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12SOCIAL SCIENCES
MODERNIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN VILLAGE: ECONOMIC RESULTS AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
Kalugina Z.I.
ABSTRACT
The article assesses the economic performance and social consequences of the market agrarian reforms in Russia in the context of food supply security, improving rural livelihood and social modernization of the Russian village. We analyze the Russia's food self-sufficiency, size of agriculture import, and food availability for different demographics. Dynamics of rural livelihood and the existing social structure of income are evaluated. We draw an inference that there are no economic and institutional preconditions to form and develop the middle class as a support for economic and social modernization of the village. The paper ends with a conclusion on the low economic and social efficiency of market reforms in the agricultural sector of Russia and the need to develop a program for the development of the agricultural sector in Russia in terms of economic sanctions and the policy of food self-sufficiency.
Keywords: agrarian reform, food supply security, quality of life and well-being, social modernization, economic modernization
Introduction
Quarter of century since the beginning of market agrarian reform leads to summarize the transformation of the agricultural sector in Russia, analyze the successes and failures, to discuss the reasons for the failures and prospects. Leading research and newsmagazines countries have published lists of articles by renowned Russian scientists studying transformation processes in the agricultural sector in Russia (Barsu-kova, 2013; Kalugina, 2014; Kalugina and Fadeeva, 2011; Kalugina and Fadeeva, 2009; Manzanova, 2011; Nechiporenko, 2010; Nefedova, 2013; Patsiorkovskii, 2003; Smirnov, 2013; Velikii, 2012; Uzun, 2013; etc.). The focus of these studies has been given to the organizational and institutional transformation in the agricultural sector and their effectiveness. The social impact of the reforms has been given much less attention.
Consider the efficiency of agrarian reform in three aspects: food security, changing rural livelihoods, social modernization of the village. The analysis is based on a desk study of relevant documents: legislation, government regulations, national programs relating to the development of the agri-food sector, and official statistics, as well as drawing on the authors' long-standing experience with research in rural Russia during the last 25 years.
Conditions in the Russian Agrarian Sector before Reform
In the 1980s domestic agricultural production was not sufficient to provide a balanced diet to the Russian population. In many areas, food distribution was limited. Attempts to improve the situation by the bureaucratic-administrative command system involved superficial adjustments that turned out to be futile in the long run. These incremental adjustments, such as intrafarm cost-benefit analyses, various types of contracts, and capital-intensive technologies, did not affect core problems. These efforts resulted in short-lived improvements and then only within specially chosen experimental farms that were artificially created and enjoyed
more favorable conditions than elsewhere. After each "reform" campaign, everything returned to its previous condition. The socialist system repulsed the market elements that were alien to it. For the situation to be reversed radical reforms were needed.
Market-Liberalization in the Agricultural Sector 1990-2000s
This period during the 1990-s is characterized by the active state intervention aimed at reorganizing of the collectively owned agricultural sector and promoting a new institutional framework for the development of new forms of management. The economic reforms during the 1990s were intended to radically transform Russia's agrarian sector. These included a reorganization of collectively owned farms (kolkhozes and sovkhozes), land reforms, and support for private-sector development in the agrarian economy. The reforms were aimed at increasing social and economic activity amongst the rural population. Labor collectives were given the right to determine how they would be managed and workers had the option to leave their collective farms. Land was divided amongst agricultural workers and a number of other groups. Land and property shares formed the basis of start-up capital for business development on a cooperative or individual basis.
