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23LOCAL CONCEPTION OF CORRUPTION IN EKEH'S TWO PUBLICS AND ACHEBE'S MAN OF THE PEOPLE IN THE CONTEXT OF PLEA BARGAIN STRATEGY IN NIGERIA
Iwu Nnaoma Hyacinth
PhD
Department of Political Science Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba-Akoko, Ondo State Nigeria
Abstract
Studies on corruption tend to view the phenomenon through a univocal lens. The problem that emerges is that the disparity that exists between official conceptions of corruption as codified in legal instruments and public policies and local conceptions of corruption often grounded in primordial ties and kinship networks are often eluded. More problems emerge as plea bargains permit public officials found guilty of corruption to only refund part of the monies entrusted in his/her cares. This situation cannot but raise serious challenges where people in a socio-cultural domain view public resources as good to be utilized to strengthen primordial expectations. This paper interfaces Ekeh's article on 'The Two Publics' in Africa and Achebe's tact portrayal of corruption in his novel 'A Man of the People' on Igbo society in the Plea Bargain as an anti-corruption policy in Nigeria. This paper, therefore, interrogates the efficacy of the plea bargain that negates the long historical analysis that shows a heroic celebration of corrupt officials at the primordial realm as a form of attack against the public realm perceived as a migrated social structure to be plundered. A community-centered paradigm is advocated as against institutional mechanisms for containing corruption in Nigeria.
Keywords: Local conception of corruption, anti-corruption agencies, public and primordial realm, plea bargain
1. Introduction
It has become a common buzzword to blame African woes on corruption; however, containing it remains elusive1. Certain questions emerge about the circumstances responsible for corruption in Nigeria. Some opinions attempt to expound perspectives that portray pre-colonial Africa as an environment inhabited by 'saints', therefore, the 'birth' of the 'devil' called corruption is blamed on colonial interjection and overrule. The question that remains unattained is how corrupt practices as emergent social behavior become easily internalized and remained resilient. Portraying the sainthood of the African past and holding a notion of its extension to post-colonial Africa is partly responsible for exonerating the primordial realm as a realm where corruption originates and is nurtured that infests the public realm. The notion in Ekeh2 of generalized morality of the private and public realm in the West as contrasted with Africa with a dominant morality of the private realm and the amoral nature of the public realm calls for reexamination. The reexamination becomes imperative, as corruption has remained resilient in Africa despite its obvious destruction.
The destructive consequences of corruption in Africa call for great worry. Why is an issue that is morally wrong in the private realm also morally wrong in the public in Western society? Is it the Christian belief as Ekeh2 shows or a moral imperative that is hinged on the enforceable laws? Why did Christian beliefs that enshrined moral behavior failed to accomplish the same in Africa under colonial rule? These questions need to be resolved. Ekeh2 refutes the nexus between Christian belief as creating a basis of morality in the private and public realm in Europe citing Banfield's3 article that drew attention to corruption in the Southern Italian village. In this case, Ekeh2 argues, "the total extension of
the Western conception of politics in terms of a monolithic public realm morally bound to the private realm can only be made at conceptual and theoretical peril". In this case, I argue that if there is the convergence in the amoral nature of human beings in both Western and African society in the absence of punitive and enforceable law it, therefore, highlights a clearer understanding of how Africa's weak institutions contribute to the festering and sustenance of corruption as contrasted from the Western society.
Achebe's4 "Man of the People" and Ayi Kwei Ar-mah famous novel "The beautiful ones are not yet born" that also presented corruption quagmire in Ghana[5] shows that weak institutions resulting from state fragility as I will argue later require a strong punitive and enforceable law contrary to plea bargain approach to fighting corruption in Nigeria. That Achebe'sMan of the People' find local people operating in the primordial realm culpable in corruption quagmire raises a problem of setting a time frame of transformation from the dominance of morality in the pre-colonial Africa to the dominance of immorality of the post-colonial Africa based on Ekeh's2 conceptual demarcation. However, Achebe, Ekeh, and Armah's articles converge on the destructive consequences of corruption and its strong impediment to collective development in Africa. My paper, therefore, contributes to the corpus of knowledge to an attempt to contain or eradicate corruption in Nigeria by interrogating the possibility of deploying a plea bargain as a strategy. This paper is written in five parts. The first is the introduction. The second part provides an overview of Nigerian society from the perspectives of Peter Ekeh2 and Achebe4, the third part provides an overview of corruption in Nigeria. The fourth part examines the possibility of containing or
eradicating corruption using plea bargains and the fifth part concludes the discussion.
