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10A. Breusenko-Kuznetsov
Metaphysical theories of personality and the problems of demarcation of scientific theoretical knowledge
About the author
Abstract. The article is devoted to substantiation of the opportunity of introduction of domestic metaphysical theories of personality in scientific use. The reasons of accusation of metaphysical theories of personality in their unscientific nature are revealed. The measure of correctness of positivistic demarcations of knowledge is determined.
Keywords: metaphysical psychology, theory of personality, scientific knowledge
The main problem of our interest is specification of the bases for introduction of domestic metaphysical theories of personality into scientific use. The given theories in Soviet as well as in post-Soviet time got neither into foreign, nor in domestic historical reviews. Motivation of such reticence is ostensibly proved «unscientific nature» of the named theories.
The tasks that we set are clarification of reasons for accusation of metaphysical theories of personality in their unscientific nature (1), and also determination of measure of correctness of the given accusations (2).
The issue of scientific character of metaphysical theories of personality is a particular case of the question of scientific character of metaphysical theories in general. It is known that the taboo on metaphysical researches refers to the basic postulates of positivism which dominated in the philosophy of science in the 20th century. Within the limits of positivistic philosophical tradition originated the scientistic outlook which exaggerates the role of science in cognition of
the world and personality, sees science as the highest form of the culture capable to replace all other forms. It is characteristic that «scientists and theorists of science act as a united front just like before them did the representatives of church - the one that grants felicity: the truth belongs only to the doctrine of church, all the rest is pagan nonsense» [8, p.128]. Within the limits of scientism the problem of demarcation of scientific and unscientific forms of knowledge has got special - ideological - importance. In fact, only scientific knowledge is recognized as common obligation.
Certainly, the act of scientific theorization has the specificity compared with the act of art creativity, the act of religious-mystical comprehension, etc. The science is a logically structured way of cognition of the world, though it loses in speed and completeness of sensual involvement in the knowledge obtained. The attempts of science to substitute other forms of cultural comprehension is the result of scientistic depreciation of the latter. The depreciation is the result of
refusal to understand these or other cultures in their own logic, substitution of their understanding by a «scientific» explanation on principles of modern European rationality and adjustment under ostensibly universal standards of the European democracy. However, as P.Fejerabend noticed, «democratic principles in their modern understanding are incompatible with the sanguineous, isolated cultures not crippled by life» [8, p.131].
About resistance of scientists to reflections regarding their ideology P.Fejerabend writes the following: «the Ideology of scientists is seldom exposed to research. It is either not noticed, or considered to be the absolute truth, or it is included in certain researches in such a manner that any critical analysis inevitably leads to its acknowledgement» [8, p. 134]. The only way to separate methodological procedures from scientistic ideological taboo for the scientist is criticism of alien paradigmic forms of knowledge when the irrational motivation leads to inadequacy: «If the scientist has doubts in his own area of
knowledge for a long time, before daring to publish some findings or expressing criticism of the important principle, so to quit with a myth or unscientific cosmology, some ridiculous arguments and a minimum of knowledge are sufficient. Such arguments can be general or special. The general arguments are reduced to the instruction that criticized ideas have been regarded unscientific and consequently unacceptable» [8, p.136]. There is no need to remind that from scien-tistic academic communities metaphysical theories of personality received criticism of exclusively similar sort.
Dehumanistic character of scientistic requirements is shown in the sphere of science itself. Meth-odologists-positivists apply for a special measure of objectivity of scientific knowledge, that can be reached by empirical check and accompanying critical procedures. They are inclined to eliminate the influence of personality of the scientist on the theory, to consider scientific knowledge as «subjectless», isolated from the creator. To such alienation contributes
as inductivism (the view reducing scientific theories to generalization of the facts), and rationalism (which puts rational schemes of explaninig empirical data in the foundation of theories) - both approaches do not support originality. For critical rationalist K.Popper, scientific knowledge is «system of theories we work over like masons building a cathedral. The purpose consists in finding such theories which in a view of critical discussion appear most closely to the truth» [6, pp.535-536].
