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EPISTEMOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE • 2015 • T. XLV • № 3
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ERSPECTIVES OF AND CHALLENGES FOR A SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: HIGHLIGHTING THE CHALLENGES
Alexander Ruser -
Zeppelin University, Friedrichshafen, Germany. E-mail: Alexander.Ruser@zu.de
The role of scientific knowledge in general and social science knowledge in particular is changing in emerging and advanced knowledge societies. Science is becoming more important in identifying and framing social challenges and providing 'suitable and feasible' solution to decision-makers. Yet, scientific authority is increasingly challenged and contested. This increased social significance of scientific knowledge claims call for an elaborate social philosophy of science. However any attempt to develop a theoretical framework for a social philosophy of science has to face three challenges: (1) an increased challenging of scientific authority,
(2) the need for interdisciplinarity to cope with ever more complex problems and
(3) to elaborate on a social epistemology and/ or social ontology respectively. Key words: social philosophy of science, scientific authority, interdisciplinary, epistemology, ontology.
1. Introduction
On November 18-19 2014 domestic and international experts gathered at the Russian Academy of Science in Moscow. Invited and organized by the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Science these distinguished scholars honored the lifetime achievements of one of the famous thinkers on the social Philosophy of Science, Prof. Vjatchslav Stepin. But the international conference Social Philosophy of Science - Russian Prospects went well beyond the honoring of a renowned scholar. The purpose of the conference, reflecting the research interests of Professor Stepin, was to identify and address the pressing and emerging issues in the field of social philosophy of science. The relevance of this topic stems from two sources. Being concerned with the relation of science and society is of exceptional importance in times when progress in science reveals fundamental challenges and problems for societies. Additionally the role of science must be rethought and analyzed carefully in emerging knowledge societies; that is societies that increasingly rely on scientific knowledge.
To help addressing these important questions the conference focused on science itself (holding sessions on the 'Social Ontology of Science', 'Science as Culture' the controversy between 'Constructivism vs. Realism' Science and Technology Studies, 'the social Dimension of Technology', dimensions, challenges and obstacles of'Reforming Science'
1 I would like to thank Dr. Amanda Machin (Zeppelin University Friedrichshafen) for providing invaluable advice and critical comments to improve the quality of this contribution. I also want to thank my master class on 'philosophy of science and research design' for their enthusiasm and inspiration.
54 Epistemology and Cognition
and the problem of 'Naturalism and Interdisciplinarity') but also reserved its plenary session to address the question of how science relates to society and how to deal with the consequences.
The aim and scope of this modest contribution is to reflect on some of the key aspects presented during the plenary sessions and to pick up on some of the thrilling and important issues raised during the subsequent discussions.
Following Stepins conviction that scientific reasoning, although in principle applicable to all kinds of phenomena (including the human mind itself) cannot be a complete substitute for all other kinds of cognition [Stepin, 2014: 5-6] the main focus is not exclusively on how science relates to society but also on the complex interplay of how science is shaping society and is in turn itself shaped by societal processes.
Addressing this interplay is seemingly an ever more pressing issue given the emergence of so called 'knowledge societies' on the one hand and the increase of political and social disputes over science (e.g. in the field of climate change or the controversy on creationism and evolution theory) sometimes interpreted as anti-scientific backlash. The concurrency of the increased importance of scientific knowledge and growing resistance to scientific authority is not only an emerging field of research for various social scientific disciplines but also a crucial premise for any social philosophy of science.
Growing popular disagreement with scientific authority and the actual or perceived significance of scientific knowledge to deal with ever more complex problems raise the questions of what scientific knowledge claims actually 'are' (e.g. whether they state something about an objective reality or whether they describe social constructions) and what kind of social consequences they provoke. The later aspect brings up once again the controversy about a value free science, a dispute, the German Sociologist Max Weber tried to settle over a hundred years ago by calling for a science, which limit itself to cautious advisory: ,An empirical science cannot tell anyone what he should do - but rather what he can do - and under certain aS circumstances - what he wishes to do [Weber, 1904]. ™
It only seems appropriate for recalling the debates held at a conference g) organized by the Russian Academy of Science to point at Max Weber's ad- ^ herence to the view expressed by Leo Tolstoi. Tolstoi claimed that 'science ^ is meaningless, because it gives no answer to our question, the only questi- g onimportant for us: What shall we do and how shall we live our live?' [We- ® ber, 1946: 138]. In Webers view, (social) science should not try to offer meaning but limit itself to help putting 'the question correctly' [ibid.]. O
Taking up on this programmatic advice the following paragraphs outline O some hints on how to formulate the questions social philosophy of science £ has to answer. These questions stem from three different processes. (1) Shifts in the relation between science and society (2) Consequences of an increased complexity of any (social) scientific venture and (3) changing ways and modes of thinking about science itself.
