CC BY
8
On Stoic Self-Contradictions:
aSixsiv vs. pXanxstv in Chrysippus (SVF III, 289)
Andrei Seregin Institute of Philosophy RAS (Moscow) avis12@yandex.ru
Abstract. In this article, I offer an analysis of Chrysippus' treatment of "injustice" (¿Sixia) in SVF III, 289. First, I show that he espouses two theses: I) Every injustice is an act of harming those who suffer it; II) One who does injustice to others thereby does it to oneself. Then I discuss the two most plausible interpretations of II): a) One who does "conventional" injustice to others, i.e. causes them non-moral harm, thereby does "moralistic" injustice to oneself, i.e. makes oneself morally worse; b) One who does "moralistic" injustice to others thereby does it to oneself. I show that a) is untenable because the Stoics reject the very notion of non-moral harm, and b) fails because they believe that moral harm is basically self-regarding.
Keywords: ancient ethics, Chrysippus, harm, injustice, Stoicism.
In this paper I want, first, to clarify the possible conceptual and logical structure of Chrysippus' treatment of "injustice" (¿Sixia) in SVF III, 289 and, second, to show that given its general Stoic background it should be considered very problematic or even self-contradictory.
The text of this fragment contains four separate quotations, all taken from Plutarch's treatise "On Stoic Self-Contradictions" (1041CD):
T1: A. ...in the Demonstrations concerning Justice he says that the one who does injustice (xov ¿Sixouvxa) is done injustice by himself (¿SixsicQai... ¿9' sauxou) and does himself injustice (auxov ¿Sixsiv) whenever he does it to another (oxav aAAov ¿Six$), for he has become a cause of transgression for himself and is harming himself undeservedly (pMnxovxa nap' ¿^iav saux6v);
EXOAH Vol. 14. 2 (2020) www.nsu.ru/classics/schole
© Andrey Seregin, 2020 DOI:io.25205/i995-4328-2020-i4-2-448-455
B. The law prohibits one from becoming accessory to a transgression; and to do injustice (to ¿Sixsiv) is a transgression. Now, he who has become his own accessory in doing injustice (tou ¿Sixsiv) transgresses in regard to himself; and he who transgresses in regard to an individual also does that individual injustice (¿Sixsi sxsivov). Therefore, he who does anyone at all injustice does himself injustice too (0 apa xai ovtivouv ¿Sixfiv xai sauTov ¿Sixsi).
C. Wrong action (to a^apT^a) is a kind of harm (wv ^Xa^aTwv sori), and everyone in doing wrong (a^apTavwv) does wrong in violation of himself (nap' sauTov a|aapravsi). Therefore, every wrong-doer (0 a^apTavwv) harms himself undeservedly (pMftTsi sauTov napa T^v ¿£iav); and if so, he also does himself injustice (si Ss touto xai ¿Sixsi sauTOv).
D. He who is harmed by another harms himself ('0 pXanT6^svog ¿9' sTspou sauTov pXanTsi) and harms himself undeservedly (napa T^v a^iav sauTov ^Matei). This, however, is to do injustice (touto S' ^v to ¿Sixsiv). Therefore, anyone who is done injustice by anyone at all does himself injustice (0 apa ¿Sixou|asvog xai ¿9' otououv nag sauTov ¿Sixsi)1.
In my opinion, this text rather obviously implies
I). Every injustice is an act of harming those who suffer it, i.e. ¿Sixsiv always involves pMflrsiv.
This idea is already present in A, where ^XanTovTa nap' a^iav sauTOv is one of the expressions which are supposed to explain how it is possible to do injustice to oneself (auTov ¿Sixsiv). It is also clearly stated in C, for the fact that "every wrongdoer harms (pAanTsi) himself undeservedly" is presented here as a reason ("an if so", si Ss touto) for asserting that "he also does himself injustice (¿Sixsi sauTOv)". The same can be said about D, where the words "harms (PMtctei) himself undeservedly" are elucidated by the following statement: "This, however, is to do injustice (to ¿Sixsiv)"2. Surely, these very statements also imply that pMnrsiv is not always tantamount to ¿Sixsiv, for the second necessary condition of injustice is that harm must be inflicted undeservedly (nap' ¿^iav)3. Nevertheless, it seems clear that according to Ti an action simply cannot qualify as an injustice unless it
1 The translation is from Cherniss 1976, 477-481, slightly altered for the sake of terminological consistency.
2 Note that D also contains a fairly obvious parallel between other-regarding injustice (0 apa aSixou^svog xai ¿9' otououv) and harming ('O pXarcTo^svog ¿9' ¿Tspou).
