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3. V. Bobrovnikov. Adat // Islam na territorii byvshei Rossiiskoi imperii [Adat // Islam on the Territory of the Former Russian Empire] Encyclopedic Dictionary. Moscow, Vol. 1, 2006.
4. F. Leontovich. Adaty kavkazskikh gortsev [Adat of the Caucasian Mouintain-dwellers] Odessa, 1882, republished in 2002 in Nalchik.
5. V. Bobrovnikov. Muslim Custom versus Socialist Law: Discourse on Sharia Courts in Post-revolutionary Daghestan // Islam and Sufism in Daghestan / Ed. by M. Gammer. Helsinki, 2009.
6. V. Bobrovnikov. "Ordinary Wahhabism" versus "Ordinary Sufism." Filming Islam for post-Soviet Muslim Young People // Religion, State and Society. 2011. Vol. 39, No 3-4.
7. V. Bobrovnikov. From Collective Farm to Islamic Museum. Deconstructing the Narrative of Highlander Traditions in Daghestan // Exploring the Edge of Empire: Socialist Era Anthropology in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Berlin. 2012.
8. J. Griffits. What is Legal Pluralism? // Journal of Legal Pluralism. 1986, No 24.
9. A. Knysh. Virtual Jihad in the Twenty-first Century: the Case of the Caucasus Emirate // Ab imperio. 2010, No 1.
10. R. Peters. The Islamization of Criminal Law: A Comparative Analysis // Die Welt des Islams. 1994, vol. 34
"Vestnik Rossiiskoi natsii," Moscow, 2014, No 4, pp 66-79.
L. Khoperskaya
MONITORING OF ETHNO-POLITICAL SITUATION IN KYRGYZSTAN (Demography and Migration, History, Religious Situation, Foreign Ties and Cooperation)
Demography & migration. Kyrgyzstan, just as in previous years, is distinguished by a high birthrate and migration activity of the population.
According to the data of the republican Statistical Committee, Kyrgyzstan's population numbered six million 777 thousand by January 1, 2014, the population surplus for the year 2013 was 113,500. The birth ratio was 27.2 per one thousand. The death figure for 2013
was 34,900. Natural population growth was 120,700. Migration outflow in 2013 was 7,200.
The absolute number and share of the Russian population in the republic diminished rapidly due to demographic losses and migration. According to the data of the Russian cultural center "Garmoniya," there are now 370,000 Russians living in Kyrgyzstan (6.3 percent). Twenty thousand people left the country in 2012, and about 10,000 in 2013. According to forecasts, about 50,000 Russians will be leaving Kyrgyzstan every five years, and by 2020 their number will diminish to 308,000 (5.2 percent), and in 2025 there will be only 249,000 Russians (4.0 percent), and in 2030 - 194,000 (3.0 percent).
As it is said in the "Concept of Strengthening Unity of the People and Interethnic Relations in Kyrgyzstan" endorsed in 2013, as a result of political, socio-economic and migration processes of the past few years, Kyrgyzstan has turned from a republic with a varied ethnic composition, especially concerning the urban population, into a country with numerical preponderance of ethnic groups of Central Asian countries. In recent years there has been a steady growth in the number of Kyrgyzs, Uzbeks, Dungans, Tajiks and Uighurs.
The migration flow is maintained at a comparatively high level due to the inflow of Chinese, the figures fluctuating from 80,000 to 300,000. They are mainly engaged in the mining industry, road building, and industrial enterprises.
The inflow of ethnic Kyrgyzs to the country is relatively small. In all, more than 900,000 ethnic Kyrgyzs live outside the borders of the republic. Among them, about 400,000 are in Russia, 385,000 in Uzbekistan, 189,300 in China, 56,000 in Tajikistan, about 2,000 in Afghanistan, and 3,200 in Turkey. (These data are cited by the republican Ministry of Labor, Migration and Young People's Affairs). During the period between 1995 and 2013, more than 40,000 ethnic
Kyrgyzs received republican citizenship. (Between 1992 and 2013, 516,500 people of Kyrgyz origin had received Russian citizenship, or almost nine percent of the entire population of the Kyrgyz Republic; many of them retain double citizenship).