The reorganization of collective and state farms was completed in 1994. Almost two-thirds (66 percent) of this large enterprises changed their organizational-legal status, while other retained the traditional collective organizational form. A total of 300 of the large enterprises registered as open joint stock companies, 11,500 as partnerships (of all types), 1,900 as agricultural cooperatives, 400 as farms affiliated with industrial enterprises or other organizations, 900 as associations of autonomous farms, and 2,300 as other forms agricultural organization. Among sovkhozy, 3,600 retained their traditional form, as did 6,000 of the kol-khozy. By forms ownership, agricultural enterprises were distributed as follows: state ownership, 26.6 per-
cent; municipal ownership, 1.5 percent; private ownership, 66.8 percent; and mixed ownership, 5.1 percent (Rosstat, 1995, pp.48-49). In the following years agricultural organizations have repeatedly changed their organizational-legal status, depending on the preferences that guarantee them a state.
As a result of market reforms the structure of agricultural production by types of farms has changed considerably. The share of large agricultural enterprises has decreased in this period by 1.5 times, about as the share of smallholders. Private farms, contrary to expectations of the reformers were not the dominant way of production in the Russian agri-food sector (Figure1).
Collectiv e
enterpri ses 74%
1990
Househ old plots 26 %
Agricult
ural enterpri ses 51%
Private farms 11%
2015
Househ old plots 38%
Sources: Rosstat, 2014a, p. 373, Rosstat, 2016, p. 275.
Figure1. Structure of Agricultural Production in Russia by Types of Farms, 1990 and 2015, %o
The reorganization of collective enterprises was supposed to be the first step toward the creation of a mixed agrarian economy based on equality of all forms of ownership and land management. These measures were supposed to foster the competition between producers in the agrarian market. The various types of management made it possible to take advantage of both large- and small-scale production, combining the capabilities of large-scale agricultural production and individual entrepreneurial initiative. The radical changes in ownership patterns were assumed to lead to an efficient allocation of land and other means of production, and which then consequently, would promote the development of private entrepreneurship in agriculture and services. Administrative restrictions on developing household plots were lifted. Reorganization did not, however, result in higher efficiency and higher output for these large-scale collective enterprises. Agricultural output and the share of national agricultural production from these enterprises have been in steady decline.
The net result of reforms has been to replace an inefficient state sector of the economy with an inefficient private sector. The number of inefficient and unprofitable enterprises that have no working capital of their own and to whom bank loans proved inaccessible (due to high interest rates) was 96 in 1995, 137 in 1996, 138 in 1997, and 142 in 1998 (Rosstat, 1998, p. 319.)
Relying on the "invisible hand" of the market, the state significantly reduced agricultural subsidies, so that in 1999 agricultural subsidies amounted to only 0.17% of GDP, as compared with 0.52% in 1995 and 8.8% in 1990 (Rastyannikov and Deryugina, 2004, pp. 363,386).
The reorganized collective farms and the fledgling private sector agricultural economy has become degraded in the face of sharp reduce public subsidies. As a result, the Russian agricultural sector was observed
the expansion of small-scale production, inefficient allocation of resources, rural poverty, the degradation of social services in rural areas, and the emergence of what has been termed 'institutional traps' (Kalugina, 2001; Kalugina, 2002a; Kalugina, 2002b; Kalugina, 2007).
In my view, the underlying cause of the failure of reform 1990s was the formal character of the transformations. The organizational-legal status of collective and state farms was changed but in essence the social organizational of economic relationships remained the same. Because most workers have not observed any difference between their previous status as employed workers and the present one as co-owners, there has been no change in their work motivation or behavioral patterns. The established mutual rights and responsibilities between owners (stockholders) and managers (directors) were not observed. Directors often merely pushed the stockholders, even major ones, aside when making important decisions in matter that were precisely within the owners' competence. The paradox of the reforms was that instead of developing in people a market mentality and behavior, they are in fact destroying work motivation in the large enterprises.
For a radical change of the situation in the agricultural sector, it was necessary to change public policy. In the early 2000s changes were made to the financial and institutional support given to rural producers, such as improving access to financial loans. The core national project for the development of the agricultural sector consisted of three main areas: an increase in livestock production, the promotion of small-scale farming (household plots and private farms), and realization of a program for the building of affordable housing for rural professionals (doctors, teachers, agronomists, etc.), which are sorely lacking in rural areas (Priority national
project, 2002). While these measures had a positive impact on the activities of the agricultural sector, they were unable to solve all its problems.
