CC BY
4HUMAN FACTOR
ON THE LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF PERSONAL COGNITIVE LIBERTY
PhD (Law. Sci.), Associate Professor, Department of International Law, Diplomatic Academy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Moscow, Russia
Elena Gulyaeva
Abstract. The article analyzes approaches to individual cognitive freedom and its legal safeguards. The author notes that modern neurotechnologies caused the emergence of completely new crimes (neuro-hacking and neurocide) and, consequently, a need for additional legal support for human rights and freedoms. In addition, in public sphere there appears a need to protect trade secrets (for example, when using neuroprostheses, etc.), with cyber-biosecurity and neurosecurity in mind. Cognitive freedom includes the personal freedom to control mental processes, cognition and consciousness. The protection of cognitive freedom includes such rights as the right to health, to mental freedom, to personal growth, as well as compliance with ethical standards. The author concludes that it is necessary to consider cognitive freedom as a completely new right in the list of basic human rights.
Keywords: freedom; cognitive liberty; neurotechnology; human rights; legal regulation.
For citation: Gulyaeva E.E. On the legal understanding of personal cognitive liberty // Social Novelties and Social Sciences: A View from Moscow. - 2024. - N 1. - P. 73-81.
URL: https://snsen-journal.ru/archive DOI: 10.31249/snsneng/2024.01.06
Introduction
Throughout human history, the concept of freedom, its definition, its significance both for an individual and for the state and society, has worried many researchers, philosophers, legal scholars. The value of freedom and its ideal (although changeable) exist throughout almost the entire period of the existence of philosophical and legal thought. As testament to this statement there are numerous works of scientists, philosophers, jurists at different stages of history: I. Kant, J. Locke, J.-P. Sartre, N.A. Berdyaev, V. So-loviev, M.A. Supataev, B.N. Chicherin, T.V. Milusheva, V.S. Nersesyants, O.I. Tsybulevskaya et al.
The "Fourth Industrial Revolution"1 has brought to life innovative technological solutions in the biological2, physical and digital sectors, which encourage states to actively deploy programs to support the digital transformation around the world. Today, the most important elements of social life have already been transferred to virtual space with the specific temporality of new technologies, which has entailed revolutionary transformations in the management system (from e-government and "smart" cities to the "Internet of Things"). "This encourages the use of political incentive mechanisms (universal digitali-zation programs, etc.)" [Shestakova, 2019, p. 26] in the context of the emerging digital civilization. Concerned with security matters, almost all states are faced with the "problem of accelerating historical time"3. No less significant changes are taking place in the field of human rights.
A distinctive feature of modern international law is the extension of international legal regulation to human rights. According to the outstanding international lawyer G.I. Tunkin, this became "a great revolution in international law" [Tunkin, 1994, p. 18]. Nowadays, manipulations with brain functions are becoming a fact of life. However, no state that claims to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms should coercively manipulate the mental state of its citizens. In this area, it is necessary to strictly observe ethical principles and approve new norms in the international and national laws of states.
This article aims to identify what new regulations that should govern modern applications in the field of improving cognitive abilities of the human brain.
1 Introduced in 2011, this concept is a part of the German initiative "Industry 4.0", a project of the state Hi-Tech strategy, based on the use of mobile Internet, artificial intelligence and learning machines. In 2016, this topic was highly praised at the World Economic Forum in Davos, whose president, Klaus Schwab, became the author of a best-selling book. See: [Shvab, 2018].
For advances in the biological field, new possibilities of synthetic biology, as well as legal and ethical problems associated with genetic sequencing and genome editing, see in more detail: [Gulyaeva, Trikoz, 2020; Trikoz, 2019; Trikoz, Gulyaeva, 2018; Trikoz, Mustafina-Bredikhina, Gulyaeva, 2021].
