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PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASSUS AND CENTRAL ASIA
NATALIA ROMANCHENKO. STRUCTURE AND MODERN DEVELOPMENT TRENDS OF TERRORIST RELIGIOUS-POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS IN POST-SOVIET PERIOD // The article was specially written for the bulletin Russia and the Moslem World.
Keywords: Islamism, extremism, radicalization, terrorist organizations.
Natalia Romanchenko,
PhD (Political sciences),
expert of Center of regional investigations,
Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, Russia
Examining the radicalization process of the activity of terrorist religious-political organizations in the North Caucasus, one can single out three periods: imperial, Soviet and post-Soviet.
During the imperial period in the course of the Caucasian war of the 19th century Islam in Russia had a political tint: numerous armed units gathered under the banners of imams to wage a struggle against the czarist army with a view to forming and upholding the Islamic state - Imamat. After the termination of the war the opened armed confrontation of the mountainous people took a hidden form of fight against the local authorities with the use of terrorist methods in order to influence Russian authorities. It became a prototype of the modern gang underground.
The Soviet period was marked by the tendency of creating official Islamic organizations whose activity was under the influence of Germany, Britain and Turkey and oriented to the setting up of state-controlled bodies in the North Caucasus. This activity acquired a radical politicized character. These organizations waged a hidden struggle against Soviet power. In the situation of prolonged contradictions in the traditional Islamic ummah, the Muslim countries of the Middle East were engaged in distribution of the ideas of "pure Islam", or "Wahhabism" in the North Caucasus calling for fight against the "infidels" with a view to building an Islamic emirate on the territory of Chechnya and Daghestan.1
In the beginning of the post-Soviet period the Islamic factor in the North Caucasian region comes out as an ideological and organizational camouflage for realization of practical interests of all and sundry separatists, nationalists, mafia groupings and clans, and dyed-in-the wool criminals gathered together under the banners of radical fundamentalism with financial and ideological assistance of the international terrorist movement. It should be noted that Islamist extremism and terrorism in the North Caucasus acquired ethnic-national features based on archaic forms of social behavior of mountainous people during the imperial period, including vendetta. These factors have strengthened the positions of Islamism, using its customs and habits to justify its political practices and mobilize believers to jihad against the "infidels" in order to reach their basic ultimate aim - the proclamation of independent Ichkeria and its secession from the Russian Federation. This aim determined the emergence of nationalist-radical movements engaged in the struggle against the Federal Center in the form of sporadic terrorist acts perpetrated by small groups (explosions of buildings, mass seizures of hostages, etc.), which provoked armed actions of the federal forces with a view to establishing the "constitutional order" in the course of the 1st Chechen war. The beginning of armed actions gave an impetus to the radicalization of the activity of the Chechen separatists, who were helped by foreign "mujahids".
After the defeat of the Chechen militants during the first months of the 2nd Chechen war, the priorities of the Islamic extremists and their ideological foundations have changed. In order to draw additional forces and supporters they changed their former ethnic separatist plan of severance of part of the "self-determinant" territory from Russia into a new religious idea, namely, the creation of an independent Islamic state based on the Sharia law in the Caucasus. This idea removed ethnic differences between Caucasian peoples, inasmuch as in the sacred war there are neither Chechens, nor Avars, nor Karachais, nor Ingush, but only the warriors of Allah, which considerably enhances the strength of radical Islamists. Along with this, the Islamist idea of resistance made it possible to draw the attention and sympathies of the fighters for Muslim religion the world over with their vast financial opportunities. Thus, the change of the ideological foundation of extremists has led to the spreading of the radical Salafite movement in other republics of the North Caucasus and transformation of groups of "resistance" into mobile terrorist groupings, using guerilla methods and means and forming a vast uniform underground network.
During the post-Soviet period of the development of terrorist religious-political organizations in the North Caucasus was characterized by the formation of a terrorist gang underground as a classical social organization with a firm hierarchy and linear forms of interconnection at various levels, which increase their effectiveness and secrecy. This is why the modern polycentric North Caucasian extremist system is well prepared to meet "challenges from the outside", and despite its limited systemic potential it retains its considerable destructive possibilities.2
During the post-Soviet period the development of terrorist religious-political organizations in the North Caucasus was characterized by the formation of terrorist bandit underground, effective enough and well hidden.