The economically active population of Kyrgyzstan comprises about 2.5 million. The number of working Kyrgyzs is two million 280,000. There are 210,000 unemployed in the republic. The number of economically active young people from 15 to 30 years of age reaches one million 515,000, seventy percent of whom live outside the borders of the country.
In 2013 more than 657,000 Kyrgyz citizens went to Russia in search of work (in 2012 their number was 544,000, which means that the flow of Kyrgyz citizens leaving their native country has grown by more than 100,000).
In 2013 about 3,000 Kyrgyz migrants who worked in Russia illegally were deported to Kyrgyzstan. Around 60,000 citizens of Kyrgyzstan have been deprived of the right to enter Russia for a term of three to ten years due to breaches of Russian laws.
In 2013 migrants from Kyrgyzstan working in Russia transferred back home from $3 to $3.5 billion earned in this country. Actually, a new branch of the economy has come into being in Kyrgyzstan, which comprises up to 31 percent of the country's entire GDP to date.
In these conditions Kyrgyzstan intends to ask the Russian authorities to grant preferences to its citizens living and working in Russia. This shows the growing interests of the Kyrgyz authorities in preserving the high level of labor migration from Kyrgyzstan.
At the same time, the country's parliament, worried as it is by the risks connected with the mass labor migration adopted a decree in June 2013 on protection of the rights of citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic going abroad.1 It was aimed at establishing state control over
the outflow of able-bodied, reproductive population going outside the boundaries of the Kyrgyz Republic. The substantiation of this decree said that the most problematic questions of migration are labor exploitation and sexual slavery. In the total number of migrants Kyrgyz women comprise up to 40 percent. The heads of Kyrgyz diasporas in Russia are worried over the position of women among Kyrgyz migrants. There are cases of rape and humiliation committed by Kyrgyz men themselves. This is why there are increasing demands to restrict migration of Kyrgyz girls under the age of 23.
As a result of wide public discussions a decree has been adopted aimed at preserving moral values and preventing a demographic crisis. The document recommends the government of the Kyrgyz Republic to work out a strategy of the demographic and migration policy of the country. It should envisage, among other things, special preparation of persons going to work abroad. There will be legal responsibility of persons in charge of sending Kyrgyz labor migrants to other countries
Language policy. In 2013 the tendency grew noticeably of lobbying the Kyrgyz language in the status of the national language against the background of the narrowing down of the sphere of using the Russian language, above all, in the sphere of politics and management.
On March 1, 2013, amendments to the laws on the national and official languages came into force, according to which all official documents of the bodies of state power and local self-government can only be accepted and worked on in the national language, and if necessary, should be translated into the official language. A document in the national language is considered original. All legal documents are accepted in the national language only. Taking into account the fact that the share of the Russian-speaking population is decreasing and is practically in a minority in all municipal units, it becomes evident that
local legal acts will be accepted exclusively in the Kyrgyz language. Moreover, the Law on the official language has a point that the normative legal acts should be published in the language of their original compilation, hence it may be difficult for the Russian-speaking population who does not speak Kyrgyz to get acquainted with these documents.
In 2013 the Law of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan came into force "On the Status of the Capital," according to which its mayor can only be a citizen of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan with a higher education, a record of work in state municipal service or private managerial bodies of no less than five years, and he or she has to be a fluent speaker of the national language.2
This and other laws have evoked a wave of criticism on the part of the non-Kyrgyz population of the republic. In reply, the President of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan A. Atambayev, speaking at a meeting of the Council on Defense said: "Whether it is to the liking of somebody or not, but we must develop the national language. Let us recognize the truth that there can be no stability in our country if the Kyrgyz language is snubbed..."
The deputies of parliament unanimously approved amendments to the law "On the National Language." They demanded that all speakers at meetings of parliament or government speak the Kyrgyz language.3
The international non-governmental organization "Freeedom House" has voiced the view that the amendments to the law "on the National Language" approved by parliament violate international norms of human rights and the Constitution of Kyrgyzstan. Prior to that, the Russian Union of Compatriots in Kyrgyzstan has issued a statement saying that "the time has come when it is necessary not to call for the greater role of the Kyrgyz language but to evolve the effective
mechanisms of its use in the life of the people of Kyrgyzstan and the Kyrgyz state."