3 This calls to mind the Stoic definition of justice as the knowledge of how to distribute things according to deserts (xaTa a^iav) (see SVF I, 200-201; 374; 563; III, 125; 255-256; 262-264; 266; 280; 303; 620 and Babut 2004, 178, n. 210). The abbreviations I use are those adopted in Liddell & Scott's Greek-English Lexicon and the Oxford Latin Dictionary.
harms. This conceptual link between harming and doing injustice appears to be rather widespread. It is present in Plato4, very prominent in Aristotle5, and shared by many other ancient philosophers6 including some Stoic thinkers7. Against this background, it is probable that Chrysippus in T1 simply adheres to this tradition.
To my mind, it is also fairly uncontroversial that the central idea of T1A-C can be put as follows:
II). One who does injustice to others thereby does it to oneself.
In other words, other-regarding injustice always implies se//-regarding injustice. Indeed, it is explicitly stated in T1 that an unjust person "does himself injustice (auTov ¿Sixsiv) whenever he does it to another (oxav aAAov ¿Sixfl)" (A), and "he who does anyone at all injustice does himself injustice too (0 apa xai ovxivouv ¿Sixwv xai sauxov ¿Sikei)" (B). In C other-regarding injustice is not clearly mentioned, but the thesis that "every wrong-doer (0 a^apravwv)... does himself injustice (¿Sikei saux6v)" certainly can be quite consistently interpreted as subsuming this kind of injustice under the general notion of morally wrong action (to a^apxn^a).
But what is the philosophical meaning behind II)? What is meant by other-regarding and self-regarding injustice and why the former should necessarily lead to the latter? Intuitively, one possible interpretation of this thesis may be as follows: when somebody commits a "conventional" injustice (c-injustice) towards others, i.e. inflicts on them some undeserved non-moral damage (e.g., kills, robs, tortures, etc.), she thereby also commits what might be called "moralistic" injus-
4 See R. 334d-335e, esp. 335^1-12, where harming (¡3MrcTsiv) is presented as the "function" or the "work" (spyov) of the unjust person (той ¿Sixou). See also R. 34303-6; Lg. 86ie-862a; Hp. Mi. 372d5; Just. (sp.) 374bc; Clit. (sp.) 4ioab; cf. Cri. 4907-8.
5 E.g., EN ii36a3i-32: "...if to commit injustice (то ¿Sixsiv) is simply to voluntarily harm (¡3MrcTsiv) somebody...". See also EN ii32a4-6; ii34bii-i3; П35Ы9-25; ii36ai; ii38a8-9; Rh. i368b6-7; i373b29-3o; Top. i09b33-35; Pol. i253ai4-i5; MM (sp.) I, 33, 27, 6-7; II, 3, 4, i-3; II, 3, 8, 2-3 Armstrong.
6 E.g., Epicur. Sent. 3i-33; Alcin. Epit. 3i, 2, 5-6 Louis; Alex. in Top., p. i4i, 22-26 Wallies; Aspas. in EN, p. Ю7, 33 Heylbut; Anon. in EN II-IV, p. 237, 30-3i; 239, i-2; 24-38; 24i, 3-4; 242, 3i - 243, 38; 245, i8-2i; 252, 3i-37; 253, i7-i8; VII, p. 433, 40 - 434, 4; 443, 3234 Heylbut; Heliod. in EN, p. io5, 24-29; io6, 6-7; iio, 23-26; iii, 8-io Heylbut; Porph. Abst. III, i8, i9-2i; i9, 7-io; 26, 48-52; IV, i3, 3-5 Nauck.
7 E.g., M. Ant. IX, 1, 1 clarifies the statement that "the one who commits injustice ('O ¿Sixwv) acts impiously" by declaring that such an agent transgresses the will of nature, which created rational creatures "to benefit (w^s^siv) one another according to their deserts (кат' i^iav), but in no way to harm (¡3MrcTsiv)". See also SVF II, 1117; III, 578-579.
tice (m-injustice) towards herself, i.e. makes herself unjust and therefore morally harms herself8. Or, to put it succinctly:
Ila). One who does c-injustice to others thereby does m-injustice to oneself.
