CC BY
96
Nargiz AKHUNDOVA
D.Sc. (Hist.), Professor, Chair of History of the Asian and African Countries,
Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan).
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND RELIGIOUS REPERCUSSIONS OF THE ARAB CONQUESTS IN THE CAUCASUS
Abstract
This is an in-depth study of how the peoples and the states of the Caucasus responded to the Arab presence in the region. The author analyzes the impact of the cooperation between the Muslim Arabs and the local political elite on the political, economic, social, administrative, and religious
spheres, as well as the economic changes caused by the acceptance of the Muslim laws. He also takes a look at the local population’s discontent with the Arab rule and the forms it assumed that gradually undermined the Arabs’ grip on the region and led to the emergence of independent states.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
Today the world with its crisscross of borders and multitude of nations looks like an immutable system of geopolitical regions. It would seem that it has always been this way, but in actual fact the history of every nation has many factors that have contributed to its interaction with the nations around it. The most important of these factors is that the civilizations of today are the products of that particular time in history.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
This explains the great interest which the history of the Caucasus, the interaction of its nationalities, their mutual influence and mutual enrichment, as well as the contribution of each to their common history evokes in researchers of the region’s distant and not so distant past. The way of thinking and behavior of the nations who had to deal with the Arab conquerors and the Islam they professed dramatically changed the course of events and their history. Many of the local people accepted Islam in its totality as a moral and spiritual imperative; some of the Caucasian peoples, however, preserved their national and religious specifics. They spoke different languages, followed different customs, and had different institutions. Their religions were also different; some of them were monotheists.
Islam and the Arabic Caliphate, as the first Muslim state, can be described as landmarks of world history that radically changed the destiny of the Eurasian world. The Arabs, as the nation which created Islam and was its first follower, became the sole rulers of the Caliphate, the most powerful empire of its time, extending to three continents.
This gives rise to the following questions: How did the dominant ethnic group establish its relations with the other nationalities of the empire and with the neighboring nations? What were the results of its domination? We all know that Islam and the Muslim culture greatly affected all aspects of the everyday life and activities of the countries and peoples within the orbit of the first Islamic state.
The Arabs Come to Power in the Caucasus
The emergence of the Arab-Muslim state, the death of the Prophet Muhammad, and the political storms which followed these events and created the Caliphate ushered in a period of intensive growth of the still very young Islamic community, as well as rapid and deep-cutting changes. They were brought about by the Arabic conquests and the mounting crisis in Islamic society, which started as the Ridda1 and developed into a war between Caliph Ali and the Umayyads.
Within a very short time after the Prophet’s death, the Muslim army, obviously unhampered by social problems and conflicts, managed to establish a vast state. The era of the Righteous Caliphs, Caliph Umar (634-644) in particular, became a period of great military victories for Islam as a new monotheist religion. The territories now occupied by Syria, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, the Caucasus, North Africa, and Transoxiana were captured; the main stage of conquests and victories began when the Muslim army demonstrated that it was stronger than the Sassanid and Byzantine armies. The huge empires enfeebled by their never ending confrontation dismissed the approaching threat as another wave of nomadic inroads, while the peoples caught in the whirlpool of the struggle hailed the conquerors who allowed them to avoid taxes and religious compulsion (especially onerous in Byzantium). The victories, which came in prompt succession, moved the Muslims to the boundaries of the eastern provinces.
Before the Arabs came to the Caucasus, the region had been an arena of struggle between the Sassanid and Byzantine empires, two rivals each seeking a tighter grip on the area. By the late 6th century, Byzantium, which could rely to a certain extent on the local Christian churches, had captured part of the Sassanid’s Caucasian domains. In some countries, Monophisitism (Eastern Christianity) supported by the Sassanids was fairly strong, while Orthodoxy, which relied on Constantinople, was never popular. Later, in the early 7th century, the Caucasian Armenian and Albanian churches split from Byzantium, while the Georgian Church remained tied to it.2 For many centuries, Iran and By-
1 See: O.G. Bolshakov, Istoria khalifata, Vol. 1, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1989, p. 63.
2 See: Istoria Vostoka, Vol. 2, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 2000, p. 37.
zantium remained locked in wars which neither could win until the Byzantines allied with the influential Khazars living in the north of the Caucasus and successfully employed various devices to pull some of the feudal lords in the south onto their side.
