CC BY
46UDC 34.01
DOI: 10.37399/2686-9241.2020.4.109-130
Legal State is the Goal of the Rule of Law
Valentin V. Ershov
Russian State University of Justice, Moscow, Russian Federation For correspondence: evv@rsuj.ru
Abstract
Introduction. The term "legal state" can be found in numerous international and national legal instruments, as well as in the works of contemporary scholars and scholars of previous generations. This word combination is widely used by politicians and lawyers. Its various applications dictate the need for a definition of the essence of the "rule of law" and its manifestations. Theoretical Basis. Methods. From the position of scientifically grounded concept of integrative legal understanding, according to which only principles and norms of law contained in a single, multilevel and developing system of national and international law forms implemented in the state, the article concludes that it is theoretically debatable that in the special literature, international and national legal documents and legal acts two separate concepts of "rule of law" and "legal state" exist.
Results. The notion of the rule of law has a long history of development. In the relevant context, the concept appeared as early as in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. At present, there are also many scientific works devoted to the study of this issue, which is still relevant. The article analyses the notion of the "rule of law" from the perspective of legal positivism as well as the scientifically grounded and scientifically debatable concept of integrative legal understanding. Based on the results of the study, the author concludes that the concept of "the rule of law" has evolved in different historical epochs under the influence of social, economic factors, emerging scientific views, but is still incomplete. From the perspective of the scientifically based concept of an integrative legal understanding, the author believes that it is theoretically more reasonable to view the rule of law as the goal of regulating legal relations in a legal state, self-limited not only by "internal" law, but also limited by "external" law.
Discussion and Conclusion. Concepts of the rule of law according to the types of legal understanding of the researchers can be classified into concepts developed on the basis of: legal positivism ('thin' concepts; scientifically debatable concepts of integrative legal understanding, arguably synthesising both the right and the wrong); scientifically substantiated concepts of integrative legal understanding. According to the latter approach, a valid legal state is not only self-limited by "internal" law, but is also limited by "external" law, and theoretically more precisely by the principles and norms of law contained in a single, evolving and multilevel system of national and international law forms.
Keywords: legal state, rule of law, legal positivism, integrative approach, legal understanding, legal norm, principle of law, system of law, national law, international law, system of legal forms, sources of law, dialectic
For citation: Ershov, V.V., 2020. Legal State is the Goal of the Rule of Law. Pravosudie/Justice, 2(4), pp. 109-130. DOI: 10.17238/2686-9241.2020.4.109-130
© EpwoB B.B., 2020
Правовое государство -цель верховенства права
В.В. Ершов
Российский государственный университет правосудия, г. Москва,
Российская Федерация
evv@rsuj.ru
Аннотация
Введение. Термин «правовое государство» содержится в многочисленных международных и национальных правовых актах, а также в трудах как современных ученых, так и ученых предыдущих поколений. Это словосочетание активно используют политики и юристы. Разнообразные сферы его применения диктуют необходимость обращения к определению сущности «верховенства права» и форм его проявления.
Теоретические основы. Методы. В статье с позиции научно обоснованной концепции ин-тегративного правопонимания, согласно которой в системе права синтезируются только принципы и нормы права, содержащиеся в единой, многоуровневой и развивающейся системе форм национального и международного права, реализуемых в государстве, сделан вывод о теоретической дискуссионности существования в специальной литературе, международных и национальных правовых документах и правовых актах двух отдельных концепций «верховенства права» и «правового государства».
Результаты исследования. Понятие «верховенство права» имеет длительную историю развития. В соответствующем контексте данное понятие появилось еще в трудах Платона и Аристотеля. В настоящее время также немало трудов ученых посвящено исследованию этой, не теряющей своей актуальности проблемы. В статье анализируется понятие «верховенство права» с позиций юридического позитивизма, а также научно обоснованной и научно дискуссионных концепций интегративного правопонимания. На основании результатов исследования автор статьи приходит к выводу, что концепция «верховенство права» развивалась в разные исторические эпохи под воздействием социальных, экономических факторов, складывающихся научных воззрений, однако по-прежнему является незавершенной. С позиции научно обоснованной концепции интегративного правопонимания автор считает, что теоретически более обоснованно рассматривать верховенство права как цель регулирования правоотношений в правовом государстве, самоограниченном не только «внутренним» правом, но и ограниченном «внешним» правом. Обсуждение и заключение. Концепции правового государства согласно типам правопонимания исследователей можно классифицировать на концепции, разработанные на основе: юридического позитивизма («тонкие» концепции; научно дискуссионные концепции интегративного правопонимания, спорно синтезирующие как право, так и неправо); научно обоснованной концепции интегративного правопонимания. Согласно последнему подходу действительное правовое государство не только самоограничено «внутренним», но и ограничено «внешним» правом, а теоретически точнее - принципами и нормами права, содержащимися в единой, развивающейся и многоуровневой системе форм национального и международного права.
