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ГЕТЕРОДОКСАЛЬНЫЕ ПОДХОДЫ В ЭКОНОМИКЕ: ГЛОБАЛЬНЫЙ ВЗГЛЯД
www.hjournal.ru DOI: 10.17835/2076-6297.2019.11.1.006-019
НЕЙРОЭКОНОМИКА: НОВОЕ СЕРДЦЕ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОЙ ТЕОРИИ ИЛИ НОВОЕ ЛИЦО ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОГО ИМПЕРИАЛИЗМА?
КОШОВЕЦ ОЛЬГА БОРИСОВНА,
кандидат философских наук, Институт экономики РАН, Институт народнохозяйственного прогнозирования РАН,
e-mail: [email protected];
ВАРХОТОВ ТАРАС АЛЕКСАНДРОВИЧ,
кандидат философских наук,
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см Московского государственного университета им. М. В. Ломоносова,
доцент Философского факультета тета им. М. В. Ломоносова, e-mail: [email protected]
Нейроэкономика обычно рассматривается как результат вторжения нейронауки в § предметную область экономики. Однако и сама экономика оказывает принципиальное Ф эпистемологическое воздействие на другие науки, распространяя модели рационального ^ выбора на предметные области социологии, политологии и, отчасти, биологии. В свою очередь, нейроэкономика вносит значительный вклад в прогресс экономического ш империализма за счет еще большей универсализации экономического (рационального) поведения путем его натурализации и предания ему статуса, по сути, биохимического явления. В статье на примере проекта П. Глимчера нейроэкономика рассматривается как специфическая версия экономического империализма, утверждающая, что функциональные состояния мозга можно моделировать с использованием
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< принципов стандартной экономической теории. Рассматривая нейроэкономику как о методологический подход, авторы показывают, что за идеями сводимости ключевых ^ экономических понятий, таких как «выбор» или «полезность», к нейробиологическим £ данным и «прямой передачи» концептов из экономики в нейронауку, лежит намерение х переосмыслить и переписать нейробиологию и другие науки о жизни в терминах
< экономической теории. Такой проект может быть реализован, если удастся ^ продемонстрировать идентичность мозга и логической или компьютерной структуры ^ и если математические модели, взятые из экономической теории, привнесут ш экономическую семантику в моделирование мозговой активности. Превращение
«выбора» и его «экономическихродственников» в ключевые понятия для интерпретации нейронных структур и их деятельности открывают нейроэкономике путь к превращению в главенствующую, базовую науку о человеке, жизни или даже о самой природе.
Ключевые слова: нейроэкономика; экономический империализм; нейронаука; != редукционизм; выбор; экономическое моделирование; экономический агент. ш
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о © Кошовец О. Б., Вархотов Т. А., 2019
NEUROECONOMICS: NEW HEART FOR ECONOMICS OR NEW FACE OF ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM
OLGA B. KOSHOVETS,
Ph.D. in philosophy, Senior research fellow
at the Institute of Economics and at the Institute of Economic Forecasting,
Russian Academy of Sciences, e-mail: [email protected];
TARAS A. VARKHOTOV,
Ph.D. in philosophy, Associate professor at the Faculty of Philosophy in Lomonosov Moscow State University, e-mail: [email protected]
Neuroeconomics is often seen as the result of neuroscience expansion into economics. However, economics itself has a substantial background of epistemic intervention by spreading rational choice modelling over sociology, political science and part of biology. Neuroeconomics contributes considerably to the economic imperialism progress by developing an important tendency. We would describe it as deeper universalization of economic (rational) behavior by its naturalization and transmuting it in completely biochemical phenomenon. The paper reviews the Paul Glimcher's project of neuroeconomics as a specific version of economic imperialism claiming that the brain can be modeled using the principles of standard economic theory. Considering neuroeconomics as a methodological approach, the authors show that behind the ideas of reducibility of key economics' concepts such as "choice" or "utility" to neuroscience data and of "direct transferring" the concepts from economics into neuroscience lies the intention to reinterpret and rewrite neuroscience and other life sciences in terms of economics. It could be done if one would demonstrate the identity of brain and logical or computer structure and if the mathematical models taken from economics would hold the economic semantics while applying to the brain activity. Turning "choice" and its "economic relatives" into the key concepts for interpreting the neural structures and their activity would open the way for neuroeconomics to become an imperial science on human, life or even nature itself.
Keywords: neuroeconomics; economic imperialism; neuroscience; reductionism; choice; economic modeling; economic agent.
