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Original article
UDC 33S.24
doi: 10.18522/2687-0770-2022-2-102-111
PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP AS A TOOL TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC TION AT THE LOCAL MANAGEMENT LEVEL OF CHINA: EXPERIENCE, PROBLEMS, AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENTS
Deug Yue
Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, Russia. 1041405206@qq.conL ORCIDID: 0000-0001-544S-7991
Abstract. At present, China's environmental situation is very severe, and the discharge of pollutants has approached or exceeded die environmental capacity. Traditional environmental governance methods can no longer effectively solve the problem of environmental pollution. However, the use of the public private partnership (PPP) model in the field of ecological environment can effectively solve the disadvantages of the traditional governance model, such as large funding gaps, poor management and conflrol capabilities, and high operating costs. The application of die PPP model ш die field of ecological environment is conducive to comprehensively improving die quality and efficiency of die supply of public products and services of the ecological environment, revitalizing existing assets, and broadening environmental protection investment and financing channels. In the environmental field, the scope and scale of public-private cooperation have begun to expand. The application of the PPP model for environmental governance is an innovative management tool for local governments m China to perform environmental functions. Keywords: PPP model, environmental governance, innovation, management tools Fot citation: Deng Yue. Public Private Partnership as a Tool to Improve Environmental Protection at die Local Management Level of China: Experience, Problems, Areas for Improvements. Bulletin of Higher Educational Institutions. North Caucasus Region. Social Science. 2022;(2):102-111.
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY4.0).
Научная статья УДК 33S.24
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННО-ЧАСТНОЕ ПАРТНЕРСТВО КАК ИНСТРУМЕНТ УЛУЧШЕНИЯ ОХРАНЫ ОКРУЖАЮЩЕЙ СРЕДЫ МЕСТНОГО УПРАВЛЕНИЯ КИТАЯ: ОПЫТ, ПРОБЛЕМЫ, НАПРАВЛЕНИЯ
СОВЕРШЕНСТВОВАНИЯ
Дэн Юе
Южный федеральный университет, Рбстов-на-Дону, Россия, 1041405206@qq.com, ORCIDID: 0000-0001-544S-7991
Аннотация. Текущая экологическая ситуация в Китае весьма сложная, при этом выбросы загрязняющих веществ прнблишлнсь к экологическим возможностям или превысили их. Традиционные методы управления природопользованием уже не могут эффективно решать проблему загрязнения окружающей среды. Однако применение модели государственно-частного партнерства в области охраны окружающей среды может эффективно устранить недостатки традиционной модели управления, такие как большие пробелы в финансировании слабые возможности управления и контроля, высокие эксплуатационные расходы. Предлагаемая модель государственно-частного партнерства способствует всестороннему повышению качества и эффективности поставок общественных продуктов и услуг в рассматриваемой области, более продуктивному использованию нмею-
© Deng Yue, 2022
ISSN2687-0770 BULLETIN ОЕHIGHER EDUCAUQtítL INSTITUTIONS. N0E1H CAUCASUS REGION. SOCIAL SCIENCE 2022. No l
щнхся активов и расширению каналов инвестиций и финансирования. В настоящее время начали существенно расширяться масштабы госудзрственно-частного сотрудничества и партнерства. Применение этой модели для управления окружающей средой является инновационным инструментом управления для местных органов власти в Китае в процессе выполнения экологических функций.
Ключевые слота: модель государственно-частного партнерства, управление окружающей средой. инновации, инструменты управления
Для цитирования: Deng Yue. Public Private Partnership as a Tool to Improve Environmental Protection at the Local Management Level of China: Experience, Problems, Areas for Improvements // Известия вузов. Северо-Кавказский регион. Общественные науки 2022. № 2. С. 102-111.
Статья апубаштаана на условиях тщании Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC-BY4.0).
1. The basic principié of PPP mode operation
1.1. The concept of PPP mode
In 2014, the "Guiding Opinions on the Development of Government and Social Capital Cooperation" issued by the National Development and Reform Commission (Development and reform investment [2014] No. 2724) clearly defined the PPP model for the first time, stating that 'the government and social capital cooperation model refers to the government's Enhance the supply capacity of public products and services, improve supply efficiency, and establish benefit-sharing, risk-shanug and long-temi partnerships with social capital through franchising, purchasing services, and equity cooperation" [1].