3 See, for example: Message from the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev to the people of Kazakhstan. February 2005. Kazakhstan on the path of accelerated economic, social and political modernization // Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. - URL: https://www.akorda.kz/ru/addresses/addresses_of_president/ poslanie-prezidentarespubliki-kazahstan-na-nazarbaeva-narodu-kazahstana-fevral-2005-g (date of access: 26.10.2022).
Gulyaeva E.E.
On the legal understanding of personal cognitive liberty Interpretations of "freedom"
Despite its apparent simplicity, the phenomenon of freedom is complex both for understanding and for practical implementation in the forms, institutions, norms, procedures and public life. Currently, there is no common meaning of "freedom". Definition and interpretation depend on many factors: historical era, cognitive abilities and background of a person. That is why there are numerous definitions of this concept, and research into the legal aspects of freedom continues to be relevant and legally significant.
The dictionary by Ozhegov and Shvedova defines freedom "as the possibility to consciously express one's will on the basis of the laws of nature and society" [Ozhegov, Shvedova, 1997]. Professor V.I. Levin interprets the concept of freedom as "the possibility to choose when the subject is aware of options for such a choice" [Levin, 2010].
Initially, freedom was considered as a natural given, physical freedom. Thus, in the famous textbook of Roman law, "Institutes" by Gaius, all people are divided into either free or slaves [Digesty Yustiniana, 2002, p. 117]. Modern ideas about the phenomenon of freedom originate from the era of humanism - from ideas about man as the measure of all things, personality as the highest social value and personal freedom as the inalienable right of an individual to exercise spiritual life, inner thoughts, desires and feelings that distinguish him from others [Allahverdiyev, 2011]. Accordingly, there are two aspects of freedom: a potential, internally conscious (ideal component) and an objectively existing, real possibility of its implementation in specific conditions of social reality (material component) through activity or inaction.
With time the interpretation of "freedom" has expanded. The term began to be used as a synonym for subjectivity. The right of subjective freedom is now considered as a measure of freedom itself. If this measure is reduced to zero (complete lack of freedom), all relations lose their legality [Varlamova, 1991, p. 51].
Professor B. Ebzeev notes that "legal impact on an individual <...> is limited mainly to regulating relations in the sphere of individual freedom and security" [Ebzeev, 1982, p. 104]. It is interesting to note that well-known Soviet scientists, considering the category of "freedom" in the context of criminal law, pointed to its connection with freedom of movement and self-determination [Noy, 1965, p. 27]), as well as its physical, social and socio-psychological nature [Sundurov, 1980, p. 12].
In turn, the right "is a set of rules and norms, on the one hand, ensuring, and on the other hand, limiting the external freedom of actors in their mutual relations", wrote the Russian philosopher and scholar of law E.N. Trubetskoy [Trubetskoy, 1917]. Hegel noted that the right, its special point, is free will, world of spirit, which is produced out of itself, and is a second nature [Gegel', 1977].
L. Petrazhitsky (1861-1931), the founder of the psychological school of law in Russia, believed that "empirical science studies two types of being - physical and mental". The right, as one of the phenomena of existence, belongs to the world of the psyche and represents an imperative-attributive (obligatory-
75
demanding) experience of people [Petrazhitskiy, 1907]. In his opinion, "human actions can be free and connected", while "ethical consciousness" or "consciousness of ethical obligation" is defined as "awareness of the internal connectedness of will and human actions" [Petrazhitskiy, 1907]. Moreover, Petrazhit-sky notes, consciousness is based on special emotions that are experienced as an internal obstacle to freedom and which prompt a person to action. The famous lawyer explains that self-expression of a person's will does not depend on other participants in the interaction, and that actions must coincide with internal rational freedom [Petrazhitskiy, 1907]. At the same time, according to Petrazhitsky, "internal barriers indicate the need to choose between actions dictated by reason or instincts". Therefore, he comes to the conclusion that freedom, understood as "independence from external restrictions, is self-will that denies limitations on its freedom and is indifferent to the freedom of others" [Petrazhitskiy, 1907].