JEL: A12, B41, C83, C90
Introduction
Having arisen as a new radical natural science-based methodological program in economics, neuroeconomics is being developed as a study of the biological microfoundations that is neurochemical mechanisms and pathways, brain regions, neurons, genes, and neurotransmitters which underlie economic cognition and behavior. All these microfoundations are considered as biological mechanisms that influence rational decision-making and this enables neuroeconomics to give a promise to improve economists^ ability to forecast behavior (Glimcher, 2003; Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005; Sanfey, Loewenstein and McClure, 2006; Camerer, 2007). This neuroeconomics' ambition to do better economics by examining brains has been heavily criticized; some have charged that neuroeconomics is a brain-centric enterprise, and neuroscience and economics are fundamentally incompatible (Harrison,
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2008; Fumagalli, 2015; Antonietti and Iannello, 2011), others have argued that economic hypotheses cannot be falsified using neuroscience data (Coltheart, 2004; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2008) and irrelevant for economics' studies of decision-making (Clithero, Tankersley and Huettel, 2008).
Both some afore-mentioned criticism from economists and huge debates over neuroeconomics' contribution to economics seems to be inspired by negative attitude to the neuroscience intervention to economic theory. Indeed, since the 1990s economics have experienced some kind of imperialism as other sciences' attempts to export their different conceptual tools and experimental practices. Neurosciense appears to be succeeding in attacks to disciplinary boundaries of economics. Yet the possible influence of other sciences on economics challenges economics' postwar self-isolation and mainstream economics' implicit conception of itself as a self-sufficient science. The majority of economists consequently believe that revealed preference theory of choice behavior, axiomatic, well-ordered preferences, utility function basis, and instrumentalist methodological defense constitute an integrated theoretical-methodological framework which serves to make economics' explanations self-reliant, so no other science resources are required (Davis, 2016a). Thus, it is hardly surprising that much of debates on neuroeconomics contribution to economics have been S limited to the question of what tools, information and methods from neurosciences might be 8 employed in economics. Moreover, economists^ attitude to neuroeconomics as to inadequate "-i or not too much valuable research field is clearly seen in the gap between epistemological ambitions of neuroeconomics regarding economic theory and the actual shift towards specialized biomedical research with local results. The shift can be detected by the example of publication activity. Neuroeconomic research are often published in medicine and natural science magazines especially if they do not make any substantial contact with standard or behavioral economics researches and, therefore, attract attention not by economic, but by neurophysiological and biochemical results1.
Meanwhile, economics itself is well known for its imperialism, which in the most general
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< sense is understood as expansion of economic models, concepts and explanation of all
constructions beyond the limits of economy. In the 1970s and 80s the economics imperialism was an attempt to export economics' understanding of what good science required to other sciences (Lazear, 2000; Davis, 2016b). Over the last few decades these ambitions has been
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< reinforced as the theoretical apparatus of mainstream contemporary economics, i.e. rational
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choice theory, is established as domain-general and its formalism does not explicitly refer to j economic phenomena at all (Fourcade, 2009; Rodrik, 2015). An 'agent' may maximize under £ 'constraints' its 'utility function' with regard to anything: military victory, social prestige, x electoral gain. Accordingly, the theory is easily exportable to any domain that features
< agents making constrained choices. This means, in addition to economic matters, most of the rest of social sciences, political philosophy as well as many parts of biology (Radnitzky and Bernholz, 1986).
co Certainly neuroscience reverse imperialism toward economic theory is capable to
undermine economics^ claim to be an exemplary science with self-sufficient theory, concepts, explanation and powerful formal tools. However, almost nobody has yet noticed that neuroeconomics is little by little becoming a very strong and unusual form of economic imperialism. Indeed, unlike behavioral economics, where some concepts and experimental methods from psychology have been imported over to economics to explain various individual tz "anomalies" in choice behavior, in neuroeconomics much of the intellectual traffic has w gone in the other direction — economic tools are widely used to modeling psychological and neural processes. We claim that neuroeconomics contributes considerably to the economic
° imperialism progress by developing an important tendency. We would describe it as
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1 For example highly cited paper "Oxytocin increases trust in humans" (Kosfeld, Heinrichs and Zak, 2005) has no direct connection to specific economic models/theories - just starts from the obvious truth that trust is socially and economically important and asks about "the biological basis of trust among humans".
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universalization of economic (rational) behavior by making it 'natural', by transmuting it in completely biochemical phenomenon, by bringing it from the level of History and Society (and consequently, from social sciences and humanities) to the level of Nature (and natural sciences).