The PPP model is essentially an optimized supply system of quasi-public goods that connects the public sector, private sector, professional organizations, and the public ш the whole society. On the premise of respecting market choices, the PPP model promotes the cooperation between the government and social capital. It combines the decisive role of the market in the allocation of resources with the guiding role of the government in the economy. The PPP model can not only integrate social resources, revitalize social stock capital, stimulate the vitality of private investment, expand enterprise development space, and enhance economic growth momentum, but can also reduce government financial pressure, strengthen government public service functions, and achieve the best effect of satisfying public interests [2, p. 43].
1.2. Operatioii mode of PPP project
There are many ways to operate the PPP model. Different PPP operation methods are applicable to different types of projects, and the degree of participation of government departments and social capital is also different. The main types are shown in Table 1.
In China, the most used PPP model is that the government selects the social capital party through bidding, signs a concession agreement, and jointly establishes a corresponding project company in accordance with the agreement. Then, the project company carnes out financing, construction, and operation, and is responsible for the execution of the project. The project company can choose the appropriate contractor, supplier, operator, bank or insurance company to sign the contract.
When the operating period of the concession agreement expires, the project assets and related rights are transferred to the government. The operation of this PPP mode is shown in Figure 1.
2.1. The concept and characteristics of PPP model in the field of ecological environment governance
2 .1.1. The concept of PPP mode in the field of ecological environment
In the field of ecological environmental governance, the PPP model is aimed at improving the quality and efficiency of environmental administration. Through the introduction of social capital in the field to environmental governance and environmental co-service, government supervision and market mechanisms are combined to establish an innovative environmental protection cooperation system [3, p. 8-10].
Applying the PPP model to the field of environmental governance is an innovative management method for local governments ш China to perform environmental functions. The government's environmental protection departments and the private sector have established a contractual relationship to achieve cooperation ш the field of environmental protection, attracting social capital to participate ш the investment, construction, operation, and maintenance of environmental public products.
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Table 1 /Таблица 1
PP operation mode [4, p. 24-30] ! Режшг работы ГЧП [4, с. 24—30]
Applicable item type Title Mode of operation Concept Contract period (Unit: Year)
New Project BOT Build-Operate-Transfer The social capital party performs the financing, design construction, and operation of the project, and when the project is completed, it will be handed over to the government in accordance with the contract 10-30
BOOT Bui Id-Own-Op erate- Transfer Deformation of BOT operation mode, higher degree of privatization 20-30
Inventory BOO Bui Id-o wn- Evolved from die BOT method. Under normal
items operate The main difference between the two is that under the BOO method the social capital or the project company has the ownership of the project, but the binding clauses to ensure public welfare must be indicated in the contract. Generally, it does not involve the transfer of the project after the expiry date circumstances, the contract period does not exceed 30 years
TOT Transfer-Op erate-Transfer The assets owned by the government are transferred to the social capital party in accordance with the contract, and the social capita] party will maintain and operate the assets and return to the government party after a certain period of time 20-30
ROT Rebuild-Operate-Transfer Based on the TOT model, the government has increased the operation mode of the project for die expansion and reconstruction 20-30
O&.M Commissioned operation The government retains the ownership of stock public assets, and only delegates the operation and maintenance responsibilities of public assets to social capital or project companies. The government pays the commissioned operating expenses to the social capita] or the project company. The social capita] or the project company is not responsible for the PPP operation of user services <8
CM Management contract Transformation of entrusted operation. In this model, the social capital needs to be responsible for die operation and management of users <3
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Government ilL'iMJtlneril
Offer fianchke
Social capital
Fruviile capital
iJ ¡nid over thue project after N years
Project Consul ny [With franchise rights |
FhbUK big
Banks iiiiti othtr flnandal tins. I i tili ¡41 ns:
contra cl
SUPPLIER
OPKRATOR
Fig. 1. PPP mode of operation [5, p. 75-76] / Phc. 1. PeacHM paoorbi rTO [5, c. 75—76]
2.1.2. Features of PPP mode in the environmental field
In the field of environmental governance, the operation of the PPP model has three characteristics: strong public welfare, strong complexity, and strong technicality [6]. It is precisely because of the three characteristics mentioned above that most of the projects in the field of environmental governance are led by the government or take full responsibility for the whole process of project construction, and social capital rarely participates. Therefore, in the process of implementing the PPP model for projects m the field of environmental governance, it is necessary to combine the actual situation of the project and its own characteristics, and to target the expected results, and then choose an economically feasible implementation plan.