Demarcations of scientific knowledge from unscientific refer to justificationism (prescribing scientific theories to have evidential proof of all statements), probabilitism (demanding quite high degree of probability of theories), falsificationism (demanding theories to have an opportunity of their refutation, and from the author - humility and «scientific honesty»). Justificationism in B.Russel's execution demands full empirical justification of the theory («the offer, claiming the final number of events, «is verified» when all
these events occur and during any moment are perceived or recollected by any person» [7, p.478]. In K.Popper's falsificationism the essentially falsifiable theory but not yet falsified is admitted scientific. He appeals to «scientific honesty» of scientists which should encourage them to reject any theory which has entered into the contradiction with the facts. This moral maxim is added to the logic of falsification as a reasonable consequence.
About the fact that competition of theories for the domination is regulated by the rules of comparison of theory with facts, T.Kun's ironical metaphor speaks the following: «Verification is similar to natural selection: it keeps the most viable among available alternatives in a competitive historical situation» [1, p.190]. A similar selection is supposed by falsificationism too. T.Kun states that «adjudgment which leads the scientist to refusal of the earlier accepted theory is always based on something greater than comparison of the theory with the world surrounding
us. The decision to refuse a paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept other paradigm, and a verdict leading to such decision includes both comparison of both paradigms to the nature, and comparison of paradigms with each other» [1, pp.112-113]. In conditions of competition the hope for impartiality of the competing parties appears rather unsteady.
Requirements of critical rationalism, as we can see, are in the sphere of obligation, instead of describing a real practice of scientific creativity. M.Polani in his theory of «personal knowledge» resolutely «re-fused an ideal of scientific impartiality. In the exact sciences this false ideal, perhaps, does not bring a big harm... But ... in biology, psychology and sociology its influence appears destructive, deforming all our outlook even behind borders of science itself» [5, p.17]. M.Polani showed that «in every act of cognition there is a passionate contribution of the cognizing personality and that this additive is not the certificate of imperfection, but is essentially a necessary element of knowledge» [5, p.18]. In scientific theorization the
maintenance of specific views of the scientist-theorist is far not exhaustively formalizable: «All formal rules of scientific procedure are inevitably ambiguous, for their interpretation will be each time absolutely various depending on the focusing of scientist on specific representations about the nature of things. His chances to reach true and significant results to a critical extent depend on fidelity and depth of these views» [5, p.239]. And further: «The result received by means of mechanical application of strict rules, without a personal involvement of someone, cannot mean anything for anybody. So, refusing a vain pursuit of the formalized scientific method, the concept of an involvement accepts instead of it the personality of a scientist as an active subject responsible for the carrying out and verification of discoveries. Procedure which the scientist follows in his research is certainly methodical, though its methods are only maxims of some art which he applies in conformity with the own original approach to problems chosen» [5, p.317].
While M.Polani stresses personal selectivity of the scientist in perception of the facts, T.Kun speaks about corresponding influence of paradigms: «Operations and measurements are determined by a paradigm much more obviously, rather than a first-hand experience from which they partially occur. The science has no business with all possible laboratory operations. Instead of it, science selects operations relevant from the point of view of comparison of a paradigm to a first-hand experience which this paradigm partially defines» [1, p.168]. According to P.Feje-rabend, «there are also such facts which in general cannot be found out without the help of alternatives of the checked theory and which at once appear inaccessible as soon as we exclude alternatives from consideration» [8, p.170]. However, it is easy to guess, that demarcation diligently spent by critical rationalism between knowledge scientific and unscientific serves the elimination of not only theories inadequate to set rules, but also (implicitly) inconvenient facts. Those that will not be coordinated with critising
K.Popper's paradigm demand essentially other type of rationality.
About the fact, how little the representatives of scientific communities reckon with the inconvenient facts, M.Polani also writes the following: «Scientists pretty often ignore the data incompatible with accepted system of scientific knowledge, in hope that finally these data will appear erroneous or not concerning to business. The wise neglect of a similar sort of data prevents scientific laboratories from eternal absorption in vanity of the incoherent and vain efforts directed on the check of erroneous and mere allegations» [5, p.200].
