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Научная статья
МЮНХЕНСКАЯ КОНФЕРЕНЦИЯ И ПРОБЛЕМЫ ОККУПАЦИИ
ЧЕХОСЛОВАКИИ
Капышев А.К., Камашев Б. А. Кокшетауский университет имени Абая Мырзахметова (г. Кокшетау, Республика Казахстан)
Аннотация. В этой статье рассматривается Мюнхенская конференция во время Второй мировой войны и проблемы Чехословакии. Мюнхенская конференция (также известная как Мюнхенское соглашение) предусматривает международную встречу между лидерами Великобритании, Франции, Германии и Италии Невиллом Чемберленом, Эдуардом Даладье, Адольфом Гитлером и Бенито Муссолини с 29 по 30 сентября 1938 года. На конференции обсуждались требования немцев к Судетскому региону Чехословакии, где в основном проживают немецкоязычные люди, известные как «Судетендойче». Конференция завершилась соглашением, которое привело к аннексии Германии обширных территорий Чехословакии с одобрения демократических держав, верных политике умиротворения, которые считали, что они достигли компромисса за долгий мир, удовлетворяя экспансионистские цели Гитлера. Хотя Франция, Великобритания и Чехословакия были союзниками, ни один представитель Чехословакии не участвовал в переговорах, и в Праге договор был объявлен «Мюнхенской диктатурой» [1, 17 б.].
Ключевые слова: соглашение, Вторая мировая война, Судетская область, Мюнхенская конференция, переговоры
Для цитирования: Капышев, А.К. Мюнхенская конференция и проблемы оккупации Чехословакии / А.К. Капышев, Б.А. Камашев // Наука и реальность. -2022. - № 4 (12). - С. 40-45.
MUNICH CONFERENCE AND PROBLEMS OF OCCUPATION OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Kapyshev A.K., Kamashev B. A. Kokshetau University named after Abai Myrzakhmetov (Kokshetau, Republic of Kazakhstan)
Abstract: This article discusses the Munich Conference during World War II and the problems of Czechoslovakia. The Munich Conference (also known as the Munich Agreement) provides for an international meeting between the leaders of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy Neville Chamberlain, Edouard Daladier, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini from 29 to 30 September 1938. The conference discussed German demands for the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia, where German-speaking people, known as «Sudetendeutsche». The conference ended with an agreement that led to Germany's annexation of vast territories of Czechoslovakia with the approval of democratic powers loyal to the policy of appeasement, who believed that they had reached a compromise for a long peace, satisfying Hitler's expansionist goals. Although France, Great Britain and Czechoslovakia were allies, not a single representative of Czechoslovakia participated in the negotiations, and in Prague the treaty was declared the «Munich Dictatorship» [1, 17 6.].
Keywords: agreement, World War II, Sudetenland, Munich Conference, negotiations.
For quoting: Kapyshev, A.K. The essence of the concept of problem-based learning / A.K. Kapyshev, B. A. Kamashev // Science & Reality. - 2022. - № 4 (12). - P. 4045.
In November 1937, a secret meeting of the political and military leadership of the Third Reich was held in Berlin, at which Hitler confirmed his intention to achieve the goals facing Germany by force. The Fuhrer planned to start a major war in Europe with an attack on France, the defeat of which would ensure the creation of strategic and economic prerequisites for a successful struggle against the USSR. At the same time, in order to exclude a flank threat during an offensive in the West, Germany needed to first improve its military and political situation by completely eliminating states such as Austria and especially Czechoslovakia, which had an alliance and friendship treaty with the French Republic concluded in January 1924. Thus, it was the territorial seizures in the center of Europe that were the necessary condition that allowed Germany to enter into a decisive battle first with France, and then with the Soviet Union. Therefore, it is no coincidence that in 1938 the first victim of German aggression was independent Austria, after which the Hitlerite leadership took up the solution of the «Czechoslovak problem» [1, 85].
In a situation when the actions of Nazi Germany in the international arena threatened peace and security in Europe, Czechoslovakia was a serious obstacle to the implementation of Hitler's aggressive plans. While Czechoslovakia, an ally of France since 1924, existed, it was very difficult for the leadership of the Third Reich to decide on a war against the French Republic, because the Czechoslovak army was well armed, relied on powerful fortifications in the Sudetenland and in the event of a Franco-German war could pull off a significant part of the Wehrmacht troops. On the other hand, the German attack on Czechoslovakia was fraught with the entry into the German-Czechoslovak war, first of France, and then of the Soviet Union, which in May 1935 concluded a
mutual assistance agreement with Czechoslovakia and was ready to cooperate with France in defending the independence of the Czechoslovak Republic.