Examining the modern North Caucasian terrorist underground as a network organization it is necessary to note that its main structural unit is "jamaat" (terrorist organization or
gang). We should emphasize that these extremist "jamaats" have nothing in common with the traditional social structures of North Caucasian societies which are also known as "jamaats".
During the post-Soviet period terrorist jamaats changed their tactic and strategy and switched over from frontal battles to subversive and terrorist acts called "beehive" tactic. They are now able to change places, manoeuver, and if need be, join similar groups. Stable communications have been established between these bands. At present the structure of the terrorist movement, which has developed in various parts of the world, is based on the network principle ("spider's web" principle). In other words, after the termination of the war in Chechnya the militants' activity has not died down. It has spread to other parts of the North Caucasus and taken the form of terrorist acts.3
The organizational structure of separatist communities -jamaats - does not coincide with the structure of the traditional Muslim communities of the region also named "jamaats". Traditional jamaats include the population of just one rural settlement or definite sections of a town grouped around mosques. In other words, traditional jamaats in the North Caucasus are organized on a territorial basis. Separatist jamaats are ex-territorial and scattered around. One such jamaat may include a multitude of small groups united in one or several networks. The jamaats' structures consist of virtually autonomous groups each one with a very small number of members, who quite often do not know one another. Such network is difficult to break inasmuch as finding one cell does not lead to discovering others. This makes it difficult to manage the system and direct its work, but it is also difficult to trace and catch it.4
Thus, the extremist "jamaats" can be regarded as a network structure, which includes groups of people connected with one another in common activities. The jamaats with many connections are called "hubs" and serve as important components of the terrorist network.
The "Wahhabi jamaats" are small gangs or groups scattered across a definite territory. The head of such cell is amir (as a rule, a local resident) with one instructor - liaison person (as a rule, he is from among foreign mercenaries), and a group of militants under their command. They are in charge of arms and technical equipment, take care of food and medicines supplies, etc., as well as do reconnaissance and recruitment work. A greater part of jamaat members is militants who come back where they live. But on order from the amir they are bound to join him there and then and fulfill his orders.
The composition of Islamist "jamaats" is diverse. Their main contingent is Muslim young men of the region, and this is why they are often named "youth jamaats". As a rule, there are mainly representatives of North Caucasian peoples, but sometimes one can meet there men from other countries -Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Middle East countries.
In the first decade of this century most "jamaats" of this type were in Daghestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia. A fewer number of them was in Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachayevo-Circassia, but their number was on an increase all the time.
Here is some information of the distribution of jamaats by regions:
Daghestan: jamaat "Sharia" and jamaat "Jennet";
Kabardino-Balkaria: jammat "Yarmuk", jamaat "Kabardino-Balkarsky";
Ingushetia: jamaat "Khalifat", jamaat "Taliban";
Karachayevo-Circassia: jamaat KChR;
Northern Ossetia: jammat "Kataib-al-Houl".
These jamaats and others, smaller terrorist and radical Islamist groups were engaged in individual activities in the early 2000s. In May 2005, the leadership of the unrecognized "Republic of Ichkeria" undertook measures to unite the scattered "jamaats". The new "president" of the self-proclaimed "Republic of Ichkeria" Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev, who came to replace the neutralized Aslan Maskhadov, issued an order on the formation
of the Caucasian Front of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria - the association of the Islamist militant terrorist groups in the North Caucasus outside the boundaries of Chechen territory, which included the following autonomous regional sectors:
Daghestani sector (Jamaat Sharia, Derbent Jamaat);
Ingush sector (Jamaat Galgaiche);
Ossetian sector (Jamaat "Kataib al-Houl");
Kabardino-Balkarian sector (Kabardino-Balkarsky Jamaat);
Stavropol sector (Nogai battalion);
Karachayevo-Circassian sector (Karachayevo Jamaat);
Adygeye sector;
Krasnodar sector.
After the 2nd Chechen war the separatists have formed, for propaganda purposes, special battalions organized on the ethnic principle. At the end of the 1990s - beginning of the 2000s, the Nogai, Karachai and other "ethnic" battalions came into being. They were theoretical rather than real military units. Raids, terrorist acts and similar operations ascribed to one or another battalion were committed by members of separatist "jamaats" of a corresponding ethnic group.
After the neutralization of Saidulayev on October 7, 2007, the "Imarat Kavkaz" was proclaimed leader of the separatist movement in the North Caucasus as the only body uniting various organizations. It was sort of the upper chamber of parliament, which had advisory functions. Besides, within its competence was the election of the new amir in the event of the death of the present one.