Ключевые слова: правовое государство, верховенство права, юридический позитивизм, интегративный подход, правопонимание, норма права, принцип права, система права, национальное право, международное право, система форм права, источники права, диалектика
Для цитирования: Ершов В.В. Правовое государство - цель верховенства права // Пра-восудие^йсе. 2020. Т. 2, № 4. С. 109-130. DOI: 10.17238/2686-9241.2020.4.109-130
T he term "rule of law" is contained in numerous international and national instruments. The word combination is actively used by politicians and lawyers. Referring to the definition of the essence of "the rule of law" and its forms of expression dictates its diverse scope.
In the appropriate context, this concept appeared with Plato and Aristotle, and then was further developed by Christian philosophers. For example, Aristotle contrasted the rule of law with the supremacy of an individual, and Thomas Aquinas saw it as a complex concept, including a number of legal and institutional instruments "to protect citizens from the power of the state" [Bed-ner, A., 2010, p. 50]. The more interesting it is to address the analysis of the concept of "the rule of law" from the standpoint of legal positivism, as well as scientifically substantiated and scientifically discussed concepts of integrative legal understanding.
The concept of the rule of law in England has been shaped by common law courts since the XIII century. For example, during the reign of Henry II, H. Bracton believed that the king "...must obey God and the law, because the law creates a king" [Lafitsky, V.I., 2010, p. 340]. Later, this position, formed around 1260, found its development in the decisions of the common law courts. For example, in the Bonham's case (1610) Judge E. Coke concluded that "acts of the British Parliament may be invalidated by the courts if they contravene general rights and common sense or if they are disgusting and unenforceable" [Berger, R., 1969].
M. Kryger argued: "In accordance with the common law tradition, it has been common practice for many years to consider that 'from ancient times, the collection of unwritten covenants and customs' was the main source of law and the only way to confirm that a particular sentence is a common law norm, showing that it was always observed according to custom... The presence of another non-legislative source, namely, the decisions of the courts on specific cases submitted to them, testified in favour of this custom. This was the "common law" that supporters of the concept of the rule of law in the XVII century preferred to the orders of their king. Hence, "common law" is "a law formed by the established practice, a law not created by will, order or right of an autocrat, but restricting his rule, depriving him of the possibility to create arbitrariness... Of course... in the XVIII century... the law exceeded the customs of court life and even court decisions, becoming the main and increasingly powerful source of law also in cases of common law, by analogy with the rest of the world" [Kryger, M., 2013, pp. 473-474]. A.V. Dicey used the notion of "the rule of law" to establish restrictions imposed on the British government. "The rule of law," he wrote, "remains a distinctive feature of the English constitution to this day. In England, no one can be punished or indemnified for any of their acts, unless they are expressly prohibited by law. The lawful rights and responsibilities of every citizen are invariably determined by the ordinary courts of the Realm, and the rights of every person are, to a much lesser extent, the result of our constitution than that on which the constitution is based [Dicey, A.V., 1915]. As a follow-up to this view, A.V. Dicey emphasized: "The legal positivism move-
ment developed by J. Bentham, J. Austin and others, according to which law is defined by the state, is essentially instrumentalist and in no way consistent with the concept of the rule of law" [Dicey, A.V., 1915].
The Anglo-American concept of the rule of law consists of two essential and interrelated components: the rule of law, expressed in the obligation of every citizen to obey the law; and the limitation of the power of government, which consists in its obligation to act within the law. According to the theory of public consent put forward by J. Locke, first of all, power is given to the government with the consent of the people. Secondly, the government's only goal is to protect the rights of citizens. If the government does not do so, citizens have the right to call such government to account1. In this regard, according to the Anglo-American concept of the rule of law, the objectively existing citizens' rights limit the state power. At the same time, according to the continental concept of the rule of law, the government limits itself by granting citizens only positive rights.
The system of public authorities, in which each public authority would control other bodies, was designed to address these issues. Thus, James Madison wrote: "The best protection against the gradual concentration of several authorities in one agency is to provide those who manage the agency with the need for constitutional means and personal motives to counter the invasions of others... In other words, it is necessary to make sure that the ambitions of some oppose the ambitions of others. In the Declaration of Independence the founders of the USA established: Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, the rights of citizens are primary, inalienable and not granted by the state, and the task of the state power is to protect the inalienable rights of citizens from invasions on them by the state itself and other persons".