However, after routing the Byzantine army in 636 in Syria in the battle of Yarmouk and the Persians at Qadisiyyah in 639 and Nihawand in 642, the Arabs buried the Sassanid Empire. They established their domination in the Middle Eastern and North African Byzantine domains. A qualitatively new stage of the Eurasian Middle Ages was thus ushered in with very different protagonists in command. Armed with a new religion, the young state could capture what remained of the Sassanid and Byzantine domains. The Muslims turned their attention to the Caucasus; the Arabs arrived immediately after the Nihawand battle and quickly approached Derbent and the borders of the Khazarean state to become masters of nearly the entire region.
By that time, the Arabs had developed a taste for the settled way of life; families and clans still very much devoted to the tribal traditions settled in far-away regions. The Caucasus had its share of uprisings and discontent, but its landowners accepted the new rulers. Later this class played prominent roles in the local administrations.
It should be said that not all the local rulers were prepared to hail the conquerors. The first Arabian march on Azerbaijan (643-644) under Bukair ibn Abdullah was not easy. The Arabs, assisted by Azeri noble Isfandiyad who was captured at an early stage of the march, fought their way across the vast province in the northeast of the Iranian plateau.3 Having warned the Arabs that, unless peace was achieved, the people might flee to the mountains and become unattainable, Isfandiyad recommended diplomatic means. The Muslims won by signing a peace treaty with the locals.4 There was practically no fighting; the people readily agreed to pay tribute in exchange for property and guarantees that they could follow their own customs and religions.5
Albanian Prince Javanshir preferred to maneuver among the Byzantines, Khazars, and Arabs. According to the historical sources, his domains stretched from the borders of Georgia to Derbent.6 T. Rshtuni, who ruled Armenia, on the other hand, entrusted his country to Byzantium. Later, in 652, he severed his ties with it to ally with Muawiyah of the Umayyad Dynasty, thus turning his country into a Caliphate domain.1
The Arabs then moved along the Caspian coast toward Bab al-Abwab (Derbent), a Sassanid fortress which shielded the lands of the bellicose nomadic tribes. Sarvaras, who commanded the Sas-sanid garrison and who knew that the Sassanid army had been routed, preferred to talk to the Arab commanders in order to exchange exemption from per capita tax for military service on the borders.8 This saved what remained of the Sassanid troops from complete destruction; they joined the Muslim army, where some of them soon became Muslims.9 Historical sources inform us that the Arabs wanted to move on to attack the nomads and that the Persians, who had much better knowledge of the local conditions, dissuaded them.10 We also know that the Christians of mountainous Armenia signed similar treaties and that the Arabs reached the Georgian city of Tbilisi.
The political disagreements in the Caliphate halted the hostilities in the Caucasus, which allowed the Khazars to expand to the neighboring countries of Albania and Armenia. Late in the 1th century, after recuperating from the civil war, the Arabs resumed their pressure on the Caucasus.
3 See: H. Kennedy, Velikie arabskie zavoevania, AST Publishers, Moscow, 2010, p. 227 (H. Kennedy, The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live in, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2007).
4 See: N. Velihanly, The Arabian Caliphate and Azerbaijan, Elm, Baku, 1993, p. 23 (in Azeri).
5 See: Ibidem.
6 See: Z. Buniyadov, Azerbaijan in the 7th-9th Centuries, Elm, Baku, 1989, p. 78 (in Azeri).
7 See: A. Ter-Gevondyan, Armenia i arabskiy khalifat, Academy of Sciences of the Armenian S.S.R. Publishers, Erevan, 1977, p. 87.