The ruling regime of "Imarat Kavkaz" may be termed authoritarian. All its bodies had only consultative functions. Anzor Astemiroiv, the supreme judge and one of its former leaders, who had been killed, once said that there was no division in the leadership of the supreme body. Religious, political and military functions were concentrated in the hands of the amir.
The structure of each jamaat had a network character. This showed that terrorist underground existed and acted on almost the entire territory of the North Caucasus of the Russian Federation.5 This was declared by Doku Umarov, the new president of unrecognized Ichkeria. He proclaimed himself the supreme ruler - "amir of the mujahids of the Caucasus", "leader of jihad", as well as "the only legitimate authority on all territories of mujahids", that is, the territory from Tatarstan to Buryatia in East Siberia.6
The situation changed very rapidly, and within five years "Imarat Kavkaz" turned into the center of most extremist and terrorist groupings scattered over a vast territory. In actual fact, it was not only the political and ideological mouthpiece, but also the guiding body of the terrorist underground in the entire North Caucasus.
Territorially, "Imarat Kavlaz" looked like a federative quasi-state. Initially, the territory it ruled was divided into six parts: Daghestan, Nokhchiicho (Chechnya), Galgaiche (Ingushetia), Circassia, Iriston (Northern Ossetia), Nogai steppe (Stavropol territory), as well as Balkaria and Karachayevo districts. In May 2009 Doka Umarov ordered that Iriston be included in Galgaiche.
Each part was headed by the amir who had almost absolute power on its territory. He was selected from among the amirs of local jamaats, who were also commanders of mobile armed units. These amirs, just as the supreme amir, had a consultative body (majlis) under them made of the most authoritative representatives of the community. Among other duties, the majlis had the function of distribution of the common fund which was formed by dues and donations of community members.7
Each jamaat consists of about 10 to 20 men who take direct part in jihad. And the rear and sympathizers whose number is difficult to ascertain can number several hundred, or even thousand. They include those who supply the underground with
information, helps with food products, means of transportation, rented housing, etc.
"Imarat Kavkaz" and its amir had structures resembling ministerial departments. Among them - "ministry of defense", "KGB", "ministry of public relations", etc. In the spring of 2009 Doku Umarov convened a special representative body -"Majlisul Shura". It included heads of parts and jamaats (local militant and extremist religious units. (see Drawing 1).
IMARAT KAVKAZ
Daghestan Nokhchiicho Galgaiche Kabardino- Cherkessia Nogai
Balkaria
and
Karachai
Republic of Chechen Ingushetia: Kabardino- Karachayevo- Nogai
Daghestan: Republic: Jamaat Balkarian Circassia Savropol
Jamaat Numerous Caliphate Republic: Karachayevs territory
Sharia scattered Northern Jamaat ky jamaat Nogai
(Dzhennet) jamaats Ossetia: Yarmuk (Muslim jamaat
Derbentsky Kutaib-al- society (Nogai
jamaat Houl Kabardino- No 3) subversive
(Forest (Powerful Balkarian battalion)
Brothers, or battalion, or jamaat
Southern Ossetain
groupmg) battalion
Drawing 1. Structure of "Imarat Kavkaz"
All experts agree that "Imarat Kavkaz" was part of the international terrorist movement, its activity was coordinated by the extremist Islamist structures of the Middle East and expressed the ideas of al-Qaeda".8 Thus, the international Islamist movement using the terrorist methods to fight the "infidels" created the North Caucasian terrorist hub within the framework of global Salafite jihad. Despite its being distant territorially, it was well connected with all big international clusters of terrorist movement.
Assessing the development of the terrorist movement in the North Caucasian region of Russia one can definitely notice certain changes in it during the 2007-2013 period.
First, the inner structure of the gang underground changed. Instead of the former independent groups and units headed by ambitious commanders a flexible network structure emerged, which was more convenient for operations and survival.
Secondly, new sources of replenishment of the ranks of radical Salafites have come into being. Along with the real supporters of Islamic fundamentalist ideas whose aim is to improve and educate society by strict religious education and the introduction of the Sharia law in everyday life, as well as marginal and criminal elements who have joined them, we can note the emergence of quite a few non-Muslims newly converted in Islam. Experience shows that they are sometimes more ardent adepts of radical Islam than Muslims by birth. For example, Said Buryatsky (prior to turning into Islam he was A. Tikhomirov -neutralized in 2009) was the new ideologist of the gang underground, and one of his major tasks was to draw more Russian-speaking young men in extremist activity.
