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A. Shapovalov. Problemy institutsionalizatsii islamskogo obrazovaniya v sovremennoi Rossii [Problems of Institutionalization of Islamic Education in Modern Russia] // Vlast. 2011, No 3, p. 4. Official site of DUM RT - http://dumrt.ru/node/8046
"Sotsiokulturny potentsial mezhkonfessionalnogo dialoiga: materialy Mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii (Kazan, May 21-24, 2013)," Kazan, 2013, pp. 363-367.
Aslan Borov,
Ph. D. (Hist.), Kabardino-Balkarian State University (Nalchik) POLITICIZED ETHNICITY: THE "CIRCASSIAN PROBLEM" - ANOTHER SEAT OF TENSION IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS
Putting to the fore the crisis and conflict elements of the situation in the North Caucasus has become a stable feature of the public and scholarly discourse of the past two decades. The "images" of the region, which have taken shape recently, largely predetermine the picture of the past of this territory and its modern position. The most general characteristic of the position of the North Caucasus in the public discourse of Russia is an obvious discrepancy between its periphery place on the political-economic map of the country and the level of concern, even alarm, displayed by Russian society concerning this territory.
Strictly speaking, these discourse practices often render it difficult to make an unbiased and rational analysis of the regional socio-political and socio-economic situation. An alarmist vector of research prevents to see the real parameters of existing problems and phenomena. This also concerns the inadequate understanding of the aggravation of the "Circassian problems" (approximately from 2008).
The task of this article is to show how politicization of ethnicity turns a socially important problem into a conflict situation.
The Circassians and Circassia
(in historical retrospect)
At present the Circassians are the titular nation of three republics of the North Caucasus and have different names in official parlance: in the Republic of Adygea - Adygeis, in the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria - Kabardians, and in the Republic of Karachayevo-Circassia -Circassians. Nevertheless, the uniform self-designation - Adygei - is still preserved, and general self-identification has consolidated and existed over the past several decades.
The Circassians themselves regard the fact that a predominant part of the Circassian ethnos lives beyond the boundaries of its historical Motherland - in Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Germany, and even the United States - as a distinctive feature of their national existence. True, many people accept this "dissipation" as anomaly, which, although historically conditioned and explained, can and should be "rectified." This is the essence of the "Circassian problem."
Over the past several years this problem has invariably cropped up in the regional, Russian and international information field as a subject of active discussions in historical and political publications. It acquired a special urgency in connection with demands that the Russian Federation officially recognize the genocide committed by the Russian Empire against the Circassians in the course of the Caucasian war in the 19th century, and calls for boycott of the Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014. On the one hand, the modern interpretation of the "Circassian problem" is directly associated with the "tragic problems of the Circassian people," which have a historically objective character. They come down to the Caucasian war and have remained 14
unresolved since then. Their essence boils down to the fact that the "Country of the Adygeis - Circassia - has disappeared from the map of the world, and the Circassian people were subjected to genocide by the Russian state and banished from their historical Motherland, having lost a large number of the population and a greater part of their territory." Accordingly, the "just solution of the Circassian problem" is understood as the implementation of the natural right of the Adygeis to live on their land as a single nation, which should be guaranteed by international law.
On the other hand, certain aspects of the question under investigation, especially the subject of genocide, in connection with the Olympic Games in Sochi, were regarded as an anti-Russian political project of the radical wing of Circassian nationalist organizations and the outside forces hostile to Russia, a project which has no objective historical foundations. It is also mentioned that although the term "Circassian problem" has become quite widespread and acquired certain legitimacy, in actual fact a considerable part of Adygeis, Kabardians and Circassians does not regard recognition of the genocide of Adygeis and settlement of foreigners of Caucasian origin in the Russian Caucasus as "the most pressing problem bearing on their everyday life." The "Circussian problem" is timely mainly for ethnic entrepreneurs, activists and ethnic ideologists concentrated in ethnic organizations or around them.
Does the "Circassian problem" really exist? A problem in sociopolitical life can be talked of when the status or position of a certain object or subject of relations is formally indefinite, unstable or arguable in a given system. Apart from the object, which is the subject of discussion, this system of relations includes, as a rule, several more participants. Uncertainty/instability of the situation is the necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the emergence of one or another problem.
If the status quo is not disputed by anyone, there is no problem. It becomes a reality when one of the actors includes it in political field. It stays there until each of the participants is unable to resolve it in its interests, or its solution involves considerable losses or risks, or until an acceptable solution is found satisfying all participants in the process.