8 See: F. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1981, pp. 205-209.
9 See: Ibidem.
10 See: M. Tabari, Tarih ar-rusul wa-l-mulyuk, Vol. 1, Dar al-maarif, Cairo, 1949-1950, p. 153 (in Arabic).
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
They conquered Arran and Armenia and exterminated ancient noble clans. Sheroi, an influential Albanian prince, was taken to Damask where he was kept for the rest of his life.11
The Arabs were convinced that a war was the only way to stop repeated Khazar inroads into the South Caucasian lands. The war, which lasted until 737, did not bring final victory to either side. Shortly before that date, Marwan ibn Muhammad, future caliph of the Umayyad Caliphate, came to the Caucasus as its appointed ruler. His arrival was predated by the assassination of Javanshir, an influential ishhan of Arran, and persecutions of Christians in Arminiya (a province, the larger part of which consisted of Albania, Eastern Georgia, etc.). The new ruler, who was convinced that this policy should be abandoned and who also counted on the Armenian cavalry in the coming war against the Khazars, paid the Armenian cavalrymen their wages for three years out of the state treasury.12 He was not as lenient in Georgia. In 753, he returned to Arminiya to cruelly squash a Georgian revolt.13 The Khazars and their land, however, remained his main aim.
They were finally routed; their kagan asked for peace, while Marwan demanded that they adopt Islam. The Arabs remained in control until the last day of the Umayyad Dynasty. In 750, when the Abbasids replaced the Umayyads, the Khazars tried to regain their independence. Byzantium interpreted the domestic squabbles in the Caliphate as a chance to revive its diplomatic and military activity in the Caucasus.
Political Consequence of the Arab Conquests in the Caucasus
The Arabs who conquered the Caucasus found administrative formations here, called Arminiya and Adurbadagan (Azerbaijan), inherited from the reforms carried out by Byzantium and the Sassanid state. The Arabic Arminiya did not coincide with the eponymous Byzantine province, while Azerbaijan covered the northern and southern parts of the province as established by the Sassanids.14 At first, the Arabs appointed generals to rule the territories they conquered; many of them unwilling to sever the ties with the center delegated their powers to their deputies. Bukair ibn Abdullah, for example, having conquered Azerbaijan, preferred to go on fighting; he left behind military commander Utba al-Furqan to rule the newly conquered province.15
These deputies (amili) were present when treaties with the local people were signed; tax collection was their main duty; amirs and walis were administrators while qadis were lawyers. Under the written agreements, the conquered peoples recognized their dependence on the Caliphate and agreed to pay jizyah. Those officials who voluntarily accepted the new rulers preserved their posts. Religious figures were also involved in the administrative process. The new system left the local administrations more or less free; they used this leeway to ignore some of the points after the center loosened its grip. These digressions were invariably punished with new invasions and much more onerous agreements.
To rule the provinces, the caliphs needed information about the local social conditions, taxes, and other specific features. Each of the provincial rulers was engaged in administration and controlled all sides of life, with the exception of the military sphere. The controlling structure, divan, was found
11 See: Ibn al-Asir, Al-Kamil fit-t tarih, Vol. 7, Beirut, 1965-1968, p. 20 (in Arabic).
12 See: M. Tabari, op. cit., p. 156.
13 See: Ibidem.
14 See: Z. Buniyadov, op. cit., p. 145.
15 See: O.G. Bolshakov, op. cit., p. 96.
in the provincial centers. Caliph Abd al-Malik (661-680) set up a postal service (the best for its time according to an Arabian historian)16 to facilitate information exchange between the center and the provinces.
There were local administrations which were staffed at the early stages of Arab power with local administrators and nobles who voluntarily adopted Islam and vowed allegiance to the caliph; there was an obvious shortage of Arab officials. Before Abd al-Malik, the Arabs, who did not have enough administrative experience, appointed local officials to the administrative posts; an exception was made for the taxation and military divans, which conducted paperwork in Arabic and were controlled by the caliph. The divans in Azerbaijan and Arran used the Pahlavi and Greek languages they inherited from the Sassanids and Byzantines; all documents were drawn up in one of these two languages. Later, on the caliph’s orders, all those who did not know Arabic were removed “by the will of Allah.”17
The Abbasids, who replaced the Umayyad dynasty, made the state a Muslim (rather than Arab) state, which radically changed the situation in the provinces. From the very beginning, the descendants of Abbas, uncle of the Prophet Muhammad, involved all the Islamic peoples in the social and political life of their countries. The newly converted (malawi)—first Persians and later Turks—competed with the Arabs and gradually replaced them.18
Under the Umayyads, Islamization of Persia and the Caucasus was a gradual process; it accelerated under the Abbasids. The local Muslims acquired the same rights as the Arabs, while the local elite regained their former positions. Well aware of the Caucasus’ strategic and political importance and because of the inroads of the Khazars who in 754 plundered Kartli and captured Tbilisi, the first caliphs of the new dynasty appointed their close relatives or successful military commanders as rulers.