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2. Challenging Scientific Authority: Fullers Concept of a customized 'Protscience'
Scientific knowledge plays an ever more important role in modern societies. Against the background of an actual or perceived increase of complexity, scientists (both from the natural and the social sciences) tend to be credited with the authority to define the most pressing problems and simultaneously providing suitable, scientifically 'proven' solutions. Apparently scientific advice provides not only 'the best way of understanding the world' [Wolpert, Lewis, 1992: 172] but is also a powerful source of (political) legitimacy. However, somewhat puzzling to philosophers of science and sociologists of knowledge scientific authority becomes increasingly contested at the same time: 'Climate Skeptics' question the authority of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) arguably an assembly of the most distinguished climate scientists in the world. 'Creationists' and supporters of 'intelligent design' reject Darwinrs theory of evolution claiming to offer a rivaling but equally 'scientific' approach. Do these developments indicate an 'antiscientific' backlash, a challenging of the authority of science?
Philosophy of Science usually focuses on the epistemological conditions and methodological principles necessary to produce valid scientific knowledge within a scientific community. In the terms of Knorr-Cetina (1999: 1) philosophy of science tends to deal with the rules and structure of 'epistemic cultures' defined as 'those amalgams of arrangements and mechanisms (...) which, in a given field, make up how we know what we know'. Keeping with the rules of an epistemic culture is a necessary prerequisite not only for the individual scholar to become a member ofa particular epistemic culture but also for estimating the validity of knowledge claims made within the boundaries of a discipline. The respective scientific community 'guards' the standards of the knowledge it produces. O In his paper 'Customized Science as a Reflection of Protscience', Steve
Fuller challenges this position, for in his view science is currently undergoing S a process similar to the Protestant Reformation of the 15th and 16th century. 0 Much like some communities of Christianity grew dissatisfied with the ortho-W dox doctrine of the Roman-catholic church, he argues, people today are 'ta-^ king science seriously means taking it personally' [Fuller, Steve, 2014: 5].2 IB This approach offers somewhat of a diverging explanation of how the
>i current interplay between science and society must be analyzed. At times ^ displayed as a general trend towards the scientification of societies on the
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E2 Fuller indirectly refers to Whiteheads notion that the spread of modern scientific thought ~ differs fundamentally from the Reformation. Starting as an elite movement during the thirty years war period modern science spread comparatively peacefully and 'quite'. It owes its M apparent success to the rise of a 'recolored (...) mentality so that modes of thought which in ^ former times were exceptional are now broadly spread through the educated world' [Whitehead, mfl 1925:2]. Unlike Whitehead who believed in the universal persuasiveness of scientific reasoning --[ibid: 3] Fuller argues that a kind of 'catching up development' is taking place.
on hand and anti-scientific sentiment in reaction on the other, Fuller argues for the emergence of 'Protscience' not as a symptom of irrational backlash but of a fundamental change of the interplay between science and society.
The changing relation between science and society is driven by the increased access of the public to scientific findings. Scientific knowledge claims become widely disseminated worldwide web, a development, which seemingly neither result in a more 'educated' nor an 'enlightened' public. People donrt simply 'get' the knowledge. As the emergence of concepts like 'creationism' or 'intelligent design' but also 'climate skepticism 'demonstrate, people more often engage and contest knowledge claims made by professional scientists. Drawing on terminology used in marketing literature, Fuller describes this process not as rising skepticism towards science and scientists, but rather as a transition from science customers to science consumers. While science costumers can be conceptualized as a purchaser of research or 'epistemic goods' while the consumer actually consumes (though not always intentionally) scientific goods. In consequence, science costumers may follow a different approach in engaging science (and scientific) authority, an approach, which may not be fully explained by the common 'deficit model' which equates the refusal to accept scientific authority with 'ignorance' or denial of facts. Science costumers may rather deliberately deviate from scientific norms, accepting alternative explanations not because of a lack of scientific knowledge but because of a personal decision (parallel to theological well informed protestants) to challenge scientific authority.