In this paper we aim firstly at review methodologies and epistemological grounds of neuroeconomics evolving in two different strands of "behavioral economics in the scanner" and "economics of neural activity". We identify them preliminarily as versions of biological reductionism and economic imperialism, respectively, and in the next part we consider it more particularly as possible "interdisciplinary" strategies of the discipline advance. In the third section we analyze contribution of economics, psychology and neuroscience to neuroeconomic research focusing on ontology (axiomatic core), empirical basis and epistemology of each discipline and on possible (un)bridgeable distance between initially conceptually disparate areas.
In the fourth section we address mainly to Paul Glimcher neuroeconomic project as it is being implicitly developed a specific version of economic imperialism. We attempt to show that Glimcher intends to reinterpret and rewrite neuroscience and other life sciences in terms of economics arguing that the brain can be modeled using the principles of standard economic theory and seeking to create a unified science encompassing neuroscience, psychology, and economics. Furthermore, we consider "economic behavior" among animals as indispensable complement to the key task of Glimcher^s kind of neuroeconomics enabling to eliminate the fundamental distance between animal and human, natural and social. In the last parts we turn briefly to some inevitable yet problematic consequences arising from adoption of concepts from other discipline and their reinterpretation and make some concluding remarks.
Neuroeconomics methodologies: behavioral economics in the scanner versus economics of neural activity
For a while the majority of economists believe that neuroeconomics is an attempt to take recourse, insights, findings and tools of neuroscience to economics. However, neuroeconomics does not exhibit a unified methodology. Fumagalli distinguishes "incremental" and "radical" versions of the discipline (2010), where "incremental neuroeconomics proceeds on the assumption that economists' traditional constructs (e.g. preference relations and co standard equilibrium concepts) provide a suitable basis for modelling people's decisions o and relies on neuro-psychological findings to adjust or enrich specific economic models" and ^ radical neuroeconomics challenges economists "to modify or even replace their traditional constructs and aims to implement substantial changes in economic theory" (2015). Craver and Alexandrova marks out 'neuroeconomics proper' and 'economic neural modelling' (2008).
The most important distinction is between what Ross (2008) calls neurocellular economics
and behavioral economics in the scanner (BES)2. Vromen offers a quite similar distinction
but prefers to entitle neurocellular economics as economics of neural activity (ENA) co
or Glimcher's economics of neural activity (2007, 2010a). Basically, BES is a behavioral q
economics-inspired approach, it takes existing neuroscience to task to better interpret ¡2
economic behavior, using brain data to support behavioral models and holds that insights _j
and findings from neuroscience show the need to revise economic theory. Neurocellular g
economics takes standard economic theory to task to better understand neural activity in the f
brain. Glimcher argues that expected utility theory (the core of standard economic theory) t
and game theory (one of a major method) provides a good basis to study neural activity in w
brain areas that are implicated in decision-making (2003). Thus, whereas BES argues for
radical changes in economic theory, neurocellular economics seeks for revolutionary changes °
in neuroscience itself (Marchionni and Vromen, 2010). ^
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2 Camerer and Loewenstein (2004), Camerer et al. (2005) is considered as the first manifesto of BES.
Neuroeconomics "interdisciplinary" strategies: biological reductionism versus economic imperialism
Methodologically based we can define the first project as heavily experienced intervention of neuroscience specific style of reductionist thinking (Gabriel, 2017). In other words, it is a case of total biological reductionism aiming to make natural the economic laws and such pivotal social concepts of economics as market, economic agent, rationality, economic behavior, choice and so on. As a kind of biological reductionism neuroeconomics enables to substitute complex behavioral (social) acts and choices of human with motoric activities and automatic (instinctive) actions of pure brain. The second project of neuroeconomics is a quite radical version of economic imperialism introducing standard economic theory in the study of neural activity and trying in fact to make "economic" the science of life while assuming brain to be a kind of economic enterprise producing economic laws. As a kind of economic imperialism neuroeconomics intend to substitute biological mechanisms with economic ones, in fact, completely changing the nature of key concepts borrowed from the natural sciences. It is far more powerful program, so no surprise that neurocellular economics is "the main hope of the whole discipline which major contribution might not lie in the traditional field of economics" (Marchionni and Vromen, 2010; Harrison and Ross, 2010). S Thus, there are two possible epistemological solutions or "interdisciplinary" strategies,
8 which are being realized in current neuroeconomic research. We would describe them in the ^ following way:
• Biological (psychological) reductionism is an attempt to replace traditional set of social science objects by approval of biological / neuroscience cognitive style in another discipline. This has resulted in making it a part of natural science as, for example, to assert that behavior (decision-making) as such is a biological (neuroscientific) phenomenon means to make it an element of the subject matter of neuroscience. So basically biological (neuropsychological) reductionism is epistemic invasion of one discipline into the subject field of another. Such expansion implies explanation of the
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explained by the cause of "X" (an element of the axiomatic core, f.e. — rationality or utility function) by the phenomenon of "Y' (also an element of the axiomatic core, but of the "alien" discipline, f.e. — cognitive processes and emotions, neural basis).