This idea would be in line with general criticism of injustice put forward by Plato: since c-unjust actions9 make the soul of the agent unjust and vicious, they bring upon her moral harm10 and evil11, thereby overwhelmingly contributing to her unhappiness12. This is why injustice is inherently disadvantageous for anyone who commits it13. When combined with I), this moral self-harming may well be construed as self-regarding m-injustice. In fact, Aristotle who usually emphasizes the other-regarding character of justice among other virtues14 and accordingly denies the possibility of committing c-injustice towards oneself15 still admits that one can "metaphorically" speak about self-regarding m-injustice, if one accepts, as Plato and himself did, the existence of different parts of the soul16. It seems that within this approach self-regarding m-injustice is nonetheless understood as essentially "social" in the sense that these soul parts are regarded as distinct agents who may commit injustices towards each other. It is important to notice that when in SVF III, 288 Chrysippus himself criticizes Plato for admitting self-regarding injustice and thus seemingly contradicts his own statements in Ti he associates this notion precisely with this "social" understanding of the human soul, which he, of course, rejected in favour of comparatively monistic psycholog-
8 See Cherniss 1976, 479, c.
9 E.g., R. 442e-443a; Grg. 471a-c; Ap. 30cd.
10 See esp. R. 367d2-4, where Adeimantus asks Socrates to demonstrate in which way injustice (¿Sixia) by itself (Si' aùrrçv) harms (ßMrcTsi) its possessor. For the general description of this harm cf. R. 443c-445b; Grg. 511e-512b; Cri. 47e-48a.
11 Moral vice is the greatest evil for its possessor (R. 366e-367a; Grg. 469b, 477a-e, 478de, 479cd, 480d, 509b, 511a; Lg. 661bc, 731c; cf. Cri. 49b). The notions of evil (xaxov) and harm (ßMßn) in Plato are almost interchangeable (R. 379b; Grg. 468c; 477c-e; 499d; 509b; Lg. 904b; Men. 77e; Hipparch. (sp.) 227a.; cf. n. 22).
12 It is the presence of evils in human life that makes it unhappy (Men. 77e-78a) in the same way as the presence of goods makes it happy (Smp. 204e-205a; Euthd. 279a, 280d; Lg. 631b, 697ab; Alc. I (sp.) 116b; Def. (sp.) 412d10).
13 Unjust people are necessarily unhappy (R. 345a; 353e-354a; 580bc; Grg. 470e; 479e; 507b-508b; Lg. 660e; 661de; 899de; Epist. VII 335d).
14 EN 1129b25-1130a13; 1134b5-6; Pol. 1283a38-39; Rh. 1373^9-26; cf. EN 1130a32-b5 on injustice.
15 EN 1134b9-i3; Ii36a3i-b1; 1136^5-25; ii38a4-28; MM (sp.) I, 33, 1-3; I, 33, 30-34 Armstrong.
16 EN 1138b5-14; EE 1240a15-21; MM (sp.) I, 33, 35; II, 11, 47-49 Armstrong.
ical theoryi7. But the very idea of self-regarding m-injustice does not crucially depend on whether one accepts the doctrine of the multipartite soul in the vein of Plato or Aristotle. There are many Stoic texts declaring or at least implying that by committing any kind of moral evil, including injustice, one morally "harms" oneself, which, given I), may be considered a self-regarding injusticei8, and it seems plausible that Chrysippus in T1 could have in mind more or less the same thing.
The fundamental problem with IIa) within Stoic ethical framework concerns rather the notion of other-regarding c-injustice. Indeed, taken together, I) and II) must result in:
III). One who harms others thereby harms oneself9.
The crucial point here is that in order to commit any other-regarding injustice, implied in II), one has to somehow harm others (according to I)). And if we accept IIa) as an interpretation of II), then this harm must be conventional and non-moral. That is, we must also accept
IIIa). One who c-harms others, thereby m-harms oneself.
But from the Stoic point of view this would be impossible because the Stoics are rigorists who only admit the existence of moral evil and harm. Certainly, they can quite consistently say that anyone who kills, robs, tortures, etc. inflicts on others the so-called "things against nature" (та пара <puo4v) or, which is approximately the same thing, "dispreferred" (anonpony^sva) indifferents2°. But the whole point of Stoic rigorism is that dispreferred indifferents are not evils2\ And since the Stoics also believe that only evil is harmful22, these indifferents cannot
17 SVF III, 229a; 257; 259; 260; 459; 461; 462, 82-88; 463; 471a; 476, 36-47. Cf. Opsomer 2017, 318-319.
18 See Muson. XII, 26-29 Lutz; Sen. Ben. VII, 32, 1; Epict. Diss, II, 10, 26-27; IV, 5, 10; M. Ant. II, 16; IV, 26; VIII, 55; IX, 4 and the next note.
