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2A. A. Breusenko-Kuznetsov1, V. A. Medintsev2 "On fragile crossings and bridges": a dialogue about modern problems integration of psychological knowledge
1 About the author 2 About the author
Annotation. The dialogue participants presented their significantly different positions on the issues of integration of psychological knowledge and the optimal methodological tools for its implementation. The discussion highlights subtopics: integration and universalization of knowledge; worldview filters, scientific criteria, ideologization of science; "fragmented" and "holistic" knowledge; the current state of integration in psychology, the goals of "integrators"; one-sidedness of formalized descriptions. The issue of distinguishing between the concepts of "integration" and "universalization" is also touched upon. It was only partially possible to bring the positions of the participants closer together, most of all because such mechanisms for the functioning of scientists and scientific institutions are needed in which, while maintaining competition, there would be minimal restrictions on the freedom of scientific research.
Keywords: methodological tools, integration, universalization, ideological filters, freedom of scientific research.
Citation: Breusenko-Kuznetsov A.A., Medintsev V.A "On fragile crossings and bridges": dialogue about modern problems of integration of psychological knowledge. Теоретичш дотдження у психологи: монографiчна серя. Сост. В.О. Медшцев. Том 19. 2023. С. 23-43.
v.a.: First of all, thank you, Alexander Anatolyevich, for agreeing to take part in this dialogue! For me, the experience of an article-dialogue is important not so much as an opportunity to test the argumentation of my position, but as an attempt to bring closer our positions, which, I think, initially do not coincide. And now to the point.
During our preliminary discussion of the topic, you expressed your readiness to conduct a dialogue either about the integration of psychological knowledge or about the use of theoretical and methodological tools of the natural sciences in psychology. For me, these topics are connected; this integration, I believe, is possible only through the use of formalized means of describing the subjects of psychological research. As we both know, a significant part of the scientific heritage of our mentor, Georgy Alekseevich Ball, consists of research to improve the methodological tools of psychology, including the use of formalized descriptions. To the best of my ability, I continue this line of research, using both the ideas of G.A. Balla, as well as our joint developments, which, I believe, we will touch on one way or another in the dialogue. So, I have briefly outlined my initial position and am now ready to listen to yours.
a.a.: And I thank you, Vladislav Alexandrovich, for the idea of the dialogue article, as well as for the invitation to
participate. I also believe that the topics you voiced are related. And you are absolutely right in believing that I see the connection between these topics differently than you do.
In short, my position is this. The use of theoretical and methodological tools of the natural sciences in psychology seems to me possible, but not as the only acceptable central tool for the integration of psychological knowledge. I believe that this pivotal role should belong to historical and humanitarian approaches that understand, attentive to the subtleties of the semantic contexts of integrated knowledge.
In my opinion, the integrative potential in formalized descriptions is present, but it is somewhat one-sided and itself is unlikely to be able to overcome its one-sidedness. They can be used as supporting tools in integrative projects, but not as a basis and basis. The danger lies in the tendency to replace integration with unification, in the hidden presence in any formalized description of certain selective worldview filters.
v.a. Worldview filters, I believe, "lose their power" as descriptions with an increasingly higher degree of abstraction are used (for example, a mathematical expression is much more difficult to "filter" ideologically). And of course, we are all in favor of not losing anything valuable from the
accumulated psychological knowledge during the integration transformation.
I would like to clarify one point. In my works, I use the terms "integration" and "unification" synonymously, and in Western psychology, in works of an integrative nature, according to my observations, earlier they began to use the term "unification", and later also "integration" and now they are used synonymously (at least At least, I have not seen their opposition in modern works). I raised this issue due to the fact that you seem to find a significant difference in the meanings of these terms, then it makes sense to discuss this at least briefly.
As for our main topic, did I understand correctly that you are a supporter of integration changes in psychology? The question is not idle, since discussions on integration topics still represent the position of those who believe that the fragmentation of psychological knowledge is historically and methodologically rooted in the specifics of knowledge about a person and psychology and should remain so.
A.A.: Speaking about "worldview filters," I mean not only conscious, but also unconscious filtering by scientists of information that does not agree with the ideological foundations they accept. The zones of such filtration for scientist-minded scientists and science experts become the demarcation lines of "scientific/non-scientific", which are
never carried out ideologically neutral, but always serve to strengthen the position of those scientific theories that are consistent with the positivist worldview in a broad sense.
In my opinion, in order to counter this trend, it is necessary to at least be aware of it. And in this regard, I believe that with all the progressiveness of the line, oriented toward "the use of descriptions with an increasingly higher degree of abstraction," including mathematical expression, it is still not worth relying on it as an automatic guarantee against the ideologization of science. Belief in such a guarantee "against the special (magical) properties of the instrument" would be blind and would not in any way exclude the possibility of unconscious activation of filters.