From the perspective of the social philosophy of science Fuller's argumentation raises a series of important questions: Science customization directly challenges the 'privilege' of scientific community to judge their knowledge claims. Scientific verdicts increasingly come under fire form people claiming that subjective viewpoints and alternative explanations (which mustnrt follow the rules of scientific inquiry) must be considered.
While Fuller portrays this development as (necessary) consequence of aS the increased accessibility of scientific information and welcomes the demo- ™ cratization of science by the advent of 'Protscience', form the perspective of g) philosophy of science these changes may not mark the beginning of a science ^ reformation but the fall back to medieval superstition: ^
It invokes Lakatos (1977) skepticism about the ability of the public to g judge the quality of scientific statements. In his view neither the number of ® people believing in a particular claim nor the strength of their conviction could establish a criteria for the adequacy of such a claim: 'If the strength O of beliefs were a hallmark of beliefs of knowledge, we should have to rank O some tales of demons, angels, devils and of heaven and hell as knowledge' £ [Lakatos, 1977: 20]. Lakatos neither argues in favor of a 'blind commitment to a theory' nor does he seeks to restore the inviolability of scientific authority. What he is arguing for is a sharp distinction between scientificity and plausibility: 'Thus a statement may be pseudoscientific even it is emi-
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nently 'plausible' and everybody believes in, and it may be scientifically valuable even if it is unbelievable and nobody believes it' [ibid.].
Lakatosr attempt to outline a structured approach for demarcating science form non- or pseudoscicence culminated in his more sophisticated model of research programs [Lakatos, 1968]. However, this concept was often criticized for being to narrow and formalistic. Among the most prominent critics was Paul Feyerabend. Fullers diagnosis of the emergence of Protscience is obviously close to Feyerabends argumentation outlined in 'Science in a free Society' (1978). Both are polemicizing against the centralized power of a 'science Vatican' jealously guarding its privilege to tell scientific knowledge from pseudo-scientific superstition. In contrast to Feyerabend, who favors a 'slow erosion of the authority of science' (1978: 102), Fuller describes an accelerated process driven by mainly by the advent of the world wide web. While Feyerabend speaks about a (truly) free society, by which he means an'assembly of mature people' (1978: 78)pre-pared to accept the plurality (and equality) of viewpoints, Fullers 'Prot-scientists' simply seem to take science 'personally' (2014: 5).
Fuller is drawing a parallel here between the impact of the invention of book print by Guttenberg in increasing the accessibility of theological knowledge (sparking reformation which lead to the erosion of a unified Christianity) and the dissemination of scientific research by the internet. However, the question of how this knowledge is translated for a wider public is yet to be answered. To stay in the picture, when the advent of the internet is mirroring the sea change for knowledge distribution by the invention of the book print, it has yet to be answered who fills the role of Luther, Calvin and Zwingli in providing alternative versions of the 'scientific gospel'? Because even when a scientific reformation would shake scientific authority to its foundations and spark a 'skewing (of balance of power in science, AR) from centralized, homogenous contributors toward distributed, collective, sometimes amateur action' [Grand et al., 2012: 680] the need to reduce complexity and establish a system of trust would remain.
Under changing circumstances like these, a social philosophy of science has to focus on the question of how trust in scientific knowledge claims can "в be justified. In contrast to the 'trust technology' of 'virtual witnessing', B) which means a 'powerful reassurance that things really were done in a way it ^ is claimed that they were'3 [Grand et al., 2012: 769-680] nowadays scien-^ tists find their ideas, theories and findings increasingly presented in the mass В media, being accessed, commented and 'used' in the internet and becoming Я part of public debates. Optimistic interpretations labeling these developments as 'open science' see 'the potential to enable citizen scientists partici-q pation to go beyond counting, checking, and organizing data to involvement ^ in the full complexities of the research process and in dialogue with resear-£ chers' [Grand et al., 2012: 683]. However, a more pessimistic interpretation
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HI 3 'Trust' is generated by a general belief in the appropriateness of 'good scientific
^ practice'. It is important to note that in this conception the trustworthiness of scientific
mfl knowledge claims depends on compliance with the rules of scientific inquiry not on discussing these very rules with an audience outside the scientific community.