Historically and politically speaking, the "Circassian problem" emerged in the mid-16th century as the question of the international-political status of some or other Circassian territorial-political formations in the system of relations between Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and its vassal - the Crimean Khanate. Conflicts between the main subjects of this system of relations and its evolution had ultimately led to the results which formed the basis of discussions of the present-day "Circassian problem."
Kabarda has been in the focus of diplomatic confrontation and military-political activity of powers since the 1560s. The "Kabardian question" is singled out from the general Adygei context, acquires independent significance, and at the same time remains part of a broader context of the Caucasian problems. Solution of the "Kabardian question" took place in the 18th century. The Kucuk-Kaynarca peace treaty of 1774 fixed Turkey's renunciation of interference in determining the status of Greater and Smaller Kabarda and virtually recognized their belonging to Russia.
However, Russia had to establish reliable control over Kabarda and maintain its imperial administrative order in Kabardian territory. It took half a century to solve a whole range of problems with the help of military-political pressure, punitive expeditions, and economic blockade. Characteristically, the final stage of this process in the first quarter of the 19th century was accompanied with a real demographic catastrophe. Due to the resettlement of Kabardians beyond the Kuban
River, numerous punitive raids, and epidemic diseases, including plague, the population of Kabarda had decreased dozens of times.
The Russian Empire began to annex the Trans-Caucasus at the beginning of the 19th century, which aggravated its relations with Turkey, including in the North-Western Caucasus. According to the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829, Russia established its sovereignty over the Trans-Kuban Circassians. But the latter did not wish to recognize the power of the Russian emperor and stepped on the road of armed resistance. Britain did not recognize the legitimacy of the Treaty of Adrianople and openly insisted on independence of Circassia. Turkey secretly supported Circassian resistance.
As a result, the "Circassian problem" became one of the elements of the "Eastern question" in international politics of the second quarter of the 19th century. The significance of that problem was determined not by ethnic, but by geopolitical factors, and its dynamics depended on the alignment of the forces of the powers concerned and the efficiency of Circassian resistance. Despite Russia's defeat in the Crimean war in the 1850s, the attempt of Britain to include solution of the "Circassian problem" in general diplomatic settlement at the Paris Congress of 1856 failed. Thus, it was taken off the international political agenda, inasmuch as nobody but Circassians themselves disputed the conditions of the Adrianople peace treaty. But just as in the case of Kabarda after 1774, Russia had to affirm its domination in Circassia by military force. The completion of the Caucasian war was accompanied with massive ethnic purge and mass banishment of the Circassian population of the North-Western Caucasus. In this way the "Circassian problem" was solved in its earlier stage.
Characteristically, the earlier stage, that is, the status of the Circassians, had been initiated by outside forces pursuing their geopolitical aims, and had never been determined in ethnic terms.
The Circassians in the Russian and Ottoman empires had no real forces and possibilities for an active mass struggle for their interests, and therefore their political national movement did not unfold in both countries. Theoretically, the "Circassian problem" could have been actualized in a situation of a sharp international conflict (war), in which these countries could have been involved, or in a situation of a deep-going internal crisis, revolution, or state disintegration. Coincidence of these external and internal factors took place in the period of World War I in both Russia and Turkey. They created an uncertain and unstable situation for the "Circassian world." In this sense an objective political ground emerged for putting forward this question. The essence, forms and results of its actualization reflected historical heritage and realities of the first quarter of the 20th century.
All groups of the Circassian population on territories of the former Russian Empire and the former Ottoman Empire became had faced the need for ethnic self-determination in some or other forms. But the possibility of working out a single all-Circassian program to solve the problem had been very limited. This was also due to differences in the position of separate areas of the "Circassian world" and inadequate information exchanges, social ties, and personal contacts. As a result, the Circassian factor had not received a proper expression and manifestation in the ethnic-political processes in the North Caucasus.
In the Soviet Union it was partly realized in local complexes of interethnic relations in the process of the formation of Soviet autonomic republics. And in the former Ottoman Empire this factor was integrated in geopolitical projects of its ruling circles concerning the entire Caucasus, or at least its northern part. It was associated with local diasporas there. But the West-Caucasian Abkhaz-Adygei circle
predominated, and this changed radically the solution of the "Circassian problem."
At the end of the Caucasian war the essence of the "Circassian problem" boiled down to fixing the territorial-political status of Western Circassia. The ethnic social and ethnic demographic consequences, namely, expulsion of the Circassian population from the North-Western Caucasus stemmed from geopolitical aims and military considerations. The situation at the beginning of the 20th century demonstrated a reverse correlation of territorial-political and humanitarian (socio-demographic) aspects of the "Circassian problem." Now it presupposed the determination of the status of groups of the North Caucasian (Circassian) population, which had not entrenched themselves in the Ottoman Empire.