In other words, the war of the Third Reich against the states of the anti-fascist coalition promised him nothing but a hopeless struggle on several fronts simultaneously. Therefore, there is no doubt that the countries that were threatened by German expansion could jointly curb the aggressor, erect insurmountable obstacles in his way and thereby make it extremely difficult to unleash a new world war. It was from this that Soviet diplomacy proceeded, proposing to create a collective security system in Europe capable of effectively countering German aggressive aspirations.
Even after the Anschluss of Austria, Moscow believed that it was not too late to join forces in order to organize a rebuff to Nazi Germany and prevent the seizure of Czechoslovakia by the Wehrmacht troops. However, in 1938, interstate cooperation, which would have made further German aggression impossible, did not work out, which was only to the advantage of Hitler and his associates.
Czechoslovakia, in the event of an attack by Germany, was vitally interested in the assistance of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the fulfillment of the USSR's obligations to provide military assistance to the Czechoslovak Republic was objectively hampered by the lack of common borders. And if Poland, which was hostile to Czechoslovakia, was categorically against the passage of Red Army troops through its territory, then Romania's position on this issue was quite complex and contradictory, as evidenced by the mutually exclusive statements of Romanian representatives, designed for any changes in the military-political situation in Europe. In addition, the Czechoslovak leadership made receiving assistance from the USSR dependent on the behavior of France. In Prague, they were convinced that Czechoslovakia's relations with Western European countries were more important than with the Soviet Union, so they considered it possible to seek military assistance from the USSR and resist German aggression only when France, fulfilling its allied obligations, confirms its readiness to come to the rescue of Czechoslovakia, and then enters the war against Germany.
Maintaining the status quo on the European continent was in the interests of the French Republic, therefore, the strengthening of German military power and the growing threat from fascist states in Europe forced France to start looking for stronger allies than its small European partners. At a time when Italy, France's ally in World War I, was rapidly moving into the camp of potential opponents, it remained possible for the French Republic to attract only two major European powers to its side - the USSR and Great Britain [2, 103].
Since May 1935, there has been a Franco-Soviet mutual assistance agreement, but France still did not see the USSR as a serious military partner and treated it with great distrust. This was largely due to the rejection of the socio-political system of the Soviet state, as well as the fact that the image of the USSR in the international arena was undermined by mass repressions, which, as they believed in Paris, negatively affected the combat capability of the Red Army [2, 114 6.]. Thus, since 1938, the French leadership has considered Britain exclusively as a strong potential ally of
France in Europe. Realizing its weakness in front of Germany and for this reason reviving the Anglo-French alliance, France was forced to play a subordinate role in it. In this regard, the French Government, despite its allied duty towards Czechoslovakia, considered it possible to fulfill its obligations to the Czechoslovak Republic only if the British also declared their determination to come to its aid.
Meanwhile, the ruling circles of Great Britain put the problems of France and Czechoslovakia far from the first place. The Chamberlain government, adhering to the traditional British policy of playing on contradictions, did not want to assume any obligations to the continental states at all and sought at all costs to avoid a direct clash between Great Britain and Nazi Germany, which in London was seen as a force capable of resisting the Soviet Union. British political leaders strongly welcomed Hitler's anti-Sovietism and anti-communism, believing that the German military machine was a good tool against the «communist threat» [3, 47].
In order to prevent Britain from being involved in a war with Germany, Chamberlain's government needed to save France from having to help the Czechoslovak Republic in the event of German aggression. To this end, in the summer of 1938, plans were being developed in London to neutralize Czechoslovakia. And here the tasks of British and German diplomacy completely coincided. The fact is that it was important for the Germans to eliminate Czechoslovakia as a link between the various alliances created by France during the interwar period, and thus destroy them so that the Wehrmacht could then smash Germany's opponents one by one. Therefore, German diplomacy also hoped to turn the Czechoslovakia into a neutral state, which would lead to the automatic elimination of the union treaties of Czechoslovakia with other countries.
