the debates about rationality in philosophy and methodology of science not only nonscientific forms of knowledge, but all the fundamental problems of development of science itself began to be considered under the sign of "rationality". Moreover, it is just a hidden evaluative rather then purely logical or methodological meaning of the term "rationality" has become dominant in discussions about the specifics of scientific knowledge, the relations between empirical and theoretical levels of research, normal and revolutionary periods in the development of science, the ways of justification of theoretical knowledge and choosing between theories, etc. Each of the disputing parties assigned the status of "rational" to that only which was considered by them as acceptable, worthy of approval, support and further development in science. But since in accordance with the ethos of science, even recognizing the rationality of just one of the solutions of a scientific problem it is impossible to name as "irrational" actions of those scientists who have another point of view, incompatible theoretical systems was awarded the status of "different types of rationality". Thus, the supporters of the idea of rationality as the exclusive feature of scientific mind have contributed to the spread and adoption of the idea of "types of rationality" in science.
It appears that a general epistemological premise of the idea of different "types of rationality" in all contexts was an intention to refute the assertion that thinking is strictly connected with norms and rules inherent in any chosen kind of cognitive activity, which receives the status of "rational" (in contrast to all the other kinds of knowledge), or in any chosen subject of culture, which is considered
to be acting "rationally" (in contrast to all or some of the other subjects), or in any chosen method of solving a scientific problem, which is perceived by his supporters as the only "rational".
The validity of this critical intention is beyond any doubts as the desire to develop a system of concepts for describing meaningful differences in the ways of existence of various subjects of culture or in the ways of knowing. However, the use of the concept "types of rationality" as the means for expression these differences has not become, in my opinion, more convincing, even after it had entered in the usual scientific discourse. From the perspective of a researcher, who does not use the term "types of rationality" for describing meaningful differences in the results of human cognition, such terms as "local rationality" or "special rationality" [See: 4; 8] look as absurdly, as definitions "regional honesty" or "local truthfulness".
There is an impression that none of the proponents of the typology of rationality never even tried to answer the question: «Is it really possible for such abstract qualities, as "rationality", "truthfulness", "sociality", "spirituality", "decency", etc., to have any "types"?». What is meant, for example, by "rationality" as such, if, on the one hand, it is believed that chemistry and alchemy, philosophy and science are equally rational, but, on the other hand — that their rationality is "typologically" distinct? Or: Why it is denied that primitive man had some kind of rationality, but at the same time any violation of the laws of formal logic is considered as a manifestation of just "local rationality"? And finally, why, in principle, the differences between mythology, religion, philosophy, science, or arts are described as different "types of rationality"? Is it because, speaking about "types of rationality", researchers actually equate rationality as a conscious way of life inseparable from human existence with the diverse content of the results of rational activity?
In any case, when as the answer to the question: "What is rationality?" — we get a discussion of "types" of rationality, it becomes obvious that in accordance with the overall style of postmodern research the idea of "types of rationality" exists besides any analysis of the essence of the rationality and is not derived from any more or less distinct theoretical model of the considered phenomena.
From the assertion that human mind can and actually acts in accordance with different systems of norms and rules, it does not follow that there are different "types of rationality", i. e. literally: different types of mind. No one talks about the different "types of activity" considering principal differences between conceptual systems of classical and non-classical science, tonal and atonal music, rhymed and unrhymed poetry, etc. It is obvious that the "type of activity" is not the same as the "result of activity". A musician remains a musician no matter what kind of music he/she writes or performs. A scientist remains a scientist whatever conceptual system she/he might hold.
No any specifics of a particular field of human activity and cognition do follow from typological differences in conscious activity of subjects who successfully can carry out a variety of activities. The various different results of human activity and knowledge demonstrate, in my opinion, not many "types of rationality", but many ways of realization of the rationality itself. One and the same rationality/intelligence/mental activity begets as mythology and religion, as philosophy and science. One and the same reason dictates people different approaches to the investigation of concrete or universal laws of the development ofnature and to justification ofour life goals. But speaking "one and the same", I do not deny the development ofreason itself, but emphasize only the fundamental difference between rationality and the lack of it, on the one hand, and between rationality and rational results of any human activities — on the other. It means that essentially
universal human mind merely uses different means to implement its own, by definition — reasonable, rational, activity.
The types of something can be allocated only on a background of continuously lasting unity, which is the essence of this something. The essence of rationality is such that it can be realized in an infinite variety of products, results, works of human activity, but cannot exist as a set of separate "types". Rationality, embodied in one or many separately existing "types", would cease to be rationality at all and would have turned into its opposite — irrationality. The strength and effectiveness of thinking is expressed in its flexibility, ability to move quickly from one system of norms and rules for solving problems of cognition or for achievement of a practical result to another. That is why rationality is not directly correlated with strict logical consistency and, especially, with formalization of the process of thought, but one-sidedness of mind or lack of
thinking should not be considered as a "specific type of rationality" as well.
Thus, when we talk about rationality, we mean universal, attributive characteristic ofhuman social activity and its results. There are no special or local "types ofrationality", but there is a single human mind, historically developing and deciding practical and cognitive problems by methods and means consistent with the nature of these problems. Despite the undoubted importance of many scientific problems that had been included in the scope of interests of international scientific community in the course of discussions of "types of rationality", the history of this idea resembles the history of the theory of epicycles and deferents in astronomy. The endless proliferation of the number of "rationalities" is the same dead end in development of cognition as theoretically unjustified increase in the number of epicycles for describing inequalities observed in the motion of the planets.
References:
Avtonomova N. S. Sense. Reason. Rationality. - M.: Nauka, 1988. - 288 p. Historical types of rationality. T. 1. - M.: Ifran, 1995. - 350 p.
Kasavin I. T., Sokuler Z. A. Rationality in knowledge and practice. Critical essay. - M.: Nauka, 1989. - 192 p.
Nikitin E. P. Special rationality. //Historical types of rationality. T. 1. - M.: Ifran, 1995. - P. 56-70.
Porus V. N. Paradoxical rationality (essays on scientific rationality). - M.: URAO, 1999. - 122 p.
Rezhabek E. Y. In search of rationality (articles in different years). - M.: Akademicheskii Proekt, 2007. - 383 p.
Shvyrev V. S. Rationality as the value of cultur. Tradition and modernity. - M.: Progress-Traditsiya, 2003. - 176 p.
Encyclopedias & Dictionaries. Philosophical dictionary//[Electronic resource]. - Available from: http//enc-dic com/philoso-
phy/Racionalnost-4287 - Caps from the screen.
