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UDC: 323.2
Sychova Anastasiia Olexandrivna,
PhD of political science, Lecturer of Ukrainian History Department, Luhask Taras Shevchen-ko National University, m. Starobelsk, Lugansk reg, 92701, pi. Gogol, 1, tel.: (066) 24 55 429, e-mail: [email protected]
ORCID: 0000-0002-0273-8469
Сичова Анастаыя Олександ^вна,
кандидат полтичних наук, старший ви-кладач кафедри icmopii Украти, Луган-ський нащональний утверситет iMem Тараса Шевченка, м. Старобшьськ, Луган-ська обл., 92701, пл. Гоголя, 1, тел.: (066) 24 55 429, e-mail: [email protected]
ORCID: 0000-0002-0273-8469
Сычева Анастасия Александровна,
кандидат политических наук, старший преподаватель кафедры истории Украины, Луганский национальный университет имени Тараса Шевченко, г. Старобельск, Луганская обл., 92701, пл. Гоголя, 1, тел.: (066) 24 55 429, e-mail: [email protected] ORCID: 0000-0002-0273-8469
POLiTiCAL TRUST AS A RESOURCE OF COOPERATiON BETWEEN THE STATE AND SOCiETY (AN ARHETYPiCAL APPROACH)
Abstract. In the article political trust as necessary component of cooperation between power-holding structures and society is considered in the light of archetypes relevant to Ukrainian mentality. There is a special emphasis on formation of trust practices.
Keywords: archetype, political trust, psychoculture.
ПОЛ1ТИЧНА ДОВ1РА ЯК РЕСУРС ВЗАСМОДП М1Ж ДЕРЖАВОЮ I СУСП1ЛЬСТВОМ (АРХЕТИПНИЙ П1ДХ1Д)
Анотащя. Пол^ична довiра як необхщний елемент сшвпращ мiж влад-ними структурами i сощумом розглядаеться Kpi3b призму архетишв, прита-манних украшськш ментальность Особлива увага звертаеться на мехашзми формування довiрчих практик.
K^40bî слова: архетип, полггична довiра, психокультура.
ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ ДОВЕРИЕ КАК РЕСУРС ВЗАИМОДЕЙСТВИЯ МЕЖДУ ГОСУДАРСТВОМ И ОБЩЕСТВОМ (АРХЕТИПНЫЙ ПОДХОД)
Аннотация. Политическое доверие как необходимый элемент сотрудничества между властными структурами и социумом рассматривается сквозь призму архетипов, свойственных украинской ментальности. Особенное внимание уделяется механизмам формирования практик доверия.
Ключевые слова: архетип, политическое доверие, психокультура.
Target setting. After 1991 Ukraine had been perceived by the world for a long time as a state of transition with frequent fluctuations concerning policy, external partners and cultural values. We seemed stuck in time, not wanting to return to the past, but the future is not too advanced. One of the main contradictions of such "fluid state" has remained a large gap between the right of citizens to defend their freedom and their ability to manage social conditions that make possible such protection.
For more than twenty years Ukrainians were hoping for changes in the system have inherited from Soviet times. Hopes were mainly relied on the coming of a "new generation" of politicians with innovative ideas for already independent Ukraine. But usually the primary enthusiasm of recruits-parliamentarians to "qualitatively change outdated political practice" has always accompanied by another voters' disappointment that spilled into reducing trust in all positions. Of course, government representatives did "democratic reverent" toward the people, occasionally appealing to "public opinion" or "national interests" for lobbying laws favorable to them. However, participation of citizens in solving political and
economic problems remained illusive, at finding decisions already adopted.
By 2014 Ukrainians had mostly used the "speckled" local forms of expression such as protests against police arbitrariness, sealing construction, environmental initiatives, etc. But Euromaydan has finally driven Ukrainians out from the "civic coma". Now each parliamentary reform is under the watchful eye of the public; people do not hesitate to oppose the officials and to remind who is the main real source of power constitutionally ("march of white kerchiefs", protests against increasing tariffs in metro, the miners' strike, blockade of ATO zone, "activists versus Russian banks", etc.). Exactly the Revolution of dignity has initiated reformatting politics and society towards acquiring a new quality — mutual publicity, existence of which is impossible without a high level of mutual trust. This refers to accommodation a kind of "trust credit" to public political players, which may be based both on rational (weighted assessment of the possibilities of prevailing authorities or opposition political forces) and irrational (including national archetypes) factors. So we consider an impact of the latter on trust practices.