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< • Economic imperialism is an attempt to reinterpret object domains not bound historically
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with social sciences by means of economic models and concepts. This expanding of
§ economics object domain aims at 'takeover of strange lands' since what was an axiom for
the economist became a research problem for the psychologist /neurosciencist. As a result,
the axiomatics of economics was included in the subject field of psychology / neuroscience - a
"psychological economic theory" or "economics of neural activity" emerged. For example,
neuroeconomists are assured that axiomatic approach to choice borrowed from economic
theory advances our understanding of brain's actual mechanisms, so they test willingly
do or do not brain obey these axioms (Glimcher, 2003).
Nevertheless, both lines presuppose the same type of reduction (social life — observing
individual behavior — inner side of behavior — measurable material brain processes) where
the neurobiological correlates of human social behavior pass as the observing choice and,
consequently, electrical and chemical processes in 'neural infrastructure' are treated as
the choice itself (see, for example (Krajbich, Oud and Fehr, 2014; Rangel, Camerer and
t Montague, 2008)3).
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— Sources of neuroeconomics: unbridgeable conceptual distance
° or sciences speaking the same language of Nature
< The possible combination or even synthesis between core elements of sciences involved in neuroeconomics projects poses a question, what means of research, conceptualization,
3 That has received very impressive criticism in (Fumagalli, 2016).
explanation and representation are preferable? Since neuroeconomics still remains quite a young discipline expanding on the border between neuroscience, psychology and economics it is worth to look intently on its sources, structure and conceptual heart.
Contribution of each of these disciplines to neuroeconomic research is presented generally in the table below with special focus on ontology, empirical basis and epistemology.
Neuroscience
Economics
Psychology
Ontology
(object of research and axiomatic core)
Brain in lab. Neurophysiological states and biochemical processes, which are the true objects of research not behavior of human/animal. So basically presupposes the reduction of the agent to fore-mentioned states. Experimentally formed object with huge role of devices providing access
Economic man, (real) economic behavior. Presupposes that economic is rational and rational is universal, as well reduction of human activity to individual behavior. This has resulted in transformation of real behavior to abstract. A priori and deductively formed object
Mental states including emotions (are not directly observable, rather theoretical postulates), lab behavior, cognitive processes (presupposes brain as information processing device). Experimentally and empirically formed object
Empirical basis /access modes
Experimental practices and devices to observe objects
Statistical quantities, econometric analysis. Models and basic concepts forming the object (rational choice, etc.)
Experimental practices and empirical models with psychological and institutional variables. Survey data set Theoretical tools for behavior research
Epistemology
(models and strategies of explanation based on axiomatic core)
Theoretical (mathematic) models used for formalization and prediction of complicated neurophysiological structures activity. Neural states = "mechanistic basis" of choice
Theoretical (mathematic) models used for formalization, explanation and prediction of economic behavior /mental states. Mental states = theoretical postulates = mathematical construction (f.e. preferences are represented by a utility function)
Takes part in the formation / further development of economics object to the extent of its understanding as individual behavior. Helps to treat rationality principle as an empirical proposition about behavior. Suggests models enabling incorporation of neuroscience results into the concept of cognition / behavior Mental states = empirical construction = mathematical construction
Firstly, we can see that object is developed through the task of opening the "black box" resulted in the consecutive reduction, from upper observable level to the underlayer inner side of behavior, to its neural basis (behavior - mental states - neural states). Neural basis is very heterogeneously dealt with in neuroeconomics: the individual neurons, neurologically relevant substances like hormones (cortisol, oxytocin) or neurotransmitters (dopamine, serotonine), neural systems (functional units), neural pathways, brain areas, etc. Secondly, it is easy to note, that neuroscience and economics introduce monotypic — from the methodological point of view — components to neuroeconomics construction. Both disciplines suggest models, which are responsible for explanation and prediction. However, in one case we are talking about models presupposing objectivity of natural-scientific type (neural
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structures, chemical substances etc.) and in another case - about models, presupposing objectivity of social type (agents making decisions and having free will, motives, values etc.). So the question about possible forms of co-operation between these families of models with ontologically different objects is bound to arise.
