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18POLITICAL SCIENCES
NATO POLICIES IN THE BALKANS AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Gjeta G.
PhD (c) in International Relations, the Faculty of History and Philogy, Albania, "Osman Myderizi" street, Tirana, 1020
Abstract
This paper aims to focus on analyzing how the North Atlantic Alliance views the closer integration of the Western Balkan countries into Euro-Atlantic institutions, when all countries in the region have expressed a desire to join these organizations. What has been the role of politics "NATO's "open door" in the Balkans? The issue of the connection between international security and democratization in the Balkan region is important for the well-being and the progress of this region as a whole. Existence or perception of threats to international security undermines democratization and, the failure of democratization undermines international security.
Nickname "unstable region", The Balkans have been holding it for centuries and not without reason. It is known that the Balkans have long been a difficult area to ensure long-term stability, due to a great record in violent conflicts. Historically there has been a turbulent life. Because of the different ethnic and religious components, but also of territorial claims, peninsula (its western part) has always produced conflicts that have generated severe humanitarian crises. Severely challenged by conflicts, the region, has laid on the table vague and dubious solutions, which have failed to quell hatred and enmity, leaving in any case, as an opportunity for radical solutions, armed violence.
Keywords: Balkans, politics, stability, integration, NATO
Introduction
Western Balkans countries are considered difficult cases for European integration, this is due to the violent conflicts in which they are involved, but also because of less developed political and economic systems. These countries continue to face challenges that have not been addressed so far, as ethnic tensions, border disputes, problems with immigration and refugees, organized crime and corruption. The investment of Western countries and international organizations has been large in the region, in order to expand the security zone between Europe and its Trans-Atlantic partners, on the other side, all countries of the Western Balkans region have expressed a desire to join European institutions and become part of the Euro-Atlantic community [ 1, p. 3].
NATO's own development, after the Cold War, has been influenced by developments in the Balkans, which remains a concern for the Alliance. After the Riga Summit 2006, Balkan countries have institutionalized relations with NATO in various ways, someone through membership, someone through PfP or the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Changes in the security of the region have caused problems, but the common goal of the countries of the region (Euro-Atlantic integration) has made their policies resonate with the Alliance. [2, 2007].
What is the policy that NATO has pursued in the Balkans?
By the end of the Cold War, NATO had emerged not only victorious but also more powerful. Theirs members are committed to promoting democracy, protecting freedom and human rights, and developing a market economy. However, the end of the Cold War could not mark the end of the wars in Europe, in the
south-east, have exploded conflicts and ethnic cleansing. Such a situation, in addition to producing instability, also undermined the democratic values for which the Alliance had fought so hard. Initially, its approach to the situation created was through the development of strategies and means of intervening in internal conflicts, and the first reactions were some verbal threats and limited attacks, to force the parties to the ethnic conflict to stop fighting and negotiate agreements. NATO could coordinate activities with a number of organizations and actors, as its officials could cooperate with the UN, the OSCE. Also, was the only organization that could exercise high diplomacy and military strength as its organizational structure enabled the simultaneous development of diplomacy and war. After all, only NATO had the organizational capacity to deploy and command peacekeeping forces to stabilize war-torn regions in the Balkans. After 1990, Alliance Members sought to involve NATO military structures in support of operations outside the area. (Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia) and to enable the participation of non-member countries in these operations [3, p.14-16]
Artificially created by Tito, with eight federal units, twenty-four ethnicities, and three major religions, the Yugoslav Federation, did not finally resolve ethno-national issues, but emerged as a fragile federal entity that disintegrated. [4, p.26] In the 1990 Yugoslav elections, Franjo Tudjman won in Croatia, Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, Milan Kucan in Slovenia, Alija Izetbegovic in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kiro Gligorov in Macedonia and Momir Bulatinovic in Montenegro. These election results removed the old Yugoslav federal structure which, however, was still active. Despite the great efforts of the Prime Minister of the Federation, Ante Markovic, to resolve economic issues, the federation could not be maintained, especially after June 25,
1991, when Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. Just two days later the JNA was stationed in Slovenia, marking the start of fighting. However, Slovenia was prepared for defense, due to the propaganda that was made against the JNA, so the fighting did not last long, thanks to the intervention of the internationals which was finalized with the Brioni Agreement of 7 July 1991, which ordered the cessation of hostilities. Despite the agreement, violence also broke out in Croatia, where hatred between Croats and Serbs escalated. The example of Slovenia and Croatia was followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina, declaring independence, but even there fighting began [5, p. 13-17].