Thirdly, more frequent cases of the wider use of shahids for perpetrating terrorist attacks have been registered in the region. Beginning from the 2nd Chechen war (in 1999) and up to now they have been an almost ordinary phenomenon. In the history of the North Caucasian peoples there have been very few cases of purposeful and conscious suicide. The phenomenon of suicide is alien to the way of life and spiritual and cultural perception of the North Caucasian peoples. However, the forces of radical Islamism have turned it into a political phenomenon and it is inculcated in certain people on the territory of the North Caucasian republics.9
Fourthly, the sources of financing have changed, too: in the 1990s radicals received financial help from the degrading Russian army, whereas in the past decade they have been helped by their brethren from all parts of the world, and also due to a vast
support of the local population. The financial basis of the activity of the gang underground is mainly formed by voluntary donations from Muslim countries. As is known, all Muslims must donate 2.5 percent of their incomes to charity. This is the income tax imposed by the Sharia law, which is used by the Muslim communities, is given over to charity funds and distributed among the poor and needy.10 As a result of thorough investigations of major terrorist acts in various countries (including the tragic events of September 11, 2001 in the U.S.A.), it became clear that the terrorist organizations which committed them, had been financed from the funds of legal Islamic religious-political and charity organizations of various kind which received voluntary donations from rank-and-file Muslims. 11
After September 11, 2001, control over financing terrorist organizations has become stricter, but in any case, one channel remains open and it is impossible to close it so ar. It is the so-called khawala, an informal way of transferring money based on business and family relations.12
Opportunities have also changed. Previously, underground commanders propagated their ideas exclusively by personal example, whereas at present the militants are actively using digital technologies. This enables them to get in touch with broad masses of people and effectively draw supporters and followers to their ranks. Modern international terrorist organizations are equipped with the most up-to-date technical means and use international and national information and telecommunication networks and systems for spreading the ideas of radical Islam and terror.
In this connection a new form of management has emerged on the part of international terrorist organizations to supervise the activities of the North Caucasian terrorist "jaamats" through network communications, the Internet and other technical means. At present there are several hundred extremist information portals in the global network. In 1998 about half of thirty organizations, which the United States considered terrorist, had
electronic pages, whereas at present absolutely all radically-minded groups are represented in the global network. And they translate their material into more than forty languages.
After the neutralization of Doku Umarov, the leader of "Imarat Kavkaz" in 2013, most network structures - members of that organization sworn to "al-Qaeda" of Osama bin Laden became subordinated to the new terrorist giant - the: Islamic state". Many Russian Islamists have gone to Syria to join the war against the government forces of that republic loyal to President B. Asad. According to official data, several thousand Islamists from the post-Soviet area have gone to Syria. The groupings left in Russia are weak and less numerous now, but they are still dangerous because they destabilize the situation in various localities, mainly in the North-East Caucasus.
At present the radical Islamist movement in the North Caucasus is in a state of degradation. It is criminalized, decentralized, weaker and more autonomous. Now small groups of militants try to deal rapid pinpoint blows at people and objects after which they go underground and finally disintegrate.13 "Sleeping" terrorist groups have emerged recently which operate against U.S. and EU citizens.
Thus, the modern radical Islamist organizations in the North Caucasus have changed. Today, their participation in the terrorist movement has shifted to support of international terrorist organizations operating in North Africa and the Middle East.
At the same time religious views characteristic of the Arab world become popular among a considerable part of the North Caucasian population, which is due to the active work of preachers from Saudi Arabia and representatives of the Turkish Islamic foundations, as well as members of international terrorist organizations in the Afghan-Pakistani zone. As a result of the influence of alien Islamist ideology the foundations of traditional Muslim religion are undermined and conditions are created for the politicization of the religious factor and, consequently, for possible manifestations of extremism. This process resulted in
that many representatives of the North Caucasian ummah of traditional Islam and also representatives of other confessions display greater interest in the situation in Syria and join the hostilities on the side of the Islamic state. According to the published data, the number of militants from Russia on the side of radical Islamists in Syria reaches five thousand.14
After the beginning of the anti-terrorist operation by the Russian armed forces in Syria on September 30, 2015, and the worsening positions of the Islamic state, militants of Russian origin began to return to Russia, primarily, to North Caucasian republics. Their coming back home may seriously aggravate the situation in the North Caucasus. These people are now bearers of hostile ideology preaching the creation of a world caliphate on the basis of the Sharia law by forcible means. They have been well trained on Syrian battlefields and can now begin activities to draw new supporters and followers to well-hidden terrorist organizations. They replenish the ranks of the "sleeping" jamaats oriented to supporting the activity of international terrorist organizations operating in the Middle East and also ready to deal pinpoint terrorist blows at various objects on the territory of the North Caucasus and entire Russia.