On April 11, 2013, the "Concept of strengthening the unity of the people and interethnic relation in the Kyrgyz Republic," in which the main task was set "to broaden the sphere of the use of the national language, and enhance the number of citizens speaking this language, including those for whom it is not the mother tongue."
In July 2013, the President of Kyrgyzstan signed a decree "On measures to develop the national language and improve the language policy of the Kyrgyz Republic." It said, among other things, that the realities of present society and the aims of greater unity of the Kyrgyz people demand that the national language should become the unifying means for all citizens of Kyrgyzstan, irrespective of their ethnic affiliation, provided the constitutional rights and freedoms of all citizens are strictly observed. The document admitted that despite the Kyrgyz language is being taught practically at all educational institutions of the country, only one-tenth of its citizens for whom it is not the mother tongue can speak, read and write it properly. This fact evoked heated discussions in society on the need to improve the state language policy.
The decree instructed appropriate institutions to organize in higher educational institutions of the capital Bishkek, Osh and other big cities free courses to teach adult people the national language, drawing teachers on a voluntary basis, and also to open a methodological center for upgrading teachers of the Kyrgyz language.
On September 23, Kyrgyzstan marked the Day of the national language. In a special address on the occasion President Atambayev said that the national language should play the key role in strengthening interethnic accord, preserving unity of the people of Kyrgyzstan, and ensuring the country's stability and development. The republic has all
opportunities, as well as political will to do this. The people of the country should raise the prestige of the national language to a proper level, making it a symbol of nationhood, and historical and cultural heritage of the Kyrgyz people. On the eve of the holiday the site of the National Commission on the official language under the President of the republic was opened. It contained dictionaries, books and programs necessary for state enterprises and organizations for compiling and keeping documents in the Kyrgyz language, which can be downloaded free of charge.
However, this well-though-out position did not exist for a long time. Already in September 2013 the parliamentary committee on international affairs postponed the examination of three international agreements because they were presented only in the official, language, one of them being Agreement on the creation of a joint system of antiaircraft defense in the Central Asian region of collective security.
The presentation of the fourth volume of the National Encyclopedia of Kyrgyzstan was timed for the Day of the National Language. At a news conference devoted to this event its organizers decided not to resort to the Russian language in their contacts with the journalists present.
In October 2013 the working group set up by an order of President Atambayev put forward a draft national program of the development of the national language and improvement of the language policy of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2014-2020. The program proceeded from the premise that by 2020 all organizations, enterprises and economic bodies will keep documents in the national language. There should be more Kyrgyz-language mass media, and Kyrgyz citizens should receive guaranteed secondary special and higher professional education in the national language. A national corpus of the Kyrgyz
language (information-reference system in electronic form for scientific research and teaching the language) should be created.
In the view of experts, the National program practically does not leave a chance to people of a non-titular nation to stay in the republic, inasmuch as according to the program the entire population of the republic shall speak the Kyrgyz language by 2020.4 On the other hand, efforts aimed at the broader use of the Kyrgyz language at the expense of the Russian language are regarded counterproductive by many experts because they do not prepare young people of Kyrgyzstan for potential work in Russia. Moreover, the measures aimed at reduction of the use of the Russian language may lead to grater isolation of Kyrgyzstan.
Questions of history. The people's uprising of 1916 was one of the most widely discussed subjects in the public and political discourse of Kyrgyzstan in 2013. Representatives of the republican authorities, political figures of the opposition, and scientists and scholars had their say. All were concerned over the official interpretation of the confrontation between the Cossacks and Kyrgyzs, the uprising as such and its results for the Kyrgyzs. What consequences can be expected at the time of the 100th anniversary of the event by descendants of their main participants - Kyrgyzs and Russians?