Information technology seems to be one of the most powerful means of improving man and society. As a result of the fourth technological revolution, noticeable changes are taking place in social relations. The transformation of the latter stimulates the development of the theory of law and legal practices, leading to the emergence of new directions in the philosophy of law, including the emergence of concepts related to individual cognitive freedom.
Cognitive freedom and its legal dimension at the universal and national levels
Generally, cognitive freedom, or the "right to mental self-determination", represents freedom of individuals to control their own mental processes, cognition and consciousness. Professor Timothy Leary identifies "two Commandments for the Molecular age": Thou shalt not alter the consciousness of thy fellow men. Thou shalt not prevent thy fellow man from altering his or her own consciousness [Leary, 1965].
Researchers K. Bublitz and R. Merkel recognize at least three "interrelated but not identical dimensions" of cognitive liberty. These include: 1) the liberty to change one's mind or to choose whether and by which means to change one's mind; 2) the protection of interventions into other minds to protect mental integrity, and 3) the ethical and legal obligation to promoting cognitive liberty [Bublitz, Merkel, 2013]. These three dimensions configure cognitive liberty as a complex right which involves the prerequisites of both negative and positive liberties. The former includes: the negative liberty of making choices about one's own cognitive domain in absence of governmental or non-governmental obstacles, barriers or prohibition; and the negative liberty of exercising one's own right to mental integrity in absence of constrains or violations from corporations, criminal agents or the government. The latter includes: the positive liberty of having the possibility of acting in such a way as to take control of one's mental life [Bublitz, Merkel, 2013].
As leading bioethicist Marcello Ienca and his colleague Pim Haselager state: "Our thoughts are the last refuge for personal freedom, but advances in neural engineering and brain imaging techniques are
putting mental freedom at risk. We propose to legislate the human right to refuse the coercive or invasive use of such technologies, as well as to ensure the protection of the physical and mental aspects of the mind from possible harm" [Ienca, Haselager, 2016].
According to many scientists, human intelligence has unlimited potential for development. However, different philosophical movements have different attitudes towards the possibility of using information technologies to improve people's cognitive abilities. Humanists present the Darknet1 as a special space that embodies human freedom and creative energy. Anarchoprimitivists believe that any technology is an intervention in the nature of man, since technical applications are always associated with a certain control and the formation of hierarchical systems. Thus, in their opinion, technology serves as a means of enslaving people [Vasil'ev, Ibragimov, Vasil'eva, 2019]. The followers of the above-mentioned ideas are the so-called neo-Luddites, who consider the only possible way to get out of technological "slavery" by returning to traditional ways of farming [Gorbacheva, 2016].
A group of Swiss scientists, led by a lawyer from the University of Zurich and a neuroethicist from the University of Basel, proposes to introduce into international humanitarian law such a concept as "cognitive freedom" or "freedom of mind" [Lenca, Andorno, 2017]. However, this has not yet been done.
Currently, commenting on Part 1 of Art. 22 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993, which proclaims the right to freedom and personal integrity, some Russian experts note that it "means human freedom as part of the personal rights and freedoms of citizens, forming two institutions: 1) personal inviolability; 2) inviolability of private life" [Constitution of the Russian Federation: scientific and practical commentary, 1997, p. 216]2. And the right to personal inviolability includes physical, moral, mental integrity and personal safety [Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii: nauchno-prakticheskiy kom-mentariy, 1997, p. 216]. Thus, it can be seen that this right is interpreted more broadly than in international law, due to the inclusion of privacy, moral, physical and mental inviolability [Gulyaeva, 2013]. Professor V.A. Miroshnikova points out that "human inviolability includes both physical integrity (life, health) and spiritual integrity (honor, dignity)" [Miroshnikova, 1997, p. 27]. With minor discrepancies, a similar position can be found in other commentaries on the Russian Constitution3, as well as scientific works (see, for example: [Morozov, 2002, p. 11]). Still, there can be found narrower approaches to understanding the law in question, close to or corresponding to modern international law [Kozlova, Kutafin, 2003, p. 261; Konstitutsionnoe pravo..., 2008, p. 151; Baglay, 2007, p. 215-219; Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii: problemnyy kommentariy, 1997, p. 153-159].