Analysis of recent researches and publications. According to C. Jung [13], archetypes are a kind of "universal matrix" dominates in people's mind, in their culture. Proceedings of A. Bentley, T. Day, R. Dahl, D. Ziegler,
A. Lijphart, G. Sartori, D. Truman, J. Habermas, J. Schumpeter and others are devoted to detailed consideration of archetypes in socio-political systems. One of the founders of Ukrainian school of archetypes E. Afonin [1] in his studies is using a binary-scale opposition to monitor and analyze changes in psychosocial culture of Ukraine. Ukrainian scientists O. Donchenko, Y. Romanenko [5] listed in detail cultural archetypes as organized principles of psychosocial evolution. The authors believe these principles constitute a kind of matrix regulation that is imposed on chaos thereby any content finds its place. Also, in the science of our country, psychological and political archetypes from different angles of view are examined by Yu. Behunov, V. Gorbatenko, L. Zubrytska, A. Kolo-diy, V. Kolotilo, A. Kryukov, A. Lu-kashov, V. Martynenko, A. Melvil,
B. Nikitin, A. Radchenko. However archetypes' influence on the formation of trust relationship between the authorities and society is still insufficiently investigated.
The purpose of the article is to consider in detail the nature of political trust subject to national archetypes inherent Ukrainian mentality, which can be used as conceptual guidelines in reforming relations between power and society.
The statement of basic materials.
Any power uses in its own interests -as far as possible — people's trust in in-
stitutions, leaders, movements, slogans and more. Only with a sufficient level of trust we can reach an openness and transparency between political elite and society that provides the minimum necessary information exchange and support for government in place.
However, an individual of modern societies (including of Ukraine) usually shows not constant but variable mentality: in different times and situations of his/her personal and historical life in his/her spiritual being certain trends may prevail. Repeatability of identical historical events (like restriction of civil liberties, speech-policing) can lead to transformation of the latter on people's subconscious, encouraging them to such reactions on similar situations in the future and, thus, creating a kind of archetype.
Extrapolating denoted conclusion on trust practices, it can be argued that citizens of post-Soviet Ukrainian society overwhelmingly prefer reproduction political trust of "soviet format" stepping on "path dependence" (D. North), i. e. keeping in mind the archetypes of behavior, norms of interaction peculiar to both horizontal and vertical projections. It was accompanied by a phenomenon of cultural trauma thanks to it informal solutions of life support problems found in the past transferred to the present and are used as the primary source of the formation of trust relationship. Concretize with examples:
1) trust of the "patron-client"
The Soviet legacy: 1930s were filled with Stalinist terror, sudden arrests, constant personnel purges, obsession with "enemies" and their relentless exposure what created an atmosphere of
uncertainty and fear, gave rise to suspiciousness of others, even of family [12, p. 60]. Socio-political trust is usually implemented in communities connected by mutual responsibility, headed by the mayor (or equivalent one) and involved in "friendly" relations with one or another representative of power hierarchy. These asymmetrical exchanges provided that patron takes care of the client on his own resources and collects appropriate tribute in the form of gratitude for care.
The consequences in the present: instinct of self-preservation has initiated the phenomenon of "social markets" where the result of shadow activities is not only financial profits or material production as social effects: bribe improving appropriate business environment; shadow reshuffle in higher echelons; secret collusions of different political factions for lobbying certain law. Clientelictic informal practices in post-Soviet societies are consequence of Soviet culture as a survival strategy in a circle of "insiders". So the latter has dinted on trust in the form of doublethink accompanied by spreading of the next symbiotic forms (a synthesis of official and backroom agreements):
• an election of entrepreneurs as deputies of legislative branch and local governments (filling of the Ver-khovna Rada committees, where most seats are distributed among prominent businessmen and managers of proper "supervising" sectors);
• a strategic partnership based on "trust relationship" between economic subjects with higher officials (financing election campaigns to ensure loyalty to his/her own business);
• "agreements" concerning redistribution of tenders (scandals about procurement of footwear production by MoD (the company of MP M. Lavryk "Talanlehprom") and also new cars for national policy; "gas schemes" of A. Onishchenko and situation with dredging in the port "Pivdenniy").
Though some researchers consider similar trust networks as a "reserve mechanisms" [4; 8] of stabilization in "transit period for the state", it should pay attention to the fact that such alliances can lead to loss of legitimacy by regime, depriving official public institutions their civil legal sense.
2) trust by "backstair influence" (as use of personal relations and mutual exchange of goods and services)
The Soviet legacy: tradition of collective responsibility, ideology of egalitarian prosperity and its accompanying expectations of fairness consumption faced with closed distribution structures and privileges range [12, p. 63]. For access to scarce goods and services it was need to connect the mechanisms of existing system. "Pull" and "black money" depended on trust to people, many of whom would cause extreme suspicion in usual circumstances.