It should be recalled that in April 2008 the parliament of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan adopted a decision on establishing the Day of Remembrance of victims of the national uprising of the Kyrgyz people in 1916. The first Friday of August was proclaimed the Day of Remembrance of victims of the national uprising of the Kyrgyz people in 1916. At the time the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation issued a special note saying that the proclamation of the Day of Remembrance of victims of the national uprising of the Kyrgyz people in 1916 by Kyrgyzstan's parliament may have a negative influence on
bilateral relations between Russia and Kyrgyzstan. "Not wishing by any means to interfere in the internal affairs of independent and sovereign Kyrgyzstan, we would like to note that, as we think, such public attitude to this delicate subject is counterproductive for the present friendly relations between our nations. We mean the victims of forcible suppression of mass actions against the tsarist regime on the territory of present Kyrgyzstan during which thousands of Russian settlers also perished. Our past was not always bright and serene. We believe that it would be more correct if historians should have investigated the problems of past ages, without their unnecessary politicization under the pretext of "restoration of historical justice."5
Unfortunately the words of Russian diplomats were not heeded. On the contrary, the subject of 1916 was more actively used as an argument in the confrontation between the powers that be and the opposition. This pretext was used as an argument against Kyrgyzstan's entry in the Customs Union (Kyrgyzstan should not integrate with Russia which subjected the Kyrgyz people to genocide).
On August 2, 2013, on the Day of Remembrance, representatives of eighteen public and political organizations gathered at the Memorial to the victims of the uprising of the Kyrgyz people in 1916 in the Boom Gorge. They read the Koran to the spirits of the ancestors and adopted the following resolution:
- To ask the President of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan to mark the 100th anniversary of the National-liberation uprising of 1916 at a state level;
- To set up a commission consisting of historians, archeologists, writers, and elders and determine the order and composition of the celebrations;
- To organize competition for the construction of a 100-meter-high monument to the 100th anniversary of the event at the southern gates to the city of Bishkek;
- To erect 100 monuments and name 100 streets in honor of the event in cities, regions and districts of the Kyrgyz Republic;
- To hold international scholarly conferences and expeditions with historians, archeologists and writers taking part;
- To make a film devoted to the 100th anniversary of the National uprising and allocate proper financial means on it; and subsequently show it on all TV channels;
- To organize contests for literary works - plays to be staged at theaters, songs, etc.;
- To build and open a memorial complex "Urkun ordo," a museum and a mosque;
- To revise Kyrgyz history and issue corresponding study aids;
- To assess the 1916 massacre as the policy of genocide pursued by tsarist Russia against the Kyrgyz people;
- To raise the question of paying compensation by the Russian Federation to the Kyrgyz Republic for innocent victims in the National-liberation uprising of 1916;
- To prepare and distribute information about the political and historical significance of the National-liberation uprising of 1916 in the Russian, English, Chinese and other languages.6
One of the persons who signed this document was N. Moruyev, the Chairman of the Popular-patriotic movement of Kyrgyzstan and the Head of the Union of True Muslims of Kyrgyzstan. He even named the sum of compensation - $100 billion, and also promised that "in three years the Russians in the republic will feel hot."
There has been no reaction of the official authorities to these demands. But soon a new significant date was added to the political
calendar - the 100th anniversary of the tragic events of 1916, which the overwhelming majority of political and public figures assessed as the genocide of the Kyrgyz people on the part of the Russian Empire. In October 2013 the parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic set up the organizing committee for preparations to this anniversary, which emphasized the need to investigate in the most comprehensive manner the course of those events, rebury the remains of the dead with observing all necessary religious rites, and erect a historical memorial. There will be special conferences devoted to the event and general history of Kyrgyzstan and also memorial services held by the Orthodox Christian clergy.
The political party "Uluttuk birimdik" announced a contest for the most objective assessment of the events of 1916, whose winner would receive a new car as a prize. The party is going to publish a collection of material giving the fullest and most objective assessment of the events.
The criteria of objectivity in assessing the developments in 1916 will be Kyrgyz patriotism, anti-Russian rhetoric, and demands for material compensation to the descendants of the victims. The above-mentioned N. Motuyev said that "the Central Asian uprising of 1916 was actually jihad. About a million of Northern Kyrgyzs rose against Russians. But the Kyrgyzs were themselves to blame for not having connections with the Muslim world, although many other Muslim peoples had them." He put forward a condition for interethnic stability in the Kyrgyz Republic. "The Russians living here should adopt Islam and not stick their head out." This concerns all others non-Kyrgyz. N. Morguyev is but one of the many Kyrgyz political and public figures of a new type born of Kyrgyz revolutions and oriented to lumpenized mobs.