Believing that the recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia would put an end to the violence on 31 March 1991, The EP had declared their right to "freely determine their future peacefully and democratically and on the basis of knowledge of international and domestic borders" [4, p.24]. The US and Russia announced that they would recognize the federal state, while the EU diplomats, during the second half of 1991 attempted about 14 ceasefire negotiations between Belgrade and Zagreb and Ljubljana, which lasted only a few days. In September 1991, was reached Yugoslav peace in the Hague, where the EU believed that the federation would be preserved through an agreement. The republics refused to keep the federation alive, and under these conditions the Yugoslav Peace Conference remained in oblivion. It did nothing but give Milosevic wings to continue the violence, in the name of defending the federation. On 15 June 1992, believing that this would help stop the fighting some EU countries recognized Croatia and Slovenia. The situation in Bosnia was different, although it had followed the example of Slovenia and Croatia, declaring itself a sovereign and democratic country. Izetbegovic's national unity government (which included Bosnia's ethnic minorities), which emerged from the November 1991 elections, found it difficult to function due to growing Croatian nationalism (Bosnian Croat nationalist groups have expressed desire for full annexation of Bosnia by Croatia) and Milosevic's claims to protect Bosnian Serbs. Incidents began to escalate Serbs (Karadzic) left the Bosnian Assembly on October 14,
1991, while Herzegovina Croats supported the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia. In December 1991, the Bosnian government sought EU recognition, which was rejected even after a referendum on 29 February 1992 confirmed the Bosniaks' desire for independence. In return, the EU proposed a cantonment plan dividing Bosnia into ten autonomous units. Bosniaks reject plan, Izetbegovic calls for UN peacekeepers' presence. The request was rejected and Serbs felt free to attack Bosnia to "protect" Serbs there. The fighting began, and, when it was too late, in April
1992, the EU, followed by the United States, formally recognized Bosnia. [6, p.83-86]
The three peace plans for Bosnia in 1993 (Vance-Owen, Owen-Stoltenberg and the EU Plan for the three Communities), for achieving peace in the country failed, due to deep divisions in transatlantic relations (especially Anglo-American ones over the settlement
of Bosnia [7, p.30]. In August 1993, when Serbs captured almost 70 percent of Bosnia and forced about one million Bosnian Muslims to flee their homes due to violence, NATO countries warned the parties to the conflict that they would take action in support of UN Security Council resolutions after declaring unacceptable the horrific humanitarian situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular in Sarajevo. Also threatened Bosnian Serbs and Croats that they would use air strikes if they attacked the Muslim population or obstructed humanitarian aid. The threat did not function, because in February 1994, Serbs attacked a market in Sarajevo causing victimes. In response, the Allies demanded that UNPROFOR take control of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons within a 20-kilometer perimeter of central Sarajevo, with the exception of an area two kilometers from the center of Pales. On February 21, the NATO mission was called over after Bosnian Serb forces surrendered their weapons. A similar situation occurred in Gordaze, however, Bosnian Serb forces resumed bombing of Sarajevo, forcing NATO Allies to attack Serb positions in Goradze on 11-13 April [3, p.44-45].
In 1995, the Clinton administration decided to engage in an effort to stop fighting in Bosnia through a peaceful solution, because the failure of the policy of that time, caused by inaction, not only was undermining the credibility of NATO and US foreign policy, but violence threatened to spread further into the region. In May 1995, Bosnian Serbs took several UN troops hostage and crossed the UN "safe zone" in Srebrenica. According to Red Cross data, between 7 and 12 July 1995, 7,079 Bosnian Muslims were killed. The killings in Srebrenica reinforced the idea of intervention within the US administration, with the belief that inaction undermined the US position in the world. On August 30, the Alliance launched Operation Intentional Force, with approximately 3,515 flights for two weeks by 293 aircraft of eight NATO countries which together with a combined Muslim-Croat attack in early August caused the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw. On October 5, 1995, President Clinton announced that a armistice would take effect in five days. [8, p.126-128].