The consequences in the present: in modern conditions pull relationship not only has not lost its significance: it has shifted. Previously, by pulling people got hands on goods and services, nowadays it is need for obtaining money or necessary information to minimize the risk, for gaining access to bureaucratic decisions regarding allocation of loans and its terms. As a result it appears the practice of barter through personal connections, i.e. on the reciprocal principle. If a patron-cli-
ent relationship involves a certain hierarchy due to vertical order of subjects, reciprocity is based on symmetrical horizontal structure, recognition the equality of actors [8, p. 70]. An example is the phenomenon of nepotism and favoritism in Ukrainian politics (clans Baloga, Bogoslovskih, Dubnevychiv, Lutsenko, etc.) that practically blocks the access to it for "mere mortals", turning the latter on outsiders.
Informal political institutions find their equivalent at the level of society: criminal structures, interpersonal networks, communications patronage and corruption act as alternative mechanisms of production of the particular trust at a general public mistrust. But after Euromaydan the nature of political trust is gradually changing. Ukrainians have begun en masse to get rid of psychocultural heritage imposed by the Soviet system and tend more to national archetypes, including on the use of trust both in everyday practice and politics. The peculiar "coming round to you" is explained by the fact that exactly in modern era features intrinsic to Ukrainian population did not develop in contrast to characteristics that met interests of the Politburo of the CPSU. This is the main contradiction of the present state of Ukrainian mass consciousness. Consider these metamorphoses:
1) The Ukrainian doesn't to be a bearer of collectivist values. But his/ her individualism lacks an aggressive intentionality and becomes apparent observing own feelings, emotions, the inner world in general which points to the reflex base aimed first of all at family, friends, like-minded people. Such natural self-sufficiency stimulates not
to join the society but to isolate from it [5, p. 220]. The strategy of the behavior is rather simple — it is an alienation from other people and the passing to the self-reticence, i. e. person exists first of all in the world of own anxiety showing an activity only in extreme situations. An example for it can be meetings, strikes of market traders, bus drivers, business owners, Afghan war veterans, just after the promulgation of certain law, although the necessary information about such possibility was given before that "X" time and at the same time there were such thoughts: "it can't become true"; "they wouldn't dare to do it". The other side of self-reticence is alarmism, when, for example, financial crisis was attended by mass buying of dollars or goods of residential use. For political practice it gives a possibility to manipulate the consciousness resting upon the fact that Ukrainian is a person without "centre" and it is possible to incline such person to the opposite decision even at the last moment.
One more feature of the Ukrainian individualism is the joining of the anti statehood (it means the power institutions aren't considered as organic constant of the political space) and the paternalism (to consider the state to be the guardian who distributes social package) [5, p. 222]. On the one hand, it looks like the people entrust their fate to the state, causing parasitical public mood, training the latter to a passive waiting for a miracle and weakening initiative of individual persons. On the other, constructively critical evaluation of governmental decisions and actions enhances a potential influence of civil society.
2) Executivity is an avoidance of originality, psychological chame-leonism, inconsistency [5, p. 230]. Such a person may easily change plans and choose the escape under the pressure of circumstances (the practice of "rushes" and votes by deputies). Even considering Ukrainian to be "a small group person", who unwillingly searches for the communication in the mass we should point to a superficial and emotional character of his/her communication (the preference to virtual communities, forums) beyond a family. Small group, except conformism and tolerance, creates original immunity against pressure of big groups and society, partially leveling the guilt by participation and identification. Therefore Ukrainian represents the atomization of individual toward a system of abstract social bonds [6, p. 23].
It should be noted that mentality of non-civicism of the "average" Ukrainian as component of his or her social character is probably protective mechanism under circumstances of dependence on central and regional politics and of persistent worsening of life conditions. In due time, exactly using a strategy of self-defense led to numerous civic initiatives, participants of which note strengthening of social relations, growth of confidence in the ability to influence not only on their own fate, but also for the future of the country; it is appear an experience of conflict resolution ("Reanimatsiynyi paket reform", "Lustra", "Nova krayina", "Pomozhemo" etc.). These are significant positive changes after a long-term state of passivity, political apathy and marginality. On the other hand, post-maydan NGO, took away the part
of monopoly duties from the state to resistance the February political crisis in 2015 and separatism, may create systemic barriers for proper power exercise by government. Because the healthy state a priori cannot be based solely on society's control under public servants. The latter should not fear the citizens but cooperate with them.
3) Introversiveness reconstructs the level of the society's neurotization, overstrain on account of bundle data accessing. Hereupon it appears original information blockade to all connected straightly with existential individual's interests [5, c. 237]. "Social fatalism" prevails, i. e. automatism of development, and also it is occurs an overrated level of optimistic expectations after another change of authority which is sure accompanied by sheer disappointments. The individual's behavior is notable for selective character: the aim of adaptation prevails in standard situations; the aim of isolation prevails in problem situations. The introver-siveness is turned into voluntarism (a search of own truth contrary to reality), political shortsightedness, mutual protection, corruption and social nihilism behind moderateness and suspension.
