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УДК 327 Yu.V. Tumina NEW AMERICAN VISION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS AFTER 9/11
NIZHNY NOVGOROD STATE TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY NAMED AFTER R.E.ALEKSEEV
This article is devoted to US global political awakening after September 2001 and American approaches to international security issues. It tackles important foreign-policy decisions have been made during recent years. The 9/11 attacks gave Washington a surfeit of purpose to go along with its preponderant power. Being an ambitious politician, George Bush-junior recognized that the war on terror would require all elements of national power, from military to law enforcement to soft power, international institutions were flawed but essential and thus needed to be reformed. Since Barack Obama came into power, he has promoted the idea of US foreign policy shift to the most realistic and acceptable one claimed during his presidential campaign. Such an alternative deals with multilateral cooperation to face global challenges like denuclearization of the world, weapons reduction, mediation in international disputes and collective security. To succeed, America must revive and update the discipline of grand strategy in the regions like Middle East, Latin America, and South-East Asia.
Key words: US foreign policy, international problems, war on terrorism, global leadership and challenges, regional conflicts, international organizations, new world order.
9/11 bolstered unprecedented impulses to America’s aspiration to determine its own rules of international existence and symbolized a first great challenge of the XXI century. The slogan «Who is not with us is against us» intended a new vision of the international security problems in US foreign policy. Crucial Washington’s actions in Iraq, Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, demonstration of American forces in Taiwan strait, NATO’s enlargement, overthrow of Haiti and Panama regimes, final, firm and binding resolution of Bosnian problem, increasing intermediation in Arab-Israeli and North Ireland conflicts were undertaken to meet American interests in the regions of high political importance. Such a manner is a reflection of the new vision; USA broads the areas of responsibilities.
The 9/11 attacks gave Washington an illusion to go along with its dominant power. In order to prevent future attacks by al Qaeda and to send the message that governments that tolerated or sponsored terrorism would not be secure within several weeks, in the opening act of what became known as the «global war on terrorism», the United States proposed to overthrow the Taliban-led regime of Afghanistan.
However, association Iraqi government with the government sponsored terrorism was not the root the United States rushed into war with Iraq in 2003. Nor was the reason aiming-off the use of unconventional weapons, for Iraq represented at most a gathering threat in that region, not an imminent one. First and foremost, the main reason for attacking Iraq was to address to the world that even after terroristic attacks, the United States was not a «pitiful, helpless giant» as in Richard Nixon’s words. USA signaled to the world community and anti-American movements that they will give no encouragement to terrorism and defend American leadership positions throughout the world. An idea that thriving democracy will be a good example for the rest of non-democratic states gave a hope to the ideologists of neoconservative wing like William Kristol, Paul Wolfowitz, Elliott Abrams, Douglas Feith, Lewis Libby, Richard Norman Perle. It was the main argument for many of the war’s proponents believed that Iraq would quickly revive into a thriving democracy of the Middle East.
According to the judgment of American establishment about the necessity to preempt terroristic attacks on the territory of the USA and abroad the decision to attack Iraq in March 2003 was made. In comparison with the war in Afghanistan it was a war of choice. There was no vital American interest in imminent danger, and there were alternatives to strong-armed conflict, such as exacerbate the existing sanctions. No other policy could have protected them in time, vital interests were at stake. But toward the end of the period of the Bush administration, that conflict started to transform into something else, and it crossed a line in March 2009, when President Barack Obama decided to increase American troop levels and declared that it was U.S. policy to “take the fight to the Taliban in the south and the east” of the country. With these escalations, Afghanistan, too, became a war of choice [1].
In Brzezinski’s opinion preponderant power is quite adequate for the USA and in a particular sense is justified. Discretion is proved by the fact that America represents itself as a reformer of the whole mankind and therefore has to be understood as the nation playing special, particular leadership role in global system of international security. After September events a fundamental brink that separated two definitions of homeland security and global one was dismissed in American perception. Today America is leading in a way that everything and everywhere are the zones of American national interests. Due to this fact it is worthy to pay attention to the fact that U.S. security introduces itself like something exclusive and extraordinary but foremost as the phenomena of liaison, intertwined home and global security. Times when domestic security was associated narrowly with national sovereignty slipped by, as far as globalization, information revolution and all-round transparency exposed vulnerability even to the most powerful states. «Unless these are repaired, and unless those who would exploit them are killed, captured or dissuaded, the survival of state system itself could be at stake. Here lies common ground, for unless that multinational interest is secured, few national interests - convergent or divergent - can be» [2].