Roscoe Pound - one of the most famous American lawyers in the middle of the XX century - presented the current law in this case as follows: "The statutes are inferior to the well-established skills of legal thinking, which we call common law. Judges and lawyers do not hesitate to argue that there are su-perconstitutional restrictions on the legislature that put common law dogmas beyond the reach of statutes" [Cited in: Carr, R.R., 1940, p. 17]. Neither the English nor the American version of the concept of the rule of law provides answers to the most important question: what is law? Is it legislation? Court practice or something else?
The Russian concept of the rule of law has gone through several stages in its development. In the initial period, according to a fair comment by T.Ya. Khabrieva, "...such totalitarian and eastern elements of state life as the "supreme right of the ruler" (imperium) are increasingly strengthened. Authoritarian forms of power organization are being strengthened, and quite developed forms of self-government, such as evening meetings, assemblies of the land, etc. are being forgotten. This breakthrough occurred during the reign of Ivan the Terrible. At this time, a new concept of autocratic, unconstrained tsarist
1 U.S. Declaration of Independence.
power is being created. The imprint of Eastern traditions can also be found in later Russian history..." [Khabrieva, T.Ya., 2013, p. 99].
G.A. Gadzhiev called "a good constitution and judicial power, developing precedent in law" as prerequisites for the emergence of the Russian model of the concept of the rule of law [Gadzhiev, G.A., 2013, p. 226]. He rightly reminded that "...judicial law-making...existed in the second half of the XIX century due to the activity of the Governing Senate" [Gadzhiev, G.A., 2013, p. 223], but does not give arguments in favour of judicial law-making. In addition, G.A. Gadzhiev made a very characteristic conclusion: "The Russian judicial doctrine of the rule of law is at the very beginning of its formation, and develops taking into account the historically established legal tradition of the continental legal family" [Gadzhiev, G.A., 2013, p. 224].
These opinions do not provide clear answers to the main questions about the nature of the rule of law and its components.
In the study of the rule of law and legal state in the legal literature, the Eight Principles of Lon Fuller have traditionally been highlighted: 1) generality, 2) notice or publicity, 3) prospectivity, 4) clarity, 5) consistency, 6) conformability, 7) stability, 8) congruency [Fuller, L.L., 1969, pp. 33-38]. In his turn, K. Stern developed the principles of a legal state, which he limited only to the constitutional state. Among them, K. Stern singled out: 1) human dignity, freedom and equality, 2) control over state power, 3) legality, 4) legal protection, 5) compensation for damages, and 6) protection against abuse of power [Stern, K., 1984].
For all the importance of the names of the principles, they are the most general in nature and do not constitute law implemented in the state itself.
It seems that the notion of "the rule of law" provides for compliance with the law of any actions (inactions) of officials as well as national legal and individual acts of state and municipal authorities. However, in some countries the essence of the concept of "the rule of law" was identified as "rule by law", "rule by the law", or even "law by rules", which enabled governments to commit authoritarian acts [Sharandin, Yu.A. and Kravchenko, D.V., 2013, p. 308].
In the report of the Venice Commission of 25-26 March 2011, the concept of "supremacy of law" is characterized by six very ambiguous and controversial features:
legitimacy, including transparency, accountability and democracy in the process of passing laws;
legal certainty;
prevention of arbitrariness;
access to justice carried out by an independent and impartial court, with judicial control over acts adopted in an administrative procedure;
respect for human rights;
non-discrimination and equality before the law (para. 41 of the Report) [Cited in: Sharandin, Yu.A. and Kravchenko, D.V., 2013, p. 308].
In its turn, the World Justice Project refers to the four "rule of law" attributes, but also formulates them only in their most general form:
"1. The state apparatus and its officials and official representatives shall be subject to law.
2. Normative legal acts are clear and defined, are officially published, meet the requirements of stability and justice and are aimed at ensuring and protecting fundamental rights, including the protection of individuals and property.
3. The process of adoption, implementation and enforcement of normative legal acts is open, fair and rational.
4. Justice shall be administered by competent, highly moral and independent assessors or by a neutral person who has adequate resources and who reflects the structure of society..." [Cited in: Silkenat, J.R., 2013, p. 16].