19 Cf. SVF III, 626: "...one who harms [somebody], also harms oneself..." (...tov Ss ¡3mrct0vta xai sauTov ¡3mtcteiv...).
20 For the terminology, cf. SVF III 121; 124; 140-142; 155; 499; 759 and SVF I, 192; III, 122; 126-129; 133; 135-136; 145; 181.
21 E.g., SVF I, 185; 190 (= III, 70); 191; III, 35; 129; 181; Muson. I, 23-28; VI, 56-61 Lutz; Sen. Ep. 94, 7; 123, 16; Epict. Diss. I, 24, 6-7; 28, 14-27; 30, 2-3; II, 19, 13; IV, 1, 133; M. Ant. II, 11, 4; V, 36; VIII, 1; 28; IX, 1, 3; 16; 42, 2; XI, 18, 3; XII, 23.
22 Evil (xaxov) is actually defined by the Stoics as harm (|3M|3n) or something which is able to harm (to oiov ¡3mtcteiv) (SVF III, 74; 77; 86; 93; 166 (= Sen. Ep. 85, 30); Sen. Ep. 87, 33; Epict. Diss. IV, 1, 44; cf. Muson. VIII, 8-14 Lutz). And this harm is exclusively interpreted as the moral deterioration of the rational agent (SVF III, 77-78; 117; M. Ant. II, 1; II, 11, 2-3; IV, 8; VII, 22; VIII, 1; IX, 42, 2-3; cf. Epict. II, 10, 12-23; III, 18, 5-6; IV, 1, 118-127). A
harm anyone23. Consequently, the infliction of та пара (puciv on others does not amount to harming (pXanxsiv) them and therefore (according to I)) to committing an injustice (aSixsiv) towards them. But if those who inflict та пара (puciv on others do not commit any other-regarding injustice, they also cannot be said to morally harm themselves by performing these actions. Therefore they do not commit any self-regarding injustice either. As a result, the whole argumentation by Chrysippus collapses. What this analysis shows is that within Stoic ethics it is logically impossible to combine I), i.e. the conceptual link between aSixsiv and pmtctsiv, Ila), which implies the notion of other-regarding c-injustice, and basic Stoic rigorism according to which there exists no other harm than moral.
Since rigorism is quite evidently a non-negotiable position for the Stoics, the way out of this impasse could be twofold. First of all, they could in some way sever the link between aSixsiv and рЛапте^ (I)). As a result, they would still be able to assert that to inflict та пара <puo4v on others is to act unjustly (aSiKeiv), even if it brings upon them no harm (pXaPn) whatsoever. However, to completely deny any connection between harming and doing injustice would ruin Chrysippus' argument in Ti anyway. For in such a case it would be impossible for him to infer that one commits a self-regarding injustice (aSixsi sauT6v) from the fact that one morally harms oneself (рМпта sauTov). Instead, he should have opted for a more complex alternative: he should have said that sometimes aSixsiv involves рМптш, i.e. when it comes to genuine moral harm, and sometimes it does not, i.e. when one inflicts on others та пара (puCTiv. But this would have looked like a rather cumbersome ad hoc solution, which obviously cannot be accepted as self-evident without further argumentation. Anyway, Ti in my opinion shows that Chrysippus simply sticks to I).
On the other hand, Chrysippus could reject the very notion of c-injustice and thereby IIa). Since according to Ti he accepts II), he would need a different interpretation of this thesis. It must be clear that the only option left is
IIb). One who does m-injustice to others thereby does m-injustice to oneself4.
That is, one who commits other-regarding injustice by morally harming others thereby commits self-regarding injustice by morally harming oneself. This solution would better agree with Stoic rigorism and, perhaps, with the rather enig-
similar relationship exists between the notions of good (àyaSôv) and benefit (w^ÉÀsia), see Tzekourakis 1974, 68-75; Forschner 1981, 178-179.
23 SVF III, 117; 146; 166; M. Ant. V, 36; VIII, 41; 49; X, 33, 4.
24 The two logically conceivable alternatives would be: IIc). One who does c-injustice to others thereby does c-injustice to oneself; Ild). One who does m-injustice to others thereby does c-injustice to oneself. But they are untenable for the same reason as IIa), i.e. because they imply the notion of c-injustice.
