CC BY
57
being carried out in these states to bring their economies into harmony with the requirements of the liberal market and free trade. Great efforts are being exerted to make efficient use of their geographic conditions and natural resources and develop export-oriented production units in order to offer a wider assortment of products for the international markets. In the future, this trend will lead to greater international integration of the Central Caucasus and a decrease in its dependence on traditional historical markets.
Oksana REZNIKOVA
Ph.D. (Hist.), researcher at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences
(Moscow, Russia).
MIGRATION PROSPECTS IN THE POST-SOVIET EXPANSE
Abstract
This article focuses on two of the main migration processes in the post-Soviet states: first, the so-called great migration of nations generated by the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the formation of independent states on the basis of the former
Soviet republics and, second, the labor migration prompted by the significant differences in the level of socioeconomic development of the new states and, correspondingly, in the material status of the broad population.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
Widespread interstate migration is a stable trend of contemporary world development. For historical reasons, the post-Soviet expanse has found itself in the epicenter of cross-border migration. According to the U.N., in 2005 there were 26 million people living in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) who were born beyond the border of their place of residence. In absolute terms of this category, Russia ranked second (12.1 million people) in the world this year after the U.S., followed by Germany in third place. Ukraine, which has 6.8 million residents who were born outside the country, ranked fourth, while Kazakhstan with 2.5 million people in this category took 17th place. More than one million people in Uzbekistan and Belarus each were born beyond the border of their place of residence.1 According to the World Bank’s estimates, which differ slightly from the U.N.’s
1 All of the estimates in this article, unless otherwise stipulated, were made in compliance with the data bases of the UN and its specialized organizations, the World Bank, and Soviet and post-Soviet population censuses. To save space, references to these sources are not given.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
statistics, Russia ranks second in terms of this index in the world after the U.S., Ukraine occupies fourth position, and Kazakhstan ninth.2 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of independent states on the basis of the former Soviet republics prompted intensified migration, which can be described as the great migration of nations. To a large extent this reality was a logical consequence of the entire previous development period.
Vector and Dynamics of Inter-Republic Migration Flows in the Late Soviet Union
Under the Soviet system, inter-republic mobility of the population was relatively high, whereby it was frequently supported by administrative and/or forced methods. Some nations were subjected to almost total deportation from their traditional places of residence. For long periods of time that date back to the pre-Soviet era, some republics acted both as donor and host countries for migrants. Until around the 1960s, Russia and Ukraine, with Belarus playing a lesser role, were the main countries from which both job-seekers and ordinary citizens migrated to other republics.3 Far fewer people migrated from other republics to these countries.
At certain times in history, migration from other parts of the Soviet Union had a pronounced effect on the demographic dynamics and ethnonational structure of the population in certain republics. Kazakh authors note that for almost an entire century, from the 1870s-1880s until the 1960s, entire groups of the peasant rural population were dispersed to these republics from the Russian Empire’s center.4 In some cases, mass migration essentially changed the national composition of the republics that hosted migrant workers and other emigrants. For example, at the end of the 1950s, the percentage of non-titular ethnic groups reached 70% in Kazakhstan’s total population and 60% in Kyrgyzstan’s. In 1926, before the Soviet Union began its intensive development of Central Asia, these indices were 39% and 34%, respectively.
The size of Tajikistan’s incoming population also rose significantly, although to a lesser extent. Migrant flows to Georgia and Turkmenistan were relatively small, but these republics also received a relatively large number of migrants. Among the non-European constituencies of the former Soviet Union only two, Azerbaijan and particularly Armenia, were essentially not incorporated into the inter-republic migration processes.
Table 1 presents the figures characterizing the intensity of inter-republic migration exchanges between 1961 and 1989. It shows how the migration trends between former Soviet republics and their intensity demonstrated a rapid increase in centrifugal movement within the Soviet Union long before its actual collapse. The most sensitive barometer in this sense proved to be the Caucasian constituencies. As early as the 1960s mainly members of the non-titular population left Azerbaijan and Georgia.
In the 1970s-1980s not only did inter-republic migration intensify but there was also a major change in its direction. Russia became the host of the growing migration flows and received
2 See: Migration and Remittances. Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, ed. by A. Mansoor, B. Quillin, World Bank, Washington D.C., 2006, p. 3.
3 For Russia and Ukraine, see the fundamental works of V.M. Kabuzan: V.M. Kabuzan, Ukraintsy v mire: dinami-ka chislennosti i rasseleniia. 20-e gody XVIII veka-1989 god: formirovanie etnicheskikh i politicheskikh granits ukrain-skogo etnosa, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 2006; idem, Russkie v mire. Dinamika chislennosti i rasseleniia (1719-1989). Formirovanie etnicheskikh i politicheskikh granits russkogo naroda, St. Petersburg, 1996.
4 See: N.E. Masanov, Zh.B. Abylkhozhin, N.V. Erofeeva et al., Istoria Kazakhstana: narody i kultury, Daik-Press, Almaty, 2001, p. 400.