To tighten the grip on the region and accelerate its Islamization, the caliphs moved Arab tribes to the captured lands. Arabs started arriving in great numbers in Mugan, Derbent, and Shirvan where their presence created new problems and stirred up collisions largely caused by the traditional rivalry between the northern and southern Arab tribes. The numerous clashes brought victory to the northern clans.19 The Arabian rulers of the Shaybani and Sulam clans were the staunchest supporters of the resettlement policy. They were responsible for the greatest number of Arab settlers who put down roots in Shirban and other parts of Arminiya. The Sulam rulers, likewise, moved members of their clan to the region’s central part.
This was done for political and strategic reasons. As a factor of stability in the conquered lands, the settlers helped to keep the Byzantines and Khazars in check and joined the marches against these rivals. The Arab tribes in Derbent played an important role in the struggle against the Khazars. The settlers occupied vast territories along the border with Byzantium, gradually pressing to the north and northwest and setting up military settlements in strategically important cities. The Arabs were moved to new lands to keep the ambitious local feudal lords in check, themselves eventually developing strong separatist sentiments. The Arab military leaders, rulers, and bureaucrats wanted hereditary lands and posts. The Shaybanids and Sulamids became the hereditary rulers of Arminiya.
In the late 9th century, the provinces acquired much more economic and cultural weight; this and the repeated uprisings against the Abbasids were the outward signs of a new historical reality and the specifics of the conquered countries. The relations between the Muslims and the local people varied from country to country.
16 See: Al-Galgashandi, Kitab subh al-asha, Vol. 15, Cairo, 1922, pp. 367-368 (in Arabic).
17 See: Ibidem.
18 See: N. Akhundova, Turki v sisteme gosudarstvennogo upravlenia Khalifata, Elm, Baku, 2004.
19 See: N. Velihanly, op. cit., p. 58.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
The Caucasus acquired new political units earlier than the central part of the Baghdad Caliphate. The process which began in the late 8th century was slowed down by the Hurramit movement suppressed by the huge military forces that were moved to the region.20 It should be said that the local Christians, who preferred to steer clear of this anti-Muslim rebellion, probably intended to use it in their interests. And when it was put down, one of the Albanian princes gave its leader, Babek, to the Arabs.21
Although defeated, the Hurramit movement was one of the reasons the Caliphate lost its political weight; Georgia and Armenia replaced it as centers of political resistance. Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, with quite a large Muslim population, did not participate in this resistance against the Abbasids. According to Arab sources, Babek’s execution was followed by never ending revolts in the Caucasus, which still remained under Arab rule.22 It took the army under Bug al-Kabir23 (dispatched to the region in 852) nearly four years (until 855) to pacify the region. The Arab commander had to recapture Tbilisi with the help of Christian feudal lords of the House of Bagratuni.
The Caliphate, however, was not strong enough to halt the emergence of semi-independent or even independent states. The war with Byzantium distracted its attention from the Caucasus; as a result, the Arab province of Arminiya disappeared. Its eastern part (northern Azerbaijan of our days) was ruled by an Arab family of Mazyadids. Arab ruler H. as-Sulami, who restored “the Albanian kingdom which fell apart,”24 declared Derbent an emirate. Albanian Prince Hamam in Sheki (part of Arran) took power; in the south of Azerbaijan, the Turkic Sajid Dynasty established an independent state of the Sajids. Unable to completely detach itself from the center for political reasons, it preferred to cooperate. This proved wise; in 898 its ruler was declared the ruler of practically non-existent Arabian Arminiya. The Sajids gradually enlarged their state; Shirvan, Sheki, Syunik, and other provinces as its parts paid tribute to the rulers.
In the north, the Princedom of the Bagratids was the largest feudal state, which included the lands as far as Kartli (it had fallen apart in the latter half of the 10th century).