When assessing this concept, it should be recognized that the World Justice Project organization rightly notes the need to "subordinate" the state power, its officials and representatives, as well as individuals and legal entities to law as a whole, and not only to the law. The weak point is the lack of a definition of law and its relationship to the law, which suggests that the concept of "the rule of law" needs further research.
The vulnerability of the World Justice Project definition of "the rule of law" did not prevent J.R. Silkenat from agreeing that the rule of law is a system of the four outlined principles. At the same time, the scholar recognized that "the rule of law is a constantly developing, living' principle... this principle is constantly evolving' [Silkenat, J.R., 2013, p. 15].
V.D. Zorkin referred both to the rule of law and legal state as "constitutional principles" [Zorkin, V.D., 2013, p. 20]. V.A. Vinogradov, who shares the idea of attributing the rule of law to the principles, believed that the "principle of the rule of law" consists of a whole set of "constitutional legal subprinciples" which they contain [Vinogradov, V.A., 2013, p. 376].
It seems that it is disputable to classify these categories as "principles of law". In my opinion, the fundamental (general) principles of national and/or international law, which are independent forms of national and/or international law, as well as special principles of national and/or international law contained in other forms of national and/or international law, are independent and primary legal regulators of legal relations as compared to the norms of law implemented in the state. With this theoretical approach, I believe that, first of all, it is debatable to refer to the rule of law as the principles of national and/or international law. Secondly, the law implemented in Russia is first of all objectified in the principles and norms of law contained not only in the Constitution as a fundamental act, but also in other types of national legal acts and other forms of national and/or international law.
According to G.A. Gadzhiev, "not only is the rule of law and legal state different from each other, but the rule of law does not exist (and cannot exist) as a universal, binding concept. This is most likely a... "family of interrelated concepts". To be more precise, a community of homogeneous but significantly different judicial doctrines... the rule of law in Russia develops primarily as a judicial doctrine with virtually passive participation of the legislator and the doctrine" [Gadzhiev, G.A., 2013, p. 214].
Traditionally, it is believed that the concept of the rule of law is most fully developed by A. Dicey in "The Basics of State Law in England", in which he
wrote: "No one shall be punished and made to pay in person or with his own wealth except for a certain violation of the law proven by ordinary legal means before the ordinary courts of the country... Residents are protected from the arbitrariness of power... (and) are subject to the laws, not whims... We have no one above the law... Every person, whatever his origin, is subject to the ordinary laws of the state and subject to the jurisdiction of ordinary courts... The Constitution is based on the rule of law, because the general principles of the Constitution... are the result of court decisions that define the rights of individuals in individual cases submitted to the courts... The most extraordinary powers which are given or authorized by the statutes cannot really be unlimited, as they depend on the expression of the act itself, and most importantly on the interpretation which the courts will give the statute..." [Dicey, A., 1905, pp. 209-210, 212, 216, 223, 400].
From the point of view of modern general law theory, it is unlikely that the conclusions about the rule of law that A. Dicey made can be recognized as an established doctrine, i. e. an established system of convincing and reliable scientific views that gained recognition. Certainly, for England of his time, his conclusions were a scientific breakthrough. However, modern law as a generic concept is expressed not only in the statutes he studied but also in other forms of both national and international law.
Lord Bingham in 2006, when analysing the first article of the UK Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which found that the Act could not adversely affect the "existing constitutional principle of the rule of law," reasonably noted: courts regularly refer to the rule of law but do not indicate what they mean by it [Bing-ham, L., 2007, pp. 67-85]. Therefore, many authors, for example, Raz, Finnis, Scklar, Waldron and Tamanaha, as L. Bingham says, doubt the meaning and value of this concept2.
The Rule of Law Index, published annually by the World Justice Project, assesses the rule of law using the following indicators: 1) limited powers of the state apparatus; 2) absence of corruption; 3) order and security; 4) fundamental rights; 5) open government; 6) proper law enforcement; 7) civil litigation; 8) criminal litigation. In my opinion, these data "indicators" are very vague and could be applied to a variety of both legal and non-legal social phenomena.
The special literature draws attention to the interpretation of the rule of law by B.Z. Tamanaha. The rule of law, in his opinion, requires that officials and citizens are subject to and act in a mandatory manner on the basis of law. This basic requirement determines the establishment of a minimum set of attributes: law must be established in advance (apply to the future), be publicized, general, clear, stable, defined and apply to all. In the absence of these attributes, the rule of law is not recognized" [Tamanaha, B.Z., 2009, p. 3]. In our opinion, the "minimal set of features" of the rule of law proposed by B.Z. Tamanaha is not original. These "attributes" may refer equally to certain forms of national law (in particular, national legal acts or customs), as well as to international and national law in all its forms.