Table 1
Dynamics of Inter-Republic and Interstate Migration in the Soviet Union and the Post-Soviet Expanse (thou. people)
1961- 1965 1966- 1970 1971- 1975 1976- 1980 1979- 1988 1989- 1995 1996- 2000 2001- 2005
| Migration range: net migration (inflow minus outflow)
Kazakhstan 407 24 -261 -414 -784 -1,242 -872 -130
Kyrgyzstan 73 53 -38 -65 -157 -360 -56 -117
Tajikistan 56 14 1 -43 -102 -363 -89 -43
Turkmenistan 1 3 3 -27 -84 -57 -71 -52
Uzbekistan 131 127 143 -110 -507 -626 -251 -426
Azerbaijan -53 -47 -22 -82 -266 -267 -31 -10
Armenia 60 80 70 10 -321 -57 -41 -43
Georgia -35 -54 -70 -94 -52 -601 -294 -143
Russia -522 -598 -195 725 1,767 2,687 1,399 332
Belarus -162 -1 -61 -31 -8 137 74 24
Ukraine 173 345 226 -37 153 -329 -391 -104
Moldova 43 24 9 -69 -56 -83 0 -19
Latvia 78 70 64 39.5 93 -154 -35 -9
Lithuania 14 34 34 34 100 -115 -109 -29
Estonia 43 48 33 27.5 55
Intensity of migration flows: net migration (in % of the population) at the beginning of the period
Kazakhstan 3.94 0.20 -1.96 -2.90 -5.32 -7.65 -5.60 -0.88
Kyrgyzstan 3.23 2.01 -1.24 -1.9 -4.41 -8.36 -1.22 -2.38
Tajikistan 2.61 0.56 0.04 -1.21 -2.64 -7.02 -1.55 -0.69
Turkmenistan 0.07 0.13 0.12 -1.03 -3.01 -1.60 -1.71 -1.15
Uzbekistan 1.46 1.23 1.16 -0.77 -3.25 -3.12 -1.09 -1.71
Azerbaijan -1.32 -1.00 -0.42 -1.42 -4.38 -3.77 -0.39 -0.13
Armenia 3.10 3.54 2.70 0.35 -10.53 -1.63 -1.09 -1.12
Georgia -0.84 -1.19 -1.48 -1.90 -1.03 -11.10 -6.36 -3.25
Russia -0.43 -0.47 -0.15 0.54 1.28 1.82 0.94 0.23
Belarus -1.96 -0.02 -0.67 -0.33 -0.08 1.35 0.73 0.24
Table 1 (continued)
1961- 1965 1966- 1970 1971- 1975 1976- 1980 1979- 1988 1989- 1995 1996- 2000 2001- 2005
Ukraine 0.40 0.75 0.47 -0.08 0.31 -0.64 -0.77 -0.21
Moldova 1.40 0.71 0.24 -1.79 -1.41 -1.91 0.00 -0.53
Latvia 3.62 2.99 2.67 1.58 3.61 -5.79 -2.46 -0.70
Lithuania 0.50 1.13 1.07 1.02 2.96 -3.13 -4.43 -1.24
Estonia 3.50 3.68 2.39 1.91 3.77
Calculated and compiled according to: Zh.A. Zaionchkovskaia, Demograficheskaia situatsiia i rasseleniie, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1991, pp. 73, 82; Social Monitor. UNICEF, 2003, pp. 54, 57; World Bank. World Development Indicators 2006; TRANSMONEE Data Base.
725,000 people in the last five years of this period alone (1976-1980). After playing the role of demographic donor for long years, Russia began attracting an increasing number of migrants.
So since approximately the beginning of the 1970s, the national migration flows in the Soviet Union have been centripetal and with rare exceptions there has been an accelerated concentration of ethnic groups in its own republics.5
In the 1980s (particularly during the latter half of the decade) migration from the former Soviet republics to Russia and to a lesser extent to Ukraine acquired avalanche proportions. In 19791988, net migration from Kazakhstan reached 5.3% of this republic’s population in 1979. A similar index for Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan amounted to 4.4%, for Uzbekistan to 3.25%, for Turkmenistan to 3%, and for Tajikistan to 2.6%. The outflow of Russians from these republics was even more intensive, whereby departure was particularly active from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.
According to the official data, during this same period more than 10% of the population left Armenia. Such a high departure index of the mainly indigenous population was stimulated, in addition to the growing socioeconomic problems, by the devastating earthquake in Spitak that inflicted the area in December 1988. In 1988-1989, approximately 200,000 people left the country.
From Soviet Republics to National States
At the end of the 1980s, particularly in the first half of the 1990s, the great migration of nations reached its peak. Migrants from the former Soviet republics were still mainly attracted to Russia and politically calm Belarus. Between 1989 and 1995, net migration to the Russian Federation topped 2.5 million people (see Table 1).
During this period, emigration from Kazakhstan amounted to 1.2 million people or 7.7% of its population in 1989. These indices amounted to 626,000 and 3.1% for Uzbekistan and 601,000 and
5 See: A.V. Topilin, “Vlianie migratsii na etnonatsionalnuiu strukturu,” Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, No. 7, 1992, p. 40.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
11.1% for Georgia. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan lost up to 360,000 people or 8.4% and 7% of their population at the beginning of the period under review, respectively.
In the second half of the 1990s, emigration from the former union republics to Russia perceptibly shrank. However, there is still an intensive exodus of residents from Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan.
Special mention should be made of Armenia. The data for this republic presented in Table 1 were construed on the basis of official statistics which are entirely unsound. Expert estimates of migration from Armenia provide a much more accurate picture of the actual process. According to the data of the main civil aviation administration, between 1992 and 2000 alone the number of those who left exceeded the number who arrived in the republic by 644,000 people. According to other even more dramatic estimates, in 1991-2000, due to legal (official) and illegal departure, the population of Armenia decreased by almost 1,270,000 people.6 If we rely on these expert data, in the 1990s net migration from Armenia amounted to between 21% and 38% of the country’s population in 1989.
The increase in mono-ethnicity of the newly independent states has been one of the most important consequences of the great migration of nations. This increase is expressed in the accelerated growth or slower decrease in the size of the titular nation compared with the non-titular. An increase in the percentage of the titular nation in the total population is seen in all the post-Soviet states, excluding Russia. In addition to migration, assimilation is also promoting this process, as well as the differences in natural reproduction level of different nationalities. But at present we are moving away from these two factors, particularly since in most of the former Soviet republics a decrease or stabilization in the size of the Russian (or other non-titular) population has been seen for at least the past two or three decades.
The Caucasus. The states of this region, particularly Armenia, were traditionally less intensively drawn into inter-republic migration exchanges. On the eve of World War II, the percentage of Russians in Armenia’s total population amounted to only 4%, in Azerbaijan’s to 16.5%, and in Georgia’s to 8.7%. In so doing, the share of other non-titular ethnic groups was equal to 13.2%, 25.1%, and 29.9% (see Table 2), respectively.
One of the reasons for the Caucasus’ isolation in the Soviet expanse was the high resistibility of the family-household sphere. This is confirmed by the relatively low index of ethnically mixed families in the three republics. In 1989, this index was the lowest in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia among all fifteen Soviet republics.7 Of course, this was largely due to the high ethnic homogeneity of the population living in them. But it must be noted that in 1959-1989, Armenia was the only republic in which a drop in this index was observed. In Azerbaijan it changed within the limits of statistical error.8 At present, Armenia has essentially become a mono-ethnic country where the share of the titular nation in the total population is close to 100%.