2.2. The main operation mode of the PPP model of Chiliad ecological environment governance project
According to the "'China Eco-Environmental PPP Development Report (2019)", it shows: the operation mode of the ecological environment PPP storage project is mainly BOT mode, (Build-Operate-Transfer). The number of projects operated by the BOT model accounted for 72.6 % of the total number of projects in the database, and the investment scale accounted for 74.6 % of the total investment scale of the projects in the database. The number of projects operatrng under the TOT+BOT model accounted for 6.3 % of the total number of projects in the database, and the investment scale accounted for 6.1 %. The number of projects operated by the TOT (Transfer-Operate-Transfer) model accounted for 4.0 % of the total number of projects in the database, and the investment scale accounted for 2.0 %. The number of projects operated by the ROT (Renovate-Operate-Transfer) model accounted for 3.5 % of the total number of projects m the database, and the investment scale accounted for 1.4 %. The number of projects operated by the BOO (Building-Operation-Transfer) model accounted for 1.4 % of the total number of projects in the database, and the investment scale accounted for 0.9 %. The number of projects operating in the O&M (Operations & Maintenance) mode accounted for 0.7 % of the total number of projects in the database, and the investment scale accounted for 0.2 %. The number of projects using other modes of operation accounted for
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11.5 % of die total number of projects ш the database, and the investment scale accounted for 14.S % [7, p. 23-24]. As shown in Figure 2.
2502.00 2002.00 1502.00 1002.00 502.00 2.00
ROT ТОТ ВОТ TOT ROT BOO O&M Other ■ Investment scaLc( Unit: 10 million Dollar) Number of projects (unit: pieces)
Fig. 2. The operation mode of China's ecological environment PPP projects [7, p. 24] / Phc. 2. Режим работы проектов ГЧП в области охраны окружающей среды в Китае [7, с. 24]
Eco-environmentai governance PPP projects usually have the characteristics of large investment amount, long capital payback period, single return channel, high risk and uncertainty, etc. The most prominent feature of the ВОТ model is that the government authorizes the project company in the form of a concession agreement, and the project company designs, constructs, operates and maintains the entire project. During the concession period, the project company will repay the loan and obtain reasonable profits through the preferential policies given by the local government and the income fiom the operation of the project. The ВОТ model is mainly used m some infrastructure projects with large investment, long construction period and profitable operation. It is suitable for ecological environment governance projects, so this model is mostly used in ecological environment PPP projects. 2.3. The status of China's environmental protection industry adopting the PPP model As of the end of 2019, a total of 16S8 PPP projects in the country's ecological environment have been transacted, with a total investment of $17,803 billion, and the most transacted projects initiated in 2015-2018. Due to the lack of economy and efficiency in the application of the PPP model in the environmental field, the PPP policy has also been tightened, showing a significant downward trend in 2018 and 2019. 2018 and 2019 showed a significant downward trend [7, p. 32]. As shown in Figure 3.
As of the end of 2019, the overall transaction rate of eco-environmeutal PPP projects was 52.82 %. Among than, the transaction rate of projects initiated in 2014-2016 exceeded 60%, and the transaction rate of 57.49 % was achieved when the number of initiated projects exceeded 1,000 in 2017. Since the implementation of the PPP standard policy, more attention has been paid to the quality of the ecological environment PPP projects, and the ecological environment PPP projects have gradually entered a standardized and steady development stage [7, p. 32]. As shown in Figure 4.
From the perspective of transactions in subdivisions, C omprehensive treatment projects have the largest investment scale, accounting for 56.64 % of the total investment in ecological environment PPP projects as of the end of 2019. Sewage treatment (including drainage) projects came in second, accounting for 25.42 %.
The total investment in waste treatment, waste-to-energy, wetland protection, and biomass energy projects are all relatively small, accounting for 6.67 %, 3.23 %, 2.17 %, and 0.09 % of the total investment in eco-euvironuiental PPP projects, respectively [7, p. 35]. As shown in Figure 5.
