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something which the Salaphites are striving for. Modern ethnic Muslims, most of all Tatars and Bashkirs, are integrated in Russian society and its civilizating structures: behavioral, socio-cultural, socio-linguistic, communicative, and industrial-technical. A great role in it is played by traditions of interethnic and inter-confessional tolerance developed in the Ural-Volga area. Taking into account these circumstances, and also the still existing differences between Tatars and Bashkirs, unification of local Muslims in one political force is hardly possible.
"Grazhdanskaya, etnicheskaya i religioznaya identichnost: vchera, segodnya, zavtra," Moscow, 2013, pp. 173-193.
M. Gadzhiyev,
Ph. D. (Political sciences), Daghestan State University, Makhachkala
POLITICAL ELITE OF DAGHESTAN
During the past decades two opposite trends of political activity have become quite pronounced in Russia. On the one hand, we observe the active role of political elites in the country's life and their influence on the development of political phenomena and processes, and on the other, considerable curtailment of the political activity and participation of the main social strata and groups in socio-political life. In examining the social nature of the main groups of the modern foreign or Russian political elite we come across tabooing this subject, which bears not so much a methodological as psychological character.
The founders of Marxism laid an emphasis on the pressing need for the participation of the broad popular masses in society's political life and warned against the situation in which a narrow circle of people could monopolize power. Marxists proclaimed as one of their task the
liquidation of such monopoly in order to abolish difference between the political elite and the rest of society. The elitist concepts, having elaborated axiological and altimetric approaches, single out the political elite as an independent social group. At present the altimetric approach to the interpretation of the term "elite" is preponderant, inasmuch as no reliable and well-tested criteria of belonging to the political elite have been elaborated by adherents to the axiological approach so far.
In the early 1990s Russia faced a choice of political and state system. The difficulties of a search for new forms of statehood and political instability have resulted in a sharp struggle between different socio-political forces and groupings with different political views and platforms. In present-day Russia as a result of socio-economic and political transformations new social strata and groups, and a whole galaxy of new political leaders and elites have emerged in the past decades.
It should be borne in mind that the formation process of a mature political elite in Russian society takes quite some time. Civil society in modern Russia is still in the "embryonic state" and largely depends on the "initiatives" of the state. During the period of cardinal economic transformations the problem of creating a developed middle class has not been solved. There is an insignificant number of owners who are independent from the state. Unfortunately, having created a multiparty system, we have weak political parties and, accordingly, their political elites and leaders have a very low prestige.
It should also be noted that in the conditions of "weakness" of Russian civil society, which is unable to control political power and political processes and phenomena, the role of political elites and their leaders could have become determining, but that was not the case. The Russian political elite, by its composition and origin, is the social sequence of the preceding Communist party elite of the socialist
formation, on the one hand, and on the other, under the impact of new social conditions and the transformations of the past several decades this political elite is changing and replenished with representatives of the sections which have emerged in the course of economic reforms and political transformations.
We should note that the specific features of the formation of the political elite in Daghestan , along with common Russian processes in this sphere, differ from the general Russian pattern. In our view, they include such factors as the specificity of the political culture of Daghestani society, its traditions, its multiethnic composition, the high level of religiousness, and poly-confessional character of the population. The socio-political transformations going on in Russian society have been aggravated by certain objective reasons typical of Daghestan only, among which mention should be made of the geopolitical position of the region and "stage" specificities of the modern ethno-regional development. A no less important factor is the inclusion of Daghestan in the system of trans-regional ethnic political relations
In other words, on the national outskirts of Russian society, especially in Daghestan, the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. has provoked tumultuous processes which were previously concealed by Soviet modernization. Political and social structures of the Soviet type were destroyed and informal relations between traditional institutions came to the fore. Clan and client relations began to take shape on the ethnic basis, which became close to the elements of ethnic cultures which still existed despite socialist modernization.
The Republic of Daghestan is a unique region of the Russian Federation by its history, original culture, poly-ethnic composition, natural and climatic conditions, and demographic potential. There is no "titular" nation in Daghestan. The most numerous people are the Avars.