Central Asia. From the beginning of the 1970s until 2003, Kazakhstan had a negative net migration balance. Between 1989 and 2000, 3.3 million people left the country and 1.2 million arrived. Since 2004, Kazakhstan has had a small positive migration balance. Between 1989 and 2006, a total of 3.8 million people left the country and 1.6 million arrived.
Gross migration (total emigration and immigration) reached approximately one third between 1989 and 2006, while net migration (emigration minus immigration) amounted to 14% of the coun-
6 See: A. Potosian, A. Khoetsian, M. Manasian, “Osobennosti migratsii naseleniia Respubliki Armenia. Tsentr mi-gratsionnykh issledovanii problemy migratsii i opyt ee regulirovaniia v polietnichnom Kavkazskom regione,” Tezisy Mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii, ed. by Zh. Zaionchkovskaia, V. Belozerov, Stavropol State University/Center for the Study of Forced Migration Problems in the CIS, Moscow, 2001.
7 See: M.N. Rutkevich, “O demograficheskikh faktorakh integratsii,” Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, No. 1, 1992,
p. 47.
8 See: Ibidem.
Table 2
Ethnonational Structural Dynamics of the Population of the Caucasian Republics
1939 1959 1970 1979 1989 2000s
Armenia
| Thou. people |
— Armenians 1,062 1,552 2,208 2,725 3,084 3,145
— Russians 51 56 66 70 51 15
*
Total population 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
— Armenians 82.8 88.0 88.6 89.72 93.3 97.9
— Russians 4.0 3.2 2.7 2.3 1.6 0.5
— others 13.2 8.8 8.7 8.0 5.1 1.6
Georgia
| Thou. people |
— Georgians 2,174 2,601 3,131 3,433 3,787 3,661
— Russians 309 408 397 372 341 68
*
Total population 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
— Georgians 61.4 64.3 66.8 68.75 70.1 83.7
— Russians 8.7 10.1 8.5 7.4 6.3 1.6
— others 29.9 25.6 24.7 23.9 23.6 14.7
Azerbaijan
| Thou. people |
— Azerbaijanis 1,870 2,494 3,777 4,709 5,805 7,205
— Russians 528 501 510 475 392 142
*
Total population 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
— Azerbaijanis 58.4 67.5 73.8 78.1 82.7 90.6
— Russians 16.5 13.6 10 7.89 5.6 1.8
— others 25.1 19.0 16.2 14.0 11.7 7.6
try’s population in 1989. It can roughly be said that at least one tenth of the residents of present-day Kazakhstan were not living in the republic at the time it acquired its independence. It stands to reason
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
that this proportion is noticeably higher among the economically and politically active strata of the population.
The main consequence of such mass migration is the change in Kazakhstan’s ethnonational appearance. At the end of the 20th century, Kazakhs were the predominant ethnic group, while in 2007 their share in the country’s total population came closer to 60%. As early as 1959, Russians were the largest ethnic group in the Kazakh S.S.R., while the share of Kazakhs in the republic’s total population amounted to only 30%. By 2007, the number of Russians had dropped to approximately one quarter.
How natural is this process in what until recently was the most Russian of all the former Soviet republics apart from Russia itself? The answer to this question largely depends on the choice of initial point of reference. The first Russian census in 1897 centuries recorded that the percentage of Kazakhs in the population living on the territory that subsequently comprised the Kazakh S.S.R. reached 85%, while Russians comprised less than 10% of the total population. The resettlement policy of the beginning of the 20th century and particularly the Soviet experiment dramatically changed the ethnodemographic balance that had formed. Proportionally the number of human losses among the nomadic and semi-nomadic Kazakh people proved the largest among all the large nationalities comprising the Soviet Union. In 1959, the absolute number of Kazakhs was lower than the 1897 level. But a gradual return to the norm is helping to restore the original ethnodemographic balance. Consequently, from the historical viewpoint, the evolution of Kazakhstan’s ethnic composition in the past few decades appears to be very natural. It is another matter that this process is also full of drama, only of a different sort.
Processes are unfolding in the other four Central Asian republics—Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—that are similar to those going on in Kazakhstan. The share of the titular ethnic groups in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in the total population is close to 80%. The share of the Russian population fluctuates from 1.1% in Tajikistan to 5% in Uzbekistan and to 6.8% in Turkmenistan.
In Kyrgyzstan, the share of Kyrgyz in the total population reaches almost 65%. Thus at the beginning of this decade there were still more than 600,000 Russians in the republic (although it is possible that this number is artificially high), which amounted to 12.5% of the country’s residents. Failed statehood and the socioeconomic crisis continuing in the republic helped to revive emigration from this country in 2001-2005, after a certain lull during the second half of the 1990s (see Table 1). Uzbekistan, which has been sinking all the lower into general poverty, is also undergoing reanimation along with Kyrgyzstan.
The revival in migration makes it possible to presume that by the end of this decade the number of Russians in Kyrgyzstan will decrease to 300-400,000 and in Uzbekistan to 800-900,000. Even if there is partial liberalization of the political regime, Turkmenistan will experience an increased outflow of Russians and Russian-speaking people. By 2010-2015, the total number of Russians will drop in the four Central Asian republics to 1-1.5 million people.
Belarus, Russia, Ukraine. Post-Soviet Russia actively received and “gave away” migrants throughout the 1990s and the first half of this decade. In 1989-1994, an average of approximately one million people came into the country every year, and in 1995-1997 more than half a million people. Closer to the mid-1990s, absolute flows of both immigrants and emigrants shrank, but in so doing emigration from Russia decreased at a noticeably greater rate. Between 1989 and 2006 a total of 5.8 million people left the country while 10.4 million arrived.
Like Russia, Belarus received migrants during its independent development, although on a more modest scale. Ukraine, on the contrary, is a migrant donor. Judging from the data of the latest censuses, the share of titular ethnic groups in the total population is increasing in Belarus and Ukraine. At the same time, there is a decrease in both republics in the total percentage of the three Slavic nationalities. Whereby the reproductive demographic characteristics of Belorussians, Russians, and Ukrainians are quite similar, which suggests that an increase in the percentage of Belorus-
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
sians and Ukrainians in the total population of their countries might be a statistical artifact. It is possible that during the last census many representatives of the Slavic people in the republics mentioned changed their ethnic affiliation by identifying themselves with the titular nation.