The Caliphate was also crumbling in Syria, Egypt, Persia, and Central Asia, which made the Tulunids, Samanids, and other appointed rulers independent of the center. De facto independent, they no longer deemed it necessary to report back to the center regarding their military, administrative, and financial activities. The so far united Muslim Empire—the Baghdad Caliphate—was falling apart under the pressure of accelerating centrifugal trends.
The Arab Conquests in the Caucasus: Economic Impacts
After conquering vast territories, the Arabs invariably demanded that the local people pay taxes. At the later stages, the Muslim laws divided taxes into haraj (land tax) and jizyah (per capita tax for non-Muslims). While the war was still going on, the distinction was not clearly observed: all taxes were described as jizyah.
Under the first caliphs and Muawiyah, the first of the Umayyads caliphs, the state treasury was replenished by the spoils of war; the payments and land in the conquered provinces were traditionally intended for the Muslim soldiers who settled in the newly conquered areas. This meant that the
20 See: Z. Buniyadov, op. cit., p. 233.
21 See: A. MMler, Istoria islama, Vol. 1, AST, Moscow, 2004, p. 112.
22 See: A. Balazuri, Kitab futuh al-buldan, Bulag, Cairo, 1051, p. 212 (in Arabic).
23 See: Ibidem.
24 Istoria Azerbaidzhana, Vol. 2, Elm, Baku, 1992, p. 102.
conquerors and the conquered belonged to different societies and had to cope with different problems. The conquered had no chance of moving up the administrative ladder.
Over time, after the local people were invited to join the Muslim administrative structures, the situation changed. The Muslim administrations were expected to collect heavy taxes from those who preserved their lands. The fiscal structure inherited from the Sassanids and Byzantines continued functioning in various regions and continued using the local languages. Under Caliph Abd al-Malik, the system was replaced with a new structure which used the Arabic language, the state language from that time on.25 Coins with Arabic inscriptions appeared; official documents were written in Arabic; and new mosques were built to accommodate the newly converted.
Quite unexpectedly the reforms created tax, social, and economic problems. State revenue, on which the Caliphate counted, dropped. It was expected that taxes and dues (paid by the agricultural sector in particular) would replace the irregular revenue from the wars. The taxes and dues were mostly collected in the non-Muslim lands; the well-oiled system of tax collection faltered. Islam began rapidly spreading to the agricultural areas. The Umeyyads tried to stabilize the situation. The newly converted Muslims were not exempt from taxes—taxes were replaced with an equivalent in Muslim donations. The new Muslims were forced to abandon their land and move to the cities to engage handcrafts; the less lucky found themselves on the social margins.
While untilled areas expanded, the amount of collected taxes decreased. The use of force and cruelty by the tax collectors merely added to the widespread discontent. In the early 8th century, Umar II (717-720), one of the Umayyad caliphs, restored the old, lighter, taxes for the newly converted; after his death the temporary privileges were annulled.26
A new social group mawali—non-Arabic Muslim—was a social byproduct of the massive Is-lamization of all categories of local people who tried to adjust to the new conditions and adapt themselves to the new circumstances. While preserving their regional specifics, they still preferred to avoid all more or less serious provocations created by their Muslim Arab neighbors. It should be said that the situation in the Caucasus was much graver than in Syria, where people easily integrated into the Arab tribal system. The newly converted Muslims in the regions were isolated from power and high posts, which made them receptive to any ideas, including Shi‘a, to rise against the government.
This created the danger of centrifugal trends in the Caliphate; however, the people at the top seemed unconcerned about it and did not try to get rid of this diversity. The Muslim empire remained a patchwork of the historical and cultural heritage of its peoples. The contradictions in the margins, which assumed religious hues of all sorts (we should not forget the Hurramit movement and what came of it), slowed down the ideological unification of Islam. Very soon the Abbasid dynasty relied on the mawali to change the unfavorable situation to some extent.