Gul and Pesendorfer argument (2008) that opening the "black box" is necessarily irrelevant also highlighted "conceptual distinctness" and an unbridgeable conceptual distance between the two areas: "economic models make no predictions or assumptions about body temperature, blood sugar levels, or other physiological data, and therefore, such data cannot refute economic models". Thus, to succeed neuroeconomics is bound to solve the issue of building conceptual bridges between initially conceptually disparate areas and demonstrate that difference is bridgeable. We suppose that only Glimcher's economics of neural activity accepts a challenge. The same question arises when analyzing the possible correlation of some ontological and epistemological components of columns 1 and 2. The object domain of neurosciences is formed by specific experimental practices. On the contrary, the subject matter of economic knowledge, at least its biggest part, is formed a priori suggesting "the essential hypothetical nature of revealed preferences" (Caplin, 2008). So we need to bridge the divide between choice data to the models and psychological and neural data. Glimcher's S project addresses the issue by building a unified science and being founded on the assumption 8 that cognitive processes and underlying neural states are mathematical structures. "-i Neuroeconomics introduces a radical approach to a pretty old question about relations
between mathematics, natural sciences and different social sciences (first of all, psychology and economics) and presuppose possibility of exchanging models and concepts inside this mosaic unity of various disciplines compiling the hypothetically holistic building of science. Following physicalism of the "third positivist wave" Glimcher assumes that this hypothetic unity is of natural kind and that mathematics of each discipline, no matter natural or social, is the same language of Nature as Galileo heralded (Carnap, 1967). As a result, mathematics transforms into ontology and this allows one to identify concepts (such as choice in economics
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basing on a similar or very close mathematical formalization. It is quite strange, but nobody seems to pose the ontological question on "formalization of what" as everybody holds that a mathematical model (formalization) of an object is just what that object is and deems that
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So it goes like this: (1) if we have all the same mathematical models and, (2) possibly, j same terms ("choice" for example — we can find this word in conceptual use inside at least economics, psychology and biology) then (3) we can combine concepts, proclaiming they are of the same nature (ontologically) and (4) we may conjoin other contents of the disciplines aiming to restore the unity of science. If the concepts of choice in biology, psychology and economics have nearly the same meaning, then we can take experimental basis from neuroscience (biology) and add it to the economic theory of choice. This is exactly what Glimcher's economics of neural activity does.
¡2 Glimcher's economics of neural activity: dreaming on a unified science
^ Neurobiologist Paul Glimcher is possibly the most philosophically radical among the
z neuroeconomics movement leaders. In "Decisions, Uncertainty, and the Brain" (2003) F Glimcher relying upon economic conceptual framework parses out experiments where ^ reward contexts affect the perceptual and motor functioning of primates mainly addressing to neuroscientists and psychologists. But his aspiration is more fundamental as he attempts ~ to use economic models (including game theory) to transcend Cartesian dualism of mind and ° body. After famous Gul and Pesendorfer critical attack upon neuroeconomics' methodological program his theoretical position has become even closer to what we entitle "neuroeconomic 3 imperialism". Glimcher distances himself from the idea of 'mindless economics in the scanner' ? (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2008) and simple use of neurobiologists measurements for defining and
predicting human choices (the latter, in general, is the Camerer's methodological program (Camerer, 2008; Rangel et al. 2008)). Instead of direct scanners application and so on Glimcher advocates neuroeconomics as a full-fledged interdisciplinary science, such as biochemistry for biology and chemistry (this is his own example). Thus, neuroeconomics should to be developed as a new unit in the solid chain stretching from the physics through chemistry and biology to the social sciences and conjoining different scientific fields and methodologies into one universal Science. Glimcher openly appeals to the reductive physicalism of logical positivists and offers the same pyramid shaped construction where high-level theories are based on low-level theories and everything is finally reducible to the only language and the only type of empirical data, — and, surely, to the same laws of Nature.
The key question here is how "linkages" between different sciences can be made considering that the reduction is actually 'partial' and not complete and if we agree that the neuroscience data cannot by themselves have an 'evidentiary function' and need to be somehow adapted and interpreted for fitting the social sciences. The Glimcher's answer seems to lie in the postulating that mathematical models (like the economic model of choice) are natural and it does not matter when and how we found them, — the unity of scientific field presupposes the unity of key concepts and models, so we can "directly incorporate conceptual objects from the social sciences downwards into the fabric of the natural sciences" (Glimcher, 2011). Therefore, the choice as a fundamental concept describes the natural rule can be used with some limitations on different levels — from biology, where the control parameter is "inclusive fitness" of possible behavior through psychology (emotional value) to rational (economic) behavior of social humans (Glimcher, 2011).