We know that such an ideological form as scientism has long been based on mathematical tools for verifying empirical data (methods of mathematical statistics), without particularly asking the question of the extent of its relevance. Radical scientists, offering their filters of "scientificness," question entire scientific directions (for example, all variations of depth psychology) on what, in my opinion, are farfetched grounds (experiment is not applicable in them and statistical methods are not used). In this ideologized case of application, mathematical statistics performs not so much the function of verifying experimental data, but rather the function of an idol, a standard of scientific excellence,
which is proposed to be equal to. But we also know that in many scientific studies, mathematical statistics are either inapplicable or uninformative, and the verification function is performed by logic applied to a specific case.
The history of the use of the terms "unification" and "integration" that you mentioned (formerly "unification", later also "integration" in synonymous use), in my opinion, is symptomatic. Moreover, this symptom, in my opinion, does not indicate a genuine increase in tolerance for other people's opinions, but rather an attempt to imitate it. (About manipulative strategy within the framework of the ideolo-gization of science?)
Let us remember that science, in principle, gravitates towards the unification of terms (within one scientific study it is simply necessary to ensure the accuracy and certainty of the results), and at the same time we notice that in relation to the integration of scientific knowledge, there are two terms that are in a relationship of synonymy (and the fact that one of the terms is precisely "unification" predisposes to irony). In my opinion, "unification" is a more honest term in terms of expressing the true goal of those "integrators" who are now promoting scientistic ideas. This goal is competitive, not cooperative. Therefore, the use of the term "integration" in this case is akin to a smokescreen. (When we
say "integration," we mean unification on its own competitive basis).
In this regard, I would like to note that I do not want to participate in any way in this kind of "integration" (which is synonymous with unification). Simply because I do not believe in the honesty of her intentions and the authenticity of her desire for dialogue.
This, however, does not mean that I am not a supporter of the integration of psychological knowledge in any possible sense. I would like to illustrate what my position is with an autoquote: "It is easy to notice that it is humanitarian-minded psychologists who tend to emphasize the principles of plurality in personological knowledge, while supporters of the natural science paradigm gravitate towards unification. The typical goal of a humanities scientist in relation to the very problem of invariant / variable is understanding, and the goal of a natural scientist is rather overcoming" [Metaph, p. 12]. I illustrated this duality using examples of the works of methodologists and systematizers of personality psychology, discovering that even in educational and methodological publications there is a duality in the logic of construction: "1) a systematic presentation of personality psychology as a science in a single theoretical and method-
ological key (starting from the provisions of some authoritative theory ); 2) a set of diversity of existing theories of personality.
The first method of presentation somewhat obscures the differences between scientific truth and authority and often deliberately presents certain variable concepts as invariant principles of personality psychology (thus it predetermines the choice of junior colleagues in favor of one or another methodology, i.e., it serves to ideologize science). The second method is frightening with the possibility of disorientation, the creation of a relativistic illusion of the absence of common foundations in personality psychology, leading to the devaluation of knowledge" (ibid.).
Thus, while recognizing that each vision of the integration of scientific knowledge has its shortcomings, I still identify with the second version, which is fundamentally humanitarian. At the same time, in answer to your question, I will note that, although I consider it impossible to integrate knowledge about the mental life of a person within the framework of the logic of a single theory, I do not at all consider multiple knowledge about it to be "fragmented." This
is holistic knowledge (it is completely holistic within the logic of each theory). And its further integration is quite possible. But not through unification, but through the development of an integrative methodology that ensures mutual understanding of theorists and mutual translation of meanings.
v.a.: It seems that it is necessary to somewhat improve our dialogue so that it does not turn into a "dialogue of articles", where the replicas cover a wide range of debatable issues; such a dialogue is much more difficult to navigate, including for the reader. Let's organize sections for constructive discussion of the subtopics already touched upon and still try to bring our positions closer together. I propose the following subtopics for discussion:
- integration and universalization of knowledge;
- worldview filters, scientific criteria, ideologization of science;
- "fragmented" and "integral" knowledge;
- the current state of integration in psychology, the goals of "integrators";
- one-sidedness of formalized descriptions.