Unlike the Umayyads who relied on the Arabs, the Abbasids involved mawali, the feudal lords who previously had no power, in regional administration. The Abbasids too preferred to leave the administrative and taxation principles of the Caliphate intact. Despite the new rulers’ lavish promises, the position of the popular masses in Azerbaijan, Arran, and other places worsened to a great extent.27
The Caliphate somewhat changed the nature of agrarian relations in the conquered provinces. At the early stages of its domination, the situation in Arran, Azerbaijan, and Armenia remained practically the same; new social relations came to the fore as eastern feudalism gradually unfolded. In Syria, Egypt, and Mesopotamia, the Arabs, who laid their hands on all the arable land and distributed it among the settlers, gained control over the local economy. They failed to do the same in
25 See: I. Filshtinsky, Istoria arabov i khalifata, Muravey Publishers, Moscow, 2001, pp. 8-9.
26 See: Ibidem.
21 See: A. M^ler, op. cit., p. 681.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Azerbaijan, Arran, Armenia, and the Georgian lands, although they controlled the state-owned
lands.28
Waqf lands (the property of Muslim organizations more or less similar to church possessions in the Christian countries) appeared under the Abbasids. In the mid-8th century, another category of landed property, iqta, appeared—land transferred to soldiers in active service. The Arabs confiscated the land of mutinous feudal lords and distributed it among the Arab settlers.29 The vast landed possessions were treated as state-owned lands; in the Caucasus, privately owned inherited land (myulk) was vast enough.
By the 9th-10th centuries, the Caucasus no longer belonged to the zone of Caliphate domination. The economy played a small role, if at all, in the process for the simple reason that in the Middle Ages economic changes in the region were barely noticeable. One aspect, however, deserves special mention. The Caliphate as a centralized state encouraged trade and urban development in the Caucasus in the most natural way. Barda, Tbilisi, Derbent, Ardabil, Ganja, Shabran,30 Dvin, and others were more than regional trade centers; they were involved in trade with other areas of the Caliphate. The local merchants, who had developed into a social group, and the economically developed Georgian princedoms were not merely part of active international trade, but also acted as trade agents.31
In Azerbaijan and Arran, the cities became administrative centers with a life of their own; the local people, other ethnic groups (Arabs, Jews and others) organized into professional corporations, and feudal landowners lived side by side in them.
Certain Aspects of Islamization of the Caucasus
Islam, a new religion which the Arab conquerors brought to the Caucasus along with the administrative and taxation system and which they tried to impose on the conquered followers of other religions, was not immediately become widespread. At first the Arabs did not enforce it on the local people, but nor did they prevent its voluntary adoption. This was most obvious in Arran with its predominantly Christian population.32
The local feudal lords made a feeble attempt to defend the religion of their ancestors; very soon, however, the obvious advantages of cooperation with the conquerors forced them to beat a retreat. The Azeri nobles lost no time in embracing Islam.33 Engaged in protracted wars with Byzantium and fully aware of the importance of the Caucasus as a theater of war, the Arabs demonstrated loyalty to the local Christians.
In the north of Azerbaijan, Islam spread much slower than in the south. In Arran, rivaling feudal clans adopted Islam to draw the Arab conquerors onto their side. The economic factor was no less important; the new faith allowed the landowners to keep their landed possessions and made them exempt from jizyah. Later, knowledge and use of Arabic, which became obligatory, were expected to bring the local nobles closer to the Arabs. Their language, however, was limited to administrative
28 See: Ibn Miskawayh, Tajarib al-umam va taagib al-humum, Vol. 1, Leyden, 1961, p. 152 (in Arabic).
29 See: E.A. Beliaev, Araby, islam i arabskiy khalifat v rannem Srednevekovie, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1965,
30 See: Istoria Vostoka, Vol. 2, p. 42.
31 See: Ibidem.
32 See: V. Bartold, Polnoe sobranie sochineniy, Vol. 2, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1964, pp. 45, 142.
33 See: Z. Buniyadov, op. cit., pp. 81-91.
matters; it was never used at home, while the ordinary people treated it as the language of Muslim theology.
The traditional (non-Arab) culture survived because Arab settlement was slow and because the Arab conquerors left the local administrative structures intact. Large-scale adoption of Islam in the Caucasus did not transform the local peoples into Arabs.
In the post-Umayyad period, when the Caliphate realized that it needed the potential of the local people, Islamization took a different turn. When moving respected Arab families to Azerbaijan, the caliphs instructed them to demonstrate the advantages of Islam by their behavior and piety.34 The simple and easily grasped religion and the fact that the Arabs alleviated the economic and religious pressure attracted people to Islam. The Arabs, who brought their religion and their language to the Caucasus, became immersed in the local culture and adjusted the local traditions and rules to their needs, administrative needs in particular.