At the same time it should be emphasized that the weaker activity of the North Caucasian extremist groups was largely due to a whole range of the anti-terrorist measures of the Russian special services, including the liquidation of the leaders of "Imarat Kavkaz", including its founder Doku Umarov.
According to official statistics, in 2016 alone the Russian special services and law-enforcement agencies prevented 42 terrorist acts all over the country, including in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg and Nizhni Novgorod. Large quantities of arms and explosives were captured and many channels of their supply to Russia closed. Last year 129 militants were killed, including 22 gang leaders in Russia. Nearly 900 bandits and their helpers were arrested. Several leaders of the supporters of the Islamic state in the North Caucasus were killed.
The leadership of the terrorist groupings acting on the territory of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic was liquidated.
The number of the discovered extremist Internet-resources has grown to 26,000. This is twice as many as in the previous year. Apart from that, it was possible to stem the Internetpropaganda of several terrorist organizations and groups. In August 2016, cells of the international Internet-community spreading radical ideas and recruiting militants for international terrorist organizations and collecting money for the Islamic state were abolished.
The special services have frozen financial accounts of over 2,000 persons suspected of helping terrorists and prevented the departure from Russia of people going abroad to join international terrorist organizations. The activity of people recruiting Russian citizens to terrorist groups in Russia was stopped.15
Comparing this situation with the previous one, a conclusion can be drawn that the religious-extremist underground of the North Caucasus has seriously suffered due to the growing activity of the special services and law-enforcement agencies. But it is too early to assert that terrorists and terrorism have been done away with on Russian territory. It should be noted that the traditional methods of anti-terrorist struggle can hardly solve the problem radically. Neither the liquidation of the widely-known terrorist leaders (Dudayev, Maskhadov, Basayev, Umarov, and others), nor the abolition of "jamaats", nor antiextremist propaganda will be able to stop terrorism. The gang underground in the North Caucasus is organized in such a way that the killed amirs are immediately replaced by new ones, and the ideas of religious extremism and national separatism are still very popular, and the destroyed "jamaats" are constantly replenished.16
Moreover, the financial assistance from international terrorist organizations, like "al-Qaeda", which was stopped, is
compensated by the system of racket widely practiced by the militants.17
With due account of spreading radical Islamist ideology in the entire North Caucasus and forming prerequisites for the creation of radical Salafite groupings in the Crimea, Volga area, the Urals and West Siberia, 18 as well as in the Muslim enclaves of Russian metropolitan cities, the recruitment of Russian citizens and their departure for the zones of military hostilities, and subsequent coming back home present a real threat to the national security of the Russian Federation and require the adoption of a whole range of counter-measures.
It seems to us that it is necessary to adopt urgent measures at the Federal level in information and propaganda activity, particularly to distribute in the mass media patriotic material prepared by highly-qualified experts and journalists.
With due account of the strong propaganda campaign waged by the leaders and supporters of the Islamic state it seems expedient to work out and implement a range of counter-propagandist measures, including those with the use of theologically substantiated theses about the anti-religious character of the activity of the Islamic state, and the utopian nature of building "Caliphate" in the modern world.
Parallel with this it is necessary, in our view, to stiffen the legislation of the Russian Federation with regard to the responsibility of the Internet-providers for violation of rules and regulations in the sphere of opposition to distributing the ideology of terrorism in the Internet.
Local authorities should step up work aimed at formulation of a platform to develop ethnicity as the key component of all-Russian identity. In evolving ethnic-confessional policy it is necessary to proceed from expediency of supporting spiritual leaders from among the indigenous population oriented to moderate Islam and traditional ethnic culture. It is also necessary to carry on a policy for raising the prestige and quality of
education at Russian theological institutions with a view to restricting the influence of foreign preachers.