Integration and universalization of knowledge
v.a.: I repeat that in English-language publications on called "deviations" in order to remove the connotation of
the topic of prospects for the development of psychology evaluativeness). Moreover, the problem of the first kind, if
there is no opposition between unification and integration. it occurs, is limited to the English-speaking culture, while
Let's look at the dictionaries: integration (from the Latin in- the problem of the second kind is transcultural, since we are
teger complete, whole, unbroken) a process or action that talking about terms formed on the basis of Latin, the uni-
results in integrity; unification, connection, restoration of versal language for scientific word formation.
unity (Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary. 2010); unifi- It is obvious to me that "unification" sounds more "to-
cation from lat. unio unity and facere do) bringing to uni- talitarian" than "integration" - which is noticeable at least
formity, to a single norm, a single form (Ushakov's Explan- in the dictionary definitions you provided. The point is that
atory Dictionary. D.N. Ushakov. 1935 1940). uniformity (to which unification leads) is in no way identical
It is possible to understand the Anglo-Saxons who find to unity (the result of integration). Uniform elements may no difference in them; it is more difficult to understand the not be in unity, and unity may not be achieved through unilife of these words we have borrowed in our languages. Try formity. Uniformity is ensured for the external observer, to state as clearly as possible the differences that you see while unity is the internal connection of the elements. between them. I had a feeling that these differences could Again: how can the uniformity of objects be ensured? Due be expressed in some other way. to the protrusion / attribution of identity and the elimina-
a.a.: I believe that if the Anglo-Saxons do not find dif- tion / obfuscation of differentiating aspects. Both lead to a ferences in some terms and use them to denote the same false apparent umty to the self-decepti°n of the scientist. concept, then the problem can be found both in the reflexive It is also obvious to me that both unification and inte-capabilities of their language (weakness in distinguishing gration are important processes in the development of sci-shades of meaning) and in ideologically motivated substitu- ence, but they are fundamentally different levels. Unifications (the fashion for more "tolerant", "pluralistic"-sound- tion is justified at the operational level. As a unification of ing terms, by analogy with how "perversions" began to be terms for identical concepts. Clearly, unification must be
accompanied by differentiation. Integration is the level of cognitive goals. It allows communication between different components of scientific knowledge included in the overall system.
v.a.: It is interesting that the other day one American psychologist drew attention in my article to precisely the part where it was said about the synonymous use by psychologists of the terms "unification" and "integration". Like you, he considers these terms to be different in content and referred to his interpretation of their distinction [Trafimow, 2012]. In connection with our dialogue, two points are noteworthy: firstly, this psychologist, apparently, comes from the USSR, where he was educated in the tradition of domestic psychology, and besides, English is not his native language; secondly, his interpretation of the distinction under discussion is essentially the opposite of yours. In particular, he believes that integration is much simpler than unification and is carried out by all researchers when reviewing publications on a research topic. But unification requires deep penetration into the essence of phenomena; he cites the periodic table as an example of such penetration. I will add that the mentioned psychologist does not specialize in integrative issues, which is perhaps why his interpretation remains outside the integrative discourse.
Of course, we can develop the theme of distinguishing between integration and unification, but what will we get? Another fork in interpretations, that is, another stage of fragmentation. However, both your judgments on this topic and the judgments of the mentioned American colleague, of course, have reason, which for me is confirmation of the relevance of putting forward a general idea of integration acceptable to the psychological community, which I recently wrote about [Medintsev, 2020]. By the way, this article proposes to consider two types of integration ideas: descriptive and prescriptive. Now, as one of the results of our dialogue, I see that the second is essentially an option that you call unification, and I will think about whether to replace its name.
a.a.: The example of an American colleague who (possibly) received an education in the traditions of Russian psychology (and interprets these concepts alternatively) is not at all surprising to me. One way or another, we are talking about scientistic education, which in the American (positivist) and Soviet (Marxist) versions presupposed trust in similar mythologies, including the ideal of natural scientific accuracy of experimental knowledge, which psychology supposedly must embody at any cost. In this regard, the predictive power of D.I. Mendeleev's periodic law, the essence of which is the influence of some elementary material
causes on the chemical properties of substances and the types of reactions in which they enter, is an example of the degree of unification of knowledge, the extrapolation of which to psychology would allow a scientist-minded psychologist to justify his a way of thinking that boils down to calculating correlations between variables. And how can one not notice that the process of "brain drain" provides real examples of transcultural "integration" that has taken place on the scale of individual scientific destinies. The only thing is that this integration of the carrier of (post-) Soviet education has a local (not universal) character and is situa-tional and functional in purpose (social adaptation of a scientist in a foreign cultural scientific environment).
In this regard, I believe that the term "unification" (of knowledge) as a bearer of claims to the dominance of a certain scientific ideology (scientism) is unlikely to inspire cooperation among representatives of scientific groups that do not identify themselves with scientism.