Moving further, it is relevant to recollect that in structure of scientific knowledge three basic levels are traditionally allocated, they are: empirical, theoretical and metatheoretical (the last one includes the philosophical bases of science, a scientific picture of the world, methodological principles, etc.).
The highest form of the organization of scientific knowledge is the scientific theory (from Greek theoria - consideration, research, speculation, doctrine). It gives complete representation about essential communications (structural, functional, causal, genetic) and laws of a particular investigated area of reality (a subject field of explanations and interpretations) and represents system of logically interconnected statements as core of which is an idealized object - theoretical model of essential communications of the reality presented by means of certain hypothetical assumptions and idealization.
The theory is in essence the integrity which 1) is based on variety of the empirical facts and 2) is based on the variant metatheoretical basis. When positivis-tically conceiving experts in science aspire to an ideal of unification of theories, they, certainly, do so with their version of the metatheoretical bases, meaningly denying, or ignoring their real variability. Developing general scientific criteria of an acceptability of theories, they actually create positivistic criteria.
The refusal of positivists to include the philosophical bases in internal structure of a science is not in-common, the tendency to recognize influence of philosophy on the process of scientific knowledge is «exclusively external». However, metaphysicists (S.L.Frank, G.I.Chelpanov, etc.), included the philosophical bases in the structure of science as the necessary component, giving theories the world outlook, ontological and gnosiological support. T.Kun occupies an average position between positivists and met-aphysicists. He claims the philosophical bases of science cannot always be included in the structure of scientific knowledge, but only during the periods of scientific revolutions when formation of new fundamental theories generates the next paradigms.
In any case, (T.Kun's) «paradigm» as well as «research program » (I.Lakatos) belong to a metatheoret-ical context with a particular theory inside. The para-digmt by T.Kun represents «the conventional sample» where «the normal science» develops, dealing with
solving «puzzles» - the problems which are not striving for revolutionary discoveries. Paradigms «are a source of methods, problem situations and the standards of solution accepted by a certain scientific community at certain time» [1, p.142]. The program, according to I.Lakatos, «develops from methodological rules: some of them are the rules specifying what ways of research need to be avoided (negative heuristics), others are the rules specifying, what ways should be chosen and how they should be gone (positive heuristics)» [2, p.322].
Obvious domination of some paradigm (or the research program) is characteristic for natural and the exact sciences during each period of time, humanitarian sciences are essentially multiparadigmatic: there is not a consecutive change of paradigms in them, but coexistence within the limits of dialogue of cultures. Positivists reckon such a feature on the account of un-derdevelopment of humanitarian knowledge.
Development of the general criteria of scientific character for various paradigms faces a problem of
«incommensurability» (T.Kun, P.Fejerabend) of their versions of scientific experience. That is why «the fair competition» of theories proceeds not in the logic field, but in the field of rhetoric, ideology and social psychology. Frequently «research programs perish not because of the impact of arguments, but because their defenders perish in the struggle for survival» [8, p.319]. And «the argumentation is capable to detain the development of science, while cunning is necessary for its progress» [8, p.316]. Irrational ways of supporting the theory are needed because of inflexibility of rational criteria: «the Theory appears under a threat because verification either contains not analyzed impressions which only partly correspond to external processes, or is expressed in terms of the out-of-date views, or estimated by means of the auxiliary sciences which have lagged behind in the development» [8, p.198].
In history of science, as P.Fejerabend shows, «principles of critical rationalism (taking falsifications seriously; demanding growth of the content,
avoiding ad hoc hypotheses; «being fair» whatever it takes, etc.) and, accordingly, principles of logic empiricism (being exact; basing our theories on measurements; avoiding uncertain and unstable ideas, etc.) give inadequate understanding of the past development of science and create obstacles for its development in the future » [8, p.295]. Along with the logic side of falsificationism, it is possible to see rhetorical, predisposed for «intimidation of timid opponents» by loud slogans. And P.Fejerabend offers «solving argument against any method supporting uniformity, -empirical or any another . any such method is a method of a deceit: It supports ignorant conformism, and speaks about the truth; conducts to damage of spiritual abilities, to easing force of imagination, and speaks about deep understanding; destroys the most valuable gift of youth - enormous force of imagination, and speaks about learning» [8, p.177].