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would doubt that the new modes of communication provided by social media will in fact turn researchers into 'public figures and honest brokers' [Grand et al., 2012: 684]? What could a 'trust technology' for the Protscience look like? With 'professional' scientist losing control over the standards of actually conducting research and subsequently backing their knowledge claims, what will determine the validity of scientific findings disseminated, discussed and constantly contested by 'civic scientists'? In contrast to the overly optimistic assumption that 'the tools used by scientists and public groups are evolving in response to demands for openness and transparency' [Grand et al., 2012: 685]. 'Protscience' could also indicate increasing conflict between scientific rules of inquiry (leading to a particular knowledge claim) and individual (or group) preferences explaining itrs acceptance or rejection. A social philosophy of science must be concerned with the future image of 'scientific reformators' and the role and the image of science in the 'Protscience'.
3. Science in a changing world - Kasavins call for true interdisciplinary
Part of the difficulties in addressing these issues and making sense of the (new and changing) role of science in contemporary societies stem from the fruitful yet artificial 'division if labour' between the history of science, science and technology studies, psychology of science, sociology of science and philosophy of science [Kasavin, 2014: 8-9] Despite some cooperation in an interdisciplinary framework, each discipline tends to focus on a particular aspect of science jealously guarding its particular field of inquiry. The lack of sufficient exchange results in shortcomings in arriving at a 'consistent picture of science' [ibid.: 9] and the subsequent development of a comprehensive 'science policy' [ibid.]. To overcome this fragmentation and enable researchers to make a fruitful contribution to our understanding of the role of science in contemporary societies Kasavin is turning to Russian philosophical traditions. Outlining a programmatic ^ framework Kasavin identifies five crucial tasks: first to acknowledge the "g non-independent character of the philosophy of science, second to consider И insights from social philosophy more systematically, third to revise the у epistemological status of the natural sciences, fourth to turn to the social sciences and humanities for alternative methodological approaches and fifth to develop new approaches in dealing with case studies [cf. ibid.: 9]. By invoking Russian philosophical tradition Kasavin calls for making use щ of a 'holistic approach' (2014: 11) suited for making sense of the 'value в controversies', which are endemic in methodological and epistemological О questions. Of particular importance, especially given the current changes E in way science relates (and is challenged by) societies is to apply these approaches to the underlying conception of 'rationality' and 'truth' [ibid.: 12]. Conventionally the authority of science rests on the implicit or explicit assumption of the universalizability of rationality, which in consequence
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implies that science may uncover universal laws and 'that universal laws not only cover everything {but also that} they can be proved by arguments that all rational men must accept' [Agassi, 1975: 405]. Instead of accepting this 'optimistic doctrine of rationality' [ibid.: 407] Kasavin seeks to build on Russian philosophical tradition, which is not only rejecting the optimistic doctrine but also stresses the role of agency in the process of scientific knowledge production, understands science as one particular source of knowledge (among others) and, finally, embraces social constructivist approaches [Kasavin, 2014:12]. Each of these dimensions is related to the 'em-beddedness' of science in respective surrounding societies. Following Fuller's diagnosis of some fundamental changes in the relation between science and society (without necessarily accepting the subsequent interpretation provided by Fuller) Kasavin's thoughts might be interpreted as a roadmap for further investigation. With regard to the first identified task, the acknowledgment of the non-independent character of philosophy of science, a more systematic inclusion of (at least) insights from history of science and the sociology of science seems the most promising. Kasavinrs reflection on combining insights from different disciplines and fields of inquiry are closely related to Stepins thoughts on scientiftic rationality itself, for it corresponds with the idea of a co-evolution or interdependency of historical types of scientific rationality and the complexity of systems observed [Stepin, 2014: 6-7]. Stepin argues that science, as moving from seeing to understand the function and regularities of simple systems, to complex self-regulating systems and finally to complex self-developing systems is developing not only new research interests but new types of rationality which differ with respect to the underlying 'ideals and norms of investigation' and with regard to the respective 'character of philosophical and methodological reflection [ibid.: 7].