Glimcher calls the concepts of "choice" and "utility" the "logical primitives" of economics, defining logical primitives as "irreducible building blocks upon which a given theory stands" (Glimcher, 2011:18 (footnote)). This definition presupposes that one can "directly" transfer the concept of choice from hi-level economics into low-level neurobiology for getting an empirical base there, since there are no level-differences between logical primitives. As the latter are "primitives" they have the same level of complexity, and are irreducible (otherwise they are not primitives). But the most important that they should be considered as some kind of atoms, as elementary components of reality.
What is totally ignored here, is the difference (and ontological gap) between theoretical models (the original meaning of "logical primitives" is "elementary logical operators" or
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"simplest transformers" — this notion corresponds to informational or mental processes
and its modeling (Piantadosi, Tenenbaum and Goodman, 2016)) and empirical (observable) ^
objects. The crucial question here is do we mean in "choice" an elementary logical function
(mathematical model) or an invariant of material praxis? Does mathematics approximate
some class of practices or the practices embody (materialize) the primitive (primal) mental
operation? Glimcher assumes that we can ignore this difference because social actors (homo
economics making economic choice) are simultaneously neurobiological machines (also doing q
the same choice, but without social component). co
Indeed, the choice can be in both cases the same only if it is a (neurobio-) logical function, ¡5
preceded human society, typical for any behavior and primary built in the neural (brain) ¡2
structure. This argument allows nerocellular economics to claim that economics have some _j
important objects belonging to the very nature of human species or even to live itself: from g
now on, choice is not only social praxis but firstly elementary form of biological activity (or f
even form of existence of living objects). Thus, neuroeconomics as a progenitor of key logical t
primitives (the choice is important but not just that) becomes the interdisciplinary science w
on human (live), annexing other sciences studying human or animate beings and even
biology itself (especially, if concepts with primarily social origin like "choice", "altruism" and °
other similar conceptual invaders born in social sciences will take power in the evolutionary ^
theory — see for example (Fowler and Schreiber, 2008; Chuang, Rivoire and Leibler, 2009)). 3
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"Economic behavior" among animals: eliminating the 'natural' distance between animal and social
Something similar is being developed in the research of the so-called "economic behavior" among animals. Such approach has significant value as it gives us evidence of the universal character of mechanisms underlying economic behavior. Indeed, according to many neuroeconomists animal models are an "indispensable complement to the model on human economic decision-making"; there are similarities in economic and evolutionary theories of human and animal decision-making, as the optimality principle is that both classes of theories have in common (Kalenscher and Wingerden, 2011; Krasheninnikova, Honer and O'Neill, 2018).
A good example is the theory of 'biological markets' which interprets the ethological data of the animal world in economic terms, encouraging one to see a variation of market exchange, for example, in the mutualism (a form of symbiotic life in biology) (De Waal, 2005; Bshary and Grutter, 2002). According to this position, the life of coral reef can be correctly described in economic terms: the cleaner fish sells the services to the big fishes same as the monkeys exchange the services when making grooming and so on. Such approaches may be very heuristic, but more important is that they eliminate the 'natural' distance between S animal and social behavior and go even further — the rules underlying both types of behavior 8 become natural. In perspective this enables us to make a conclusion that economic behavior ^ (which is the same as rational or optimal behavior) is biological by its nature and does not need to be socially explained. As economic behavior is present not only among humans, but also among animals, we can say that market, competition, exchange etc. are not social phenomena or theoretical constructions, but evolutional achievements of the biosphere. Human forms are just the most complicated and perfect but underlying principles are natural and not exclusively human.
We are used to believing that human behavior is arbitrary and has purposes, motives, and means. So the quasi-economic description of the life of a coral reef implies that there
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< are similar structures in the animals' life. Such view cannot go without the "Stanislavsky's
method" — one needs to imagine oneself a fish and be aware how it feels, and then define its goals and motives. However, how can we estimate what comes from the fish, and what was contributed by our "terrifically human" perception and behavior? The same question but in
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< different context was posed by Thomas Nagel in his famous article on bat (1974), where he
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gave a classic decision for the issue. We cannot finally know how is it to be the fish because we j simply cannot imagine its way of perception and therefore its goals, motives and so on. But £ within neuroeconomics we seem to have a quite opposite radical opinion which may sound x like this: the question loses its polemic power if there are no significant differences between < the rules underlying human and animal behavior and if the 'choice' is natural mechanism which can vary but is the same in essence.