Polemics of scientism and antiscientism is marked by efforts as dispute of rationalism and irrationalism,
but at the same time it is dispute of logicism and his-toricism, ideological totalitarianism and pluralism, orientations to obligation and to reality. In T.Kun and I.Lakatos's polemic about the reasons of change of paradigms it is easy to notice basic distinction of approaches: T.Kun after M.Polani stresses a socially-psychological level of consideration of scientific revolutions, and I.Lakatos after K.Popperom - logic level (only he sees "internal" history of science in it, and all other refers to «external»). By doing so, I.Lakatos leaves the "irrational" bases of change of paradigms and ideological loading of ostensibly impartial scien-tistic methodological schemes outside the basic zone of consideration.
Colliding of theories and research programs in competitive struggle for existence on the bases of fal-sificationism leads to monopolization of scientistic outlooks, and as consequence, to dehumanization of a scientific life, to narrowing a field of researches, to stagnation. Alternatively, P.Fejerabend offered a
principle of «methodological pluralism» or the «anar-chism» assuming preservation in a field of a science -as in a valuable resource - also the theoretical constructions which have been not confirmed by the facts. This way of movement of science is counter-inductive. «The knowledge understood in this way is not a number of the consistent theories which are coming nearer to some ideal concept. It is not a gradual approach to the truth, and represents an increasing ocean of mutually incompatible, more likely (perhaps, even incommensurable) alternatives in which each separate theory, the fairy tale or a myth are the parts of one set, inducing each other to more careful development ... The task of the scientist ... consists in «do-ing the weak stronger» as sophists said, and by doing so, «to support movement of the whole» [8, pp.161162].
It is obvious that while in natural sciences the idea of methodological pluralism can be challenged, in humanitarian sciences following it has no reasonable alternative. The mental world of the person and the
forms of his creativity, accessible, are too wide to be captured by frameworks of one theory.
The scientific psychology historically originated in the act of denying metaphysics as a sole form of existence of psychological knowledge. It happened exactly at the beginning of the epoch of Scientism and was marked by introduction of a method of experiment. It is not surprising that positivism formed philosophical methodology of experimental tradition in psychological science. Transformation of psychology into a positive (natural) science became for some time an ideal of its construction. It is paradoxical, because realization of the given ideal is impossible in principle, as the object of psychology (a mental reality) is outside the subject domain of natural sciences.
Introduction of a method of the experiment borrowed from physiology and hastily adapted for solving psychological problems, became for psychology a powerful inoculation of natural-science methodological schemes. Together with schemes the world outlook forms connected with them were borrowed - the
ideas which historically go back to that understanding of scientific experience which was generated during an epoch of baroque (the 17th century) . The form of cognitive crisis specific to this epoch - «crisis of the law and experience» (I.P.Manokha) - corresponds to its basic content. That was the epoch of scientific revolution, institutionalization of science as an original way of cognition and transformation of the world. As science during that epoch found authority owing to the practical utility, institutionalizing science was more and more «turning to technics». Because of it, as writes I.P.Manokha, «the idea of experience as most effective and productive basis for formation of the person's vision of the world and corresponding ways of his interaction with the world is essentially getting poorer, as the focus is on the direct, real-practical experience while metaphysical experience, experience of intellectual comprehension of the reality remains behind the side of "practicality" so, utility and necessity» [3, p.21]. And further: «Speaking about the crisis of experience means narrowing the concept of experience only to one of possible levels of realization.
This fact looks especially amazing when it is considered on a background of a cultural-historical situation as a whole: the epoch which made great discovery of essence and opportunities of experience, narrowed it up to the most comprehensible, generalized and simplified forms» [3, p.21].
Many prejudices of the epoch of baroque since then have generated in each methodological crisis of the European science: mythologization of the law (which «it is not known why, but exists and operates» [3, p.22]); the simplified understanding of experience; the tendentious statement of naturalness of decentralized visions of space; persuasive belief in mechanical determinism which in psychology finds features of reflexological reduction of the mental phenomena, etc.
It should be noticed that the given prejudices of baroque have been for the first time reflected not today. Many authors of metaphysical theories of personality were specially engaged in their refutation.