2. The perspectives of Peter Ekeh (1975) and Chinua Achebe (1966) on Nigeria society
The interface between Ekeh and Achebe's articles is in the underlying description of Nigeria's local society as a realm separate from national society, even though the former's intention was to highlights colonial rule and its implication for postcolonial African states and the latter's epic description of Nanga the corrupt politician and Odili the moralists (or idealist) who later had to recontextualization his stance on politics4. Ekeh's theorization of two public of which the private realm stands in contradiction with the public in terms of moral disposition leaves the implicit understanding that colonial intrusion into autochthonous local societies came with the introduction of the notion of corruption. The notion of corrupt-free pre-colonial Nigerian societies downplays the existence of disparity and exploitation between the ruled and rulers in which the former challenged the position of the latter resulting in the conflicts that occurred in communal, slave, and feudal societies.
If we accept that pre-colonial African leaders exploited the common people among them, we can also assume that Ekeh's work attempts to show that both the leaders and followers in the private realm concealed their differences (the haves and have-not). In that case, the migrated social structures as the police, legislature, bureaucracy, etc became the target of attack. It is hard to accept that there was a conspiracy by both haves and have-not against the colonial rule because the nationalists and their local supporters displayed privileged lives that aroused suspicion and conflicts in the localities. Even the contemporary societies are equally drawn to view the African past in the light of been highly moral. Viewed as such, the act of immorality common in Africa society is blamed on the inability of parents to bring up their children in an African traditional way6. This moral portrayal of the African past ignores some harmful practices that brought sorrow to some in the past such as the killing of twins in Igbo society, human sacrifice, harmful widow practice, victimization of orphans, slavery, and subjugation.
The right of Kings to impose their will on their subjects and "war of all against all" as depicted by Thomas Hobbes in his Leviathan is a universal theory, therefore should not be missing in Ekeh's conception of the African past. Besides, the Treaties of John Lock that followed the absolutism of Hobbes confirm that the dis-advantaged in the earlier form of government viewed the system as corrupt, privileging, and excluding oth-ers7. Oral traditions, archaeological and early books by North African and Arab travelers contain information that shows inequality and servitude in pre-colonial Africa8. Ibos of Nigeria were described by Basden9 as occupying their time-fighting war among themselves, Abyssinia (Ethiopia), Rwanda, Swazi which is classified under absolute systems10, and the exploitation carried out by the Northern oligarchy against other members of the society were captured by Coleman11, and Ochono12.
Nevertheless, societies had institutions that guided against the concentration of power in an institution or a
person and averting the emergence of a rigid hierar-chy13. It is difficult to identify pre-colonial Africa societies described by Ekeh2, so guided by morality and where the absence of corruption was a ground norm or a given. I, therefore, argue that corruption as a social behavior predates the emergence of Nigeria as a state. Appropriation of what belongs to others or the entire community for personal use, existed with the human proclivity to assert hegemony over others. The nobles and the kings were differentiated from other people by the amount of wealth they possessed. Attempt to challenge this order resulted in an attack against the common people, since the nobles or kings in this pristine era represented the institution of governance and security.
The justification by Thomas Hobbes for the emergence of an absolute monarch to halt the state of nature provides the logic for the kings to assert inequality and rights to be respected by those who ordinarily would have been under precarious conditions. This interface between the ruler and the ruled is glossed over by Ekeh's2 portrayal of moralistic society before the emergence of colonialism. His position I consider misleading. One notes the argument made by Ekeh2 as thus:
When one moves across Western society to Africa, at least, one sees that the total extension of the Western conception of politics in terms of a monolithic public realm morally bound to the private realm can only be made at conceptual and theoretical peril. There is a private realm in Africa. But this private realm is differentially associated with the public realm in terms of morality. There are two public realms in postcolonial Africa, with different types of moral linkages to the private realm. At one level is the public realm in which primordial groupings, ties, and sentiments influence and determine the individual's public behavior. I shall call this the primordial public because it is closely identified with primordial groupings, sentiments, and activities, which nevertheless impinge on the public interest. The primordial public is moral and operates on the same moral imperatives as the private realm. On the other hand, there is a public realm that is historically associated with the colonial administration and which has become identified with popular politics in post-colonial Africa. It is based on civil structures: the military, the civil service, the police, etc. Its chief characteristic is that it has no moral linkages with the private realm. I shall call this the civic public. The civic public in Africa is amoral and lacks the generalized moral imperatives operative in the private realm and the primordial public.