In turn, France, vacillating between the allied duty and the desire to avoid war with Germany, in fact, was not against freeing itself from its obligations to Czechoslovakia. Moreover, over time, Paris came to the following conclusion: assistance to the Czechoslovak Republic from France and the USSR without the participation of Poland and other countries of South-Eastern Europe will not be able to prevent German aggression. According to the French leadership, in order to strengthen the military-political position of Czechoslovakia, it was necessary to create a solid front from the Baltic to the Adriatic, which, however, was practically unrealistic: the countries that were supposed to make up this front not only did not trust each other and even openly feuded with each other, but also were wary of the Soviet Union, a potential member of the anti-Hitler coalition [4, 68].
In such a difficult international situation, France, following in the wake of British foreign policy, finally made a choice in favor of appeasing Nazi Germany. Both in London and in Paris, they believed that this was the best way to avert the threat of war from themselves, and hoped to peacefully overcome differences with Berlin through reasonable concessions. The Anglo-French policy of appeasement of Germany was based in Western Europe on broad public support: ordinary people who still remembered the First World War wanted to believe in the possibility of a peaceful solution to all international problems. In this regard, taking into account the opinion of the electorate, Western European leaders were forced to set themselves an almost impossible task - to
satisfy the unlimited appetites of the aggressor. At the same time, the Czechoslovak Republic inevitably became a victim of the Anglo-French policy of appeasement, since it was at the expense of the interests and security of this country that Great Britain and France hoped to negotiate with Hitler's Germany [5, 57].
The apogee of the course of appeasement of the aggressor was the Munich Agreement of 1938. In pacifist circles, it was received with joy and glee. However, this agreement can be called a peace agreement for the sake of war. By agreeing to the transfer of the Sudetenland of the CHSR to the Third Reich, the Western powers made Czechoslovakia an easy prey for the aggressor, destroyed the French "rear alliances" and eventually themselves improved the military-political situation of Germany in Europe - Hitler was just talking about the need for this in November 1937. After all, the leadership of the Third Reich had the opportunity to choose where to send the German war machine further - to the west or to the east.
Naturally, the Western powers were vitally interested in the fact that the flame of war, if it was unleashed, would flare up not in Western, but in Eastern Europe. Moreover, Hitler's desire to move to the east, set out in his book "My Struggle", was well known to everyone.
That is why the Western European countries, hoping to direct German aggression in the right direction for them, went to the signing of the Anglo-German and Franco-German declarations (of September 30, 1938 and December 6, 1938, respectively), which, in fact, were non-aggression pacts. Thus, Great Britain and France, formally ensuring the inviolability of their borders from the Third Reich, actually unleashed Hitler's hands in Eastern Europe, first of all giving him the opportunity to crush the Soviet Union without hindrance.
However, the hopes of the "appeasers" of Nazi Germany ultimately did not materialize. The Hitlerite leadership, solving the problem of the successive defeat of the main opponents of the Third Reich on the European continent (in order to avoid a long war on two fronts at the same time), believed that the way of the Wehrmacht to the east lies through France. German strategists saw no chance of success in the war against the Soviet Union, while Germany still had one more serious opponent in the rear - the French Republic. Therefore, up to a certain point, Hitler's anti-Sovietism and anti-communism, which were welcomed by many Western European politicians, were just a screen to cover up German aggressive plans in the West.
Thus, we can say that the Munich Agreement of 1938 did not contribute in any way to the preservation of peace in Europe. On the contrary, it allowed Nazi Germany to take a decisive step towards a new world war.
Bibliographic list
1. Enzo Bianchi. The Second World War. Fabbri Editori. Volume I. - 1995. - 209 P.
2. John Keegan. The Second World War. Rizzoli. - 2000. - 187 P.
3. Basil H., Liddell H. Military history of the Second World War. - Milan: Mondadori. -2009. - 412 P.
4. Cesare S., Alfredo P. The Second World War. - Milan: Mondadori. - 1989-248 P.
5. Stephen J. Pledge. Invasion of Poland. - Blitzkrieg: Osprey Publishing. - 2008. - 212 P.
Капышев Ардак Кайыржанович, кандидат исторических наук, ассоциированный профессор, проректор по научной работе, Кокшетауский университет им. Абая Мырзахметова. (г.Кокшетау, Республика Казахстан)
Камашев Бексултан Абылсерикулы, магистрант, Кокшетауский университет им. Абая Мырзахметова. (г.Кокшетау, Республика Казахстан)
: sultan.kaz@bk.ru
Дата поступления: 05.12.2022
© Капышев А.К., Камашев Б. А., 2022