By the early 8th century, Islam had become the main religion in Azerbaijan. The top crust embraced it to preserve their privileges; the merchants and artisans were encouraged by the attention and concessions; while the peasants wanted to avoid the per capita tax. The new religion banned encouragement of all forms of paganism, from idolatry to polytheism.35 In Arran, where Christianity was widespread and where its confessions were locked in a fierce struggle for domination, Is-lamization began much later, in the 9th-10th centuries under the aegis of the Muslim rulers of Shir-van and Arran.
C o n c l u s i o n
After conquering the vast and geographically diverse territories, the Arabs immediately moved into them; the newcomers settled separately from the locals and almost never mixed with them. To avoid discontent and uprisings, the Muslim victors never used force to impose their faith on the conquered and maintained friendly relations with the church and other religious structures.
The local people adopted Islam to avoid taxes; the nobles did the same to join the ruling class of the Caliphate. Those wishing to join the army and climb the military ladder, likewise, had to become Muslims. In the 10th century, or even earlier, official posts were reserved for the Muslims. The fact that there was no coercion and that people were free to choose whether to join Islam or stay away from it made the new faith doubly attractive. By joining Islam, the conquered joined the camp of the victors, joined the top crust, and became equal, at least theoretically, with other Muslims.
There were disagreements between the Arab Muslims and mawali, but this did not refute the fact that Islam was open for all and declared the equality of all Muslims before the Allah. The confrontation in Islamic society, however, contributed to the crumbling of the old social order and destroyed social partitions.
By setting up political and social frameworks conducive to gradual adoption of the new faith, the Arab conquests were the first step toward future Islamization of many nations and regions. By the 10th century, the larger part of the territories captured by 750 had become part of the Islamic community. This would have never happened without the Arab conquests; had it been otherwise, Islam would have never become the main religion in this part of the world.
In many respects, the Muslims’ wise policies reconciled the conquered peoples to their rule. The Arabs convinced the local people that capitulation on their conditions and payment of tribute were
34 See: D. Sourdel, J. Sourdel, Tsivilizatsia klassichekogo islama, U-Faktoria, Ekaterinburg, 2006, pp. 89-92 (D. Sourdel, J. Sourdel, La Civilisation de l’Islam classique , Arthaud, Paris, 1983).
35 See: Ibidem.
preferable to resistance. The Arabs’ political success contributed to Islamization and Arabization, but they did not stem from the military victories. The process was a gradual one triggered by the people’s desire to become part of the dominating culture.
Abbas QURBANOV
Ph.D. (Hist.), Independent Researcher (Baku, Azerbaijan).
SOME ASPECTS OF THE RESETTLEMENT POLICY OF THE ARAB CALIPHATE IN AZERBAIJAN
Abstract
Before the Arabs appeared in Azerbaijan, its territory was the theater of a brutal battle between the Byzantine and Sassanid empires, which had a very negative effect on the country’s political and socioeconomic situation and brought the na-
tion to poverty. This article analyzes the period after Azerbaijan was conquered by the Arabs and takes an in-depth look at the administration system they adopted, as well as their political, economic, religious, and demographic policy.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since the time of Caliph Umar, incursions were made into Azerbaijan. After the Persians were routed under Nahavand (21/641-642), the country was controlled by the Arabs from Ardabil to Der-bent (Babul Abwab). It is worth noting that the local rulers and population perceived the arrival of the Arabs as salvation from the Byzantine, Sassanid, and Khazar conquerors.
Moreover, when the Arab conquests began, a moderate policy was conducted, which helped the local population to accept the Islamic religion.
But after Caliph Umar came to power, the Arabs began carrying out a resettlement policy, which reached its peak during the rule of the Abbasids.
When the Umayyad dynasty came to power, repression of the local population intensified, which was expressed in its compulsory Islamization and repeated raising of taxes. During the rule of the Abbasid caliphs, this policy led to an outburst of national discontent.
In this respect, it should be noted that the fairest policy was conducted during the rule of the four rightful caliphs (632-661); however, after the Umayyad dynasty came to power, national uprisings and revolts began to break out again in Azerbaijan.