Then come the Darghins, Kumyks, Lezghins, Lakz, Tabasarans, Nogais, Rutuls, and Tsakhurs. Apart from them, Daghestan is also populated by Russians, Azerbaijanis, Chechens, Tats, Tatars, and others.
One of the ethnopolitical specific features of the Republic of Daghestan is that its ethnic groups are the "holders of right." The peoples of Daghestan are represented in legislative and executive bodies through regional groups.
Ethnicity is an important political factor in the formation process of the Daghestani political elite. "Ethnic balance" is a typical feature of Daghestan. The system of appointments and promotions at Daghestani ministries, departments, industrial enterprises, and bodies of executive power contradicts the Russian legal standards, but it enables the authorities to maintain fragile civil peace in Daghestan.
The system of ethnic quotas is dangerous because it strengthens nationalistic tendencies among the political elite in Daghestani society. As has been shown by recent developments, ethnicity is used by representatives of the local elites as a trump card in protecting and promoting their interests. In the early 1990s the leaders of many national public and political movements ("Popular Front named after Imam Shamil," "Sadwal," "Tenglik," "Birlik") came out for the division of Daghestan into independent states. The problem of sovereignty has led to the growth of national self-consciousness, inasmuch as national movements called for territorial division and political independence. In the conditions of Daghestan these processes developed very rapidly due to a complex ethnopolitical background picture. During the period under review the leadership of the republic had to encounter the processes of swiftly growing national self-consciousness and exacerbation of interethnic relations which were manifested in the activity of the political elites pursuing different
political aims and propagating different ideas about the future of their republic.
It is also necessary to note that the political elite of Daghestan largely depends on clan interests in the socio-political life of the republic which were growing during the post-perestroika period, and this was conditioned by the transformation of the Soviet state system. In the conditions of the reforms carried on in Russian society the federal center continued to initiate radical economic and political transformations, and at the same time make concessions to the sovereignization of the national autonomies of the country.
As a result, the specific features of the political situation in the Republic of Daghestan, at a time of the formation of its present political elite, now included the trend of considerable politicization of interethnic relations and ethnicity of politics. This circumstance has contributed to stepping up black-market processes in which the ethnic factor became a channel for acquiring, keeping and using resources of all types by clan groupings. Thus, ethnic affiliation became the necessary attribute for implementing narrow group interests.
In other words, the ethnic factor was used by clan groups to join and carry on the struggle for power in the Republic in Daghestan. During that period the socio-political climate in Daghestan was favorable for the black-market and other shadowy groupings to take part quite actively in Daghestani socio-political and economic life. One of the specific features of the Daghestani political elite is that the old Soviet party and nomenklatura elite was able to remain afloat in the new conditions and successfully integrate in the new reality.
In these conditions the party-nomenklatura elite of Daghestan used in greater degree the existing state resources in the struggle for power against formal and informal non-governmental figures, big businessmen and leaders of various national movements. In their turn,
they began to appeal for ethnic solidarity, and also for support from financial groups.
We believe that the struggle for power between these groupings predetermined the character of the political system of Daghestan and laid an imprint on the further development of the republic. Some experts believe that the political system, which has taken shape in Daghestan after the collapse of the communist regime was a result of harsh confrontations and complex compromises of different political forces, which came into being in place of the uniform system of communist hierarchy on the basis of "checks and balances."
One of the results of these processes was the emergence of such model in which the clan and ethnic character acquired the dominating significance in socio-political and socio-economic processes of the republic. This is shown, for one, by the fact that throughout the entire post-Soviet period representatives of the three most numerous ethnic groups of the republic - Avar, Darghin and Kumyk - hold all three highest posts in the republic: President, Chairman of the People's Assembly, and Chairman of the government of Daghestan. Many people believe that the most prestigious and profitable places in the lower echelons of power are distributed, first of all, among representatives of these ethno-clan groupings.
Speaking of the political elite of Daghestan we imply that it consists mainly of representatives of the Devashin and Khunzakh clans, where each clan is striving to achieve a stable position, control its surrounding, and create favorable socio-economic and political conditions for its activity. The typical aim of these clans is to seize valuable assets, promote their people to federal or local legislative bodies of power, receive important government posts, and remove rivals and former business partners.