In this context the globalization of threats arises therefore the central feature of «great dispute» over «global-domestic» security is how to determine the threat? U.S. foreign policy divides spheres of vital national interests, zones of influence and involvement; and today that classification exhausts all the arguments. Threats are to be prevented, opposed and counteracted. An attitude alike helps to differentiate long-standing allies, temporary partners, implicit enemies and opponents. However, threat determination after terrorist attacks had uncertain and abstract character. Making speech in the beginning of 2002 about «axis of evil» and declaring hard-line stances against North Korea and Iran, G. Bush-junior had rhetorically confused two problems stemmed from North Korea like providing stability in North-Eastern Asia; Iran and its wide-ranging assertions in Persian bay, the heritage of suspended 1991 campaign against Iraq government [3].
Economic development and engagement are proven, if not fail-safe, some countries are on the way to be integrated into international system. Globalization is going on and it is evident that the USA is still keeping the most effective financial network involved in bilateral and regional free-trade agreements, currency exchange, private direct investment all over the world. U.S. input to world trade on the proportion with national GDP was prevailed on the beginning of the 21st century and reached the highest point - 25%. America is a leader of direct investments, American transnational corporations such as «General Electric», «General Motors», «Ford Motors», Exxon Corporation and IBM are popular with developing countries, and 72% of direct investments were placed there in 2001 [4].
World export of commercial services came to $2.2 billion in 2012 in accordance to IIP Digital’s data. The U.S. economic relationship with the EU is one of the largest and most complex in the world, generating an estimated goods and services trade flow of about $2.7 billion a day in 2012, and representing an estimated 30 percent of global trade. The transatlantic economy is a powerful link between companies and producers, and businesses and employment opportunities. In 2011, the United States supplied 11 percent of all EU goods imports and 29 percent of all EU private services imports, and purchased 17 percent of all EU goods exports and 24 percent of all EU services exports [5].
In spite of the 2008 financial crisis triggered a broad debt crisis across households and businesses, incomes failed to service record levels of consumer and corporate debt, increasing unemployment and in turn reducing revenues to state and federal governments, U.S. economy had regained its ranking as the worlds most competitive, largely as a result of its efficient markets and corporate innovation, according to The Global Competitiveness Report. Switzerland is on the second place followed by Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Finland and Singapore, respectively. In the 2007 edition, 131 countries were ranked on the quality of institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, health and primary education, higher education and training, goods and labor market efficiency, financial market, technological development, market expansion, and business management and innovation. The United States scored high on innovation, labor market efficiency, and higher education and training. The ranking was based on publicly available data and a survey of more than 11,000 business leaders around the world.
America possesses substantial instruments of world reorganization that are democratic institutions, streamlined promotion of economic development and war industry. There is a fundamental change in American World Order, key foreign policy challenge in U.S. is reconsideration of unilateralism.
Notwithstanding generally alliances have a restricted importance: this fact was evident in Kosovo in 1999 where 90% primary military expenses were for America but it doesn’t mean at all that America will renounce NATO or Treaty with Japan. The advent of a new global politics has led NATO to expand its geographic reach and the range of its operations. Now, NATO must extend its membership to any democratic state that can help to fulfill its new responsibilities. Only a truly global alliance can address the global challenges of the day. This new reality transformed not only U.S. foreign policy but also the role of history of most successful alliance. On September 12, 2001 NATO members took unprecedented step of invoking the North Atlantic Treaty’s collective defense provisions saying that an attack against one alliance member is deemed to be an attack against all of them [6]. While the alliance has increasingly recognized the necessity of operating far from Europe or “out of area”, in NATO parlance it has been limited by the requirement that its member states be North American or European. NATO will consider a proposal to redefine the alliance’s role by deepening relations with countries beyond the transatlantic community, starting with partners such as Australia, Japan and New Zealand. A key part of this effort is the proposal by the USA and the United Kingdom to «forge a global partnership» between NATO and non-European states that will provide a forum for expanded dialogue.
Related to UNO, adherents of «concordance diplomacy» are not satisfied with traditional peaceful methods of constraints, they also admit military methods of resolution collecting UNO, NATO, OSCE’s strengths as well as other regional organizations under U.S. leading role. Hegemonists entrust all global security and guarantee stability to the USA that implies U.S. responsibilities for unilateral measures. American look at relationships with UNO is that the last can be useful for some humanitarian and peacekeeping functions, and the USA doesn’t expect that organization will expand its functions. The UN has failed to resolve almost every dispute during last 50 years [7]. Worse as well as other international organizations it failed to combat terrorism; too often it has been weak, indecisive. The UN’s Charter and the speeches of its members’ leaders have meant little because its members’ deeds have frequently fallen short.
To my mind, despite the UN’s flaws, however, the great objectives of humanity would become even more difficult to achieve without mechanisms of international discussion, coordination and cooperation. Besides, the 2006 National Security Strategy reiterates Washington’s dual position by arguing that great-power consensus «must be supported by appropriate institutions, regional and global, to make cooperation more permanent, effective and wide-reaching. Where existing institutions can be reformed to meet new challenges, we, along our partners, must reform them. Where appropriate institutions do not exist, we, along with our partners, must create them» [8].