2321
185,89 202 ,28 M,
_ 59,41 UC 41.30 28.45
46
7.10 21
448Л
I
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9002,00 8002,00 7002.00 6002,00 5002.00 4002.00 3002.00 2002,00 1002.00 2,00
36,89 64,77 9 13
2009-2012 2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
■ Itivesitinent scalâ(LJQit: 10 millioa Dollar)
Number of projects (unit: pieces)
Fig. 3. Пне status of China's eco-envirouniental PPP transaction projects initiated in each year [7, p. 33] / Phc. 3. Статус проектов экояого-экологаческих сделок ГЧП в Китае, инициированных в каждом году [7, с. 33]
1200 65,4 ---- t --I
1000 шт
800 600
591
400
200 0 107
2014 2015
66,6
637
2016
Number of projects, units
18/
2017 201S 2019 -Transactions, % (right esis)
70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Fig. 4. 2014-2019 Transactions of China's ecological environment РРР projects [7, p. 33] / Phc. 4. Сделки по проектам ГЧП в области охраны окружающей среды в Китае
в 2014—2019 гг [7, с. 33]
3. The problems faced by C hinese local governments in applying the PPP model in environmental governance
In the environmental governance of China, the application of the PPP model is still in the stage of exploration and experimentation. There are still many problems with this new type of environmental governance. The main problems are as follows:
3.1. The systemization of laws and regulations related to the PPP model needs to be further improved
Complete laws and regulations are an important prerequisite for the effective operation of the PPP model. However, there are gaps and inconsistencies in the laws and regulations related to the PPP model in China.
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10002.00 900100 8002.00 7002.00 6002.00 iOOl.OO 4002.00 .4002.00 2002.00 1002.00 2.00
4525^3
ft
Cj inveilrieiil 5(de(Uni1: ] D mil ILiai JMIar) — Number nf projects (udLi: рмш)
Fig. 5. Segmented areas, the number of transactions and investment scale of China's ecological environment governance PPP projects [7, p. 35] / Рнс. 5. Сегментированные области, количество сделок
и масштаб инвестиции проектов ГЧП по управлению экологической средой в Китае [7, с. 35]
At present, the "'the Civil Code of the People's Republic of China" and the ' Administrative Measures for Infrastructure and Public Utilities Franchising'' stipulate the relevant content of the PPP model. The PPP project process is mainly based on the "Government Procurement Law" and the "Tendering and Bidding Law". However, these laws are not comprehensive in terms of the relevant provisions of PPP. In the absence of legal norms and constraints, it is difficult to clarify the rights, responsibilities. and interests of relevant subjects of PPP projects and the scope of powers of relevant functional departments, which makes it more difficult to predict the risks of PPP projects, which ш turn creates obstacles to the further promotion and development of the PPP model [8. p. S3].
3.2. The unsound social credit system hinders the sound development of environmental protection PPP projects
In the operation of environmental protection PPP projects, each participant faces the credit risk of other participants. As the main body of participation, the local government have the following risks:
First, government not paying on time. At this stage, under the background of greater financial pressure m various regions, there are problems ш the payment of expenditures such as operating subsidies for PPP projects of local government departments. For example, during the cooperation period, the government has seen shrinking or even non-fulfillment of cash. However, to ensure the long-term operation of the project, the social capital side adopts a compromise attitude to the government to fulfill the risks. In addition, compared with the government, the social capital party is relatively in a weak position in the cooperation of PPP projects. When the local government exceeds the time agreed ш the cooperation agreement and defaults on the environmental service fee compensation, the social capital party can often only advance in advance [9, p. 221-222].
At the same time, the government is also facing the credit risk of social capital. In the process of project bidding, it is very easy to produce vicious competition of low-price bidding. After winning the bid at a low price, some companies are pursuing profits, which may result in low project quality, or delay or even stop work to raise prices afterwards.
3.3. The contradiction between the public welfare of environmental governance PPP projects and the preference of social capital investment
The introduction of the PPP model in the environmental field is conducive to solving the problems of large financing volume and lack of mortgage guarantees for the construction of environmental protection infrastructure. However, due to the strong public welfare nature of environmental governance PPP projects, it is difficult to bring stable cash flow to the investment subject, or can only generate low returns [10, p. 102].
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In addition, some large-scale environmental protection projects often have a long return on investment, and it is difficult to obtain benefits in a short period of time, such as ecological construction projects. Social capital is profit-seeking, and they prefer to invest in investment fields with high yields and short return periods. Therefore, environmental protection PPP projects with strong public welfare are not attractive to social capital. Even if there is a large amount of social capital, it is difficult to make up for the gap m environmental investment demand. The contradiction between the long duration of environmental protection PPP projects and the pursuit of short-term profits by social capital has also highlighted the problem of maturity mismatch m project financing. On the one hand, the project requires long-term stable capital investment; on the other hand, investors are more inclined to participate in the short-term due to the future uncertainty and liquidity of the project [11,p. 101].