Examining the situation with the problems of political elites in the entire North Caucasus we shall see the attempts of the Russian leadership to use the regional specificities of the political elites for stabilizing the situation in this difficult region. The federal center believes that the specific features of the North Caucasus, where power was allegedly transferred from father to son, should be taken into account. We consider this view erroneous.
Each independent part of the North Caucasian Federal region has its typical characteristics. For instance, a comprehensive work carried out by the federal center in Chechnya in the past several years gives grounds for certain optimism concerning stabilization of the ethnopolitical situation in the region. The election of Ramzan Kadyrov (the son of Ahmat Kadyrov) President of Chechnya in 2007 was an attempt of the Russian leadership to use regional specificities of the elite for stabilizing the situation in this far from calm and quiet republic. Not all clans and families of that republic were unanimous in acknowledging the election of the new President. This was possible thanks to the strenuous work of the Kadyrov "teip" (clan, family) with representatives of other teips in the process of prolonged negotiations with them.
In Ingushetia the traditionally leading teips were the Ozdoyevs, Evloyevs, and Aushevs. When Yu. Evkurov has been elected President these teips were pushed into the background, because Evkurov was member of a small teip, but by the time of his election he had the rank of major general and was Hero of Russia.
The situation in Daghestan is somewhat different. Recruiting the leading political elites there takes place from among the two leading ethnic groups - Avar and Darghin replacing each other. First the Darghin M. Magomedov was the supreme ruler; he was replaced
by the Avar M. Aliyev. Then again, according to Daghestani traditions, M. Magomedov's son was elected.
We believe that in the present situation in modern Daghestan and in view of the exacerbation of many factors concerning redistribution of power and economic resources, their position and significance of the elites is far from simple. Their confrontations often go beyond legal boundaries and become the cause of a general systemic crisis in the republic. Confrontation within the political elite of Daghestan is manifested in an impact on the political process in the republic via state and unofficial structures kept under control, on the on hand, and through their own agents of influence in the federal center, on the other.
A question could be asked: "What is to be done?" Historical experience shows that the situation is better when the political elite includes representatives of different ethnic groups. Beginning from the mid-1990s heated discussions were going on in the Daghestani mass media whether the republic needed president. The discussion of the problem of changing the form of the state structure of Daghestan was initiated by political and religious figures both in the republic and outside it who were opposed to the ruling elite.
On March 7, 1999, the third referendum took place in the Republic of Daghestan on the following question: "Do you think it necessary to introduce in the Republic of Daghestan the post of President (head of state) elected by citizens on the basis of universal, equal and direct vote with secret ballot?" The number of votes "for" was 201,730, or 23.59 percent, the number of votes "against" was 613,010, or 71.68 percent.
Thus, a much greater number of inhabitants of the republic rejected the idea of presidential rule in the Republic of Daghestan at the time, deeming it more expedient to have the State Council of the Republic of Daghestan as the most acceptable body in essence and
form. This Council consists of 14 people and is formed by the Constitutional Assembly of the Republic of Daghestan. The State Council cannot have more than one representative of one and the same nationality.
Summing up the above-mentioned facts and figures, it can be concluded that the political elite in the republic is under a great influence of definite ethnic clans. It would be no exaggeration to say that this phenomenon is present in all spheres of life in Daghestan. The formation process of modern influential elite clans began at the end of the 1980s, and it can be considered more or less completed by today.
"Elitologiya Rossii: sovremennoye sostoyaniye i perspektivy razvitiya," Rostov-on-Don, 2013, vol. 2, pp. 474-480.
S. Zhemchurayeva,
Ph. D. (Sociology), Research Institute named after H. Ibragimov, RAS, Grozny RELIGION AND ETHNICITY AS COMPONENTS OF CHECHEN IDENTITY (Material of sociological survey)
Chechen culture has been formed as part of Caucasian culture. In this connection it is possible to examine the phenomenon of the so-called Caucasian identity. A study of this problem is quite timely in the light of the growing process of globalization. In the view of many scholars and experts, ethnic identity is a special characteristic of subjectivity consisting of perception and consciousness of the individual of his or her affiliation to a definite group or community of people through the feeling and understanding of oneself as part of common material and spiritual culture, the language, values,