Russia is the only state in the post-Soviet expanse in which there is not only a decrease in the absolute size of the titular nation, but also a reduction in its percentage in the total population. Whereby this is happening despite the large inflow of migrants from the former Soviet republics, most of whom are Russians. The Soviet experiment undermined (if not destroyed) the Russian people’s demographic reproduction mechanism.
The Baltic countries. The ethno-demographic structure of the population in the Baltic republics during the years of independence has been changing in favor of the titular nationalities. In Lithuania, the share of Lithuanians in the total population reached 83.4% at the beginning of the 2000s, the share of Estonians in Estonia amounted to 67.9%, and of Latvians in Latvia to 57.7%. Whereby the absolute size of the titular nations in all three countries is decreasing and the increase in mono-ethnicity is the result of the rapid reduction in the size of the non-titular nations, particularly Russians.
Prospects. What is the future of a further concentration of nationalities within their own state boundaries in the post-Soviet space? In 2000-2001, the number of Russians in the former Soviet republics, excluding Russia, dropped to 18 million people compared with 25 million in 1989. There were 16.7 million Russians living outside the three Slavic countries. In our opinion, the official statistics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova present an artificially high number of Russians remaining in these republics. Nevertheless, even taking into account the possibly artificially high figures it would appear that the great migration of nations could last for another 10-15 years. But since the average age of the Russians still living in the former Soviet republics can be roughly estimated at 45 (and perhaps higher), it is unlikely that they will return to Russia in large numbers. Their significant (if not overwhelming) majority does not have enough money to move and settle in a new place. In addition, since the beginning of the 2000s, the Russian Federation has been consistently toughening up migration policy with respect to its former compatriots. The real potential of migration from the former Soviet republics to Russia until 2025 is estimated at 4-6/7 million people.9 Nevertheless, we believe that even these estimates are artificially high. It appears that, barring any sociopolitical disasters in the former republics, actual migration to the Russian Federation is no more than 2-3 million people.
Post-Soviet Labor Migration
Mass labor migration has become a vitally important factor of global development. At the turn of the 21st century, International Labor Organization experts estimated the number of guest workers in the world at 86 million people.10 Most of the world’s states are involved in global labor migration. Whereas in 2001 transfers by guest workers the world over were estimated at 72 billion dollars, in 2005 they reached 167 billion.11 Whereby the matter only concerns transfers through official bank
9 See: Zh. Zaionchkovskaia, “Pochemu Rossii neobkhodima immigratsionnaia politika,” Metodologiia i metody izucheniia migratsionnykh protsessov. Mezhdistsiplinarnoe uchebnoe posobie, ed. by Zh. Zaionhkovskaia, I. Molodikova, V. Mukomel, Center of Migration Studies, Moscow, 2007, p. 134.
10 See: Towards a Fair Deal for Migrant Workers in the Global Economy, International Labor Organization, Geneva, 2004, p. 7.
11 See: Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2006, pp. 87-88; Global Development Finance 2003: Striving for Stability in Development Finance, World Bank, Washington, D.C., April, 2003, pp. 157-159.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
channels, the amount of unofficial resources cannot be calculated with sufficient reliability. There are immense fluctuations in the estimates for different countries and regions.12
Labor migration has also acquired noticeable dimensions in the post-Soviet expanse. According to the most frequently encountered conservative estimates, up to 7-8.5 million people may be involved in interstate migration in the post-Soviet economies. All attempts to support even temporary labor migration from labor-surplus to labor-deficit Soviet republics with the help of administrative levers completely failed. What the command-administrative system failed to do was achieved by the market.
The differences in levels of development and material prosperity among the post-Soviet economies are vast and since 1999 have only been increasing. The severe fluctuations in development levels are the main driving force behind labor migration between the post-Soviet states.
Donor States of Labor Migrants. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, and to a certain extent Belarus act as donor states of labor resources. Several aspects of this phenomenon deserve special attention.
■ First, large contingents of the economically active population participate in migration in the donor countries (the author’s calculations); in Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Tajikistan up to one third of this category are involved in this process, while in Azerbaijan and Georgia up to 20-40% participate.
■ Second, approximately 70% of all migrant workers in the post-Soviet space (excluding the Baltic republics) go to Russia. These are primarily migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus. In addition to the Russian Federation, Central Asian and to a lesser extent Caucasian migrant workers have their sights set on Kazakhstan. Migrants from Ukraine are approximately equally distributed between Russia and the West. International migrant workers from Moldova are mainly oriented toward the European states.
■ Third, migrant transfers have become an important factor of economic development for the labor force export countries. In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the transfers of guest workers from Russia reach 11-14%, in Azerbaijan they amount to 8%, and in Moldova and Georgia to 5-6% of the gross national product.13 Let us take a closer look at the situation in individual donor states of labor migrants.
Ukraine: this is where the largest migratory labor flow forms among the post-Soviet countries. According to some estimates, labor migration from this republic amounts to 4-7 million people.14 We believe it comprises 3-4 million people, approximately half of whom go to Russia. According to other more modest estimates, labor migration from Ukraine amounts to 2-2.7 million people. Ukrainian migrant workers are mainly attracted to Russia (40-50%), Poland (15-20%), the Czech Republic (10-12%), Italy (around 10%), and Portugal (5-8%).15 We estimate the transfers of guest workers to constitute 4-5% of the Ukrainian GDP. This salary level of Ukrainian labor migrants may be somewhat lower than in reality. According to other data, their transfers amount to 58% of the country’s GDP.16
Azerbaijan: the second largest flow of migrant workers in the post-Soviet space forms here. Relatively mass labor migration from the Azerbaijani S.S.R. to Russia was observed as early as the
12 See: D. Agunias, Remittances and Development. Trends, Impacts, and Policy Options. A Review of the Literature, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, D.C., 2006, p. 8.
13 The author’s calculations.
14 [http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2007/0285/panorm01.php#12].