In new American vision OSCE is a unique pan-European organization of prompt actions, provided regulatory acts and capable to guarantee legitimacy of measures undertaken by other regional states beyond its area. But America considers it only as an instrument for cooperation.
Crisis in Kosovo in 1998-1999 revealed a long-standing problem of the lack of peace settlement instruments in European community and ability of European Union to participate in internal processes when it faces humanitarian catastrophes or right abuses. At the moment US politicians are not considering European Union as a self-reliant structure that can maintain European security. USA regards Europe as a component of NATO to advance their interests within U.S.-led global governance structures rather than outside them. Western European and Atlantic enlargement to the East could be characterized as an integrative option (alternative) of collective security system where European Union is a built-in structure of NATO.
Increasing military U.S. and NATO activities directly on external border of all CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) collective regions, military infrastructure is re-established or renewed by NATO in Eastern Europe, trans-Caucasus and Central Asia. In accordance with decision adopted by CSTO in 2004, these organization guidelines are to promote interrelationships with NATO. NATO’s cooperation with CSTO is unavoidable in the atmosphere of geopolitical challenges in order to strengthen counterterrorist potential of community, to protect borders, to eliminate anthropogenic catastrophes and etc. NATO’s ambitions for global leadership could be realized only by means of Alliance’s readiness to cooperate with other regional organizations.
The new vision of this matter restricts that it is worthy to follow the rule of «selective multiparticipation». As it proceeds, its task is simple to articulate but hard to execute: keep U.S.’ old friends close or its new friends closer. White House, State Department and Ministry of Defense admit the necessity of broad coalition. Counterterrorist coalition includes such unexpected allies as Russia, Pakistan, India and even abstaining from collective actions China. It is a positive tendency to forge unanimous, mutual criteria to state-allies that favors to establish unprecedented cooperation system, for example U.S. cooperation with Russia, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan. Russian bodies purposefully appealed to Central -Asian states for crediting military site required at American military disposal. These measures strengthened American positions in post-soviet countries and American soldiers were dislocated in Central Asia and Caucasus.
Such understanding of international security problems clearly secures global leadership responsibilities for the USA and simultaneously stipulates the syndrome of “mirror reflection” in foreign policy of those countries that are ready to share the same roof with the USA. For instance, America is ready to delegate responsibility to Japan in North Eastern Asia to promote common security policy on the basis of specified plan elaborated by Washington and handled to Tokyo; whereas Japan is entitled to observe it fully. From a US perspective it would be preferable for Japan to advance their interests within American global governance structures.
Today US administration lacks a strategy for Middle East region. A grand strategy consists of a clear articulation of national interests married to a set of operational plans for advancing them [9]. After the suspected large-scale chemical weapons attack against civilians in the end of August 2013 it seems some sort of military action against the Assad regime is now inevitable. The problem in the Syrian case is part of a larger dilemma regarding the upheaval in the Middle East. The solution to that upheaval cannot be based entirely on military power nor should it be dependent almost exclusively on the Western powers.
Washington’s diplomatic involvement in the Middle East during these years was uneven. Efforts to promote peace between Israel and the Palestinians more or less came to an end after Israel’s government rebuffed Obama’s pressure to rein in settlement construction, and by 2012, the administration appeared more anxious to block un consideration of the Palestinian issue than promote progress in other venues. In early 2011, the Obama administration pushed Hosni Mubarak without any doubt to give up power in Egypt but appeared reluctant to demand changes from his successors and said little about the resistance to reform in friendly monarchies.
The United States retains important and in some cases vital interests in the Middle East, including a deep commitment to Israel’s security, opposition to terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons, and a commitment to safeguarding access to the region’s energy resources. To meet its national interests America tries to stop Iran to get nuclear weapons. Having nuclear weapons Iran will intensively shape anti-American image among the neighbors.
As Richard Haass, a President of the Council on Foreign Relations, said «Today, the Middle East is not an arena of decisive great-power competition, nor is it home to any major power». It means USA has to establish stable relationships with new governments in Egypt, Lybia and Tunisia, give strong support to friendly countries like Bahrain and Jordan to act responsibly. Distancing itself from newly formed governments that are not pursuing reforms Washington will not retain its vital interests in the Middle East. US involvement on the other hand will exacerbate conflict and worsen political consequences of region’s turbulence.
America has never confronted a global challenge of the type or magnitude it faces today. In my opinion the contemporary American vision of security problems entails the reconsideration of New World Order and American mission throughout the world brings about the revelation both positive and negative points in this vision. The affirmative factors are the preconditions of further coordination with other states (America and its allies have made progress since terrorist attacks), elaboration of single standards for potential state-allies, as well as consolidating of US global assumptions about this vision and subsequent actions. The negative one is that abstractionism and linkage of these terms of domestic and foreign security may cause unpredictable consequences, America will be racked by violent storms - both figurative and literal - as the global order breaks down.
References
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