The word "integration" does not have such odious "coalition" connotations. Therefore, speaking about the "relevance of putting forward a general idea of integration acceptable to the psychological community," one should note the positive point that it does not provoke its rejection "from the threshold," but gives hope for mutual understanding among colleagues. True, we can talk about deep
levels of mutual understanding only after considering all interpretations of the integration of psychological knowledge (and this is probably an open list), all its types and levels. And, in my opinion, by explicating the "fork in interpretations," we are not entering the "next stage of fragmentation," but rather, the creation of a universal map that allows supporters of different scientific camps to come to agreement.
v.a.: Unfortunately, this kind of "universal map" is still being formed, and the authors are not particularly keen to harmonize, let alone integrate, their approaches. In my opinion, this is another manifestation of the fragmentation of knowledge. I will add that "representatives of scientific groups that do not identify themselves with scientism", apparently, do not show interest in integrating their approaches, in which they are no different from many of those whom you classify as scientists.
a.a.: Actually, yes. There is a difference, of course. Scientist projects have taken a dominant position in academic science, and are only sluggishly pushing through "puzzling" (in the sense of T. Kuhn) tasks regarding which of them is more right and which is somewhat less. Anti-scientist projects do not defend domination at all, but organizational autonomy, the freedom to theorize, record and interpret experience according to one's own tolerances. Therefore, they
are disconnected not only from the dominant academic at- knowledge." Simply because I associate the future of psy-
titude, but also from each other. And personally, their cur- chological science with the humanitarian tradition par ex-
rent internal disunity upsets me much more than the cellence. "schisis" along the lines of "natural science / humanities
Worldview filters, ideologization of science
v.a. : I am a supporter of the integration/unification of psychological knowledge and our dialogue can become a test of your disbelief in the honesty, at least of my intentions.
As for "worldview filters," I don't know of examples of their application, say, in mathematics. Perhaps you know these? In any case, for conscious or unconscious (say, by speakers of various natural languages) filtering of certain discourses carried out in the "humanitarian paradigm", the possibilities are much wider than those of the same mathematical ones.
I believe that ideologization, including science, is in principle ineradicable in human culture; it is a given that has to be taken into account. Moreover, ideologization is not necessarily counterproductive (as with the persecution of cybernetics in the post-war USSR), but it can also be productive, for example, the volume and depth of research conducted within the framework of the ideologized theory of
activity (A.N. Leontiev and others), in my opinion, up to still remains unachieved by any other psychological school. And again, ideologically justifying the rejection of formalized descriptions is incomparably more difficult than humanitarian ones.
a.a. : I had no idea of testing the honesty of your intentions. In this case, we are talking about something slightly different, not about personal gain pursued by one or another "integrator," but about the "rules of the game," in the sci-entistic project, historically built in such a way that each new integration initiative risks turning into another crusade, the erection of new idols and the establishment taboo. The main reason for this, in my opinion, is the lack of ideological self-reflection of this project, which, in turn, stems from the rejection of humanitarian approaches.
In this regard, I think that psychologists should be granted the right to make formalized descriptions within
the framework of research activities (in case one of them believes that they are deprived of such a right), but not the obligation to be guided by the methods of formalized descriptions.
I believe that the volume and depth of research conducted in the activity school of A.N. Leontief function from the resource that this school had due to its "court" status. On the other hand, one can recall bright researchers who belonged to both this school and its basic approach only nominally (for example, F.E. Vasilyuk, whose psychology of experience has different foundations than the activity approach, although his dissertation was written under the formal leadership of the school leader himself).
v.a. : Any socially significant initiative risks turning into another crusade and the erection of new taboos, and it is hardly worth blocking it on this basis. And the imposition of taboos as the implementation of a system of norms of social behavior is one of the fundamental functions of human culture. But I think you are primarily concerned about the restriction of freedom of scientific research; however, this has never been within the competence of scientists. Such restrictions can only be imposed by significantly more influential forces. In science, many categorical structures, the discourses of their critics and new "crazy ideas" have long
coexisted; some of them then become scientific classics. Rejection of the humanitarian approach that you write about is, of course, unacceptable, but it is not necessary. At least neither I nor other supporters of integration say anything like this. I don't see a lack of ideological self-reflection in the works of the integrative direction, but I see a possible prospect of remaining in endless self-reflection, which is what humanists are often inclined to do.
I propose to summarize this part of our dialogue something like this.
The ideologization of science depends to a small extent on the scientists themselves, but the competition of ideas and scientific schools was, is and, most likely, will continue for a long time in science (which is akin to ideologization). The form of administrative regulation of possible future integration of psychological knowledge also depends to a small extent on scientists; their competence is only to offer methodological tools for integration.
a.a.: We can talk about different levels of ideologiza-tion: 1) the external influence of government, political, and economic circles on science (this influence often occurs as a selection of scientists for the desired way of thinking, and in order to effectively resist it while remaining in the position of a scientist, it is difficult to find suitable levers); 2) intra-scientific. It was the second level that I, in fact, emphasized.
Not because it is more destructive (this is probably not the case), but because it is the responsibility of the scientists themselves. An example of an intrascientific ideology is sci-entism, whose demands "to be scientific" tend to turn psychology into an imitation of natural science and close other paths. Unlike fair competition of scientific ideas and schools, ideologization presupposes a pronounced manipulative nature and a tendency towards monopolism.