4. Discussion
Suggestions made by the author for optimizing the application technology and socio-economic mechanism of PPPs in China's local government environmental governance projects
4.1. Create a legal environment for the sound development of the PPP model of environmental governance
In the process of legislative advancement, coordination and cooperation between different departments should be strengthened to ensure the integrity and unity of basic laws, regulations, and policies. For example, the China Development and Reform Commission issued the «Notice on Strengthening the Management of PPP Project Investment and Construction m accordance with laws and regulations». The six aspects of punishment for violations and dishonesty have made clear requirements and standardized the investment management procedures of PPP projects.
On this basis, combmed with the problems m the practice of PPP m the environmental protection field, it is necessary to further improve the price mechanism, market access and exit mechanism, credit restraint mechanism and other supporting laws and regulations. For example, the "Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues C oncerning the Trial of Administrative Agreement Cases" and ' Government Accounting Standards No. 10-Govermuent and Social Capital Cooperation Project Contracts" further clarify the nature of PPP agreements and expenditure responsibilities. With the implementation of the policy, China's PPP development will be more standardized, and it will also create a good policy and market environment for the development of ecological environment PPP.
4.2. Improve the social credit restraint mechanism to ensure the sound development of environmental protection PPP projects
It is very necessary to enhance the contract awareness of the government and relevant departments m PPP environmental protection projects. During the design phase of the project contract, government participants must thoroughly demonstrate and analyze the project to prevent unreasonable commitments. The content of the environmental protection PPP cooperation agreement is as standard and detailed as possible, and the rights and obligations of both parties should be clarified m the agreement, and the design responsibility and risk boundary should be clarified [12, p. 41].
For the social capital side, it is necessary to regulate their own behavior, especially m the process of project construction and operation, to clearly express their own demands, and they cannot blindly compromise in the face of government participants.
At the same tune, the public needs to play their supervisory role and use a third-parly credit evaluation system for evaluation, so that the government and social capital can be constrained m terms of credit, so that PPP environmental protection projects can proceed smoothly.
At present, the development of C hina's PPP environmental protection industry fund is still in its infancy, and it is mainly used for ecological construction and regional or watershed protection. In the future, the government should continue to improve the relevant supporting mechanisms for the operation of the PPP environmental protection industry fund, including investment return mechanisms, capital entry and exit mechanisms, and so on. The government promotes the development of green finance by guiding the green investment behavior of financial institutions and social investors [13].
4.3. Strengthen the supervision and management of environmental PPP projects to ensure the development of environmental benefits
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PPP projects in the field of environmental protection require strong regulatory measures to ensure environmental benefits. In the contract design stage, the relevant regulatory requirements must be clarified to ensure the private capital's investment m the operation of the PPP project.
First, adopt the approach of environmental protection projects. Before the social capital implements resource development projects, it is necessary to build and ensure the normal operation of environmental PPP projects. Second, environmental PPP projects should focus on building a performance-based payment mechanism and pay based on pollution control effects or environmental benefits to ensure the environmental effects of project implementation. Third, regularly carry out performance evaluation of PPP projects to form a mechanism for the application of evaluation results. According to the evaluation results, the prioe or subsidy will be adjusted according to the contract. Performance evaluation should not only be on the social capital side, but also include government performance into the performance evaluation system to strengthen the government's performance of responsibilities. Fourth, establish an independent, transparent, accountable, and professional supervision system for government and social capital cooperation projects, implement information disclosure, encourage public participation, and form a multi-party supervision mechanism.
5. Conclusion
In the environmental governance of Chinese local governments, the use of the PPP model is still m the stage of exploration and experimentation. There are still many problems in this new environmental governance method.
First, the systematization of laws and regulations related to the PPP model needs to be further improved. Second, the imperfect social credit system hinders the healthy development of environmental protection PPP projects. Third, there is a contradiction between the public welfare of environmental governance PPP projects and the investment preference of social capital.
To optimize the application technology and social and economic mechanism of PPPs m C hina's local government environmental governance projects, the author puts forward the following suggestions: First, create a legal environment for the healthy development of the PPP model of environmental governance. Second, improve the social credit restraint mechanism to ensure the healthy development of environmental protection PPP projects. Third, strengthen the supervision and management of environmental PPP projects to ensure the full play of environmental benefits.
References
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Information about the author
Deng Yue-Master of Law, Postgraduate, Faculty of Management.
Информация об авторе
Дэн Юе -магистр, аспирант, факультет менеджмента.
Стагм поступила в редакцию 25.05.2022; одобрена после рецензирования 06.06.20(22: принята к пу&шкапии 22.06.2022. The article was submitted 25.05.2022; approved alter reviewing 06.06.2022; accepted for publication 22.06.2022._