Ekeh's position here is what I call 'moral partitioning'. His attempt to exonerate Africa's past from human proclivity towards misdeeds is misleading and problematic. At least, Harneit-sievers14 noted embezzlement and other forms of corruption in the local societies that reflect Ekeh's primordial realm. I argue, therefore, that a system of rule at the public realm targeting eradicating corruption in Africa and Nigeria, in particular, must be conscious of how it reinforces or exacerbates corruption at the primordial realm since it is not abhorred of corruption as Ekeh2 argues. An individual can be amoral and operates in that manner within the primordial realm, but can find expressive action
against the public realm when seen as a scapegoat. The problem with Ekeh's theorization is seen against his assumption that the individual in Africa is amoral only in relationship or interaction with the public realm. Against this backdrop, it becomes imperative to juxtapose Ekeh's two public vis-à-vis Achebe's novel "A Man of the People".
Achebe's4 work titled 'A Man of the People' reflects a realistic view of African society. It provides a narrative of the machinations of African politicians to enlist the support of the common people to advance their quest for political power. The story centered on Chief Nanga and Odili Samalu, sees Nigerian society as a continuum in the reproduction of corrupt people seeking to incorporate those who claim to possess a more moral character than others do. Local people as Achebe highlights are aware that the politicians seek political power to enrich themselves, but wish to give their support because of expectations of certain favor from the politicians. The expectation of rewards for their support restrains the common people from the open condemnation of any conduct by the politicians. This point of convergence provides a confidence level to the politicians who are aware that their sustainability in politics requires keeping the line of patronage open. The work shows that opposition against the political office holders is motivated by personal rather than common ethical norms. Intention and awareness on the part of the local people (Ekeh's primordial realm) show an interlocking behavior that cannot be differentiated based on location.
Chief Nanga slapped Odili (the supposed moralist) when he seized the microphone to tell the crowd that Chief Nanga is corrupt and a liar. He was aware that he will get the full support of the crowd. People came out in mass to welcome Chief Nanga including their local Chiefs when he came to a party rally in his hometown to canvass for votes. His people are aware of government corruption and accept it as a way of life. As Chief Nanga speaks, Odili demanded the microphone and he offered him. As Achebe captures it:
I come to tell you, people, that he is a liar and .... As he speaks, Nanga slaps him on the face. To Odili's shock, the crowd joins in the beating: He pulled the microphone away smartly, set it down, walked up to me, and slapped my face ... immediately hands seized my arms, but I am happy that he got one fairly good kick from me. He slapped me again and again. Edna rushed forward crying and tried to get between us but he pushed her. By this time, blows were falling as fast as rain on my head and body until something heavier than the rest seemed to split my skull. The last thing I remembered was seeing all the police officers turn round and walk quietly away.
Chief Nanga responded later in the listening ears of his people as thus:
What a fool. Whose son is he? Was he not here when the white men were eating? What did he do about it? Where was he when Chief Nanga fought and drove the white men away? Why envy now that the warrior is eating the rewards of his courage? If he were Chief Nanga would he not do much worse? (pp 155-156)
The fight by Chief Nanga, (just as the nationalists against colonial rule) was largely for personal rather than altruist reasons. This concealment extends to the formation of opposition parties that accuse incumbent parties of corruption. The formation of the Common People's Convention (CPC) party by Max and Odili to challenge the P.O.P party belonging to Chief Nanga was purely an elitist power struggle than determination to eradicate corruption as canvassed by CPC members. An example was that Odili (the moralist) did not resign from the CPC party having realized that his party has a support of a junior minister in the corrupt government of P.O.P rather concluded that political ideologies must consistently struggle even without coherent codes of conduct to survive4.