15 See: A.V. Pozniak, “Sovremennaia migratsionnaia situatsiia i problemy formirovaniia migratsionnoi politiki v Ukraine,” available at [http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2007/0285/analit07.php].
16 Calculated according to A.V. Pozniak, op. cit. It is believed that migrants send three quarters of their earnings
home.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
1980s. At the wane of the Soviet Union’s existence, Azeris began to temporarily settle in Moscow and other large Russian cities while still officially registered as employed in their homeland. Most of them came for 3-5 months to sell fruit, vegetables, and flowers. By the end of the 1980s, Azeris had essentially monopolized the Russian flower market. In 1989, approximately 4 billion rubles worth of flowers were exported from Azerbaijan, which amounted to more than half of the republic’s gross social product!17
We estimate the number of Azeri workers in Russia at 1.3 million people. During the few decades they have been working on the Russian market, Azeri merchants and laborers have created a geographically widespread ethnic network there. Therefore it is not surprising that Azeri migrant workers can be found in essentially every region of the Russian Federation. At the same time, at least half of the guest workers from this republic are concentrated in Moscow and St. Petersburg.18 In addition to Russia, approximately 200,000 Azeri laborers are working in Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.
Uzbekistan: labor migration from here remains terra incognita. There are not even any more of less reliable expert estimates of the number of labor migrants for this country. According to some data, approximately half a million Uzbeks work in Russia, but this estimate is considered to be artificially high.19 We believe that for 2006 this figure more likely underestimates than overestimates the real situation. The number of migrant workers from Uzbekistan can be roughly estimated at 700-800,000, approximately four fifths of whom are working in the Russian economy. In addition to the Russian Federation, Uzbek labor migrants are oriented toward Kazakhstan and even Kyrgyzstan. The latter attracts several thousand Uzbek workers from the border regions.20 Transfers by labor migrants home are estimated at no less than 4% of Uzbekistan’s GDP. In absolute terms, they are much higher than the foreign direct investments coming into the country. This is probably an extremely low estimate.
Tajikistan: the number of guest workers from this republic amounts to 600-650,000 people. Approximately 80-85% of migrant workers go to Russia, whereby most of them work in the Central, Siberian, and Volga federal districts.21 No less than one quarter of Tajik workers are concentrated in Moscow.22 Guest workers from Tajikistan are also attracted to Kazakhstan and to a certain extent to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
Most of the able-bodied men in those regions of Tajikistan where the civil war and general chaos of the 1990s dealt a particularly severe blow have left to earn a living abroad. According to the expert polls of the World Bank, in 1996 70% of the adult male population of such cities as Kurgan-Tiube and Garm worked in Russia and Iran.23 Most Tajik workers are unskilled. According to the polls, some 60% of labor migrants do not have any special qualifications, 12% specialize in the service sphere, and 7% qualify themselves as farmers.24 So it is not surprising that 51% of Tajik guest workers are employed in unskilled labor in construction, 34% in the service sphere, and only 6% in agriculture.25
17 See: A.S. Iunusov, “Trudovaia emigratsiia iz Azerbaijana: strategii intergratsii v rynok truda i riski,” in: Trudo-vaia migratsiia v SNG: sotsialnye i ekonomicheskie effekty, ed. by Zh. Zaionchkovskaia, Center for Study of Forced Migration Problems in the CIS, Independent Research Council for Migration of the CIS and Baltic Countries, RAS Institute of National Economic Forecasting, Moscow, 2003.
18 See: Ibidem.
19 Interview with Zh. Zaionchkovskaia, president of the Center for Study of Forced Migration Problems in the CIS, available at [http://analitic.efko.ru/news.php?idsubj=7&idnews=8742&npage=1&newsf=1& searchf=0&archivef=0].
20 See: A. Elebaeva, “Labor Migration in Kyrgyzstan,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3 (27), 2004, p. 80.
21 See: S. Olimova, I. Bosc, Labor Migration from Tajikistan, International Organization for Migration in Cooperation with the Sharq Scientific Research Center, Tajikistan, July, 2003, p. 22.
22 See: Ibid., p. 24.
23 See: When Things Fall Apart. Qualitative Studies of Poverty in the Former Soviet Union, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2003, p. 68.
24 See: S. Olimova, I. Bosc, op. cit., p. 30.
25 See: Ibid., p. 31.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Occupying the lowest labor niches in the host countries, Tajik workers also earn relatively low salaries. We estimate that their transfers home amount to 15-17% of Tajikistan’s GDP. In absolute terms, labor transfers are much higher than the volumes of official development assistance and foreign direct investments. After export revenues, migrant workers’ transfers are the main inflow of convertible currency into the Tajik economy.
Kyrgyzstan: according to our data, up to half a million people are involved in the republic’s labor migration processes. According to the estimates by Kyrgyz economists, transfers by guest workers amount to between 10% and 25% of the country’s GDP (200-500 million dollars), and migrants account for between 10% and 18% of Kyrgyzstan’s economically active population.26 The main force prompting laborers to leave the country is the widespread and profound poverty of most of the population. The main labor donors are the southern provinces of Kyrgyzstan—Osh, Jalal-Abad, and Batken. The overpopulated Ferghana valley with its stifling shortage of land forces large contingents to migrate abroad.
We determined the number of guest workers from Kyrgyzstan to Russia to be 350,000-400,000 people. The main areas of attraction are the Ural and Siberian regions, as well as the Volga region. Since 2002, a consulate general of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan has been operating in Ekaterinburg, which is especially engaged in the problems of labor migrants in the Ural, Volga, and Siberian federal districts.27 Since 2004, an abrupt increase in the number of illegal workers from Kyrgyzstan has also been designated in Moscow and the Moscow Region.
In addition to the Russian Federation, large contingents of Kyrgyz labor migrants also go to Kazakhstan. As early as 2002-2003, their number was estimated at more than 50,000 people.28 During the farming season up to 50-70,000 of the republic’s residents go to the Kazakh tobacco plantations in search of a job.29 The earnings of Kyrgyz laborers in Russia are evidently a little higher than for Tajiks. An illegal unskilled construction worker earns 180-200 dollars a month, whereas specialists (painters, electricians, and so on) earn 300-400 dollars. Shuttle workers who trade in Chinese commodities earn 700-1,000 dollars.30 According to the data of the payment balance, labor transfers amounted to 14% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP in 2006, which approximately coincides with our estimates. In so doing, transfers here amount to approximately half of the export revenues and are three-fold higher than the inflow of foreign resources under the “Foreign Direct Investments” clause.