It is to be hoped that on the eve of the 100th anniversary of the tragic events of 1916 their historical interpretations will not be a cause for the exacerbation of interethnic relations. There is a whole number of authoritative scholars and public figures of Kyrgyzstan who are ready for a dialogue, which they voiced at a session of the round table arranged by the Academy of Education of Kyrgyzstan held on February 15, 2013. They agreed that the 1916 events and Stalin's reprisals should be viewed as tragedies of the entire people of Kyrgyzstan, all ethnic groups and citizens, and should not be opposed to one another as conflictogenic stereotypes.
U. Babakulov, editor-in-chief of the newspaper "MK-Aziya", maintains that all Russians living in Kyrgyzstan, as well as other Slav ethnic groups, should fear that in 2016 local nationalistically-minded elements can go over from verbal threats to more resolute actions.
Religious situation. The overwhelming majority of the Kyrgyz population (more than 80 percent) are Sunna Muslims, and this is why the main problems in the religious sphere are connected with the distribution of Islamic extremism.
Prior to Kyrgyzstan's independence, there were 39 mosques and 25 churches and parishes of Orthodox Christians, as well as small communities of Baptists, Catholics, Adventists and Pentecostalists. At present there are 2,475 organizations of 33 religious currents functioning in the republic. They include 2,081 Muslim organizations with 1,922 mosques. There is not a single populated center in the republic without a mosque. Big villages have several mosques, with their imams.
Along with the growing number of religious organizations contradictions between Islamic religious communities, which are formed on the ethnic, family or clan principle, grow, too. This is directly reflected in numerous rows and scandals around the Spiritual
Board of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan, in which nine muftis have changed since the revolution of 2010. On January 7, 2014, the Mufti of the Kyrgyz Republic Rahmatulla Egemberdiyev left his post after a great row.
These resignations have been caused not only by corruption in organizing hajj, or merger of individual clergymen with criminals, but also by rivalry between religious-political concepts.
Kyrgyzstan is the only Central Asian state where the activity of the Islamic missionary movement "Tabligi jamaat" is not banned. Formally, its activity is coordinated and controlled by the Spritual Board of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan, however, this movement is not subordinated to the muftiat and functions independently. The movement has not been officially registered at the State Commission on religious affairs. The main task of the movement is organization and delivery of sermons, which, in the view of many experts, is fraught with the hidden threat to the country's security, inasmuch as its aim is propaganda of the "Islamic model of state management."
This movement has noticeably increased its activity after the arrival in Kyrgyzstan of graduates from Muslim educational institutions in Pakistan and India. There are quite a few supporters of the movement - from people engaged in physical labor to representatives of the political and creative elites, government officials and businessmen. Ethnically, they are mostly Kyrgyzs. Their age limit is from 16 to 70, predominantly men from 19 to 45. The geography of their functioning is vast enough: at present there is practically not a single populated center where members of the movement do not read or hear sermons.
The number of its supporters is growing all the time. Certain communities of "Tabligi jamaat" can unite with radical Islamic groups,
among them representatives of the "Khizb ut-Tahrir" party, whose aim is the creation of an Islamic state in Central Asia.
According to experts' estimates, over 60 percent of the religious groups and organizations in the republic are financed from abroad, and even the banned religious extremist parties and movements, such as "Khizb ut-Tahrir," "Akramiya, Islamic movement of Turkestan, terrorist organization "Zhaishul Mahdi," "Jund al Caliphate," "Ansarulloh, and others.
In 2012-2013, the republican law-enforcement agencies uncovered 403 crimes of extremist character. Most of them were registered in Jalal-Abad regions (20.4 percent), Osh region (19.6 percent) and in the capital Bishkek (16.3 percent). More than 1,700 active members of the extremist movements and organizations have been registered by the police, the overwhelming majority of whom are members of "Khizb ut-Tahrir."
The Spiritual Board of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan is not able to oppose effectively the spreading of Islamic radicalism. In turn, radicals actively remove representatives of "official Islam" from leadership in mosques and educational establishments and carry on their own policy. The appointment of a representative of a terrorist grouping as imam of one of the mosques in Kara-Sui district and organization of departure of some citizens of Kyrgyzstan for the zone of the armed conflict in Syria are a case in point.