Agricultural policies during this period were aimed at achieving a sustainable development of the agriculture sector and in rural areas more generally. The main aims were: a sustainable socio-economic development in rural areas, an increase in agricultural output, more efficient agricultural production systems, sustainable land use, and improving rural livelihoods. The policies succeeded in terms of increasing agricultural output, reducing the number of unprofitable agricultural enterprises, increasing profitability and reducing the share of private households in agricultural production. However, the measures were not a holistic approach to agribusiness development and were insufficient. In 2002, Russia passed a law allowing the free sale of land. Agricultural businesses thus became a potentially attractive investment. The state encouraged the arrival of large-scale investors in the agricultural sector and the subsidy system favoured large-scale enterprises. According to Uzun (2005), in the early 2000s, 1.4% of the largest farms received 22.5% of all subsidies.
Western observers often characterize government intervention in the Russian agricultural sector as a legacy or a return to the Soviet past. However, it can be argued that government support to agriculture is consistent with approaches employed in other counties with the aim to encourage the development of agriculture (Visser et al., 2012).
The global financial and economic crisis of 20082009 initiated further political reforms directed at the agri-food complex. Russia's grain production increased dynamically. Gross grain output increased from 65.5 million tons to 108.2 million tons between 2000 and
2008, with an average annual grows of 3.8%. This, in turn, made cereals an important export, increasing from 1.3 million tons in 2000 (2% of the gross grain harvest) to 18.2 million tons in 2008 (16.8% gross yield), making Russia the third biggest exporter of cereals after the United States and the European Union (Deryugina, 2010). Overall, agricultural output grew 10.8% between 2008 and 2009, which is especially relevant considering the 1.2% decline in other sectors (Rosstat,
2009, pp. 412,418).
During this period, the state monopolized the export of grain, creating a "United Grain Company" (UGC) has brought 31of 41 existing companies under federal ownership. This company was given authority by the state to make interventions in order to maintain stability in the grain market. However, the experience of 2009 showed that the UGC acted not as a regulator, but as a punter seeking to maximize profit through price manipulation (Deryugina, 2010, pp. 67-69). The state's
s failure to stabilize market prices has had obvious adverse effects on thousands of rural producers.
In the post-crisis period, agricultural production in Russia is developing dynamically. In the period from 2010 to 2014, agricultural output in current prices increased by 1.7 times from 2587.8 to 4319.0 billion rubles (Rosstat, 2015a, p.393).
Currently the situation has changed for the better. Implementation of the program of import substitution in agriculture has been very successful. The number of unprofitable agricultural enterprises decreased markedly. According to experts, their share currently does not exceed 18% (The Russian Business Newspaper, № 1013(34)).
Thus, we can say that over the last 15-20 years the process of market transformations in agricultural production decreased significantly the role of large agricultural enterprises and greatly increased the role of the family forms of agricultural production. Informal family forms of agricultural production developed in 2000e years, rather in spite of, not because of agrarian reform. A significant (1.6 times) growth in the products grown in the farms of the population, shows not about success but rather about failures carried out agrarian reforms. The informal agricultural economy has become a form of survival for the rural population. Many collective farms in the result of hasty, ill-considered and total conversions were destroyed and the rural societies due to objective and irreversible reasons were not ready to return to individual farming. Lost experience of individual and family agricultural production on a large scale returns slowly and as if involuntarily. However, poverty forced the rural population to return to your past experience. In terms of production of agricultural products of family farms began to compete with large agricultural enterprises, and in some regions ahead of them.
Thus, in the last twenty years, the agrarian policy of the state was characterized by situational and inconsistency, which negatively affected the situation in agriculture, rural development and standard of living.