There are three most significant aspects. First, the Circassian subject had been formulated by representatives of the intellectual elitist sections of the diaspora and had not boiled down to supporting the military-political ambitions of Turkey. This subject had reflected the real historical experience and their own ideas and aspirations. A statement of the Circassian representative I. Badanok at the 3rd conference of the "Union of Nationalities" in Lausanne on June 27-29, 1916, expressed what could be termed "phenomenology of the Circassian problem." He touched on the subjects dealing with the inner structure and concepts of every discourse of Circassian themes, which were current during discussions on the history of Russian-Caucasian relations. This was the conquest of the Caucasus by Russia, cruel methods of waging war, banishment and dispersion of Circassians, assimilation, and a threat of the complete loss of their originality.
In real political practice of that time a change in the state of affairs in the "Circassian world" largely depended not on the Circassians themselves, but on the degree of correspondence of their
interests and aspirations to the geopolitical interests of big powers. But in a social and political discourse, in public discussions of Circassian problems the ethnic historical context is not dissolved in the geopolitical context of the confrontation between the empires, but acquires independent interpretation.
Secondly, the initial point of departure in putting forward the "Circassian problem" in the first quarter of the 20th century was inevitably the assessment of the key historic event - the conquest of the Caucasus by Russia and the loss by a greater part of the Adygeis of their Motherland. But there were differences in the historical experience of different groups of the Adygeis. Inasmuch as the real relations and interaction of the foreign Circassian diaspora with the Russian state and society had ceased from the time of their banishment, their attitude to Russia was determined by this circumstance. For those remaining in the North Caucasus, their socio-legal, economic and cultural interaction with the Russian state and society continued after the conquest. Their attitude to Russia was formed not only by historical memory, but also by the close ethnic social experience and search for the future, and this was why they did not place the "Circassian problem" on the agenda in any form.
Thirdly, for groups of Circassian intellectuals in Russia and the Ottoman Empire, along with the consequences of the Caucasian war, another source of dissatisfaction with the position of their own people was realization of their relative social and cultural backwardness as compared to Europe and the most advanced sections of Russian and Turkish societies. Striving for a change of this situation was connected not with return to traditional social foundations, but with inclusion of Circassians in the modern development processes.
On the whole, viewing the period of wars, revolutions and disintegration of empires in 1914-1923, one can conclude that the
"Circassian problem" had not received clear-cut and promising political development against the backdrop of new political opportunities. But its complex phenomenology had become clear, reflecting a new sociopolitical structure of the "Circassian world" itself, and the existence of alternative development ways of the countries inhabited by Circassians, primarily Russia and Turkey. The "Circassian problem" of the period of World War I and the revolutionary upheavals caused by it now looks as a discourse formation, as an embryo form of its modern guise.
Modern Interpretation
of the "Circassian Problem"
The mid-1980s can conditionally be regarded as the start of a new wave of actualization of this problem, when a sharp turn began in the living conditions of the Circassians in the U.S.S.R. and in Turkey, which was connected with the liberalization and democratization of the socio-political life of these two countries. The initial incentives for ethnic-national mobilization in the urban medium of Circassian intellectuals were given by the realization of the well-advanced assimilation processes and real prospects of the imminent complete loss of ethno-cultural identification in the diaspora and in the Motherland.
The Circassian national movement rapidly developed parallel in Russia and beyond its borders in the late-1980s. One of the reasons of this development was belief in the possibility to restore Circassian unity within the framework of an international organization symbolizing the prospect of real reunification of Circassians in their Motherland. The first All-World Adygei congress was held in Nalchik in May 1991. It formed the International Circassian association (ICA). Its Charter said that it was set up for the purpose of "ethnic preservation, self-determination and development."
In other words, at the end of the 20th century the "Circassian problem" was posed for the first time as the problem of consolidation and prospects of the global Adygei-Circassian community within the framework of a national movement of the international character. The main subjects forming the essence of the problem became quite clear: they included opposition to the processes of cultural-linguistic assimilation of Circassians in the countries of their residence; recognition of the Caucasian war and genocide against Circassians on the part of the Russian Empire as the main source of their present problems; all-round assistance to repatriation. The idea of the restoration of historical Circassia as an integral territorial-political unit was not officially put forward by any influential organizations in the 1990s, but was used by their ethnic and political rivals for discrediting the Circassian national movement in the eyes of the Russian leadership.