Moldova: whereas labor migration from the country is estimated at 400,000-450,000 people, more than 40% households receive work transfers from abroad.31 According to the estimates of the World Bank for 2004, Moldova ranked third in the world in terms of labor migrant transfers to the GDP after the tiny state of Tonga, as well as Haiti.32 On the European continent, Moldova ranks first in terms of economic significance of labor transfers.
At the initial stage of independent development (1990-1994), the republic was characterized by the eastern vector of labor migration. Subsequently, Moldova began finding a niche for itself in the
26 See: D. Esenaliev, “Effekt vneshnei trudovoi migratsii dlia ekonomiki Kyrgyzstana polozhitelen,” available at [http://www.akipress.org/_ru_analit.php?id=736].
27 Interview by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic A. Aitmatov with the editors of Komsomolskaia pravda in Kyrgyzstan of 23 May, 2003 on questions regarding labor migration, available at [http://www.mfa.kg/index_ ru.php?news=95].
28 See: “Kyrgyzstan: Poverty Fuels Labor Migration in the South,” available at [http://eng.gateway.kg/cgi-bin/ page.pl?id=28&story_name= doc4063.shtml].
29 See: “Kyrgyzstan: Half a Million Labour Migrants Abroad,” available at [http://www.irinnews.org/ report.asp?ReportID=40232&Select Region=Central_Asia&SelectCountry=KYRGYZSTAN].
30 See: A. Elebaeva, op. cit., p. 96. It should be kept in mind that the estimates presented relate to 2003/2004. Today these earnings are at least 20-30% higher.
31 [http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2007/0285/panorm01.php#12].
32 See: Migration and Remittances..., p. 58.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
European labor market, thus the eastern vector was supplemented by the western.33 Some experts believe that since the end of the 1990s, the western and southwestern vectors have begun to dominate, while the importance of the eastern vector, mainly the Russian Federation, has begun to decline.34 There are two reasons for the reorientation toward Europe.
■ First, salaries in developed European countries are much higher than in the Russian Federation (800-1,000 euros and 250-300 euros).35
■ Second, criminal and police extortions, corruption, and bureaucracy are much more strongly manifested in Russia.
Nevertheless, we believe that right up until the present time, approximately two thirds of all Moldavian labor migrants have been oriented toward the Russian Federation. In Moldova, to judge by the data of payment balances that show transfers only through bank channels, migrant transfers amounted to approximately 18% of the GDP in 2006, which is more than half of national export and 2.5-fold higher than the inflow of foreign direct investments.
Georgia: there are no reliable estimates of labor migration for this republic. According to some data, the number of migrant workers from it reaches 1 million people.36 We believe this figure to be artificially high. We determine the number of Georgian migrant workers at 350-400,000, 85-90% of whom go to Russia. Whereby highly qualified workers leave Georgia in search of work—64.9% of the migrants polled have a profession, while 46.3% of them have higher education. In the host countries they are mainly engaged in low-skilled work and only 15% have jobs in their field of specialization.37 According to the estimates of Georgian experts, labor transfers home amount to between 720 million dollars38 and at least 4 billion.39 We think that both of these estimates are way too high, according to our calculations, transfers by Georgian workers amount to 400-500 million dollars or 6-7% of Georgia’s GDP.
Armenia: according to a recent sociological survey of households, in 2002-2005 alone labor migration from the republic was evaluated at 95,000-122,000, which amounts to 4-5% of the official size of the country’s population. Migrant workers comprise 7%-9% of the able-bodied population and 11%-14% of the able-bodied male population.40 Most guest workers from Armenia still go to Russia. During the period mentioned, 90.1% of labor migrants went to the CIS states in search of a job, including 87.6% to Russia, 2.2% to Ukraine, and 0.3% to Kazakhstan. In so doing, 95% of Armenian labor migrants work in the cities. Only 9.9% of guest workers went to markets beyond the CIS.41
Most of the Armenian labor migrants (43.1%) prefer to work in Moscow; such large cities as St. Petersburg, Tiumen, Cheliabinsk, and Rostov are also very popular. A total of 51.9% of Armenian guest workers who went to the Russian Federation in 2002-2005 worked in the regions of European
33 See: V.G. Moshniaga, “Regulirovanie trudovoi migratsii v Respublike Moldova: sostoianie i osnovnye etapy,” in: Trudovaia migratsiia v SNG: sotsialnye i ekonomicheskie effekty.
34 See: E. Burdelniy, “Izuchenie praktik regulirovaniia transgranichnykh trudovykh migratsii v Respublike Moldova,” Migratsiia v zerkale stran SNG (molodezhniy rakurs), ed. by I. Molodikova, ROO Center of Migration Studies, Dialog International Association, Moscow, 2006, p. 255.
35 See: Ibid., p. 256.
36 See: A. Iskandarian, “Migratsionnye protsessy i gosudartsvennoe stroitelstvo na postsovetskom Kavkaze,” Mi-gratiia v SNG i Baltii: cherez razlichiia problem k obshchemu informatsionnomu prostranstvu. Documents from a conference held in St. Petersburg on 8-9 September, 2000, ed. by G. Vitkovskaia, Zh. Zaionchkovskaia, Moscow, 2001.
37 See: N. Chelidze, Trudovaia migratsiia naseleniia Gruzii, Tbilisi, 2000.
38 See: T. Gugushvili, Vneshnie migratsionno-demograficheskie problemy Gruzii, Tbilisi, 1998.
39 See: R. Gachechiladze, Migratsiia naseleniia v Gruzii i eio sotsialno-ekonomicheskie posledstviia, Tbilisi, 1997.
40 See: A. Minasyan, B. Hancilova, Labor Migration from Armenia in 2002-2005. A Sociological Survey of Households, Erevan, 2005, pp. 55-56.