When common people support political leaders of this nature, they do so for the same reason because corruption is a common behavior among them. The puzzle is whether plea bargain as a policy can be effective to eradicate corruption in a society where there is a convergence of corruption between the primordial and public realm. Therefore, the great concern lies in finding out answers to how plea bargain (which takes back part of what is stolen by a corrupt government official and allows him/her to return home without saving a prison term that commensurate matches the offense committed ) can contribute to the eradication of corruption in Nigerian society. I will return to this argument later. The next section presents an overview of corruption in Nigeria.
3. Overview of corruption in Nigeria
While the concept of corruption encompasses so many things, the focus of this paper is as it relates to illegal means of appropriating public wealth for personal gains. Several reasons can be adduced for the prevalence of corruption in Nigeria but principally weak institutions emanating from state fragility are largely responsible. Weak institutions extend to hamper technological devices manufactured and deployed to identify corrupt persons in public offices as against appeal to moral reengineering. The police, army, and officers of the EFCC display such moral rectitude that confirms the sordid institutional mechanism for fighting corruption in Nigeria. Failure to deliver on economic and social security amplified a focus on re-contextualization of the post-colonial African state's ability to contain its various challenges. It mostly raised questions about the aftermath of the nationalists' struggles for independence15. Most African states are susceptible to conflicts16, suffer legitimacy crisis17, fail to provide security regarded as the most important political goods18, and lacking "stateness"19, that is, enforcement, the ultimate ability to send someone with a uniform and a gun to force people to comply with the state's law. A state that is unable to enforce its will especially in areas that demand moral rectitude according to Myrdal20, is soft. It, therefore, implies that a state must have an extensive and often highly punitive criminal and civil justice system that deploys substantial enforcement powers. Using corruption as a type of criminality to measure state failure is highly problematic but confirmable in Nigeria.
Corruption as a security problem raises the issues conversed by scholars on securitization21. Securitiza-tion teaches that the ruling elites can consider issues originally taken for granted or treated with kid gloves as security challenges, observing the phenomenon even from speech act, thereby broadening security agenda from state centeredness of security studies to include economic welfare, environmental concerns, cultural identities, political rights, individual and group security. The power elites then have the prerogative to label any issue as a security problem. They determine when, how, and why, and when a particular security threat is under control. In seeking to securitize the society, the elites are not bound to follow established rules or procedures as the survival of the threatened individual is uppermost21.
Equally important is that waging war against corruption in Nigeria receives support from United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Country Office Nigeria22, under the 10th European Development Fund1. The projects' outputs and achievements include the development of the Bibliography of Corruption in Nigeria; the Extradition Act (Modification) Order 2014 and Federal High Court (Extradition Proceedings) Rules 2015; the Federal Capital Territory Courts (Sentencing Guidelines) Practice Direction 2016; the Federal High Court (Corruption and Other Related Offences) Sentencing Guidelines and Practice Direction 2015; and the Code of Conduct Tribunal Ethics Guideline for Tribunal Staff. All the collaboration, including internal policies, has not resulted in eradicating corruption and how to deal with it remains elusive. Critiques and members of civil societies, who find themselves in government positions, easily become enmeshed in the looting of public funds for personal gains.
Nwolise23 had argued that the anti-corruption policy in Nigeria should be mainstreamed into a lexicon of strategy. The author assumes that since extant policies on corruption are not able to arrest the trend or ameliorate its devastating consequences, "the war must be well planned, multi-dimensionally pursued, well-coordinated, and with the peoples' participation"23. The work outlined four phases that can be followed to deal with corruption as thus: Phase one: preparation. Phase two: launching. Phase three: consolidation (enforcement and real war), and Phase four: sustenance (internationalization of anti-corruption to become a way of life in Nigeria). Broad acts that constitute corruption was highlighted in phase one stipulating red lines on stealing (referred as corruption) of public fund.