Ensuring Food Security
Indicators of the success of ongoing agrarian reforms may serve as the degree of food independence of the country, as well as territorial and economic access to quality food for all social groups. According to the Food Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation to achieve food self-sufficiency is necessary to ensure its own production at the level of 95% of the total demand for cereals, 95% - potatoes, 85% - meat and meat products, 80% - fish and 90% - milk and milk products. However, the real picture is far from desirable, as evidenced by the level of self-sufficiency of the country the main agricultural products (Table 1).
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Table 1.
Level of domestic agricultural production in Russia, 2000-2014, %
2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Grain 102.5 116.3 148.2 134.8 93.3 135.9 108.3 140.6 153.7
Meat 67.0 62.6 66,6 70.6 72.2 74.0 76.1 78.5 82.8
Milk 88.3 82.5 83.2 82.9 80.5 81.5 80.2 77.5 78.6
Eggs 97.5 98.7 98.9 98.8 98.3 98.0 98.0 98.0 97.6
Potatoes 99.6 100.7 100.0 102.0 75.9 113.0 97.5 99.4 101.1
Vegetables and melons 85.6 84.9 86.8 87.3 80.5 93.2 88.7 88.2 90.2
Source: Rosstat, 2015b, p. 142.
Despite the measures taken to protect domestic producers, Russia remains the largest net importer of food. In 2013, Russia imported food worth 43 billion U.S. dollars. (Vegren, Trotsuk, 2015). After the introduction of the food embargo, Federal government has taken a series of measures on import substitution and changes in the composition of countries exporting food.
The country's dependence on imports of meat products remains high. This was due to a sharp reduction of cattle and sheep in the agricultural organizations and households. In comparison with 1990 the number of cattle in all categories of farms decreased from 57 million to 19.3 million heads (reduction by 3 times), including cows from 20.5 million heads to 8.5 million heads (reduction by 2.4 times). The number of pigs in this period fell from 38.3 million to 19.5 million (reduction - 2.0 times), sheep and goats decreased from 58.2 million to 24.7 million goals (Rosstat, 2015a, p.407). The implementation of the priority national project for the development of agriculture contributed to the improvement of the situation, but did not solve all problems.
Import substitution for most types of agricultural goods generally reached. In 2015, the first time exceeded the minimum threshold of food self-sufficiency for meat. According to the food security Doctrine of the Russian Federation, the self-sufficiency of the Russian Federation meat should be at least 85%. In 2014, the self-sufficiency of Russia's meat of all kinds amounted to 82.8%, 15 years ago the self-sufficiency of Russia's meat was 67 % (Table1).
One of the important indicators of food security of the country is the affordability of food for all social groups. Analysis of food consumption, depending on the level of per capita income suggests that not all group's available quality food. According for 2014, the daily ration of food by 10% income groups of population (from poorest to richest) was differentiated in the following way: 1917, 2185, 2360, 2489, 2613, 2740, 2730, 2818, 2997, 3080. (Rosstast, 2015b, p. 198.)
The energy value of the daily diet of the first decile group (in terms of per capita disposable resources) was below the minimum established norms of a balanced diet in 2000 calories. The data show that one in ten Russians are malnourished. However, according to FAO, one in three adults Russian is obese. According to experts, "the main problem is the food of the Russian Federation - overeating and poor nutrition due to unhealthy eating habits" (Human Development Report. 2013).
Calorie food consumed in extreme income groups of urban and rural population varies by 1.6 - 1.7 times. Caloric content of daily diet of rural residents is higher than their urban counterparts, but its structure is worse. During the 2000s, the consumption of meat and meat products per capita in Russia increased by 1.6 times, milk and dairy products - by 1.1 times (Rosstat, 2014b, p. 289).
However the Russians consumption of meat and meat products, milk and dairy products, and fruits and vegetables were lower than the established norms of rational nutrition. Russians consume in excess of these standards and in comparison with other countries, only potatoes and bread. The consumption of meat, dairy products, fruits and berries in Russia is clearly lagging behind the developed countries.