41 See: Ibid., p. 27.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Russia, 21% in the Urals, 8.2% in the Northern Caucasus, and 5.5% in Siberia. Only 40.3% of them had a profession, 23.1% worked in menial unskilled jobs, and 35.3% did not have any special qualifications at all.42 Armenian migrants are mainly engaged in services and commerce, while in countries of the Far Abroad they are occupied in construction. In Armenia, transfers of the ethnic diaspora (in this case it is impossible to single out labor transfers in pure form) top 15% of the GDP. Transfers, 70% of which come from Russia, are at least three-fold higher than foreign direct investments and reach almost two thirds of national export.
Host countries of labor migrants. Russia is the largest importer of labor in the post-Soviet expanse. According to official sources of the Russian Federal Migration Service, the recruitment of foreign workers on a legal basis into the Russian economy increased from 129,000 people in 1994 to
1.500.000 in 2006.43 The unregulated flow of labor migrants is much higher.
As a rule, specialists in migration analysis avoid giving direct absolute estimates of the number of guest workers in Russia, preferring to rely on relative indices. For example, one of the latest studies notes that whereas official data put the share of foreign workers at approximately 0.5% of all those employed in the Russian economy, in reality it reaches 5-7%, which corresponds to the level of such states as Belgium, France, and Sweden.44 Whereby in 2005 the official estimate of employment in the Russian Federation was 68,285,000 people,45 in absolute figures we get an index of 3.4-4.8 million. We will remind you that according to our rough estimates the number of labor migrants in the Russian economy amounts to 5-6 million people.
Along with Russia, Kazakhstan is a host country of guest workers in the post-Soviet expanse. The increase in production and export of oil, as well as of unrefined metals, has made this republic a leader in post-Soviet and even world economic growth. The relatively high standard of living and wages make Kazakhstan attractive to migrant workers from the former Soviet republics and particularly from the closest Central Asian states. Without supplies of natural raw materials for export Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are experiencing a profound socioeconomic crisis. Most of the population of these republics languishes in poverty. The economic growth potential, which also means the possibility of finding a job here, despite the reassuring official statistics, is not high. The gap in salary level between Kazakhstan, on the one hand, and Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, on the other, is constantly growing. In 2006, the average wage in the Kazakhstan economy was on the whole 4-5-fold higher than the Kyrgyz and Uzbek level and 9-10-fold higher than the Tajik.
As noted above, right up until 2004 Kazakhstan had a negative population migration balance. Over the past two or three decades several million qualified specialists left the country. Approximately 45% of those who left Kazakhstan in the 1990s are people with a higher and secondary specialized education.46 Consequently, the shortage of qualified workforce and specialists in Kazakhstan is much more acute than in Russia, which in the last decades has not lost qualified workers but accumulated them from abroad.
An important additional stimulator of labor migration to Kazakhstan from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is the traditional presence of the large Uzbek community there. According to the 1989 census,
325.000 Uzbeks were living in the KazS.S.R., whereby 285,000 of them (or four fifths) lived compactly
42 See: Ibid., p. 28.
43 See: E. Tiuriukanova, “Sovremenniy migratsionniy rezhim i ego osobennosti v Rossii,” Metodologiia i metody izucheniia migratsionnykh protsessov. Interdisciplinary textbook, ed. by Zh. Zaionchkovskaia, I. Molodikova, V. Mu-komel, Center of Migration Studies, Moscow, 2007, p. 107.
44 See: Ibidem.
45 See: Russian Statistical Yearbook-2006, Russian Federal State Statistics Service, CD-ROM.
46 See: E. Sadovskaia, “Trudovaia migratsiia v stranakh Tsentralnoi Azii: prichiny i sotsialno-ekonomicheskie pos-ledstviia,” in: Migratsiia v Tsentralnoi Azii: problemy i perspektivy, documents from an international conference (Almaty,
30 November, 2004), Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Foundation of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Daik-Press, Almaty, 2005, p. 19.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
in the south Chimkent Region on the border with Uzbekistan.47 Cross-border ethnic networks make it much easier for migrants to find work and help them to quickly adapt to their new life conditions.
The total number of guest workers in Kazakhstan is not known. According to the official data, in 2005, 53,700 labor migrants arrived in the republic, most of whom were citizens of the CIS states, primarily Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.48 The real number of foreign workers in Kazakhstan is many times higher than the official statistics. In 2002, expert estimates fluctuated between
200,000 and 500,000 people.49 According to some data, the number of guest workers in Kazakhstan (including temporary) is close to 1 million people.50 The number of Tajik workers alone (including seasonal) is estimated at 400,000.51
There is even less reliable information about the branch structure of employment of foreign workers. It is believed that approximately 60% of Tajik workers in Kazakhstan trade on the market, 20% are occupied in construction, 10% in industry, and the other 10% in various service spheres.52 Geographically, guest workers are concentrated in the official capital of Astana and in the southern regions bordering on Uzbekistan. It is obvious that with respect to both demand and supply powerful factors are still in effect that stimulate mass labor migration. The petrodollar-induced economic growth in Kazakhstan and Russia is turning these two countries into an increasingly attractive market for cheap low- and medium-skilled workers from the labor-surplus Central Asian and Caucasian states, particularly since Kazakhstan is next to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Closer to 2010 the Russian Federation will enter an acute depopulation phase. Correspondingly, the Russian economy’s need for imported labor will increase.
In turn, the high rates of demographic growth in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are creating constant pressure on the labor market and causing ever newer contingents of workers to migrate. The piteous material state in which most of the population of the Caucasus, Central Asia, Moldova, and Ukraine languishes is also encouraging labor migration.
Host countries are obviously trying to take control over the spontaneous movement of labor resources. With this in mind, migration and labor legislation is being toughened up and the administrative fines which employers must pay for using illegal workforce are increasing. Nevertheless, these measures have a limited effect. Ubiquitous corruption and, most important, the vast dimensions of migration are making it difficult to control the flows of labor resources, particularly since the differences among the post-Soviet states in terms of level of economic development and income are still in evidence, which objectively stimulates the movement of large masses of workers from the poorest to the relatively prosperous countries.
In Lieu of a Conclusion: Prospects for Post-Soviet Cross-Border Migration
This analysis showed that interstate migration exchanges in the post-Soviet expanse are stimulated by two powerful processes. First, the disintegration of the single state and emergence of new
47 See: Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989, Vol. II, State Statistics Board of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Republican Information Publishing Center, Alma-Ata, 1992, pp. 7, 138.