1 The Shadow Internet, or Darknet, is a hidden group of websites accessible only through specialized browsers. They are used to maintain the anonymity and privacy of activities performed on the Internet, both legal and not. See: What is the deep and shadow Web // Kaspersky. - URL: https://www.kaspersky.ru/resource-center/threats/deep-web (date of access: 26.10.2022).
2 An identical position can be found in the book: [Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 2003, p. 67-68].
See, for example: [Kommentariy k Konstitutsii..., 1996, p. 98-104; Kommentariy k Konstitutsii..., 2002, p. 147-157].
Gulyaeva E.E.
On the legal understanding of personal cognitive liberty The role of cognitive freedom in international humanitarian law
Today, the field of international law is undeniably more open to all sorts of eclectic views and topics, including emotional aspects.
There are many examples illustrating the involvement of emotions in all issues of international law. Although few scholars of international law would deny the role of emotions in our world and argue that the concept of "law" is a social construct, very little attention has been paid to the emotional aspects of international law. It is necessary to start taking emotions seriously, since the contemporary issues that international law deals with are real and extremely important. International lawmaking and enforcement are aimed at combating global threats to human health, ensuring safe and adequate food supply, and regulating warfare. At the same time, the laws adopted and applied are determined not only by rational facts and data. On the contrary, international law influences and contributes to emotions, and emotions in turn influence perceptions of international law1. For example, an attempt to understand consumer fears and concerns about the spread of genetically modified or otherwise "unnatural" foods opens up the field for explaining and justifying food safety regulations in a more convincing manner.
Social psychologists and neuroscientists argue that cognition (in the sense of understanding, representation, and reasoning) and emotions are not easily separated. Some even consider this division to be outdated [Haidt, 2001; Dolan, 2002]. Recent discoveries in neuroscience highlight a more integrated, mixed-methods approach to understanding the relationship between cognition and emotions. It is based on the fact that emotions are closely related to consciousness, as well as to cognitive and sensory perception [Hutchinson, Bleiker, 2014]. Martha Nussbaum calls emotions "appraisals or value judgments". She considers them part of the cognitive process [Nussbaum, 2001]. In other words, emotions influence our understanding of the world and therefore the decisions we make.
Lawyers and legal scholars rarely deny the relevance of emotions outright. Nevertheless, they maintain a strong presumption that law must be based on reason and that emotions should have no part in law. Gerry Simpson relies on Kant to emphasize the dominant "orthodox, post-enlightenment" perception of the separation of the mind "into a calculating instrument of reason and a chamber of passion". He moreover highlights the "unmistakably gendered" tendency to "regard the emotions as inferior and subordinate" [Simpson, 2015, p. 10-11; Simpson, 2021]. Scholar Pierre Schlag has written brilliantly on the misplaced (or unreasonable) devotion to reason in the American legal tradition, a powerful critique that can equally be applied to international law [Schlag, 1998].
Refusing to engage with emotions because of concerns - however justified - that soft, subjective, intangible feelings will threaten the hard, objective, tangible rational foundations of international law is in my view a refusal to engage with the world as it is. International lawyers and legal scholars must learn
1 On the influence of law on emotions, see: [Minow, 2015, p. 1627].
78
from social psychologists and neuroscientists, as well as from colleagues who have been carving out space for emotions in the legal discipline. We must acknowledge that emotions are not biases or untruths that need to be weeded out, but rather ought to be understood and embraced as a central component of reasoned decision-making [Saab, 2021]. Professor of International Relations Rose McDermott believes that understanding the role of human emotions in decision-making is very important for building effective and balanced policies in relation to the cyber sphere [McDermott, 2019].