4) An emotional and aesthetically acceptable dominant shows in instability of emotional reactions of Ukrainian to the same stimulus as a mechanism of adaptation to surroundings [5, c. 246]. That is why he or she likes rumors and made-up stories which give possibility to remove the load of the reflectiveness, and are actively used by politicians. For Ukrainian politics it is typical to produce the following myths: about wise and honest head, about "sit-
uation under control", about openness of all income items of public servants, about political and economic independence, about 144 successful reforms for Euro-integration etc.
5) Tolerance as a component of the Ukrainian psychoculture is also marked by historical influences. In particular, it can assert that tolerance of "soviet version" is notable for paternalistic personalized forms, mainly to the power-holding structures through mechanisms of socialization, censorship, etc. Using the definite term was not hailed, because it was considered as the suggestion of the West. Current understanding of tolerance is more appealing to religious or ethnic format, sometimes turning into patience or outright conformism. So during the stay of our country under the rule of foreigners (Turks, Poles, Russians) Ukrainians formed a caution and a willingness to accept the opinion of others, to turn a blind eye to disorder of being for preserving an existing status.
On the other hand, tolerance correlates with Ukrainian archetype of "social compact" peculiar to the period of Kiev Rus. It should pay attention to the popular assembly as a traditional Ukrainian governing body for collegiate decisions which are discussed and adopted by general meeting of community, were the most objective and assumed overall responsibility. Therefore, in public dimension it worth talking about development an "active tolerance, which would ground on the perceived importance in community and would force a legal ability to suppress some groups and strengthening others" [11, p. 112]. This requirement appears quite relevant for Ukrainians'
adaptation to new political course according to claims of representatives of the European Union.
Thus, it may be affirmed that Ukrainians are characterized by using of double trust practices formed under the influence of both historical events and their national archetypes. In general — against the background of mistrust by most political leaders — it is dominated three types of orientation:
• "immoral familism" [3, p. 462] -trust to yourself and members of the family;
• "an extensive trust", i. e. at the place of residence, social status or professional interests;
• a strategy of forced trust as a means of developing a sense of onto-logical security in the "risk society".
Dedicated types of trust can be used as initial training solidarity mechanisms, but their "conservation" and reproduction is an alarming trend that run deepen split and even threaten the existence of Ukrainian society as a whole.
Conclusions. The Ukrainian specificity is not that "political trust does not overcome an individual level" [6, p. 44]; it operates at the level of adaptation tools and habits. The phenomenon of social cohesion on other grounds, except mobilization from above, i.e. at the level of national relations, is keeping awake fear and alienation in former-Soviet people. Finally, political trust should turn into norm of "general reciprocity" [2, p. 26], when discharge of own duties by politicians in exchange for civil support will stop being depended on someone's personal feelings and interests. Otherwise, reciprocity principle loses its potential of universal
social integrator into a large community for those informal associations existing at the grade of microenvironment.
Unfortunately, we must note the trend of declining trust level to the representatives of "new pro-European minded government" [9]. Significantly, the majority of those who received mandate, like their predecessors, do not actually seek to confirm their own legitimacy "from below", frankly ignoring citizens' assessments of their activities. Thus, the power does not become thought-leader for electorate and does not generate belief in the importance and correctness of their actions before voters. Of course, Ukrainian politicians are using various methods for trust building, such as meetings with foreign colleagues as confirmation of common position on some problems (US Republican senator John. McCain); public reports about "successful completion of negotiations and compromise" (statements of D. Klimkin); passage of laws and compliance with standard procedures ("democratic" elections, requirements for individual voting in parliament, etc.).
However, fights, populism, passing laws to improve their own status significantly reduce trust to present Parliament. It is no mere chance, A. Giddens in due time promoted the concept of "active trust" is one that should be earn, not derived from specified social positions or gender roles. In the context of Ukrainian politics it means the need of breaking the practice of simulation publicity (lack of coherent argumentation and public debate of new utility rates, of accountability concerning direction of tranches from the IMF) and "eyewash" through fa-
cade programs that solve, according to Ukrainians' opinion, minor issues (for example, creation of the police or government contact center).
Therefore, building a "new" — according to the Sustainable Development Strategy 2020 of P. Poroshen-ko — Ukraine with its own voice both internal and on the international scene requires solidarity on the ground of mutual — hereafter impersonal — trust, tension of intellectual efforts and loyalty to the country from its powers that be and citizens. Since the state and society should develop together but without sacrifice of each other.
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