They did it during the moment when for the psychology, allocated in a separate science, the crisis of 17th century was reproduced. From that newly appeared crisis of experience, according to D.S.Merezhkovsky's impressions, all domestic culture found new quality: «Unprecedented development of skilled knowledge has imposed original pressure on intellectual order of the modern person, has generated insuperable, instinctive mistrust to creative ability of spirit, to our internal, ideal world. The special sober mood of laboratories, scientific cabinets and medical clinics is penetrating into poetry, in religion, in love, in the attitude to death and to life. It is, if possible to say so, a smell and colour of the 19th century. At the same time the continuous, lasting for three centuries work of denying and destruction of former ideals could not but leave an indelible trace in people. The boundless grief and bitterness of cognition captivates our souls with feelings of boundless intellectual freedom, freedom unique, extraordinary, not so far experienced in one of the previous centuries» [4, p.173]. In «labora-tory-clinical» scenery people became «as gods». Their
authority, however, was based upon temptation from «a demon of scientific progress», and, as usual, demanded the oath: not to have other Lord, except for the idol of Science, piously to honour myths and rituals of the XVII-th century, etc. And when the ideal of construction of the Babel tower in the psychological science backsliding from philosophy only had started to appear, sound voices of psychologists-metaphysi-cists discording with the general mood started to be heard. In «scientific» outlook not all is equally scientific, specified L.M.Lopatin. «There is no objective psychology and it cannot exist, there is only objective method in psychology», showed G.I.Chelpanov. The metaphysical speculation itself is also a sort of experience, proved N.A.Berdyaev, I.A.Ilin, etc. Their opponents, however, were ready not to deny, but to knock down with the numerical superiority the truths inconvenient for them.
The victory of positivism over history of psychology was of a temporary character. Presently, experimental orientation in scientific psychology coexists with clinical. Their adherents form as though two
camps, being in antagonism. The experimental psychology adheres to positivistic outlook. Its strong parties are strict evidentialness, the tendency to establishment of objective truths which are not subject to individual research arbitrariness. But experimenting is a labor-consuming way with little space for a share of scientific intuition and imagination and conclusions of research works at times amaze with their particular character and practical futility. Other position has developed in the clinically-focused psychology where it is possible to meet pluralism of methodologies even the very exotic ones. The many-sided heritage of metaphysical psychology of the last centuries
has been kept and applied by clinical tradition to healing human souls. Both traditions have met on the general floor of psychology of personality. The experimental psychology has come to studying personality, preliminary having been at the end of its resource of studying elementary mental phenomena, and only on this basis has dared to rise to the generalizations of a highest level covering all individual mentality. The clinical tradition was initially interested in personality, in fact its representatives worked with complete personalities and tried to catch uniqueness in each personality (let it be the uniqueness of problems)
Conclusions
We made sure that representation about unscientific nature of metaphysical theories of personality entirely and completely belongs to ideology of scien-tism and submits to the "demarcation" logics in narrow frameworks of positivistic outlook.
As the monopolism of positivistic methodology in psychology is a temporary phenomenon, and in the field of psychology of personality it is not realized, the refusal to metaphysical theories of personality in their right to scientific character lies within the plane of historical fortuity.
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А.А. Бреусенко-Кузнецов Метафизические теории личности и проблема демаркации научно-теоретических знаний
Аннотация. Статья посвящена обоснованию возможности введения в научный обиход отечественных метафизических теорий личности. Выявляются причины обвинений метафизических теорий личности в ненаучности. Определяется мера оправданности позитивистских демаркаций знания.
Ключевые слова: метафизическая психология, теории личности, научное знание/
О.А. Бреусенко-Кузнецов Метафiзичнi теорш особистост i проблема демаркацп наукових
теоретичних знань
Анотащя. Статтю присвячено обГрунтуванню можливост введения у науковий вжи-ток в1тчизняних метаф1зичних теорш особистость Виявляються причини обвинува-чень метаф1зичних теорш особистост у ненауковость Визначаеться м1ра виправда-носл позитив1стських демаркацш знання.
KnwHoei слова: метаф1зична психолопя, теорп особистосп, наукове знання