However, according to the report of the aforementioned group of neuroscientists, the increase in human capabilities, in addition to undermining human authenticity, will influence social norms, creating problems of equal access to technology and giving rise to new forms of discrimination. In civilian life, the ability to connect the brain to the Internet through an interface will increase the likelihood of creating omnipotent superhumans. Unless based on medical recommendations for curing pathologies, this can lead to the emergence of a new social group that would differ from the rest in its enhanced human qualities. It should be emphasized that artificially enhanced human biology is ethically reprehensible. It reminds of the infamous Nazi medical experiments and calls for the use of international law to regulate this issue.
Regardless of one's position in these discussions, it is clear that the emotional aspects of artificial intelligence in warfare require particularly serious discussion and thought. Currently, the world's armies are already discussing the possibility of equipping their forces with enhanced mental abilities (superintelligent agents) in order to better predict combat configurations and more skillfully decipher data streams.
In international humanitarian law, the concept of "reasonable military commanders" is used, especially when assessing the principle of proportionality of actions on the part of the state in relation to civilians of the other side of the conflict, i.e. enemy states or rebels. Reasonable military commanders are not devoid of emotions, but, on the contrary, are able to experience human emotions, empathy, compassion and understand the importance of self-esteem.
Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWs) completely or partially free from human control (such as drones now widely used in military operations) exacerbate the problem of adequate decisions made. Opponents of LAWs argue that emotions are necessary during war for meaningful human control. In 2016, participants at the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons created a group of government experts on LAWs, which has since met annually in Geneva. There is no doubt that international law scholars should actively participate in these discussions. It is equally important to think in the direction of harmonizing international military law and humanitarian law.
Conclusion
In January 2022, UNESCO proposed to expand the list of fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms set out in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights to include new rights and freedoms arising from the impact of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Cognitive freedom can be seen as a new right
that arose as a result of the use of neurotechnology and which can be understood as a revision of the essence of human free will.
At the same time, "cognitive freedom" is a multidimensional concept that is difficult to define due to its complex nature. The issue of cognitive freedom and its legal dimension require further study by the legal community. Currently, there is a need to adopt a set of legal norms in order to prevent states and individuals from manipulating the mental health of the population, as well as from committing socially dangerous acts.
References
1. Allahverdiyev G. Vzaimosvyaz' svobody i gumanizma // Vlast'. - 2011. - N 8. - P. 84-87.
2. Baglay M.V. Konstitutsionnoe pravo Rossiyskoy Federatsii : uchebnik dlya vuzov. - 6-e izd., izm. i dop. - Moscow : Norma, 2007. - 784 p.
3. Bublitz C, Merkel R. Guilty minds in washed brains? Manipulation cases and the limits of neuroscientific excuses in liberal legal orders // Neuroscience and legal responsibility / ed. by N.A. Vincent. - New York : Oxford university press, 2013. -P. 335-374.
4. Danel'yan A.A., Gulyaeva E.E. Neyrobezopasnost' kak novoe napravlenie v mezhdunarodnom prave // Mezhdunarodnyy pravovoy kur'er. - 2022. - N 4. - P. 17-21.
5. Digesty Yustiniana : per s lat. / otv. red. L.L. Kofanov. - Moscow : Statut, 2002. - Vol. 1, book 1-4. - 584 p.
6. Dolan R.J. Emotion, cognition, and behavior // Science. - 2002. - Vol. 298, N 5596. - P. 1191-1194.
7. Ebzeev B.S. Konstitutsionnye osnovy svobody lichnosti v SSSR / pod red. I.E. Farbera. - Saratov : Saratovskiy gosu-darstvennyy universitet, 1982. - 137 p.
8. Gegel' G.V.F. Entsiklopediya filosofskikh nauk : in 3 vol. / otv. red. E.P. Sitkovskiy. - Moscow : Mysl', 1977. - Vol. 3 : Filosofiya dukha. - 471 p.
9. Gorbacheva A.G. O sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh posledstviyakh vnedreniya konvergiruyushchikh tekhnologiy v zhizn' cheloveka // Chelovek.RU. - 2016. - N 11. - P. 96-105.
