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The repartition of the Islamic area of Russia and the intervention of extremist ideologies reflect the general trend of the formation of "new Islam" in Russia, confrontation between traditional Islam represented by the older generation and "new Muslims" who do not know the Koran and Sunna and have chosen Islam as the ideology of protest against the worsening economic and social situation. The Russian umma subjected to radical ideas is integrated in the anti-Russian opposition.
"Rossiya i Arabsky mir: istoriya i sovremennost,"
Ufa, 2012, pp. 32-40.
E. Arlyapova, Ph. D. (Political sciences) MOBILIZATION POTENTIAL OF ISLAM YESTERDAY AND TODAY
The tendency to view the post-Soviet area as a field of ethno-confessional tension, which is now in the habit of Russian and foreign historiography, has all prerequisites to become a tradition, inasmuch as the train of events on the vast territories of the former U.S.S.R. gives all grounds to believe that intra- and interstate relations of new political figures on the map are far from harmonization. Researchers and experts are unanimous in the opinion that Islam rapidly spreading in the postSoviet area has one of the highest proneness to conflict. There is the need for greater attention to these processes and the monitoring of their quantitative and qualitative components, which is especially important in examining the forms and trends of Islam, which has favorable conditions for entrenching itself in the ideological vacuum formed after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation, just as other states with regions inhabited by predominantly Muslim
population, is now part of general world processes and is also facing the threat of "transnational Islamist terrorism." The Russian historical realities of the middle and end of the 1990s added the definition "Chechen" to the words "Islamic radicalism." Loud warnings were heard and apprehensions expressed that the entire North Caucasus should be regarded as one of the non-Russian ethnic peripheries, moreover, as a periphery of the Middle East and the Islamic world.
The growing ethno-confessional tension in the country and adjacent territories, along with the present evolution of Islam itself, has evoked great interest in it on the part of the special services of the Russian Federation and the CIS countries. It has now become habitual to study Islam in the context of a "conflictological analysis of terrorism as a socially dangerous phenomenon." This tendency has appeared due to serious reasons. As one of the most authoritative experts of Islamic fundamentalism in Russia, Georgy Mirsky aptly noted, "while disagreeing with the definition of Islam as "religion of enmity and hatred, one cannot ignore the indisputable fact that most acts of international terror recently have been committed by Muslims..."
In the attempts to revaluate the phenomenon and actions connected with it, the history of mutual relations of power and Islam has also been revised, which entailed the working out of new periodization of their development. Alternative variants were suggested for the Islamic renaissance of the period between 1989 and 1999. Chechnya was given a special place, because its official Islamization, in the view of many authors, combined with the military and political opposition to the federal forces exerted a special influence not only on all Muslims in Russia, but also on the entire post-Soviet Muslim umma. A special place has now been given over to Dagestan, Chechnya's neighbor, confirming the priority of the North Caucasian region in the
Islamic discourse for the Russian Federation as part of the post-Soviet area.
It is firmly believed that Islam is a destabilizing factor of the ethnopolitical processes going on in the North Caucasian region, moreover, it is the catalyst of its powerful conflictogenic potential. An especially harsh position on this problem has been taken by our foreign colleagues, who directly state that Russia itself has contributed to the emergence and consolidation of Islamic radicalism on its own territory. Many Russian experts also agree with the idea that Islamism in the North Caucasus has gained ground and many supporters due to a difficult socio-economic situation there, where the political situation is permanently unstable and has been aggravated by the 10-year-long Chechen conflict.
All efforts, intellectual included, have been devoted to fighting fundamentalists in the North Caucasus, whereas in the rest of Russia, where the situation is calm, radical Islamists (Wahhabi) were able to unfold energetic activity. This concerns Muslim communities in the Volga-Urals area. According to the data of 2007, the radicals took up to 80 percent of the Islamic mass media under their control. Earlier there have been reports about prevention of several terrorist acts on the territory of Tatarstan, and several groups of extremists have been smashed. At a meeting of the State Council of Tatarstan it was admitted that the problem of spreading Wahhabi ideology reached a critical level.
The view is widespread that the Chechen Republic in the North Caucasus is a traditional Islamic region contaminated with "extremist socially dangerous ideas," which penetrated it through young Chechens who have received religious education abroad. One of the essential factors of destabilization and prolonged crisis in Chechnya is the policy
of Islamization pursued in the republic since the late 1980s, which has a strong influence on public schools.
The socio-economic situation in Chechnya did not allow young Chechens to receive full-fledged school education. Thus, the educational and ideological vacuum was filled by Islamist propaganda. The mobilization potential of Islam in Chechnya during its confrontation with the Federal authorities grew immensely. In the late 1980s - early 1990s hundreds of mosques were built, numerous religious educational establishments were opened, and an independent spiritual board began to function In other words, the process of Islamization of Chechnya proceeded at a very rapid pace.
The religious (Islamic) idea was called for complementing and strengthening the national (ethnic) idea, even for replacing it, if necessary.
At the same time, the ethnic factor is quite strong, but in today's Chechnya one can observe processes which became a consequence of its young leader Ramzan Kadyrov having unexpectedly begun to incorporate Islam in public and political life of the Chechen Republic. There are three reasons for appeal to Islam on the part of his team: "the growing prestige and popularity of the leader among the Chechen people," "his growing prestige as a Muslim in the Middle East and among international organizations working in Chechnya," "interception of Islam from the radical opposition." The second reason is, perhaps, the strongest.
Islam in Chechnya has been, and still remains, a political instrument with all its pros and cons. Its influence on politics is determined by the requirements and interests of the political elites.
"Voprosy natsionalnykh i federativnykh otnoshenii," Moscow,2012, issue 4(19), pp. 145-155.