4. Thinking differently about Science: Three challenges for a social philosophy of science
Social Philosophy of Science can be rooted in scientific realism or fol-"5 low constructivist approaches. Given the social phenomenon of more and B more people challenging scientific authority (social) philosophy has to ela-y borate on how knowledge claims made by scientists can be justified. In or-^ der to do so it has two general options: To develop a social ontology or a soC cial epistemology. A social ontology addresses the 'mode of existence of ® social objects' [Searle, 2006: 12]. A social epistemology asks how we gi know about a social object: Can social ontology provide a secure base for O dealing with the 'Protscientists? At first glance, no: For elements of social O reality 'are all objective facts in the sense that they are not matters of my E opinion. If I believe the contrary, I am simply mistaken. But these objective ji facts only exist in virtue of collective acceptance or recognition or ack-« nowledgement.' [ibid.: 13, Emphasize AR]
Following these more general considerations regarding the prospects of philosophy of science the final paragraphs will focus on more specific
concepts of how to deal with the challenge of making sense of the relation of science and society and the prospects of arriving at a more holistic approach of thinking about science.
While Steve Fuller diagnoses a loss of the authority of science, Hama-ti-Ataya turns to the loss of its apparent foundation. At the heart of much of the epistemological and methodological discussion in the social sciences in recent decades she argues lay the need for 'theory of knowledge' understood as a discourse that has the ability to establish social order by setting standards for what counts as valid representation of the social world' [Ha-mati-Ataya, 2014: 14]. But where does this challenge to Foundation come from? What led to the 'chaos' and the necessity to 'interrogate the social function of epistemology' [ibid.]. From my perspective Hamati-Ataya outlines here another frontline of contemporary thinking about the social philosophy of science. For unlike Steve Fuller, who focus on challenges for (social) sciences stemming from changes within societies, Hamati-Ataya points towards the sociological reflexivity, which 'is more specifically concerned with the social conditions of possibility of knowledge' [ibid.: 15]. Starting with the broad assumption that 'knowledge and reality are mutually constitutive' [ibid.: 14] she then describes her understanding of reflexivity as an epistemic principle of social scientific research. Accordingly any theory of knowledge must refer to a 'social epistemology' that is it must contain a 'system of principles that define the conditions of possibility of all the properly sociological acts and discourses produced in the course of social scientific research" [ibid.: 15].
What is argued here is that the social 'facts' lying at the core of social science knowledge mustn't have an 'ontological status (...) over and above its relation to the realm ofthought' [Rescher, 2003: 101]. That again mustn't imply that social science knowledge contains 'fictional facts' but rather calls for philosophically distinguishing between the 'finding of facts' and the construction of (social) science knowledge. To a certain degree the issues (or problems) addresses by Fuller and Hamati-Ataya can be considered to be complementary: both take a specific socio-historic perspective to indicate at some major challenges for science and subsequent for social philosophy of science. However, in contrast to Fuller who outlines his interpretation of a particular episode in history Hamati-Ataya draws attention to the problem П that any attempt 'to objectivate knowledge socio-historically {means necessarily to} objectivate (...) it from a given socio-historical perspective' [Ha-mati-Ataya, 2014: 15] One of the implications Hamti-Ataya suggests is particularly important here because it adds to the implicit relativism of Fullers concept of'Protscience'. Reflexivism clearly conflicts with an 'objectiveun- gj derstanding of objectivity' (ibid.). This means that social philosophy of О science by adopting reflexivity, has to accept that 'knowledge is socially and О culturally produced and historically contingent' [Knuuttila, 2002]. E
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In a nutshell: Social philosophy of science might face three challenges: ■!£ (1) since scientific knowledge claims increasingly come under attack from rft, 'Protscience', the classical scientific disciplines might struggle to maintain '—
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their 'cognitive authority in a distrustful world' [Jasanoff, 1990: 14]. (2) In order to stay abreast of the changes in the natural and social world scientific inquiry is forced to transgress disciplinary boundaries and (3) taking into account the social functioning of scientific epistemology requires rethinking some of the most fundamental concepts of philosophy of science, in particular the ontological and epistemological status of social science knowledge.