During the 1990s the activity of this movement did not engender tension in relations with the Russian state, and the "Circassian problem" did not become a widely popular subject either in this country or abroad. But in the early 2000s a sharp turn began to be observed in the development of the factors determining its dynamics. The activity of the state leadership has now shifted from the subject of democratization and federalism on to the subjects of territorial integrity, uniform constitutional legal order, and the strengthening of the vertical of power. The illusions of coincidence of the vector of ethno-national aspirations of the Circassian community with the general trend of the state and political evolution of Russia are losing ground.
In the early 1990s the official administrative bodies and national movement in the "Adygei" republics of the North Caucasus had a common agenda and could be compared in the degree of their influence on internal ethnic and political processes, whereas a decade later their
tasks and functions came virtually to naught. The leaders of these republics deprived Circassian national organizations of independence (Kabardino-Balkaria), distanced themselves from them (Adygea), or ignored them as a marginal opposition (Karachayevo-Circassia). Meanwhile, by the 2000s it became clear that there was no real progress in the main aspects of the "Circassian problem", as they were determined by the international Circassian movement. The national organizations of the "first echelon" did not have ideological and organizational dynamism allowing them to cope with difficulties and obstacles along the way of solving the "Circassian problem." A short period of their influence and activity was replaced by prolonged stagnation.
During that period deep-going socio-demographic and cultural shifts took place in the "Circassian world." New generations have entered social life, which have been formed in the urban medium, were more educated and mobile, were able to use modern information and communication technologies, and create network communities. They are free in expressing their ideas and attitudes, they exist in a multicultural medium, and nationalism as a means of confirmation of their group identity and the base of political activity is as legitimate as any other ideology. Such groups of Circassian young people exist in different conditions in Russia, Middle East countries, Turkey, and in Europe. They differ from one another, but have much in common, reflecting essential characteristics of the modern global world. The "new wave" of Circassian nationalism came into being in the 2000s, and the revival of its national movement was taking place against the backdrop of a relative lowering of importance of other ethnopolitical problems in the North Caucasus. In these conditions any exacerbation of the "Circassian problem" depended on the combination of
circumstances, existence of organized forces capable to respond to them, presence of charismatic leaders, etc.
New circumstances could arise in the sphere of current political life and an effective reaction to them could emerge from organizations regarding them as political problems essential for dealing with the "Circassian question." The understanding of it as political strategy aimed at reaching the ultimate aim and determining the means and algorithm of its achievement was based on the following premises:
- Assimilation, loss of the language and culture by Circassians dispersed all over the world as a result of the Russo-Caucasian war are fraught with complete disappearance of the Circassian ethnos;
- These problems cannot be solved without solving the political problem - the return of banished Circassians, and recreation of the Circassian ethnos on its historical Motherland;
- The legal mechanism for achieving this goal can be recognition by the Russian Federation of the fact of genocide against the Circassian ethnos in the 19th - early 20th century.
At the same time a group of activists has been formed capable to lend this strategy greater public weight. Over several years a whole number of new organizations has come into being practically in all countries of Circassians' residence. They use modern network methods of mobilization and coordination of public street actions, various manifestations and demonstrations for bringing their demands and problems to the attention of the authorities, international community and European institutions.
The general course of the political process has given the Circassian radicals various pretexts for staging various actions. Among the factors contributing to the further aggravation of the Circassian problem was an attempt to reintegrate Adygea in Krasnodar territory, thus lowering its status as part of the Russian Federation (2005-2006);
avoidance of discussion by the Russian authorities of the status of Circassians as an indigenous people of Eastern Black Sea region because of the decision to hold the Winter Olympics of 2014 in Sochi; and finally, the stepping up of public polemics around the "Circassian problem," which reached its peak in 2011, when the parliament of Georgia officially recognized the fact of genocide against Circassians by the Russian Empire.
Organizations of the new generation representing the Circassian national movement have stepped up their activity. They put forward the political aspect and demand that genocide against their people be recognized officially. Circassian organizations of the foreign diaspora have become involved in political collisions with the Russian state, and this subject has been included in the agenda of an international scientific community, non-governmental organizations, and European institutions. At the same time the key elements of the present-day "Circassian problem" - attitude to the single "Circassian" unit of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus, ethnopolitical "collisions" around the Sochi Olympics, interference of foreign political forces -have become a tangible factor of political demarcation in the international Circassian movement. It is based on different approaches to building relations with the modern Russian state.