48 See: A. Dosmanbetova, “O problemakh trudovykh migrantov Respubliki Tajikistan na territorii Respubliki Kazakhstan,” available at [www.kisi.kz], 10 July, 2007.
49 See: E. Sadovskaia, op. cit., p. 22.
50 See: B. Sultanov, “Nelegalnaia migratsiia v Kazakhstane i problemy bezopasnosti strany,” Migratsii v Tsentral-noi Azii: problemy i perspektivy, documents of an international conference (Almaty, 30 November, 2004), p. 88.
51 See: A. Dosmanbetova, op. cit.
52 See: Ibidem.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
sovereign states, which is encouraging ethnic groups to remain concentrated within their own state territories, and, second, the growing mobility of labor in the globalization context. As of today, the great migration of nations to their historical homelands has pretty much come to an end. This is also halting the cross-border migration generated by this process.
The prospects for cross-border labor migration in the post-Soviet space are determined by three factors. First, by the various economic and demographic processes in different constituencies of the CIS. Second, by the rapid aging of the population in the post-Soviet republics hosting foreign workers. Third, by the anticipated aging of the population in most of the European countries. Let us take a closer look at these factors in the order they are presented.
The abrupt and growing gaps in levels of material prosperity and job opportunities are the main driving force behind labor migration between the newly independent states. Most of them have slithered to the bottom of world development, and resource-rich Kazakhstan and Russia have become ensconced somewhere in the middle. In addition, it is the relatively successful exporters of raw material, particularly the Russian Federation, that have entered a long period of demographic crisis, while the most underdeveloped post-Soviet republics are distinguished by high rates of demographic growth. Over a relatively short time, the different trends in economic and demographic development have been creating objective interdependence among the post-Soviet economies in labor terms.
Indeed, according to the current demographic forecasts, by 2015 Ukraine’s population will decrease by 10% compared to 2005, Georgia’s by 7%, Belarus’ by 6%, and Russia’s by 5%.53 In the next 20 years, Ukraine will head the list of countries distinguished by the most rapid rates of population decline. According to the middle version of the U.N.’s forecast, in 2005-2015, the Ukrainian population will decrease by 10%, and in 2015-2025 by another 11%. As early as 2020, the population of the Ukrainian republic will amount to less than 40 million people compared with 49 million in 2000. The size of its population will essentially return to the level of the beginning of the 1950s. There will be an even more rapid decline in the number of people aged 15-64. By 2020, the size of the ablebodied population will decrease by 16% compared with the 2005 level, and by 23% by 2025. In absolute terms, the size of the economically active population will decrease between 2005 and 2010 by approximately 1 million people and between 2010 and 2015 by almost 1.8 million. Between 2015 and 2025, the drop will amount to 4.5 million people. This means that very soon the Ukrainian economy will experience a serious shortage of workers. It does not seem likely that the growing deficit of labor resources will be compensated for by an explosive increase in labor productivity. In 2010-2015, Belarus will encounter a drop in the size of the able-bodied population and a little while later so will Moldova. Every five years, this drop will increase.
All of the above means that the potential of labor migration from the European republics of the CIS is close to exhaustion. Some experts also believe that Ukraine with its more comfortable climatic conditions could itself become a center of migration for people from Russia. Belarus could also claim this role.54
The potential of mass labor migration from Armenia and particularly from Georgia is also essentially close to exhaustion. After 2015, an intensive drop in the size of the population is forecast in the latter, which will only accelerate. In 2015-2025, Georgia will rank third in the list of countries with the most rapid drop in size of population after Ukraine and Bulgaria. After 2025, Georgia will rise to second place on this list. Between 2010 and 2015, a drop in the number of able-bodied people will begin. In the next decade, depopulation and aging of the population in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia will become accelerated. In 2005-2015 and 2015-2025, the size of the population in Latvia will decrease faster and in Lithuania and Estonia a little slower than in Russia.
! Here and hereafter we rely on the middle version of the U.N.’s global demographic forecast for 2004.
53
54 See: Zh. Zaionchkovskaia, “Pered litsom immigratsii,” Pro et Contra, November-December, 2005, p. 76.
In addition to everything else, this means that demand for foreign workers is rising in the labor markets of the Baltic countries. Along with Ukraine and Belarus, the stable Baltic states, which are part of the European expanse, will draw labor migrants from the western republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as the Russian Federation. Russia will enter an acute depopulation phase in the next ten years. By 2015, the Russian population will decrease by 5% compared to the 2005 level, and by 12% by 2030. The size of the able-bodied population will decrease even faster. The situation with the 15-24 and 40-49 age groups will become particularly tense. On the whole, the situation in Kazakhstan’s labor market is a little less acute. But here too after 2010 the size of the 15-24 and 40-49 age groups will decrease at accelerated rates. Russia and Kazakhstan can only compensate for this drop by means of incoming workers from labor-surplus Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
Finally, in the near future an increase should be expected in competition over foreign migrants between the post-Soviet labor-deficit countries and aging Europe. Europe’s aging will be accompanied by a major restructuring of the labor markets. These changes will evidently take the form of an increase in demand for guest workers. As was noted above, labor migration from Ukraine is approximately equally distributed between the Russian and European markets at present. This balance will most likely shift increasingly in Europe’s favor in the future. The latter will become an ever greater rival of the post-Soviet recipients of foreign workers.
It is possible that some European states may simplify the naturalization process for guest workers. It is also possible that the naturalization procedure for people from the neighboring European CIS republics will turn out to be even simpler than the similar procedure for labor migrants from Muslim and African countries. The latter is particularly likely in the event of a further increase in the trend toward a global civilizational confrontation. All of this will greatly increase Europe’s attractiveness as a destination for migrants from the post-Soviet republics.
Vakhtang BURDULI
D.Sc. (Econ.), department head at the Paata Gugushvili Institute of Economics
(Tbilisi, Georgia)
THE POTENTIAL OF HIGHER INVESTMENT ACTIVITY IN GEORGIA
Abstract
T
he author offers his analysis of the so-far inadequate investment activity in Georgia and points out that its ge-
oeconomic advantages should be more fully tapped. He explains the situation by the obsolete technology, insufficient re-