A likely candidate for providing some solution might be Science and Technology Studies. 4 After all STS is clearly an interdisciplinary undertaking, which derives three important assumptions from the account of 'social constructivism'. First, 'that science and technology are importantly social' [Sismondo, 2010: 57; 2014: 32]. This assumption clearly links to the first challenge.
Second, that science and technology imply activity. Analyzing this active part requires an interdisciplinary approach, which means that STS may be well equipped to chart a way to avoid the second horn. Third, and finally STS acknowledges that 'science and technology are not themselves natural' [Sismondo, 2014: 32] which has important implications regarding their respective ontological status.
To start with the third assertion, one has to ask what the 'non-natural' character of science and technology means? Drawing on Searlers fundamental distinction 'natural' could be conceptual as observer- independent. Science and technology would then, being 'non natural' fall into the category of observer dependent facts [Searle, 2006: 13].
Acknowledging 'observer dependence' has major implications for a social epistemology as well as social ontology. Emphasizing the observer's dependence of the observation points towards the need to develop a social epistemology. Rather than accepting the Cartesian 'cogito' as the cornerstone of an epistemological venture the social, cultural and historical circumstances of the lone thinker have to be taken into account as inter-individual aspects. Only then social conditionality mustn't lead to epistemological arbitrariness.
"g Stressing the observer's dependence of the observed in contrast calls
01 for a social ontology. The task is then to uncover 'the principles that under-y lie the constitution of social reality' [Searle, 2006: 16] or at least follow the ^ 'historical ontology' which can be found in STS to 'see the competing jg ways in which things are constructed' [Sismondo, 2014: 35]
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01 4 Knuutilla, taking a stand closely related to Sismondo points out that reflexivity in STS
О 'was on the agenda more or less in the beginning of that movement' [Knuutilla, 2002].
^ However, STS, having been interested in the social study of science ever since (in particular
_ so called 'interest explanations', Knuutilla, 2002) is running into the problem of
'simultaneously trying to approach the practices of any scientific group as historically contingent and culturally specific, and seek for generalizable explanations' [Knuutilla, 2002]. ID The question is whether STS can provide some guidance when moving away from objectivist
^ (or positivist) social sciences 'can be a move towards many different things - including a
mfl complete indifference to what becomes the meaning of knowledge' [Hamati-Ataya, 2014:
1 16].
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5. Conclusions and Outlook
What does this all mean for a social philosophy of science? Scholarly discussions at the international conference Social Philosophy of Science -Russian Prospects highlighted some of the important issues currently driving theoretical thinking in the social philosophy of science. In particular three challenges for a social philosophy of science surfaced:
(1) An increased challenging of scientific authority in emerging and developed knowledge societies
(2) The need to develop truly interdisciplinary approaches to deal with an ever more complex world
and, finally
(3) The need to elaborate on a social epistemology and social ontology
How (and if) these challenges can be satisfactorily met has yet to be determined. However, it is important to stress that the existence of these challenges mustn't indicate failure or flaws in the thinking about social philosophy of science so far.
All of the three challenges highlighted here can be explained as a consequence of a changing relation between science and society. This change can stem from changes within society (like Fullers concept of 'Protscience' which is mainly technologically driven and is an expression of social change) or from scientific progress itself (e.g. the sequence of'turns' in STS). In any case it is not surprising that such changes result in the need for progress in the social philosophy of science. This thought, the idea of a co-evolution of social complexity (or at least the level of the complexity investigated) and scientific rationality lies at the core of Stepins typology of scientific rationality.
Tolstoi claimed science was meaningless, for it fails to provide to the
crucial questions of 'What shall we do?' and 'How shall we live our live?'.
If he was correct, then there is no urgency for a social philosophy of science J5
to meet the challenges discussed in this paper. And yet scientific knowled- C
ge does seem able to provide at least some guidance for these important ®
questions, particularly in knowledge societies where technological advan- U
ce actually compounds rather than reduces social complexity. Meeting the ^
challenges discussed is therefore crucial if there is to be a meaningful con- jg
ception of the range and limits of scientific knowledge claims. In conse- ^
quence, this could inform a truly reformatory debate about the future of W
scientific authority. ™
O
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