10. Gulyaeva E.E. Pravovye osnovaniya ogranicheniya prava na svobodu i lichnuyu neprikosnovennost' po Konventsii o zash-chite prav cheloveka i osnovnykh svobod 1950 goda. - Moscow : Yurlitinform, 2013. - 208 p.
11. Gulyaeva E.E., Trikoz E.N. Yuridicheskie aspekty geneticheskikh issledovaniy v stranakh Latinskoy Ameriki (opyt sudeb-noy genetiki v Argentine) // Mezhdunarodnyy pravovoy kur'er. - 2020. - N 3/4. - P. 55-59.
12. Haidt J. The emotional dog and its rational tail : a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment // Psychological review. -2001. - Vol. 108, N 4. - P. 814-834.
13. Hutchinson E., Bleiker R. Theorizing emotions in world politics // International theory. - 2014. - Vol. 6, N 3. - P. 491514.
14. Ienca M., Haselager P. Hacking the brain: brain-computer interfacing technology and the ethics of neurosecurity // Ethics and information technology. - 2016. - Vol. 18, N 2. - P. 117-129.
15. Ienca M., Haselager P. Hacking the brain: brain-computer interfacing technology and the ethics of neurosecurity // Ethics and information technology. - 2016. - Vol. 18, N 2. - P. 117-129.
16. Kommentariy k Konstitutsii Rossiyskoy Federatsii / obshch. red. Yu.V. Kudryavtseva. - Moscow : Fond «Pravovaya kul'tura», 1996. - 552 p.
17. Kommentariy k Konstitutsii Rossiyskoy Federatsii / pod obshch. red. V.D. Karpovicha. - 2-e izd., pererab. i dop. - Moscow : Yurayt, 2002. - 959 p.
18. Konstitutsionnoe pravo Rossii : uchebnik / pod red. A.E. Postnikova. - Moscow : Prospekt, 2008. - 224 p.
19. Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii : nauchno-prakticheskiy kommentariy i semanticheskiy slovar' / pod red. I.S. Yat-senko. - Moscow : Berator-Press, 2003. - 751 p.
20. Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii : nauchno-prakticheskiy kommentariy / pod red. i so vstupit. stat'ey B.N. Topornina. -Izd. 3-e, pererab. i dop. - Moscow : Yurist', 1997. - 716 p.
21. Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii : problemnyy kommentariy / otv. red. V.A. Chetvernin. - Moscow : Tsentr konstituts. issled. Mosk. obshchestv. nauch. fonda, 1997. - 702 p.
22. Kozlova E.I., Kutafin O.E. Konstitutsionnoe pravo Rossii : uchebnik. - 3-e izd., pererab. i dop. - Moscow : Yurist', 2003. -585 p.
23. Leary T. Politics of ecstasy. - New York : G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1965. - 250 p.
24. Lenca M., Andorno R. Towards new human rights in the age of neuroscience and neurotechnology // Life sciences, society and policy. - 2017. - Vol. 13, N 1. - P. 1-27.
25. Levin V.I. Filosofiya, logika i metodologiya nauki : tolkovyy slovar' ponyatiy. - Penza : Penzenskiy gosudarstvennyy tekhnologicheskiy universitet, 2010. - 67 p.
26. McDermott R. Some emotional considerations in cyber conflict // Journal of cyber policy. - 2019. - Vol. 4, N 3. - P. 309325.
27. Minow M. Forgiveness, law, and justice // California law review. - 2015. - Vol. 103, N 6. - P. 1615-1646.
28. Miroshnikova V.A. Kommentariy k Konstitutsii Rossiyskoy Federatsii. - Moscow : EKMOS, 1997. - 176 p.
29. Morozov A.P. Konstitutsionnoe pravo cheloveka i grazhdanina na svobodu i lichnuyu neprikosnovennost' v Rossiyskoy Federatsii : avtoref. dis. na soisk. uchen. step. kand. yurid. nauk : spetsial'nost' 12.00.10 / Saratovskaya gosudarstvennaya akademiya prava. - Saratov, 2002. - 28 p.