Bingham L. The rule of law // The Cambridge Law Journal. 2007. Vol. 66. P. 67-85.
Both the above wording and other options suggest that experts view the concept of "the rule of law" as the opposite of arbitrariness. However, in this regard, the question remains: arbitrariness of which organs or persons?
М. Kryger reasonably noted: "...those writing about the rule of law often distinguish its 'thin' or 'formal' concepts, on the one hand, and 'thick', 'essential' or 'material' concepts, on the other. The former are limited to the formal properties of laws and legal institutions aimed at establishing the rule of law. The second require the inclusion of essential elements of the broader concept of an ideal society and state - democratic, with a market economy, respect for human rights or something similar" [Kryger, M., 2013, pp. 478-479]. According to Kryger, "modern legal scholars and analysts prefer the first path. They often even adopt... or expand... Lon Fuller's eight well-known principles relating to what he himself called "the ethics of law," in the sense that those principles were the defining characteristics of the rule of law, even if those lawyers did not agree with Fuller as to whether those principles were deservedly called moral and ethical. According to Fuller, these principles consisted in the fact that there must be some rules, which should be well-known, predictable, understandable, consistent, fundamentally feasible and stable enough - so that citizens could be guided by them in their actions - as well as implemented through methods that coincide with their conditions" [Kryger, M., 2013, p. 479].
Both "thin" and "thick" concepts of "the rule of law" appear to be theoretically debatable and practically ineffective, since they are limited to "the formal properties of laws and legal institutions aimed at forming the rule of law" or the inclusion of various social elements in the law - justice, human dignity, etc. I believe that as a result, such "blurring" of the right by the wrong can lead (and leads) to a variety of and even contradictory law enforcement (including judicial) practice, and, consequently, to the violation of rights and legal interests of individuals and legal entities [Ershov, V.V., 2013d].
Therefore, A.F. Cherdantsev and N.A. Vlasenko are right claiming the following: "From the point of view of ontology, we should not include into the concept of law diverse phenomena, although in some way related to each other. In this situation, law is deprived of ontological homogeneity, monolithic, and becomes an uncertain phenomenon" [Cherdantsev, A.F., 1999, p. 203; Vlasenko, N.A., 2014, p. 39]. From the point of view of ontology, based on the scientifically grounded concept of integrative understanding of law, it is theoretically more justified, and it is practically productive to recognize only homogeneous and only legal phenomena as "law" - first of all, principles and norms of law contained in the single, developing and multilevel system of forms of national and/or international law implemented in a state. As a result, law will be in continuous dialectical development from a lesser degree to a greater degree of its certainty.
For a long period of time, it was believed that "from the ancient times, the collection of unwritten covenants and customs... was the main source of law and the only way to confirm that a particular sentence is a common law norm, showing that it was observed according to custom ... In favour of this custom the presence of another non-legislative source evidenced, namely, the decisions
of the courts on specific cases... This was the 'common law' [Kryger, M., 2013, p. 473].
With the approval of legal positivism in the XVIII century, law began to be regarded as a product of the legislator, the "sovereign". In this regard, M. Kry-ger wrote: "Shocked by this decline in the status of law, which previously had supremacy over the sovereign, and by what they 'considered' 'arbitrariness' towards themselves on the part of the sovereign British Parliament, American colonists first organized a revolution, and then applied a breakthrough innovation - a written constitution, binding on the legislator and regularly monitored by an independent Supreme Court, whose decisions over time also became binding on the legislator. This was an innovative way to rehabilitate a longstanding legal principle" [Kryger, M., 2013, p. 476]. And since, as M. Kryger rightly acknowledged, "...legislation has outweighed court customs and even court decisions, becoming the main and increasingly powerful source of law in common law countries as well..." [Kryger, M., 2013, p. 474], the essence of the rule of law is to subordinate the state to law [Palombella, D., 2013, p. 362].
The third paragraph of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is rather significant in this regard: "Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law"3. The UN Secretary General explained this paragraph: "The rule of law is a core concept for the UN mission. It implies an organization of government in which all individuals, institutions, organizations, public and private, including the state itself, are subject to the laws (emphasis added. - V.E.), which, in turn, are subject to official publication, apply equally to all and are implemented by an independent court of law, and comply with international human rights standards and norms. It also requires ensuring implementation of the principles of priority of law, equality before the law, responsibility before the law, impartiality in law enforcement, separation of powers, participation of people in decision-making, legal certainty, prevention of arbitrariness, as well as procedural and legal transparency"4.