By the way, rating publications, international scien-tometric databases, etc. have become a typical background, if not the instrument of ideological pressure on scientists in recent decades. in combination with university rating systems. It is no secret that the constant race to confirm their scientific status forces scientists not only to make personal financial investments, but also to those forms of publishing activity where the adaptive component prevails over the creative one. Can a scientist effectively counter these trends? In his modern domestic beggarly status, with uncertainty about the future, there is no. But I hope that such opportunities will arise in connection with forms of administration that encourage creativity in various aspects of scientific life. By the way, even if we limit the competence of scientists with regard to the integration of psychological knowledge only to the development of methodological
tools, then even then the responsibility for the completeness of the integrative model will fall on them.
v.a.: I'll start with the last one. Of course, the authors of the works are responsible for them. Any theory or methodology can be reproached for incompleteness, and scientific knowledge, developing from theory to theory, as it seems to us, fills this incompleteness. Further, I also don't like the current ratings, scientometric approaches, etc., but this is part of the culture in which we work and we have to consider these "measures of creative achievements." In addition, there has never been fair competition between scientific ideas, schools, and research methods, even in ancient Greece, in the USSR, or today in the Western world. The same applies to competition between writers, artists, musicians, etc. And few people can "effectively resist" these processes; special talents are needed for this. And for many of us, all that remains is to adhere to the Stoic motto "do what you must, and come what may." I will correct my version of the summary of this part as follows.
Recognizing the inevitability of competition between ideas and scientific schools, we are supporters of finding such mechanisms for the functioning of scientists and scientific institutions in which, while maintaining competition, there would be minimal restrictions on the freedom of scientific research.
a.a.I agree with this formulation.
"Fragmented" and "holistic" knowledge
v.a.: You noted that psychological knowledge is holistic within the logic of its constituent theories, and for its integration at a higher level, the methodology of mutual understanding and translation of meanings is sufficient. This is roughly how it seems to me that most integration researchers in psychology see integration. But, as you can see, many years of efforts in this direction have not yielded results. From what? Of course, one of the reasons may be the reluctance of the heads of scientific schools to lose their positions and "dissolve" their theories in some faceless holistic theoretical model. And nothing can be done about it. But there is also a methodological side to the issue: all psychological theories are not as logically holistic as they seem. In conversations with Georgiy Alekseevich, we touched on this topic more than once; he gave examples, some of which he analyzed in his articles (see also [Ball, 2014]). The complexity of research subjects in psychology far exceeds the methodological tools still used by psychologists, in which intuition and heuristics remain the main components of theorizing. To what has been said, I will add that they focus attention and give numerous examples of fragmentation (or disintegration) in psychology not by novice researchers, but
by specialists with rich experience, and in terms of criticism of fragmentation, Western psychologists are clearly superior to us. There is no doubt that the volume of knowledge accumulated in psychology must be preserved, but transforming it into a form of modern rational "integrated knowledge" based on the mutual translation of meanings is hardly an achievable goal. I believe that for integration we need to look for a fundamentally different methodological approach.
a.a.: I agree that it is very useful and necessary to seek new methodological approaches for integration. Like any developing field of culture, science cannot stop at one or another ready-made list of methodological approaches, solving puzzles in one or another ready-made field. At the same time, the fundamental failure of integrative trends in psychology seems to me to be a consequence of the depreciation or one-sidedness of the philosophical and methodological foundation provided for integration. The logical weakness and fragmentation of the theoretical constructions of certain schools in psychology can stem both from encapsulation within their own local spaces of theoretical
thought, formed around their own authorities, and from the desire to adapt one's scientific thought to the requirements of the external scientific community or "integrative project", as well as from the philosophical illiteracy of psychologists, which over the long years of scientistic dictatorship was recognized as almost an advantage. I believe that it is impossible to talk about the logical integrity of this or that psychological theory without its philosophical foundations being clarified and systematized. Ideally, a psychological system should include detailed study and comprehension at the philosophical, theoretical-scientific and empirical-applied levels and, on this basis, integrate with other systems into a kind of universal invariant meta-sys-tem.
I also think that mathematical methods are inherently unable to compensate for the lack of philosophical reflection on the acquired theoretical products, which means they must be competently supplemented with it.
v.a.: I agree that ideally theories in academic psychology should be developed at multiple levels of scientific knowledge. But even in the natural sciences we do not know such harmonious systems. Perhaps this can be explained by the extreme complexity of the cultural processes in which these systems are formed. There is even less reason to count
on the construction of such harmonious systems in psychology. At the same time, the growing fragmentation of psychological knowledge, about which much has been written and argued, must somehow be stopped or at least slowed down. We have to put forward options for integrative approaches, albeit with different conceptual and methodological content.