He argues in phase one that "in addition to returning stolen money, anybody who steals below N1,000,000. (One million naira) should go for community service (culture of shame) in the marketplace, a school, or government secretariat. Whoever steals between N1,000,000 and N5,000,000, should go for 10 years jail with hard labor. Whoever steals between N6,000,000 and N10,000,000 should face the death penalty. He posits that some people do not want to hear of the death penalty, but those who loot our commonwealth kill thousands of innocent citizens daily. In
1 The project supports the promotion of good governance, transparency, accountability, and anti-corruption policy in Nigeria. The implementation of this project is in three phases:
(i) strengthening anti-corruption policy-making, coordina-
phase two he argues that the launching of anti-corruption should be elaborate to include dethroning of money and enthronement of knowledge, patriotism, integrity, honesty, humility, good name, hard work, etc. In phase three he posits that anybody who crosses the "red line" must be arrested, prosecuted, and punished according to law no matter who is involved, arguing that if law enforcement agents begin to exclude sacred cows, horses, and elephants, then the war will be lost. Anybody who crosses the "red line" should be published in the newspapers and the internet with their pictures. Also, in phase four he posits that for internalization of anti-corruption ideas, values, and practices, people should learn the culture of keeping their hands away from public funds, and of questioning opulence and sources of people's wealth, instead of hailing thieves. Since corruption in Nigeria has made a dangerous dive he argues, it must be given a dangerous bullet. Though the author appeared to have anchored his confidence on the implementation of his postulations on President Buhari as a retired military officer, yet the work certifies the criteria of social science research, therefore the policy prescription can be deployed by other regimes whether engineered by a civilian president who does not have a military background or not.
Contemporary discussion on corruption is largely limited to attempts by the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), Code of Conduct Bureau, and Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) to contain corrupt practices in Nigeria24. These robust institutional mechanisms to fight corruption became a hallmark of the Fourth Republic differentiated from the previous attempt under military regimes. This is not new. Anti-corruption crusades emerged as far back as 1950 as a response against the prevailing state of corruption in some institutions25. The work shows that the League of Bribe Scorners founded by some students of Kings College in Lagos and the Anti-Bribery and Corruption Society of Nigeria in the 1950s emerged as a response against government institutions and society bedeviled by corruption. The report by the Federal Republic of Nigeria26, 27, cited in Enweremdu24 showed that there was an official inquiry established to investigate corrupt practices in the Eastern region government under the National Congress for Nigerian Citizens (NCNC). In 1962, a commission of inquiry known as Justice Coker Commission showed how politicians in the Western region under Action Group (AG) used the marketing boards then to divert millions of pounds for their party and personal use28 cited in Enweremdu24. It is well documented that the use of federal resources to enrich ethnic loyalties, mismanagement and party supporters elsewhere by the political office holders in the first republic accounted for the first military coup against the Nigerian state29, 30 , 31 ,32.
Therefore, containing corruption requires a more nuanced approach than the plea bargain offered by policymakers. To introduce a plea bargain in a society where there are amoral problems and opulence is construed as a sign of approval and institutionalization of corruption. The next section, therefore, interrogates the
tion, monitoring, legislation, and research in Nigeria; (ii) assisting the Nigerian government in strengthening relevant institutions, and (iii) facilitating the empowerment of civil society in the area of anti-corruption.
tenability of the success of plea bargain as an anti-corruption policy in Nigeria.
4. The possibility of containing or eradicating corruption using a plea bargain approach
There is controversy over which type of crime could be more appropriate if a plea bargain method can be used as an approach to contain it. The plea bargain originated in the USA33 where it is mainly used to deal with criminal cases as theft, abuse, injury, and other crimes not associated with looting public funds but in Nigeria used mainly in the trial of public officials facing charges of looting public funds. One question it raises is how to measure the impact of corruption and consequences if plea bargain serves the same purpose of punishing the offender to deter future occurrence. How local society views plea bargain becomes imperative unless taken as given that they are moral and will remain uninfluenced even when the national strata of the society are grossly enmeshed in corruption. No doubt Ekeh's attribution of innocence to the primordial realm could influence policymakers to ignore the effect of non-deterrence content of the plea bargain. As Achebe's Man of the People shows not even the moralist in the primordial realm can sustain the disposition of morality over a while before caving into the corrupt influence of the majority in the locality.