30. Noy I.S. Teoreticheskie voprosy lisheniya svobody. - Saratov : Saratovskiy gos. universitet, 1965. - 166 p.
31. Nussbaum M.C. Upheavals of thought: the intelligence of emotions. - Cambridge : Cambridge university press, 2001. -751 p.
32. Ozhegov S.I., Shvedova N.Yu. Tolkovyy slovar' russkogo yazyka : 80 000 slov i frazeol. vyrazheniy. - 4-e izd., dop. -Moscow : Azbukovnik, 1997. - 939 p.
33. Petrazhitskiy L.I. Teoriya prava i gosudarstva v svyazi s teoriey nravstvennosti : in 2 vol. - Saint Petersburg : Tip. SPb. akts. o-va «Slovo», 1907. - Vol. 1. - 308 p. ; vol. 2. - 310-656 p.
34. Saab A. Emotions and international law // ESIL Reflections. - 2021. - Vol. 10, N 3. - P. 1-10. - URL: https:// esilsedi.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ESIL-Reflection-Saab.pdf (дата обращения: 02.11.2022).
35. Schlag P. The enchantment of reason. - Durham : Duke university press, 1998. - 176 p.
36. Shestakova I.G. Novaya temporal'nost' tsifrovoy tsivilizatsii: budushchee uzhe nastupilo // Nauchno-tekhnicheskie vedo-mosti SPbGPU. Gumanitarnye i obshchestvennye nauki. - 2019. - Vol. 10, N 2. - P. 20-29.
37. Shvab K. Tekhnologii chetvertoi promyshlennoi revolyutsii. - Moskva : Bombora, 2018. - 320 p.
38. Simpson G. The sentimental life of international law // London review of international law. - 2015. - Vol. 3, N 1. - P. 329.
39. Simpson G. The sentimental life of international law: literature, language, and longing in world politics. - New York : Oxford university press, 2021. - 240 p.
40. Sundurov F.R. Lishenie svobody i sotsial'no-psikhologicheskie predposylki ee effektivnosti. - Kazan' : Izdatel'stvo Kazan-skogo universiteta, 1980. - 216 p.
41. Trikoz E.N. Zashchita prav cheloveka v kontekste razvitiya bioetiki i genomiki (obzor mezhdunarodnogo kruglogo stola) // Vestnik Rossiyskogo universiteta druzhby narodov. Seriya Yuridicheskie nauki. - 2019. - Vol. 23, N 1. - P. 141-154.
42. Trikoz E.N., Gulyaeva E.E. Pozitsii ESPCh po nekotorym voprosam bioetiki i geneticheskikh dannykh // Advances in law studies. scientific and theoretic journal. - 2018. - Vol. 6, N 4. - P. 36-40.
43. Trikoz E.N., Mustafina-Bredikhina D.M., Gulyaeva E.E. Pravovoe regulirovanie protsedury geneticheskogo redaktiro-vaniya: zarubezhnyy opyt // Vestnik Rossiyskogo universiteta druzhby narodov. Seriya Yuridicheskie nauki. - 2021. -Vol. 25, N 1. - P. 67-86.
44. Trubetskoy E.N. Metafizicheskie predpolozheniya poznaniya: opyt preodoleniya Kanta i kantianstva. - Moskva : Put', 1917. - 335 p.
45. Tunkin G.I. Mezhdunarodnoe pravo : nasledie XX veka // Rossiyskiy ezhegodnik mezhdunarodnogo prava, 1992. - 1994. -P. 8-21.
46. Varlamova N.V. Pravootnosheniya: filosofskiy i yuridicheskiy podkhody // Pravovedenie. - 1991. - N 4. - P. 44-54.
47. Vasil'ev A., Ibragimov Zh., Vasil'eva O. Darknet kak uskользayushchaya sfera pravovogo regulirovaniya // Yurisling-vistika. - 2019. - N 12. - P. 10-12.