matic Stoic idea that mutual harming is limited to vicious people, just as mutual beneficence to virtuous ones25. But it has at least two serious problems. First of all, to put it frankly, the implications of this Stoic idea simply do not make much sense. For instance, in order to morally "benefit" one another virtuous people do not need to actually interact with each other or even to be aware of each other's existence26, and if the same is the case with moral "harming" among vicious people (which seems likely), then it is rather hard to understand what is actually meant by all this "harming" and "benefiting"27. What is obvious, however, is that according to IIb) the Stoics, when arguing consistently, still cannot afford describing c-harmful acts (such as murder, robbery, torture, etc.) as "injustice". And it is a problem for they surely want to describe them this way28. Secondly, the Stoics often insist that it is essentially up to us whether we are virtuous or vicious29, and that consequently nobody can really harm us since to morally harm us against our will is impossible whereas any infliction of non-moral damage is not really harmful by rigorist standards3o. Basically, according to this view, the only possible harm is moral and self-regarding3i. But this is incompatible with IIb) for it amounts to admitting that other-regarding m-injustice is inconceivable.
To conclude, when Chrysippus in T1 asserts that one who inflicts harm and injustice upon others thereby inflicts them upon oneself, he makes statements that are pretty unintelligible under any possible interpretation, and the main reason for this is his belief that injustice always involves harming those who suffer it (I)). For in this case he has to explain how it is possible for an unjust person to harm
25 SVF III, 93-94; 587; 625-626; 672; 674; Sen. Ep. 109, 1-13; Ben. V, 12. Cf. López 2004, 204, n. 128.
26 SVF III, 626-627. Cf. I, 223; III, 630-31; 635.
27 Cf. Forschner 1981, 180, Anm. 122.
28 E.g., SVF I, 313; III, 347; 531; 535; 578-580; 701; Hierocl., p. 50, 7-9 von Arnim; Sen. Ep. 24, 16; 76, 33; 79, 14; 90, 39; Ben. I, 5, 3-4; 9, 5; II, 35, 2; III, 22, 3; VI, 4, 1; 26, 1; Muson. IX, 77; 138-140; X, 37-41; XII, 23; XVI, 15-28 Lutz; XX, 50-55; Epict. Diss. III, 18, 9; IV, 1, 118-123; 5, 9-11.
29 E.g., SVF II, 1118; III, 32; 215; Sen. Ep. 80, 3-4; Muson. Fr. 38 Lutz; Epict. Diss. I, 25, 1-4; 29, 1-4. 12. 47; II, 5, 4-5; 13, 10; III, 8, 2-3; IV, 1, 133-134; Ench. 31, 2; M. Ant. V, 5; 10, 2; VII, 71; VIII, 29; 47; 55-56; IX, 3l; 40; X, l3; 33, 2-3.
30 E.g., III, 149; Epict. Diss. IV, 12, 7-9; 13, 8. 13-14; Ench. 30; 42; 48, 1; M. Ant. II, 1; 11, 2; IV, 8; V, 36; VII, 22; 33; 64; VIH, 1; 41; 49; 51; 55-56; IX, 42, 2; X, 33, 3-4; XI, 18, 4. Actually, T1D, which Pohlenz suspected to be an Academic parody of Stoic argumentation (Pohlenz 1939, 15), may reflect the authentically Stoic idea that those who are subjected to c-unjust treatment are only harmed in the sense that they erroneously believe to be harmed. Cf. Epict. Ench. 30 and Babut 2004, l80, n. 2l6.
31 Cf. Chrysippus' words quoted in SVF II, 1000, 45-49.
others if from the Stoic point of view non-moral harm does not exist at all, and
moral harm is essentially self-regarding.
References
Babut, D., Casevitz, M., ed. (2004) Plutarque. Oeuvres morales. T. XV. 7 partie. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Cherniss, H., ed. (1976) Plutarch's Moralia. Vol. XIII. Part I.7033A-7086B. Cambridge, London: Harvard UP, William Heinemann LTD.
Forschner, M. (1981) Die stoische Ethik: über den Zusammenhang von Natur-, Sprach- und Moralphilosophie im altstoischen System. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
López, A.D., Sánchez R.C., tr. (2004) Plutarco. Obras morales y de costumbres. XI. Tratados platónicos. Tratados antiestoicos. Madrid: Editorial Gredos.
Opsomer, J. (2017) "Is Plutarch Really Hostile to the Stoics?" in T. Engberg-Pedersen (ed.) From Stoicism to Platonism. The Development of Philosophy, 700 BCE-700 CE. New York: Cambridge UP, 296-321.
Pohlenz, M. (1939) "Plutarchs Schriften Gegen die Stoiker", Hermes 74. 1, 1-33.
Tzekourakis, D. (1974) Studies in the Terminology of Early Stoic Ethics. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag.