Then one can put another objection. How can one know the choice is rational? That co is because the social behavior is — at least partially — rational, and humans are rational. This assertion presupposes that rationality rules the observable behavior basing on goals and values. People have — at least partial — consent about typical social goals and values; and the consent can be achieved in conversation or by appealing to the common sense and mechanisms of human rationality itself4. Well, what about rationality of fishes, bacteria or neurons? We do not have any consent with these entities; we can only make them rational t by observing them and applying our consent on what we are observing. This way they are as (f> much rational (and consequently, can have economic behavior) as we decide their behavior looks rational. Both assumptions are required: the observable similarity and our decision (because they only looks like and, therefore, there is still no satisfactory way of binding social rational behavior and presupposed pre-human forms of rationality such as neural processes connecting with the choice function (Antonietti, 2010; Vromen, 2010b)).
4 A very good story of the origins of these two modern forms of consent see in (Shapin and Schaffer, 1985).
Actually rationality in this case becomes external to an agent in a sense that it belongs to the observer rather than to an agent of the action. And if rationality belongs to the observer, everything is rational when the observer can rationalize it, — so animals are rational. This way rationality becomes easily a part of Nature - just because we do not ask nature and simply presuppose that our way of seeing is inner rule of things.
We can see how economic rules are magically transformed into natural when we are reading about the choice in the Glimcher's "Foundations of Neuroeconomic Analyses" (Glimcher, 2011). Discussing the biological, psychological and economic explanations of human sexual behavior, Glimcher presupposes that in all three cases there is the same 'choice' and that the optimization model fits explanation because what else can it be if not the choice. The difference lies only in parameters and their weights but not in the model of determination itself. Glimcher is convinced that biology, psychology and economics are the sciences about human behavior reduceable to choices and optimization, and the only problem here is that the specific choice models in these sciences are "extremely local" — "what we lack is a global theory that can unite these disciplines and their explanations for human and animal behavior" (Glimcher, 2011).
Thus, the goal of neuroeconomics is to build up a mechanistic, behavioral and mathematical grand theory of choice and exchange. To clarify, "behavioral" means observed choices. "Mechanistic" means at some level of neural circuitry, which "includes psychophysiological measurement". As Camerer notices: "economics (in the form of revealed preferences and the myriad axiomatic foundations of decision) already has a mathematical and behavioral theory, but the theory is usually interpreted as agnostic about the mechanistic details" (Camerer, 2008). Neuroeconomics fill in the gap of mechanistic tools by interpreting the choice in term of biological measurements, i.e. by naturalizing the mathematical choice model and extending the economic theory of social behavior over the all forms of biological activity (treated as behavior). Then expectedly it proclaims that the measuring biological indicators (mostly neural) are the observing choice as it is.
Adopting concepts from other discipline and imperialism
Supported by many modern evolutionary biologists, the fusion of biological and social science concepts (such as, on the one hand, species, organism, ecosystem etc., and, on the other hand — choice, market, service etc.) opens opportunities not only for cooperation between co biologists, ethologists, neurophysiologists, psychologists and experts from social science, o but also for assimilation of disciplines, because the discourses are not just combination of ^ technical notions, but mainly epistemologies. Each of them aims for universal character.
Indeed, conceptual language as a part of a discourse always presupposes some model
of the universe and so words cannot serve as just indexes for the things — they necessarily
pull up the world view, cognitive style and specific practices (f.e. access to object, connected
observations and measurements, strategies of explanation) of the subject field they come
from. Words and concepts connected to them cannot be used in other context without co
changing their meaning and the object they refer to. Meanwhile, there is the only way to take q
solely mathematical representation of concept, for example, choice model from economics to ¡2
biology. During this procedure the concept will lose its particular meaning and connected _j
ontology so will be narrowed to formal ontology ("empty" mathematical abstraction), which g
thereupon should be connected to some substantial ontology. Thus, using the concepts such f
as "choice" within neurobiology is not just "direct transfer" from one discipline to another as t
these concepts are not just neutral "logical primitive" or the same mathematical functions. w
Basically they are metaphors, so concept adoption from other discipline purports modifying
both meaning of the term and image of the object this term refers to (Lacoff, 1993). In "Real °
Science" (2002) the physicist John Ziman claims that "scientific theories are unavoidably ^
metaphorical". But here we just would like to highlight that there is a big ontological issue; 3
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as adopting an alien concept (choice) one does not only describe with it something new (certain neurons activity) in a metaphorical manner. Over time one really comes to think of neurons activity as a choice.