Politicized Ethnicity: Open Results
And so, the "Circassian problem" became a reality of the political life of the countries of this ethnos again at the turn of the new century and acquired certain characteristics of an international problem.
Its continuity is connected with the fact that the status of the Circassian community in the modern world retains structural analogy
with the situation of a divided people from the beginning of the 20th century. Hence, the stability of the phenomena of Circassian national consciousness: the Caucasian war and banishment as the "beginning"; dispersion and the ethnic crisis as a heavy reality; reunification and revival as the goal. But at the end of the 20th century the "Circassian problem" was put forward quite independently by Circassians themselves as a global ethnic community. In its previous historical forms and depending on the geopolitical interests of powers it was either connected to various fragments of the Circassian world (Kabarda, Western Circassia), or dissolved in broader geopolitical units (Caucasus, Northern Caucasus), and ethnic conglomerates (mountain dwellers, Circassians as North Caucasian diasporas as a whole).
In the conditions of the modern globalized world, intensive international communications and openness of information space the general Circassian national program has not been simply formulated. It has been institutionalized as a sum total of Circassian organizations acting all over the world. They have been present for over two decades in the international cultural and political area. It should be emphasized that this reflects not only the inner vital energy of the Circassian national movement, but also the general conditions of global integration and democratization.
The experience of the 2000s has clearly revealed that an attempt to transfer pure ideas about the ultimate national aims to the algorithm of political actions undertaken on the basis of the ideas of one's own rights and interests would lead to political division within the Circassian national movement itself. This is an expression of the contradictory character of influence of international political factors on the development of Circassian self-consciousness and world outlook. On the one hand, the modern international context cannot be compared with the situation of World War I, when the "Circassian
problem" was inspired by the powers in the state of war with Russia in their military-political aims. Today the influence of the external factors should not be reduced to intrigues of geopolitical rivals. The practice of using democratic values and democratic motives by western powers in their interests does not give grounds for ignoring these values and motives as irrelevant or unrelated to the "Circassian problem." The special services and "unfriendly" political forces abroad can try to use anything to reach their aims. Despite this, the activity of Circassian activists of the diaspora remains part of democratic civil activity in Turkey, Europe and the United States.
On the other hand, geopolitical rivalry and military-political conflicts remain a reality of the international medium in which the Circassian problem exists. It is not possible to isolate the forms of its political existence from their influence. The question is whether it will be turned into a means of solving its main tasks by other subjects, or it will preserve its essence and will be solved by those who are vitally interested in its solution. There are only two collective subjects of relations for whom the "Circassian problem" expresses or touches on their genuinely vital interests and its solution bears the character of an independent major task - these are the Circassians themselves and Russia.
The main problem of the modern Russo-Circassian "situation of discussing" the present state and prospects of the Circassian community lies in that its subject seems to the parties concerned as one non-coplanar. For Circassian activists and intellectuals their "problem" is an embodiment of results and prospects of the ethno-historical evolution of the Adygeis. This is another crossroads of the trajectory of national existence, which puts the ethnos before the alternative of existential nature: continuation of ethno-national being in institutionalized forms through self-organization and its recognition by the state, or ethnic
entropy and dissolution of Circassian identity in the chaos of the "big world."
For Russian state consciousness the "Circassian problem" is another expression of ethnic nationalism fraught with a threat to sociopolitical stability, territorial integrity and international interests of Russia. Thus, the present-day "Circassian problem" is a dual historical-political phenomenon by its nature.
The political and historical prospects of the problem depend on what will prevail in the actions of the sides vitally interested in its solution. It may be a search for either means to "overpower" another pole of argumentation, or the foundation of a solution which would be broader than the Circassian ethno-historical perspective, and politically - broader than the Russian sovereign tradition.
This foundation can be found in the sphere determining the conditions of existence and development prospects common for Russia and the Circassian community - in the sphere of the modern processes of globalization, modernization and democratization. These fundamental trends of world development, which throw a challenge to and at the same time open opportunities for all social, national and political subjects involved in the system of relations, which is termed today as the "Circassian problems." Both Russia and the contemporary Circassians should search for means to reach their aims within the global process of changes. If their strategy and tactics are based on these trends, the forms and consequences of the development of the ":Circassian problems" may become predictable and acceptable.
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A. Dankov,
Assistant professor, Tomsk State University (Tomsk) MODERN CENTRAL ASIA: SOCIAL TRENDS AND POLITICS
Central Asia is living through a period of great changes this century, which will be truly unique by their scope. Even the transformations, which took place in the region last century, cannot be compared with what is in store for it. The vast dimensions and complex