Reference is also made to the rule of law in the last preambular paragraph of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: "Being resolved, as the governments of European countries which are like-minded and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to take the first steps for the collective enforcement of some of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration".
The term "rule of law" is contained in many national constitutions, but in most of them "law" is limited to the "laws" adopted by the state's law-making bodies.
The above-mentioned shows that the concept of "the rule of law" developed in different historical epochs under the influence of social, economic factors
3 http www/un/org.ru/documents/decl.conv/declarations/declhr.shtml
4 The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies: Report of the Secretary-General (S/2004/616). 23 August 2004, par III 6.
and emerging scientific views, but is still incomplete. What is needed is not a simple clarification, detailing or rethinking of the concept of "the rule of law", but a substantial modernization, objectively suggesting the need for more in-depth theoretical research. From the point of view of the scientifically grounded concept of integrative understanding of the rule of law and taking into account the connection and interaction of these categories, I believe it is theoretically more reasonable to consider the regulation of legal relations in a legal state limited by domestic and international law as an objective. Other authors also pay attention to this connection. Thus, S.F. Udartsev and Zh.R. Temirbekov believe that "...the doctrines of the rule of law and legal state are two variants of designation of the priority of law (emphasis added. - V.E.), developing in different legal systems. The doctrine of the rule of law is a relatively more general expression of the place of law in society, and the doctrine of the rule of law is a relatively more private one, focused on determining the relationship between law and state, on programming the legitimacy and reasonable limitation (including self-limitation) of state activity as the main institution providing law-making and law enforcement" [Udartsev, S.F. and Temirbekov, Zh.R., 2015, p. 16].
Addressing the notion of "legal state" requires a definition of its scope, its constituent elements and nature.
For the first time, the notion of "legal state", as the researchers believe [Vinogradov, V.A., 2013, p. 373; Tidemann, P., 2013, p. 272], appeared in the work of Carl Welcker: he introduced these concepts to denote a state governed by the rational (general manifestation of will) [Welcker, C.T., 1813]. This understanding was interpreted by P. Tidemann: "Initially, the meaning and function of the Rechtsstaat principle was to preserve and protect individual freedoms through positive law" [Tidemann, P., 2013, p. 272] (emphasis added. - V. E.).
Following Welcker in the same XIX century, the rule of law attracted the attention of Robert von Mohl, who considered the goal of a legal state as a source of "law" ordering people's lives [Mohl, R., 1832]. Comparing it with other types of states - Machstaat (a state of power) or Polizeistaat (a police state), which could manage people without law - R. von Mohl deduced the following wording: "a legal state" can be considered as a state limited, at least, by its own principles and norms of law.
This approach is based, among other things, on the definition of a legal state developed by I. Kant.
I. Kant is traditionally recognized by most researchers as the founder of the legal concept of a legal state. As G.A. Gadzhiev emphasized, "Kant cared more about the problems of the structure of state power, not the individual, so this concept is called a legal state" [Gadzhiev, G.A., 2013, p. 215] (emphasis added. - V.E.).
As I. Kant believed, the fundamental principles of a state governed by fair laws are the freedom of every member of society as a human being, the equality of a person with other people as a subject, and the independence of every member of society as a citizen [Kant, I., 1793]. Such a state must involve citizens in
the process of creating laws, both directly and through their representatives; as a result, they will only have to comply with laws that they have chosen for themselves [Kant, I., 1793, pp. 46-48]. Thus, I. Kant defined the state as an association of many people according to the laws of justice, i. e. in essence as a "lawful" state.
After the French Revolution of 1848, views on the legal state changed: the prevailing view was that the "legal state" had nothing to do with the purpose of the state, but only with the methods and means of its implementation [Stahl, F.J., 1856, p. 137]. R. Grote summed up these views: "The end of the XIX century witnessed a gradual transformation of the Rechtsstaat concept into the principle of legality in its purest form" [Grote, R., 2013, p. 241]. And now many authors believe that "...the Rechtsstaat concept has become a constitutional principle of state management, which includes such fundamental organizational principles as the principle of separation of powers, the possibility of judicial review by the German Constitutional Court... as well as the principles of legality, fair procedure, legal certainty and proportionality" [Nedzel, N.E., 2013, p. 122].