By October 12, 1995, the combined Muslim-Croat offensive had reduced Serb-controlled territory from 70 percent to 50 percent. NATO airstrikes, which were an essential part of the US strategy to force the Serbs to negotiate, had a particularly important role in the offensive. [3, p.55].
On July 2, 1990, Kosovo was officially declared an independent and equal entity within the Yugoslav Federation, and on September 21, 1991, an independent and sovereign state. The referendum held from September 26-30 also confirmed the desire of Kosovars for independence, because of the 87 percent of eligible voters, 99.87 percent of them voted in favor [9, p.225]. From 1989 to 1995, Kosovo had a relatively calm climate. The situation worsened after 1995. Elections of 22 May 1992 in Kosovo led to the appointment of its President Ibrahim Rugova (with 74.4 percent) who aimed to achieve Kosovo's final independence by peaceful and diplomatic means, convinced that the other way about would provoke violence and ethnic cleansing by Serbs. In addition to the LDK, extremist
political and military groups emerged, such as the LPRK, which was for the use of force. The product of this division was also the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) [7, p.98-100]. In 1996, the KLA organized a campaign of bomb attacks against Serbian police stations, post offices, military barracks in some regions of Kosovo, such as Pristina, Suhareka, Mitrovica, Podu-jeva and elsewhere. On January 16, 1997, a bomb planted by her seriously injured the rector of the University of Prishtina, which was administered by Serbs. In early 1998, the KLA numbered about 500 active members, who carried out occasional attacks. Milosevic responded with a counterattack, engaging some 40,000 troops with various weapons, tanks, helicopters and heavy artillery [9, p. 226-267]. The current situation could not but include NATO, which launched several military maneuvers in the region, in preparation for a possible air or ground attack, as CIAS reports in January and February 1998 indicated that Milosevic was preparing for war. In early March, Serbs intensified attacks in Drenica, as a result of which Adem Jashari was killed, together with his family. In the first moment there was no strong reaction from the allies, but only verbal threats, as military intervention would require a consensus between the US and European allies. On the other hand, Serbia had rejected any kind of mediation on the Kosovo issue through a referendum organized by it [7, p.106].
In March 1998 the UN Contact Group (US, Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Russia) urges Yugoslav government to end attacks, sit down for talks with Kosovar politicians. In April, with the exception of Russia, it imposed economic sanctions on Belgrade. Despite this, Milosevic did not stop the violence [3, p.47]. NATO Ministers, meeting in Luxembourg on 28 May 1998, issued a Declaration recommending a number of measures:
- expand PfP assistance to assist Macedonian and Albanian national armed forces secure their borders;
- the development of a joint NATO-PfP exercise in Macedonia during September 1998;
- establishing a PfP partnership cell in Tirana and conducting a small PfP-led exercise during August;
- opening of a permanent NATO naval structure in the port of Durres;
- commitment to expand UN and OSCE oversight in the region.
However, the recommended measures could prevent the spread of the conflict in the short term, but could not permanently extinguish it [9, p.234].
At the NAC meeting in Brussels on 11 June 1998, the Alliance's defense ministers agreed on air training "Determined Falcon over Albanian and Macedonian airspace" which would include conducting an air exercise in Albania and Macedonia, to project rapid power in the region. In this training, which lasted nearly six hours, was attended by 13 Alliance countries, with about 85 aircraft. In the summer of 1998, Serbs intensified attacks against the KLA which led to a mass exodus of the population (about 100,000 civilians had fled their homes). On September 23, the UN Security Coun-
cil adopted Resolution 1199, which called on the parties to a lasting political compromise. The use of force by NATO was was predicted in three phases:
- the first phase was ACTWARN, the activation warning, approved by NATO defense ministers on 24 September 1998 in Vilamoura, Portugal;
- the second phase was ACTREQ, the activation request, approved by the NAC in early October 1998.