As for mathematical science, on which most of modern scientific knowledge rests, then, as we know, its objects, subjects and methods are entities that are completely abstract from the objective world and other scientific knowledge. And at the same time, the use of mathematical tools has been ensuring the growth of scientific knowledge about the objective world for thousands of years. On the other hand, philosophical science is no less fragmented than psychology, and making efforts to build a logically coherent system of psychological knowledge on the basis of fragmented philosophical knowledge seems to me an impossible task. However, there have been and are ongoing attempts to create a coherent system of philosophical knowledge, and it is possible that they will be crowned with success (for example, in one of the recent versions, the Logic of Open Synthesis was developed, by the way, using mathematical tools [Moiseev, 2010]).
How would you suggest summarizing this part of our dialogue?
a.a.: It's unlikely that I'll be able to summarize at this point, because I strongly disagree with your last text. The fact of the matter is that natural science develops in a linear way, through a change of paradigms. The humanities are multi-paradigm. A.V. Yurevich even talks about the non-paradigmatic status of psychology. Attempts to look at this completely expedient feature of them as imperfection, immaturity, etc. devaluation as a consequence of the inoculation of a scientistic worldview. "Fragmentation" of psychology, as well as philosophy, is a resource, not a problem. The problem is precisely the adjustment of psychological knowledge to the canons of natural knowledge, and this problem is of poor quality, which is associated with defensive behavior.
Experimental psychology is only a stage in the history of our science. Although, as we remember, its claim was to serve as the first principle. But it, like other (past and future) versions of science, also has a philosophical foundation, in my opinion, rather dull, almost completely devoid of those
bright insights about the nature of the human spirit that psychology absorbed from speculative systems.
Should we not think through psychological knowledge on a philosophical level, limiting ourselves to relying on mathematics? But is it not a mistake to demand from mathematics what it is not intended for, namely, to replace philosophical meanings with pure formalization?
v.a.: Yes, it's clearly impossible to summarize this part. In my statement, you have significantly shifted the emphasis, but it's time for us to complete the dialogue, so I won't go deeper. It is interesting that at the beginning of the dialogue you did not deny the need for integration in psychology, but now it seems that you do not see such a need: fragmentation is a resource of psychology, multi-paradigmality of the humanities is the norm. An unexpected result of our dialogue, although an effective dialogue is better than a fruitless one.
a.a.: Even now I do not deny the importance of integration in psychology. But our essential vision of integrative processes really differs sharply.
The current state of integration in
v.a.: Perhaps the "goals of integrators" in psychology differ, and it is possible that some simply want to win the competition. But in general terms, the following situation seems to me (for more details, see [Medintsev, 2021]). Inte-grative research in psychology has been carried out at least since the 1940s ("integral psychology"), and since the 1970s, a direction of research on the unification/integration of psychological knowledge has been formed. Many years of research on "integral psychology" did not lead to the unification of psychological knowledge, but to the formation of an independent psychological branch with its own conceptual apparatus and research methods. In "younger" studies on the unification/integration of psychology, discussions about the need for integration remain dominant, as well as about the scientific status of psychology, about the content of its basic categories, about the disciplinary structure, etc., that is, until the creation of a coordinated integration project, apparently, still far. At the same time, regardless of this discussion, interdisciplinary and interdisciplinary research is being carried out within the framework of psychology. The results obtained in them may well be of scientific value, but the spontaneous nature of such research, outside the general integrative paradigmatics of the object, subject and
hology, "the goals of integrators"
method, essentially contributes to the further fragmentation of psychological knowledge.
a.a.: I believe that the failure of integrative research in psychology since the 1940s could be due to the fundamental incompleteness of the field of scientific knowledge that was supposed to be subject to integration. In particular, such a significant level of psychological knowledge for integrative processes as philosophical (metaphysical) psychology was eliminated from consideration.
The fact you cited of the transformation of integrative psychology into a separate (differentiated) branch, in my opinion, is symptomatic and may indicate a substitution of goals that has occurred among the subjects of integration. An analogue can be seen in social reality, when a certain foundation, collecting funds for some great mission, at some point begins to feed only itself. I think that the turning of integrative processes towards oneself (when all integration begins and ends in the mind of the researcher) naturally leads to this kind of manifestation.
Genuine scientific integration is unthinkable without real communication between scientists belonging to different fragments of divergent psychological science. Otherwise, there is a high probability of integration with one's
own fantasy of a certain scientific direction, and not with the scientific direction as it is in reality.
v.a.: I think that metaphysical philosophy is not at all excluded from consideration; articles in this direction are regularly published in philosophical and psychological publications. Another thing is that few people find it possible to use rather florid metaphysical discourses to develop methodological tools in other branches of psychology. However, they exert their influence on the development of scientific approaches only indirectly, just as fiction can influence the formation of a scientist, including a mathematician and a psychologist. In addition, research continues in which they try to use metaphysical concepts in combination with tools mastered in other sciences (for recent publications, see [Prygin, 2020]).