In France, the concept of the legal state (Etat de droit) was developed on the basis of the embodiment of a single will (volonté générale), researched by J.-J. Rousseau. As it was believed by J. Gicquel and J.-E. Gicquel, a common will and respect for the Constitution result in "good governance, or a legal state" (emphasis added. - V.E.), under the shadow of which citizens are protected from arbitrary rule [Gicquel, J. and Gicquel, J.-E., 2011, p. 11].
According to the French legal doctrine of the time, the state, as Montesquieu wrote, "...is a society where there are laws" [Montesquieu, 1758, p. 268]. Later, F. Gélina made a convincing conclusion: "the semantic content of the concept of 'legal state'... is partly reduced to the concept of just 'state' until it was not associated in modern legal doctrine with the constitutional control of laws introduced by the 1958 Constitution" [Gélina, F., 2013, p. 274].
Thus, a study of German and French doctrine shows that the concept of the "legal state" in Germany and France has undergone significant changes over the course of several centuries and has now become very flexible and overly uncertain.
In Italy, a special study by G. Sartori was devoted to the problems of the legal state. In his view, "the true essence of the legal state (stato di diritto) is the self-subordination of the state to its own law; in case of 'the rule of law', the state is subject to law that is not its own" [Sartori, G., 1964, p. 311] (emphasis added. - V.E.).
The stated point of view causes a number of principal clarifications and objections. First, from the point of view of scientifically grounded concept of in-tegrative understanding it seems theoretically more reasonable to conditionally distinguish the law of "external" in relation to the state, for example, fundamental (general) principles of international law, and the law of "internal", "proper" (in particular, internal legal acts), operating in a single and multilevel system. Second, the given theoretical approach does not monopolize the process of law-making by the state, and the real true essence of the modern legal
state, in my opinion, is expressed in subordination of the state both to the "external" law and to the "internal" law. Third, the very existence of two separate concepts - "rule of laW' and "legal state" - seems theoretically debatable. It is no coincidence, I believe, that in special literature and in many international documents the concepts "rule of laW' and "legal state" are often not differentiated. It is no coincidence, I believe, that in special literature and in many international documents the concepts "rule of law" and "legal state" are often not discriminated and are even shown identical. Thus, in the text of the 2009 report of the European Commission for Democracy through Law "The Rule of Law and the Rechtsstaat" it was noted that these two doctrines overlap to a large extent and cannot be easily separated from each other, pursuing common goals to prevent arbitrary state actions5.
In Russia, among the specialists who studied the issues of the legal state, I will name first of all V.M. Gessen, F.F. Kokoshin, S.A. Kotlyarevsky, N.I. Pali-enko and B.N. Chicherin. Thus, V.M. Gessen, following German and French scientists, recognized a state as a legal state if it "in its activities, in the exercise of governmental and judicial functions is limited and bound by law, stands under the law and not outside and above it" [Hessen, V.M., 1917, p. 1]. Later, V.M. Gessen specified this understanding of a legal state: "... only a constitutional state can be a legal state" [Hessen, V.M., 1917, p. 1], and stressed at the same time that "the implementation of the constitutional principles by the basic laws, being necessary, is not a sufficient condition for a legal state" (emphasis added. - V.E.). In development of this provision, the scientist put forward a number of criteria: "The rule of law in the state life of the country suggests and requires a consistent and strict implementation of the beginning of the subjugation of government power. The presence of super-legal powers of the head of state - the right of dispensation, the right to issue exclusive decrees - contradicts the essence of the legal state. On the other hand, not only constitutional but also administrative reform is necessary for the state to be recognized as legal. There is a need for administrative legislation that minimizes the discretionary nature of government authority as far as possible; legislation that, while imposing duties on the authorities, gives citizens subjective public rights corresponding to those duties. Finally, without a system of legal guarantees ensuring the inviolability of public rights, there is no and cannot be a legal state. In particular, administrative justice - a kind of organization of judicial (rather than administrative) power, the purpose of which is to protect subjective public rights by abolishing an illegal administrative order - is the cornerstone of a legal state [Hessen, V.M., 1917].
B.N. Chicherin developed the concept of "protective liberalism" from the position of strong but democratic state power. He expressed the essence of this concept with the formula "liberal measures and strong power": "Liberal measures representing independent activity to society, ensuring the rights and per-
5 Report on the Rule of Law. Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 86th plenary session. Venice, 25-26 March 2011.
sonality of citizens"; "strong power, guardian of state unity, binding and restraining society, protecting order, strictly supervising the execution of laws... a reasonable force that will be able to defend public interests..."
[Chicherin, B.N., 1862] (emphasis added. - V.E.).