Thus, Russia's dependence on food imports is not eliminated, the country's self-sufficiency in agricultural products remains at a low level, high-quality food in the required quantity is not available for all populations. The result: the most important task of past reforms in the agricultural sector of Russia - the country's food security is not performed.
Improving Rural Livelihoods
Empirical indicators that characterize the welfare of the rural population can serve as the dynamics of wages and incomes of the population, the social structure of the population, the state of social infrastructure in rural areas. Despite the observed positive trends in Russia in the payment of agricultural labor, it remains the lowest in the country (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Dynamics of average monthly wages of agricultural workers, the subsistence minimum and the minimum consumer budget, the Russian Federation, 2000-2015. Source: Rosstat, 2009, pp. 119, 123, 124; Rosstat, 2013a, pp. 135, 139, 140; Rosstat, 2016, pp. 125, 129, 130.
The average monthly salary The subsistence minimum
The minimum consumer budget
Shown in Figure 3 data show that until the early 2000s, wages in agriculture was below the poverty line. Consequently, the share of poor households in rural areas in 2011 was 37.7%, and the proportion of extremely poor households (average incomes that do not exceed half the subsistence level) was 49.5%. Share of the rural population in the total population in this period was 26%. Low wage does not provide rural workers even reducing the level of consumption, which negatively affected the development of human potential. Positive trends in recent years have provided higher wages in agriculture to the level of the minimum consumer budget, or twice the subsistence minimum. But now the value of wages in agriculture is about half the average monthly wage in the economy as a whole. This level of income provides only a restorative type of consumption that is not enough for the expanded reproduction of adequate human capital challenges of modern society and modernizes the economy. Resource insecurity expanded reproduction of human potential negative impact on the health, life expectancy and educational level of rural workers.
So, according to data for 2012, expectancy of men living in urban areas was 65.1 years, while in rural areas - 63.12 years for urban women - 76.27 years, while the rural - 74.66. (Rosstat, 2013b). According to data for 2013, the difference in life expectancy between urban
and rural population remained roughly at the same level with a slight decrease in the gap.
In order to ensure that agricultural workers developing the type of consumption, their wages should be increased at least three times, so that it reached the level of 6 subsistence level. Low wages is one of the reasons and lower pensions for rural workers compared to urban populations. The average size of pensions in the countryside is about 15% lower than their urban. Nevertheless, pension reform, periodic indexation of pensions, valorization of pensions and regularity of payments made rural pensioners "affluent" layer with a steady income. If a part of the rural family has retired, this family in the eyes of local residents considered materially quite safe.
In general, the value of the resources available per family member in rural areas was about 40% less per month than the urban population. Natural receipts of food from personal subsidiary plots do not change the picture radically, as they account for only one-tenth of all the available resources of the rural family. As a result, the risk of falling into poverty in the rural population, especially in small towns, there is a significantly higher compared with the citizens and the general population (Figure 4). Calculations of T. Bogomolova and T.Cherkashina (2015) confirm the settlement differentiation representation of residents of different types of settlements in Russia in the property strata.
Figure 3. Risk index of poverty in urban and rural areas in 2014, by human settlements with different populations
Source: Rosstat, 2015c, p. 121.
Urban settlements
1,15
1,21
1,42
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Low standard of living of the rural population and increase the share paid segment in vocational training significantly reduced its availability for the villagers. Thus, in the period from 2005 to 2013, the output of skilled workers and employees with basic vocational education for agriculture declined in state and municipal educational institutions from 77.4 to 37.2 thousand people. The number of specialists with secondary special education has decreased during this period from
Source: Rosstat, 2015a, p. 116.
Poverty of the population, as well as specific rural lifestyle reduces spectrum of opportunities to spend your free time. Studies show that the villagers travel to destinations to be involved in tourism or sightseeing trips and attend cultural events were half as likely than urban residents (Rosstat, 2012a).