Adetomiwa34 shows that EFCC introduced the concept of plea bargain through the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act 2004 (EFCC Act). Section 14(2) of the Act provides as follows: "subject to the provisions of section 174 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (which relates to the power of the Attorney-General to institute, continue, takeover or discontinue any criminal proceedings against any person in any court of law), the Commission may compound any offense punishable under this Act by accepting such sums of money as it thinks fit, exceeding the amount to which that person would have been liable if he had been convicted of that offense." However, a plea bargain was introduced into the Nigerian criminal justice system by Lagos State under what is referred to as the Administration of Criminal Justice Law (ACJL 2007) of Lagos State. According to Adetomiwa34, it was possible since under the Nigerian legislative framework it is not the exclusive preserve of the center to enact laws to regulate the criminal justice system.
Plea bargain has been used to try three categories of financial crimes in Nigeria. The trial of some cases relating to advanced fee fraud like the 2004 celebrated case of FRN v. Nwude and others alongside their four companies arraigned before an Abuja High Court for swindling a Brazilian bank, Banko Noroeste S.A., Sao Paulo, Brazil the sum of $242 Million in which case one of the accused persons Amaka Anajemba changed her plea to a guilty plea in the middle of the trial. In the case, Amaka Anajemba got a two and half year imprisonment and the other two persons got 25 and 12 years and were made a refund of 110 million dollars to the Brazilian bank and 11.5 Million Dollars to the Federal Government including forfeiture of their houses and vehicles35. The second case is the one involving Mrs. Cecilia Ibru. In October 2010, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) charged the former Chief Executive Officer of Oceanic Bank International
Nigeria PLC, Mrs. Cecilia Ibru with twenty-five count charges on financial crimes. She entered into a plea bargain with the prosecution and pleaded guilty to a lesser three-count charge. The Court thereafter convicted her on the three-count charge and ordered the forfeiture of her assets amounting to about N191Billion. She was sentenced to six months on each of the three counts which ran concurrently. In effect, Mrs. Ibru only spent six months in jail35. This case of Mrs. Cecilia Ibru cannot be taken for public funds because ordinary people are the shareholders and government is the regulatory agency.
Public funds are only associated with government officials or employees of the government. My worry is on why plea bargain is used to try government officials who steal public funds and the implication on society. Sources of public funds as Niven36 posit is "all government revenue. That is to say, it is the money of the people of Nigeria. It comes from their taxes, from the Customs duties they pay, from the fees which are charged for various actions of Government Departments, from rents on lands and mining leases, from the stamps and postal orders they buy and so on," and I will add money from foreign loan and aid. The trial of former Inspector-General of Police Mr.Tafa Balogun in 2005 is a clear use of a plea bargain against a public official. In the trial, Mr.Tafa Balogun pleaded guilty to an amended eight-count charge of corruption and embezzlement of public funds to the tune of 10 billion nairas. He gave up most of the funds and got just six months for the offense which attracts a maximum of five-year jail terms. The issue applies to former Governor Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa State. He was sentenced to 12 years in prison on a six-count charge that on corruption and other economic offenses in 2007. Under a plea bargain, he was sentenced to two years on each count but all sentences ran concurrently, starting from the day he was arrested and detained and therefore released on the day he was sentenced.
In 2008, the former governor of Edo State from 1999 - 2007, Chief Lucky Nosakhare Igbinedion was arraigned by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) before the Federal High Court, Enugu on a 191- count charge of corruption, money laundering, and embezzlement of N2.9b. In a plea bargain arrangement, the EFCC through its counsel Mr. Rotimi Jacob reduced the 191- count charge to a one-count charge. In that case, Lucky Igbinedion refunded N500m, three properties, and pleaded guilty to the one-count charge37. The Deputy Director, Police Pensions Office John Yakubu Yusufu, got a reduced term and fine having pleaded guilty to charges against him. He was arraigned before a Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja, High Court on a 20-count charge for converting N32.8billion Police pension funds to his use. However, on 28 January 2015 Justice Abubakar Talba sentenced him to two years imprisonment on each of the counts with the option to pay a fine of N250, 000.00 for each count. Besides, the convict was ordered to forfeit 32 landed properties and the sum of N325.187 million to the Federal Government. This was because the convict saved the time of the court by pleading guilty38.