In his "Lectures on the General Theory of Law", N.M. Korkunov addressed the problem of the legal state: "Anyone who has power tends to abuse it; he always extends his power as far as he can. Therefore, to eliminate arbitrariness, it is necessary to divide power among different institutions so that the power of one stops and holds back the power of another" [Korkunov, N.M., 2003, p. 322].
S.F. Udartsev and J.R. Temirbekov note the internal evolution of the content of the term "legal state" from a state where "acts of law rule" to a legal state that provides real legal protection ("Rechtsschutzstaat") and a "state of justice" ("Justizstaat"), a state with legal legislation, with "legal power", i. e. limited by law, as a "rational" state [Udartsev, S.F. and Temirbekov, Zh.R., 2015, p. 15].
This evolution is reflected in the constitutional provisions of European states. In modern Europe, the term "legal state" at the constitutional level is usually denoted through its essential attributes. In the preamble to the Constitution of Portugal of 1967, Article 3 of which was characterized by the words "Sovereignty and legality", according to part 2, "the State is subject to the Constitution and is based on democratic legality"6 (emphasis added. - V.E.). In the preamble to the Spanish Constitution of 1978, the establishment of the legal state was defined as one of the objectives of the State; part 2 of Article 9 of the Spanish Constitution "guarantees the principle of legality..."7 (emphasis added. - V.E.). Part 3 of Article 20 of the Basic Law of Germany of 1949 contains a more complex formulation: "Legislation is bound by the constitutional order, executive power and justice - by the law and law"8 (emphasis added.- V.E.). Finally, the Union Constitution of the Swiss Confederation contains Article 5 "Principles of the operation of the legal state", according to which the basis and limit of state action is not "the law" or "the law and law", but "law" as a generic concept9. As we can see, a single European doctrine of the legal state has not found its consolidation in the constitutions of modern European states.
The Russian Constitution of 1993 in part 1 of Article 1 (as amended in 2020) states: "Russia is... a legal state"10. However, there is no definition or authentic interpretation of the term "legal state". Systematic interpretation of part 1 of Article 1 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation with its other articles allows to draw a conclusion that the legal state in Russia is a state primarily limited by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and Russian laws. For
Constitutions of European States. In 3 vols. Moscow: Norma, 2001. Vol. 2.
Ibid.
Ibid. Vol. 1.
Ibid. Vol. 3.
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202007040001
5
7
8
y
example: "The Constitution of the Russian Federation shall have supreme legal force on the entire territory of the Russian Federation (part 1 of Article 15); "All shall be equal before the law and the court" (part 1 of Article 19); "judges shall be independent and subject only to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal law. The court, having established during consideration of the case the inconsistency of the act of the state or other body to the law, shall take a decision in accordance with the law" (article 120).
A brief analysis of the opinions of foreign and Russian scientists, as well as the provisions of a number of international and Russian documents, I believe, allows us to draw several final conclusions.
1. In my opinion, the existence of two separate concepts "rule of law" and "legal state" in special literature, international and national documents is theoretically debatable.
2. From the point of view of the scientifically grounded concept of integra-tive understanding of the rule of law, I believe it is theoretically more reasonable to consider the rule of law as the goal of regulating legal relations in a legal state, self-limited not only by "internal" law, but also limited by "external" law.
3. Concepts of the legal state according to the types of legal understanding of its researchers can be classified into concepts developed on the basis of:
- legal positivism ("thin" concepts);
- scientific discussion concepts of integrative legal understanding that arguably synthesize both the right and the wrong [Ershov, V.V., 2013d, pp. 24-31].
- scientifically substantiated concept of integrative legal understanding.
4. According to the latter approach, a real legal state is not only limited by "internal" but by "external" law as well, and theoretically more precisely by the principles and norms of law contained in a single, developing and multilevel system of forms of national and/or international law.
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Information about the author / Информация об авторе
Valentin V. Ershov, Dr. Sci. (Law), Professor, Honored Lawyer of the Russian Federation, Honored Worker of Science of the Russian Federation, Academician of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, President of the Russian State University of Justice (69 Novocheremushkinskaya St., Moscow, 117418, Russian Federation)
Ершов Валентин Валентинович, доктор юридических наук, профессор, заслуженный юрист Российской Федерации, заслуженный деятель науки Российской Федерации, академик Российской академии естественных наук, президент ФГБОУВО «Российский государственный университет правосудия» (117418, Российская Федерация, г. Москва, ул. Новочеремушкинская, д. 69). E-mail: evv@rsuj.ru