Thus, the underestimation of the peasant labor shortage generates resources for expanded reproduction of the labor force. This in turn leads to low levels of human development in rural areas, which negatively affects the efficiency of labor in the agricultural sector. Unfounded differences in wages of different categories of workers and the distribution of income groups had a negative impact on the social and economic stratification of the population of Russia.
According to the sample survey for the II quarter 2012, the dominant groups in the population are poor
28.3 to 15.6 thousand and specialists with higher education from 34.8 to 32.4 thousand (2012). In 2013, graduates of higher education for agriculture amounted to 35.2 thousand (Rosstat, 2014a, pp. 191,195, 200). As a result, the level of education of workers employed in agriculture, markedly lower than in the economy as a whole (Table 2).
Table 2.
and not enough affluent segments of the population. The proportion of extremely poor people living on less than 0.5 subsistence minimum (SM) (extreme poverty) was - 5.1% of the poor population with incomes below the subsistence level (0.51 to 1 SM) - 32.2%, of the poor (from 1.1 to 2 SM) - 33.9%. Together, more than 70% of the rural populations have incomes that do not exceed the minimum required for simple reproduction of the labor force.
Population with incomes between 2.1 and 6 living wages are about one-quarter of the total number (Figure 4).
Income enabling developing standard of consumption, have no more than 2-3% of the rural population. Developing standard consumption may serve as an indicator for inclusion of a particular group of the population in the middle class. According to this criterion,
Distribution of employed in the Russian economy according to education level in 2014, %
Education level Employed in the economy Employed in agriculture
Higher education 32.2 10.5
Secondary special 25.8 17.8
Primary vocational 19.2 20.8
High school (complete) 19.2 35.5
Basic general 3.5 13.4
No basic general 0.2 1.4
the share of the middle class in rural areas is very small. Archaic nature of social structures (income) due to underestimation of agricultural labor is evident.
Prospects for the development of the middle class are also associated with a wide access to business income. But count on entry into the middle class through access to market sources of income may, according to expert estimates, no more than 8% of Russia's population, whereas in developed countries - 20-25%. In the period from 1995 to 2010, the share of income from business activities in the Russian Federation decreased from 16.4 to 9.3%. Property income in the Russian Federation have not changed and accounted in the structure
The world practice shows that for countries with a small share of the middle class in the social structure is characterized by the dominance of consumers with low purchasing power. Under these conditions many companies in order to increase profits and competitiveness pursuing a policy that leads to the "environmental dumping", that is lower costs by reducing the costs associated with environmental conservation.
This business practice is possible in the first place in low state of environmental regulation in the countries with economies in transition and developing countries, including in Russia. In markets with a dominance of middle-class consumers a high degree of environmental responsibility becomes a competitive market advantage (Human Development Report, 2013). Thus, the presence of a vast middle class in society is a kind of mover "green" economy, improving environmental and safety products, and thus the preservation of public health.
of cash income 6.5-6.3%. This means that the overall economic environment in Russia does not create preferences for entrepreneurship, especially those of its forms, which can act as engine of growth of the middle class for material security. Meanwhile, it is the expansion of the middle class - this is an important result and a factor of modernization development. The structure of the income of the Russian population indicates that the country has not been established institutional and economic conditions for improving access to market sources of income and, consequently, for the growth of the middle class.
In the last decade the social infrastructure of the village is developing dynamically, but now about 30% of villages do not have paved roads, approximately every tenth village has no telephone and postal communication with the outside world. Today, only half of the rural housing stock is equipped with running water, 40% to sanitation - 61% - heating, one quarter - hot water, 74% of gas supply.