One major problem with a plea bargain in Nigeria is the lack of social relevance. It is not connected to society since its deterrence effect is missing. Ani35 argues
plea bargain provides immunity against corruption because the corrupt officials know that he/she will only refund a part of what was stolen from the public treasury with a reduced jail term if any when caught. I argue that a plea bargain can even turn the moral public into amoral public since the culprit is as good as a free person when caught in corrupt acts. A plea bargain is certainly a misnomer in a society condemned by corruption. Achebe's portrayal of African society as corrupt warrants that any targeting elimination of corruption must ensure strong punitive measures. More worrisome is that plea bargain undermines the consequences of looting public funds. It seriously ignores that failed roads, inadequate provision of security, insufficient medical care, insufficient electricity supply hunger, and crime including dependence on developed countries and loss of lives are connected to brazen looting of public funds that would have been used to contain the problems. As argued by Rawls39 under retributive law, punishment is justified because people deserve it. The argument is made as thus:
What we may call the retributive view is that punishment is justified because wrongdoing merits punishment. It is morally fitting that a person who does wrong should suffer in proportion to his wrongdoing. That a criminal should be punished follows from his guilt, and the severity of the appropriate punishment depends on the depravity of his act. The state of affairs where a wrongdoer suffers punishment is morally better than the state of affairs where he does not, and it is better irrespective of any of the consequences of punishing him.
Plea bargain I argue is another form of legitimizing corruption, since contrary to Ekeh's portrayal of the primordial realm as moralistic, African society has always been corrupt and remains corrupt till today. A society that is enmeshed in corruption would easily see plea bargain as the mere justification of the already held practice. Anti-corruption wars have failed because the framers failed to interrogate its societal relevance. Ekeh's two public and Achebe's man of people on local society in Nigeria is a clear indication that for any anticorruption policy to be effective the society must be part of the process. The pretense that refunding part of the looted public funds and returning home (joining your kiths and kins) in celebration of freedom as plea bargain suggests is a mockery and has emboldened the urge to steal public funds by public officials. The argument of Pierce40 is that corruption in Nigeria is simple not of 419 but a history of the cultural category. The challenge is that the label is used locally but it transcends regions, local moral communities, and traditions of moral discourse. Stapenhurst and Kpundeh41 had argued that the strategies to control corruption comprise long-term processes that are as much about changing attitudes and behavior as they are about changing the institutions of a society. Nigerian society reproduces corrupt officials that occupy the public space therefore the consequences should be very severe to attract deterrence.
Society knows that they will not have any corrupt person to celebrate as a hero if their kiths and kins are
serving life imprisonment or are killed by the government for looting public funds and his/her property confiscated or destroyed. The argument advanced in support of plea bargain stating that Nigeria state gained more in all the plea bargain entered into with looters of the public treasury on the ground that a lot of time and resources were saved, the accused persons did not get away with the loot, the recoveries were substantial and left the accused persons with nothing as far as the proceeds are concerned42 are just argument that completely ignore the consequences of looting public funds that would have been used to provide social services that could prevent unwarranted carnage on Nigeria roads, hospitals, poverty, and general insecurity. Further, Obla42 supports plea bargain on the premise that government officials accused of stealing public funds engage the services of the best defense lawyers that EFCC is not able to contain in the law court and that prosecuting financial crimes requires a lot of money that EFCC may not have, therefore recovery part of the looted funds is considered as gain to the country. This argument is made against the backdrop of others who regard plea bargains as a mockery of the legal process in Nigeria, 43 , 44. The consequences of corruption require se-curitizing the phenomenon. It should be treated under national security, and people killed for looting the public are seen as a process to uproot the fundamental cause for other malfeasances.
5. Conclusion
Containing corruption has been a major in Nigeria. People enter into the circle of government from their locality (even when they join politics from the city because of residence, they are required to go back to their various electoral wards for party registration) and return to their locality after service to the government. This nexus is important in the contextualization of the plea bargain. Ekeh and Achebe's portrayal of local society as being corrupt should call for concern about how the local people perceive plea bargains. Achebe was realistic in showing that people who beat up Odili the moralist were regarded as moralists before. Ekeh's compartmentalization of two societies in which one is moral and the other not is misconstrued since the primordial publics are aware of corruption and support it in the public realm. Therefore, a more punitive rule is needed that will instill fears in the society if corruption is to be eradicated.
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