A no less important problem is the absence of control on the part of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan over religious education in the republic. According to the data of the Ministry for the Interior, of 2,285 imams of mosques have no special education.
There are 75 Islamic educational institutions functioning in the republic (ten higher educational establishments and 67 madrasahs) with
a student body of 4,630 men and about 10,000 priests working officially.
All these Islamic educational units are subordinated to the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan, but they have no license of the Ministry of Education and Science of the republic and have no corresponding state standard. The curriculum of most Islamic educational institutions includes learning the Koran and holding everyday rites. There is no teaching of such secular subjects as computer literacy, foundations of market economy, knowledge of the sphere of human rights, and foreign languages.
Graduates from foreign religious educational institutions exert a considerable influence on the religious situation in Kyrgyzstan. According to various expert estimates, about 800 citizens of the republic are now studying at Islamic educational institutions in Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan, Kuwait and Malaysia. The total number of those who have graduated from foreign religious educational establishments during the past decade exceeded one thousand.
The graduates of educational centers of religious extremist character are actively using the new forms and methods of propaganda of their ideas among the local population, particularly the Internet, mobile communication system, etc. for distributing information and other material of extremist character. Apart from that, they recruit young men in terrorist groups through their own web-resources. Today the number of Internet sites containing material of subversive and extremist character exceeds seven thousand.7
All these features and signs of mass Islamization of the population of a secular state by its Constitution, combined with an analysis of domestic processes going on in the country do not give ground for optimistic forecasts.
Foreign ties and cooperation. The many-vector foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan is regarded as a means for ensuring state sovereignty, national security, and tackling problems of the country's membership in the UN, OSCE, WTO, CIS, CSTO, SCO and EurAzec.
Kyrgyzstan's choice of the strategy of many-vector policy has been prompted by the constant need to replenish financial and other material means, mainly at the expense of new credits, grants, privileges and preferences. In this context it is necessary to view the country's decision to join the Customs Union.
The statement to this effect was first made in April 2011, when a meeting of the republican government approved a decision on joining the Customs Union and Unified economic area of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
President A. Atambayev has said that "whether we like it or not, there is no other way forward except joining the Customs Union. Our tradesmen will not be able to earn by re-export of Chinese commodities any longer. "
In June 2013 Kyrgyzstan's parliament adopted a decision, and President Atambayev signed the Law on denunciation of the agreement with the United States on a center of transit transportation and its closure and removal from the territory of Kyrgyzstan in 2014. However, it can be assumed that the United States will do everything possible, including financial means, to preserve their presence in Kyrgyzstan even after the withdrawal of the NATO troops from Afghanistan.
The decision on the entry of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan in the Customs Union was endorsed in January 2013 by the President of the republic. This step, as the Premier of Kyrgyzstan Zh. Satybaldiyev said in March 2013, could bring not only economic benefits, but also political ones for further integration. Membership in
the Customs Union is the republic's strategic position.8 President A. Atambayev reaffirmed in April 2013: "If we enter the Customs Union, it will open new prospects to us."
These statements were made on the eve of the signing of an agreement with "Rusgidro" on the construction project of a hydropower cascade at a total cost of $727 million and writing-off of Kyrgyzstan's debt to Russia amounting to $599 million, as well as Russian military and financial assistance to a sum of $1.1 billion.
However, Kyrgyzstan's entry in the Customs Union and the EurAsian Economic Union still remains at the level of declarations. Quite a few representatives of Kyrgyz public voice doubts and apprehensions concerning the expediency of entering these unions. Some people see more politics than economics in them and regard them as a geopolitical instrument.
The political year in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan ended with the statement made by President A. Atambayev that Kyrgyzstan would join the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan only if the demands of Bishkek are met.
The three sources and three components of the Kyrgyz economy ("Kumtor," labor migration and "Dordoi," forming the budget of the republic) determine the basic problems of domestic and foreign policy, and as long as approaches to their solution are based only on "the interests of the Kyrgyz people," but not on the entire poly-ethnic population of Kyrgyzstan, social tension in society will increase."
"Etnopoliticheskaya situatsiya v Roissii i sopredelnykh gosudarstvakh v 2013 godu, " Moscow, 2014, pp. 601-615.