Since the mid-2000s going optimization of the network of small schools and small health care facilities in the countryside. It was assumed that consolidation should improve the quality of education and health services, but the main criterion of "optimization" was the regulatory compliance of budget expenditure. It is this criterion to 2012 was taken into account when assessing the performance of executive power in the regions. However, experience has shown that a sharp reduction in the number of educational and health facilities reduces the territorial availability of basic social services,
The share of the strata in the population, %
__— —rural population_□ urban population__
Figure 4. Decomposition of the social structure of urban and rural population in Russia, 2012
Source: Rosstat, 2012b, p. 15.
especially in rural areas. The Report on Human Development in the Russian Federation in 2013 stated that for the maximum possible preservation of the territorial accessibility of the process of reduction and enlargement of the network of schools should be linked to the peculiarities of settlement in the region.
Thus, the state of social infrastructure in the modern Russian village though indicates an improvement in the living conditions of the villagers, but does not meet the requirements of the time fixed in the consciousness, especially young people. Negative image of the rural way of life contributes to the migration outflow of villagers in the town. Rural labor remains the most low-paid jobs, which reduces the economic opportunities for the expansion of the middle class and the development of human capital in the countryside.
Social Modernization of the Village
Assessing the social modernization in Russia, Director of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences M.K.Gorshkov, said it slow and contradictory character. In his opinion, the degree of urbanization of the country does not meet the standards typical for countries in transition from industrial society to the late industrial. Consequence of this is the prevalence of poor urban culture, is an important prerequisite for the formation of the modern type of personality, the new model of social relations, a new system of social institutions (Gorshkov, 2010). According to M.K.Gorshkov, there is a rapid decomposition of traditional rural culture and intensive marginalization of a large part of the rural population. With the last statement of the author can hardly agree.
Sociological monitoring of agrarian reform in the rural regions of Siberia, carried out the sociological department of the Institute of Economics of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences for the past 20 years, leads to different conclusions.
Almost annual expeditions in the rural regions of Siberia convince us that the village has undergone substantial positive changes. This is evidenced not only positive changes in the level and quality of life of the rural population, which was discussed above, but also the visual observations of the author. Yes, in Siberia, too, disappear village and youth goes to the city, and drink in the Siberian villages, no less than in other regions, but there are positive changes. The appearance of the village is getting better; the houses are getting richer, and the streets - cleaner. As the saying goes, "build here a lot and beautiful: and social facilities, and housing." And indeed it is. As for the not so rapid spread of urban culture in its modern form, it is rather good, and it does not matter for the villagers. One of the latest programs of rural development of the Novosibirsk region, along with measures to improve the beau-tification of rural areas, improvement of working and living conditions of the rural population was aimed at creating conditions for the preservation of the rural way of life.
About the ongoing social modernization also shows the formation of a class of owners in the Russian countryside. The reorganization of collective farms has provided agricultural workers, pensioners and social
workers of the right to receive land and property shares. Under current law these categories of the rural population received their share of the collective assets in cash or in kind, and used it to conduct an independent peasant economy, one's own business or to expand production in household plots. However, in most cases, the rights of peasants to the land were not issued legally, they were not known to a specific location and boundaries of land allotted to them. The property was only nominal. In such circumstances, the majority of newly-owners tried to transfer their land shares to the former collective and state farms on loan or contribution to the statutory fund of the reorganized collective farms. Mass transfer of share of land at the disposal of the former collective and state farms has led to the splitting of the property rights. As a result, the owners of land shares of the real owners turned into virtual ones. Agricultural organizations, having no real competition, established almost a symbolic rent for leased land in the form of payment of agricultural tax and a small payment in kind at the end of the year.
Parish of big capital in the agricultural business, including urban, intensified competition for the leased land. The owners of land shares have felt that they have in their hands is not just "paper" certifying their rights, and real capital. You can talk about the gradual formation of market consciousness in the rural population. It manifests itself in the consciousness of the value of land as capital, especially in the context of increased competition between the major players in the land market. In such circumstances, land owners can bargain with respect to rent and choose more «generous» tenants to sell their land share is not at fire-sale, and market prices or pass it inherited his family.