I agree, there are signs that there is a "turning of integra-tive processes towards themselves (when all integration begins and ends in the mind of the researcher)." I also agree that in the development of integrative approaches, paradoxically, there is no meaningful communication between researchers; instead, competition between approaches continues, as in other areas of psychological research.
I think here we can agree that integration in psychology is fundamentally impossible without the constructive cooperation of researchers interested in it. The conclusion is trivial, but, unfortunately, relevant.
a.a.: Yes, we have to agree with the trivial conclusion about the importance of constructive cooperation. As for the difficulties of using "florid metaphysical discourses," it should be noted: it cannot be ruled out that they stem from scientistic stereotypes and taboos, with which metaphysical approaches cannot be reconciled by definition.
Perhaps an increase in the cognitive complexity of researchers would be a positive outcome of these efforts, especially since metaphysics has long served an important function: it was a school of philosophical thinking.
v.a.: It seems to me that no one excluded metaphysical psychologists from constructive cooperation. The problem is that we agreed that it is still not implemented.
a.a.: In fact, they were suspended. S.L. Frank in the preface to "The Soul of Man" (1917), as well as L.M. Lopatin in his works "Scientific Worldview and Philosophy" (1903) and "Urgent Problems of Modern Thought" (1917) reflect in detail on the heels of over the mechanism of this detachment, and among the representatives of the opposite camp, L.S. Vygot-sky speaks out just as definitely (in favor of detachment) in
"The Historical Meaning of the Psychological Crisis" (1927). Yes, the times are bygone, but the history of science has preserved the memory of events and actions that led to the modern opportunity for scientists to appear "tolerant" of metaphysics, without risking much (since the living academic
One-sidedness of
v.a.: I believe that in this area of discussion there is a "stalemate" situation where neither side has an impeccable argument. As a supporter of the use of formalized descriptions in psychology, in addition to the above, I will give Georgiy Alekseevich and I a laconic response to critics of formalized descriptions in general, and the TM method in particular: "The use of formalized theoretical models in psychology remains rather an exception against the backdrop of traditionally humanitarian forms of theorizing. The reasons for this, in our opinion, lie partly in the reluctance of psychologists to delve into the principles of constructing scientific discourse that are unusual for them. On the other hand, based on our own experience, we can highlight the typical doubts of psychologists about the advisability of using formalized methods (in particular, the one we proposed) for constructing and improving theoretical models. For example, the disadvantages of all formalization methods in-
tradition of metaphysical psychology has already been interrupted and marginalized, and its persecutors have managed to educate several generations of followers). However, declared tolerance for dissent in psychology is still better than none.
lized descriptions
clude the obvious simplification of real processes. We, however, draw attention to the fact that this drawback is combined with the undoubted advantage of greater clarity of description. It seems to us that it is no less important that the improvement (in principle, limitless) of formalization methods is the path to more and more completely overcoming this shortcoming" [Ball, Medintsev, 2016, p. 64]. I continue to adhere to this position.
a.a.: You may have thought differently, but I am not at all against formalized descriptions in psychology in general, nor (especially) the TM method in particular. I believe there is much to be gained by enthusiasts of methodological approaches of this kind, especially as the descriptions become more refined.
On the other hand, I don't think there is any point in regret if the enthusiasm for formalizing scientific discourse does not embrace all psychological scientists. I believe that
the "reluctance of psychologists to delve into the principles of constructing scientific discourse that are unusual for them" that you mentioned is unlikely to constitute such a uniform reason. Yes, probably someone gives in to habit and prefers the familiar forms of any new idea that enters into cognitive dissonance with them. But other scientists may not accept the path of formalization from directly opposite innovative positions (why not assume they have their own no less promising approach, to which formalization at this stage is decidedly alien). I also believe that pluralism in science plays an important role in the creative destinies of scientists. The right to relatively freely choose one's own original scientific path is an important achievement of our time. In my opinion, only such a model of integration of scientific knowledge can be recognized as adequate, which takes into account this important right of the subject of scientific creativity. Well, in order for this right to be based on the possibility of free choice, it would be highly desirable to make the process of training psychologists more universal, starting from the university period.