The state security bodies, along with preventing recruitment of Russian citizens in the armed conflict zones in Arab countries, should step up control over those who have left international terrorist organizations and returned to their permanent place of residence and, if necessary, start criminal action against them. It is also important to reveal and stem money transfers from the accounts of those taking part in the conflict in Syria to their relations on Russian territory.
Thus, a successful opposition of the country to terrorist threats is only possible on condition of combining efforts, including of all institutions of the state, informational opposition, and support and assistance from the government, influential religious and public figures, and the entire civil society.
References
1 See: I. Dobayev. Radikalizatsiya Islama v sovremennoi Rossii [Radicalization of Islam in Modern Russia]. Moscow - Rostov-on-Don. Sotsialno-gumanitarniye znaniya. 2014. Pp. 60-84.
2 S. Sushchy. Terroristicheskoye podpolye na vostoke Severnogo Kavkaza (Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetiya) [Terrorist Underground in the East of the Caucasus (Chechnya, Daghestan, Ingushetia]. Rostov-on-Don // YUNTs RAS. Pp. 8-16.
3 I. Dobayev. Sovremenny terrorism: regionalnoye izmereniye [Modern Terrorism: Regional Parameters]. Rostov-on-Don. SKNTs VSh UFU Publishers. 2009. P. 114.
4 See: I. Dobayev. Noveishiye tendentsii v razvitii islamskogo dvizheniya na Severnom Kavkaze [The Latest Development Trends of Islamic Movement in the North Caucasus] // Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya. Moscow, 2008, № 1(53). Pp. 31-38.
5 The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation satisfied the demand of the Prosecutor of Moscow of February 8, 2010, and banned the activity of the international organization "Imarat Kavkaz". The Court qualified its activity as terrorist (Rossiiskaya gazeta № 4130. 2006, July 28).
6 Novaya gazeta. 2-10. March 3.
7 I. Dobayev, A. Dobayev. "Novy terrorizm": globalizatsiya i sotsialno-ekonomicheskoye rassloyeniye ["New Terrorism": Globalization and Socioeconomic Stratification] // Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya. Moscow. 2009. № 5. Pp. 114-120.
See: Religious Factor and Security Problems of the South of Russia. Collectively written monograph. Rostov-on-Don. YUNTs RAN Publishers. P. 81.
V. Akayev. Islam: sotsiokulturnaya realnost na Severnom Kavkaze [Islam: Socio-cultural Reality in the North Caucasus] - Grozny. 2004. Pp. 221-231. I. Komissina. Musulmanskiye organizatsii Vostochnoi, Yugo-vostocnoi i Yuznoi Azii [Muslim Organizations of East, Southeast and South Asia]. Moscow. RISI Publishers. 2009. Pp. 9-13, 223-225.
See: I. Dobayev, A. Dobayev, V. Nemchina. Geopolitika I terrorizm epokhi postmoderna [Geopolitics, and Terrorism of the Post-modern Epoch]. Rostov-on Don. YUFU Publishers. 2015. Pp. 177-224.
A. Dobayev. Khavala: neofitsialnaya sistema finansirovaniya terrorizma [Khavala: Unofficial System of Financing Terrorism]. Rostov-on-Don. SKNTs VSh YUFU Publishers. 2010. 228 pp.
I. Dobayev, N. Romanchenko. Radikalniye islamistskiye nepravitelstvenniye religiozno-politicheskiye organizatsii v sovremennom mire [Radical Islamist Nongovernmental Religious-political Organizations in the Modern World]. Moscow - Rostov-on-Don. Sotsialno-kulturniye znaniya. 2017. 141 pp. Putin: Special services of the Russian Federation suffer losses when terrorists are returning from Syria. 03.12.2015. http://news.rambler.ru/politics/ 321253717/
https: // eadaily. com/ru/news / 2016/12/13/za-2016-god-rossii-preditvratili-42-terakta.
N. Romanchenko. Institutsionalizatsiya sovremennykh radikalnykh nepravitelstvennykh religiosno-politicheskikh organizatsii na Severnom Kavkaze [Institutionalization of Modern Radical Non-governmental Religious-political Organizations in the North Caucasus] - Rostov-on-Don. 2011. P. 97. I. Dobayev A. Dobayev. Osobennosti finansirovaniya terroristicheskikh struktur na Severnom Kavkaze [Specific Features of Financing Terrorist Organizations in the North Caucasus] // Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya. 2013. № 4. Pp. 79-86. N. Romanchenko. Op. cit., p. 97.
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