For lack of demand in the 1990s land often remained unclaimed, abandoned and uncultivated. However, according to calculations N.I.Shagaida, reducing the area of agricultural land as the main agricultural resource over 20 years of reform in Russia is not catastrophic and is 13%. In this case, 12.5% of agricultural land is reserved for private farms, 23 - for citizens (not farmers), 56.7 - for the non-state agricultural enterprises - 4.7 - for state and municipal agencies, 2.6% -for other organizations (Shagaida, 2013).
In fairness it should be noted that only a small proportion of rural residents took the opportunity to lead an independent peasant economy, contrary to the expectations of the reformers. Nevertheless, during the reform was formed the layer of initiative, professionally competent people who risked under inconsistent and controversial reforms of the 1990s to embark an independent voyage. We are talking about farmers. Although the private farms did not become the dominant sector of the agrarian economy because of the existence of economic and social barriers to development, the share of private (peasant) farms in agricultural production has increased from 1.1% in 1992 to 10.2 in 2013. The share of farms in grain production has increased during this period to 24.6% (Rosstat, 2014a, p. 275). Social activity of the rural population increases in business, commerce, in the development of private farms and freelancing.
Corporatization of agricultural enterprises carried out in Russia in the 1990s, in the context of market economic agents, can hardly be considered a successful project. If the shares in the reorganized farms were dispersed across many shareholders, and their rights were blurred. Accordingly, the patterns of behavior of people practically unchanged. At creation of such joint-stock companies, even the names of farms remained the same. There were such paradoxical title, such as a closed joint-stock company " Kolchoz of the Karl Marx» or open joint stock company "Kolchoz "Road to Communism». Often these farms were corporatized not just a place of work, but also a kind of "social security", social security body, where it was possible to ask for help in difficult situations. As a rule, such enterprises were kept so-called "excess" workers. This is mainly veterans who until his retirement were to modify one or two years. In this age and poor health, they could not find work elsewhere. Fire them - so get disapproval rural community.
But this situation was not widespread. Formed and there is another type of stock farms, where the controlling stake (often its share exceeds 90% of the shares) is concentrated in the hands of one. As a rule, it is - business leaders, who took possession of unclaimed land or redeemed them from the villagers at symbolic prices. In such cases, one can hardly speak of a joint management and disposal of property. On one pole is the owner, and the other are employees. Basically it is a private enterprise, where there is a host-owner and employees.
The specifics of the current situation are that in the agricultural sector came big business, which dictates its terms. In rural areas, there are equipped with the latest technology, agricultural livestock complexes and other profile, working the most modern technologies. Employers in these enterprises make high demands on employees. At such enterprises observe high standards of labor discipline, imposed strict sanctions against violators. Herein productivity and wages are above. Such enterprises are beacons of modernization of the agrarian economy. At the same time they increase competition in the labor market, releasing part of the surplus labor force, and dismissing those workers who not withstand the high intensity of labor. Some employees leave companies with such good will and join the ranks of migrant workers, shift workers, seasonal workers or rural unemployed. Thus, the new players in the rural labor market make greater demands on the quality of human capital, increase competition for jobs. On the one hand, they stimulate the activity of professional workers and on the other, - enhance social tensions in rural society and contribute to the outflow of labor from the village. Qualitative changes in the social sphere of the village are only possible when creating the institutional and financial conditions for the development of local government and local rural communities.
The current situation on the domestic food market is determined by the introduction of Russian food embargo and the country's transition to self-sufficiency basic food commodities. Refusal to import a number of food products, focus on domestic production of domestic agriculture gave a historic opportunity for the socioeconomic breakthrough. However, this is only possible
when strong government support domestic producers and the mobilization of internal resources of the agricultural sector. Optimism may be associated exclusively with boundless energy and inventiveness of the Russian peasantry, with its amazing ability to adapt to the most incredible conditions and the impossible to do possible!
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