- the third phase, ACTORD, the activation order approved by the NAC on 12-13 October 1998, giving Milosevic 96 hours to agree with international negotiators, otherwise he would face military action [7, p.106-109].
Two days before the NATO ultimatum expired, on 25 October 1998, an agreement was reached with FRY officials on the number of troops and units to be determined and the conditions for their reinstatement. Although the Allies reported that the FRY complied with Resolution 1199, they continued to threaten to use force if violations of the Resolution were to be seen in the future. From what can be seen, the verbal threats of NATO did their job to calm down the situation after the humanitarian crisis eased in November, several agreements were also negotiated with the FRY, such as the establishment of the OSCE KVM, which also provided security for the Kosovar population to return to their homes. This calm did not last long, because Milosevic violated UN Security Council Resolution 1199 with his ethnic cleansing campaign, in the hope that depopulating Kosovo would quell the KLA armed uprising. It was clear that Milosevic's purge campaign had ignored NATO verbal warnings, however, the Allies organized the Rambouillet Peace Conference, to avoid war and to give diplomacy another chance. The organizers of the Rambouillet Conference (USA, France and Britain), drafted an Interim Agreement with four provisions that was presented to the parties:
1. a self-governing autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia;
2. withdrawal of all VJ and MUP forces towards Serbia;
3. the presence of a NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo to ensure security;
4. The duration of the agreement would be three years, until an international conference on Kosovo's final status is held [3, p.48-49].
The Rambouillet negotiations ended on 23 February 1999. The Albanian delegation signed the Interim Agreement, it was the Serbs who rejected him on the pretext that point four meant the creation of an independent Kosovo and the insistence on categorically not accepting foreign troops into the territory of the FRY. On March 24, NATO launched the first phase of Operation Allied Forces and on March 30, the air campaign. Milosevic's refusal to end his repressive policies and opposition to the presence of a peacekeeping force in Kosovo led to airstrikes on Serbia. A post-war OSCE investigation had estimated that during the period March-June 1999, about 863,000 ethnic Albanians were expelled by Serb forces from Kosovo, of whom about 440,000 remained in Albania and 248,000 in Macedonia and 589,000 internally displaced within
Kosovo. The 78-day NATO air campaign was conducted under the concept of humanitarian intervention, to stop exactly one humanitarian catastrophe [7, p. 114]. The first attacks were limited and did not target Belgrade or the country's electricity grid. The first phase of Operation Allied Force, which lasted until March 27, targeted Yugoslav air defenses. Second phase, security and support forces in Kosovo. While the third phase, would include political leadership, economic infrastructure, highway networks, as well as roads and bridges. In May, Operation's status changed from limited to intensified to exert strong military pressure on Yugoslavia. The strategy succeeded after Milosevic decided to step down in June, signing the June 9th Military-Technical Agreement which set out to put Kosovo under NATO control [3, p. 59].
NATO policy in the Balkans, after the 1990s, is related to the inclusion within the Alliance of the countries of this region that had remained outside it (Greece and Turkey had joined the Alliance since 1952). Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2004, Croatia and Albania in 2009. By this time, Macedonia had remained outside the Alliance, which officially did not accept the invitation to join the Alliance, due to problems with Greece, although it joined the Membership Action Plan in 1999. Data from a 2010 survey showed that 80.02% of Macedonians were in favor of NATO membership, while an accompanying survey estimated that 65% of Macedonians opposed name change in exchange for NATO membership [7, p. 240-243]. Macedonia fulfilled its dream in March 2020, after mortgaging its name. Montenegro became an independent state in 2006. In December of the same year it joined the Partnership for Peace Program and after three years (2009) the Membership Action Plan, although the support of Montenegrins was low. According to an October 2010 study by the Center for Democracy and Human Rights, about 32.6% of Montenegrins supported NATO membership, 39.7% opposed it, while 27.6% had no opinion. Serbia, although not expressing any interest in NATO membership, joined the PfP in 2006 and in 2010 opened its mission in Brussels with a promise to send its military representative in due course. Most Serbs did not support membership due to the NATO bombing in 1999, while centrist politicians wanted membership. The case of Bosnia is problematic, due to the lack of political dialogue between the leaders of the two entities, 63% of Bosnian Serb population opposes membership, while 93% of Muslim-Croat population are in favor of membership [7, p. 240-243 Idem]
From the IDM Survey in cooperation with its regional partners in the Western Balkans, Center for Security Studies (Sarajevo), Analytica (Skopje), Kosovo Center for Security Studies (Pristina), CEDEM (Podgorica), Croatian Atlantic Council ( Zagreb), as well as the Atlantic Council of Serbia (Belgrade) which was organized in the period January - February 2010, in seven countries it turned out that: 66.09 percent of representatives of the elites of the Western Balkan countries perceived NATO as an important institution that guarantees security in the Euro-Atlantic area, while 7.3 percent of respondents saw NATO as a mechanism to fight terrorism. Also, 66.09 percent of respondents
chose NATO as the organization that guarantees more regional security and stability in the Western Balkans, compared to the EU, OSCE and UN [10].