Introduced in neuroeconomics, which is developed on neurobiological axiomatic core, "choice", "trust", "exchange" and other concepts taken from the social sciences are gradually rewriting the new field on the language of economics. This language also being modified with non-social - neurobiological and ethological - data, but the interpretation and semantics still lie in the field of economics as it was capable to formalize it basic concepts and axiomatic core making them general-domain. Appropriately, neuroeconomics of Glimcher's kind does not reduce economic concepts to neuro(physical) data - it reinterprets neurobiological data in terms of economics and make rationality and optimality principle inherent in brain.
Let us look on the example. The matter is the substitution of basic dichotomy 'rationalemotional' for the 'deliberative — emotional', which allows neuroeconomics to get rid of the mystery of human rationality. At first glance it may sound like a more subtle distinction, but actually this change is fundamental.
It goes like that: rational implies optimality and it means that rational is "to the best of my ability at the time," so emotions can be rational. In other words, emotions are interpreted S as quick, immediate responses that were developed either through biological or cultural 8 evolution, and they are quick and efficient because they are important to survival. Thus, "-Í for example if a wasp ready to sting, its prey does not want to pause to think, they will wave away or jump aside as it is the right thing to do - and then think about it later. Such emotional fear response to danger is considered by neuroeconomists as rational because one tries to defend their life. On the contrary, deliberation takes time, so it is exactly what it sounds like, careful thinking about complex relationships and actions (Sanfey, Rilling and Aronson, 2003; Corcos and Pannequin, 2011).
It appears that 'deliberative - emotional' dichotomy describes the observable animal
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m forms of behavior rather than human social ones — so "emotional" in fact is an immediate, < instinctive action, while "deliberative" is action, forestalled by orienting reflex. Consequently, o in neurobiological context this dichotomy loses understanding of emotional behavior as it reduced to the basic instincts; meanwhile, emotions have a huge role in the real human behavior (f.e. marketing experts are aware of it and build their consumer strategies on
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< feelings, memories and imagination rather the optimality principle). Nevertheless, it allows o neuroeconomics to retain the rationality principle and even extend it by making it natural rule of any behavior.
is ix Conclusion
Through all the examples discussed above one can trace the same plot: emphasizing the
importance of neurobiological basis of choice and demonstrating the reducibility of economic
behavior to it, neuroeconomics is seeking to redefine basic social by its essence concepts
of economics. Surprisingly, it does not lead to neuroscence takes over on economics and
the reason is not as there are unbridgeable distance or even ontological gap between social
and natural or "opening the black box" is necessarily irrelevant and add nothing to our
knowledge about economic behavior. The attempt to build a "unified science" ignores this
"useless metaphysical arguments", so neuroeconomics "successfully" overcomes the gap
arming itself with mathematics as the universal language of Nature. Rationality, choice and
t the others specific concepts of economics (to be exact, their mathematical models) turn into
w the laws of nature. Accepting the idea that the mechanisms, which we considered inherent
in social behavior are natural and typical for all forms of life one unlocks the gate for further
° explaining the nature phenomena in terms of economics. Economics becomes the natural
^ science to surmount the boundary between 'humans' and 'non-humans' (but not on the way
3 the author of this dichotomy — Bruno Latour — meant). o
Thus, actually we are witnessing a reverse expansion of economic discourse grounded in epistemic merits of the domain-general rational choice methodology. Animal behavior has the same structure and goals as human not so much due to both of them based on neuronal processes but for reason that neurons are driven by economic (rational) laws and basic economic (rational) operation as, for example, choice. Yet, choice is logical primitive, an elementary logical operation that machine, human, animal and neurons share as their behavior (or better to say operating activity) is rational. It does not matter that source of rationality is an observer (researcher) as mathematical models coming from economics are naturalized and spreads across the disciplinary frontiers, transforming the subject-matters and ontologies of the different sciences into the 'local versions' (paraphrasing Glimcher) of economics. This is how neuroeconomics turns from biological reductionism to economic imperialism.
Seemingly, now neuroeconomics aims at no more than to find economics mathematical models directly inside the neuro-cellular structures of brain, to naturalize them and then to reload economics on solid empirical ground. However, in the case of success the whole building of social sciences or even natural science could be reconstructed. For such success, it is necessary to make mathematical models material (brain operations should be identified with the computer's ones) and retain economic semantics of these models. In this case, neuroeconomics would become an imperial science about rationally (mathematically) driven neurobiological machines we used to call humans. If domain-generality, mathematical sophistication and recent naturalization of economic behavior encourage current and further imperial success of economics, what normative implications follow and is economics imperialism desirable?
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