v.a.: In my opinion, the decisive factor in the rejection of formalized descriptions remains the one-sided humanitarian education and even the worldview of most psychologists. When discussing formalized tools, it does not come to constructive criticism at all, since for such it is necessary to
delve into the details of the proposed tool, for which there is neither the desire nor, to be honest, the necessary knowledge. So this is by no means just a "tribute to habit". And it is necessary to begin changing this situation, as you noted, even at the stage of training future psychologists. 2. Those who deny the path of formalization from their innovative positions on this topic, I have already spoken out in our dialogue, are not in danger from the scientific community. They, like all other researchers, can only limit their freedom of scientific research by forces external to science. Another thing is that while the current global trend of computerization of all subsystems of culture continues, it is difficult to doubtthat well-structured formalized means will prove to be significantly more effective tools for psychological research than traditional humanities, at least until the next change in the leading paradigm of cultural development. But integrative approaches in general and formalized descriptions in particular are still far from practical implementation simply because of their conceptual and methodological fragmentation. Can you offer a summary of this part of the dialogue? a.a.: The fact of the matter is that the "one-sided humanitarian education and even the worldview of most psychologists" is now devoid of the most important humanitarian components and is thoroughly saturated with natural science prejudices. This education today is the result of many silences and rules taken for granted. And yet I think
that the main integrator of psychological knowledge can be the history of psychology, the only discipline where everything and any psychological knowledge falls, regardless of which paradigm representatives are celebrating victory at the moment. The history of psychology returns to us everything that has been repressed into the unconscious of the current state of science.
Can mathematical description replace history? I think it was just a misunderstanding. How exactly to use it? I believe that keeping in mind the limits of applicability.
v.a.: As we know, the history of psychology, like any other, is reflected in historiography, which is always not free from ideology, therefore the "main integrators" are the authors of textbooks and monographs on the history of psychology, not free from ideology and personal likes/antipathies. So history does not solve the problems of integration, especially since an effective methodology for the integration of psychological knowledge is needed today, including
for the integration of the accumulated experience of psychological knowledge.
a.a.: The history of psychology, one way or another, illuminates a certain continuity of cognitive experience, scientific ideas, structures and events, and therefore goes beyond the current state of psychological knowledge and communicates with its alternatives, even if it forcibly throws an ideological net over them.
But yes, of course, the ideological positions of the authors influence (limit, distort the field of integration), therefore the models of historical and psychological reflection need to be improved, allowing us to perceive the ideas of psychologists of previous eras in their own logic (or as close as possible to it). Personally, I place my hopes here on the logic of understanding approaches, but I do not see any fundamental contraindications to the language of formal descriptions.
In conclusion
v.a.: Since I opened the dialogue, I suggest you start the first approximation. And no wonder: two participants in the
final part. dialogue, who agreed among themselves about the im-
a.a.: Summarizing our dialogue, we have to admit that portance of integratmg psychol°gkal knowledge, fin^y can-
the current situation of "psychological schism" cannot be not be considered as authorized representatives of their sides
overcome by the potential of thought revealed in it, even to a of the "schisis" (after all no one ^tiion^ and there are
now no indisputable authorities who could would do this), secondly, and by integration we mean different tasks solved by very different models.
On the other hand, the very fact of problematizing the "integration of psychological knowledge" should apparently be considered mutually beneficial for the participants in the dialogue. Fundamentally different semantic content of the ideas of "integration" was revealed, and the beautiful fantasies about mutual understanding without clarifying the concepts disappeared.
Along the way, it became clear that the issue of integrating psychological knowledge is very closely tied to the ideological struggle (both on ideological fronts external to science and on internal scientific fronts, where scientism clashed with anti-scientism). An understanding has been reached that the instrument of integration, whatever it may be: be it a formal description or a historical-psychological understanding reconstruction, must be equipped with procedures for de-ideologization, otherwise integration will turn out to be imaginary. An important aspect of such de-ideologization will be the study of the limits of applicability of a particular integrative method.
3. And, finally, about the main resource of the dialogue, regarding which the differences in the positions of the participants turned
out to be minimal. This is a commitment to freedom of scientific research, the requirement of which must be consistent with the functioning mechanisms of scientists and scientific institutions, including in conditions of integration.
v.a.: I support your conclusion. On my own behalf, I will add that I find the dialogue successful, even though it was only possible to partially bring our positions closer together. But the second (implicit) task, I believe, has been successfully solved: as I hoped, in a direct dialogue, when the parties have the opportunity to delve into the partner's arguments and state their own as clearly as possible, the discussion was much more meaningful and constructive than in public debates at conferences, seminars, etc.
In our articles, we often enter into correspondence dialogues with colleagues from the present and past, reconstructing their arguments at will and, as a rule, surpassing them. Of course, with the classics (and non-classics) of the past, no other discussion is possible, but between contemporaries, especially specialists in the same field of research, direct dialogues seem to be a very effective tool for achieving progress in theoretical and methodological issues. At the same time, the convergence of positions in such dialogues can become an important intermediate stage in the integration of psychological knowledge.
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