According by Ronald D. Asmus "NATO enlargement would never have happened in the absence of the US and its comprehensive and ultimately successful effort to stop fighting in Bosnia''. It was precisely the involvement in the Western Balkans that allowed NATO to "exit the area" [8, pg 25].
However, NATO has been actively engaged in Bosnia in a variety of areas, which include defense and security sector reform, security cooperation and civil emergency planning, as well as in science and environment, etc. But the core of NATO's engagement in Bosnia is defense and security sector reform, in which it has also held a leading role in the Defense Reform Commission since 2005. One of the Alliance's mechanisms to assist in the development of the Bosnian Professional Armed Forces for interaction with NATO units has been SFOR, created to build a unified structure of command and control aimed at reducing ethnopolitics and strengthening the concept of shared statehood. Other collaborations have been in the field of security (contribution of Bosnian officers to ISAF, Afghanistan since 2009), Bosnia has signed and ratified the PfP Force Status Agreement (SOFA) with NATO or the conditional agreement of April 2010, to continue with the NATO Membership Action Plan [11, pg 25].
Conclusions
In the volatile conflicts in the Balkans, NATO pursued a coercive policy. It was able to restore stability only after the Allies used military force and threatened the domestic political base of the stronger parties that blocked an agreement. The resolution of the conflict abroad depended on the preferences of the parties to the internal dispute and on the nature of the threats posed by NATO countries [3, pg 4]. NATO exerted diplomatic and military pressure to extinguish the conflict over the Balkans which now presents a stable situation achieved with great effort and difficulty.
NATO's specific objective in the Balkans is to establish lasting peace and pave the way for Euro-Atlantic integration, while in the shorter term, the improvement of crises and, if possible, their prevention. An essential mechanism that helps create internal stability and a successful transition in the region is the promotion of defense reform, together with the monitoring of defense budgets in each country, through a range of other activities and programs, including PfP. The success of NATO-led missions is guaranteed by their impartiality, non-bias or favoritism, full compliance with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law, as well as from perspectives from interested nations in international organizations, cooperation and close coordination of which is a key priority, including the UN, OSCE and EU. In line with its goals and objectives, NATO relies on short-term tools, which include immediate crisis prevention or management activities, and long-term tools, which include engagement through the EAPC / PfP, MPA process, SEEI, and support through the Stability Pact, including SEECAP [12, 2003].
CSIS report, while acknowledging the contribution of the EU's political and economic engagement in the region as well as the US in building a sustainable future in the Western Balkans, claims that transatlantic policy has not been able to overcome growing regional challenges, even in the future these policies risk remaining in place if they do not advance European integration. The issue of enlargement in the Western Balkans has remained in place, raising suspicions among politicians in the region about the sincerity of the EU's commitment to the accession process, for this reason the report suggests that the EU and the US should make new long-term plans for the region for EU accession, which should include strong incentives for Balkan political leaders to implement key reforms and regional co-operation. The report sees the renewal and regeneration of transatlantic policy towards the Western Balkans as necessary to steer the region towards a sustainable future in the transatlantic community [11, pg v-vi].
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