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117
Vladimer RAMISHVILI
President of the Georgian National Academy
(Tbilisi, Georgia).
JAVAKHETI OR JAVAKHK? THERE IS NO ARMENIAN-GEORGIAN CONSENSUS
Abstract
The author discusses the problems of Javakheti, a historical area that is now part of the Samtskhe-Javakheti Province of Georgia. The Armenians, whose ancestors
came there in the 19th century, insist that in the distant past the area was part of Armenia. The author analyzes all kinds of historical and ethnic collisions related to the issue.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
In Georgia, the Armenians are an ethnic and confessional minority living mainly in Tbilisi, Ja-vakheti, Abkhazia, and Ajaria. The chaos of the early 1990s led to certain problems in the relations between Tbilisi and some of the Armenian political organizations of the region.1 Since that time, the center’s authority remains limited there. After the “experiments” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Tbilisi prefers to refrain from putting too much pressure on Samtskhe-Javakheti with its predominantly Armenian population. The tension mounted when the Russian military base was removed; the still unresolved problem of the Meskhetian Turks who were deported in 1944 and have still not been returned to their historical homeland is doing nothing to relieve the strain.
The province, which is situated in the southwestern corner of Georgia, is one of its largest administrative units and one of the key geopolitical and geo-economic regions of the Central Caucasus (Transcaucasus): it is a transit territory for the BTC oil pipeline leading to Turkey, the pipeline being the “official enemy” of all the Armenians. This means that the local Armenians present a potential threat to it. It is expected that in a day or two a railway between Akhalkalaki and Kars (in Turkey) will cross the Armenian-populated area; therefore, terrorism and subversion cannot be completely excluded. In the 1990s, terrorist and subversion acts occurred in the Megri Corridor of the Baku-Nakhchy-van railway. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, which ends in Turkey, as well as the Baku-Sup-sa oil pipeline, is also threatened.
The history of the compact Armenian population in Samtskhe-Javakheti started 170 years ago. After winning the 1828-1829 war against the Ottoman Empire and seizing the Black Sea coast between the Kuban River and the port of Poti, as well as a large chunk of Meskheti and Javakheti, Russia started moving Armenians from Turkey to the Central Caucasus and Georgia in great numbers. The newcomers who settled in the Akhalkalaki uezd (Javakheti) soon outnumbered all the local Georgians. In the 1890s, the Armenians rebelled against the Ottoman Empire in the Southwestern Caucasus (Eastern Anatolia), but were defeated, and sought refuge in the Central Caucasus, including Javakheti. During World War I, the Armenians fled the Southwestern Caucasus for the Central Caucasus to avoid the hostilities unfolding on the Caucasian Front.
In 1919, the Ararat Republic (Caucasian Armenia) set up in Azerbaijan a year earlier started “its own” war against Georgia over Akhaltsikhe, Akhalkalaki, and some territories in Abkhazia that Erevan regarded as its own. At that time 120,000 Armenian refugees, some of them armed, turned up on Georgian territory (mainly in the Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikhe uezds),2 obviously wishing to settle there with the active support of the Dashnaktsutiun Party.3
The party, however, was pursuing far-reaching aims of its own: it dreamed of “Great Armenia stretching from sea to sea,” of which the Akhalkalaki uezd should become a part.4 Together with the National Council of Armenia in Georgia, Dashnaktsutiun was engaged in secret anti-Georgian activities.5 Erevan also claimed the Akhalkalaki uezd (homeland of the Akhyska Turks6) and the Azeri-populated Borchali uezd7 as part of Armenian territory.8 In 1944, when Stalin removed the Akhyska Turks from Javakheti, Armenians, not Georgians, moved in to the Turks’ historical lands. During the war between Abkhazia and Tbilisi in 1992-1993 the local Armenians fought side by side with the Abkhazes.
1 See: V. Guretskiy, “Javakhetskiy vopros,” available at [www.vub.ac.be/rubli/crs/rus/03_05R.htm].
2 See: Sh. Vadachkoria, Voprosy gruzino-armianskikh vzaimootnosheniy v politicheskoy mysli Gruzii (1918-1920), Tbilisi, 1999, pp. 88, 101.
3 See: Ibid., pp. 89, 91.
4 See: Ibid., p. 99.
5 See: Ibid., Para 2, pp. 104-111.
6 See: A. Iunusov, Meskhetinskie turki: dvazhdy deportirovanny narod, Baku, Ch. 1.
7 See: M. Sarvan, Old Borchali, Baku, 1998, Ch. 2 (in Azeri).
8 See: Sh. Vadachkoria, op. cit., Para 3, pp. 111-124.
The Javakheti Issue
Today, in the early 21st century, the Armenians, guided by inadequate historical information, claim that “the region’s indigenous population consisted of Armenians from time immemorial, because this territory has always been part of historical Armenia.”9
Russia consistently and deliberately moved Armenians to Georgian territory in several stages.10
In 1801, when the Kartli-Kakhetian Kingdom was liquidated, 2,000 Armenians settled around Tbilisi; in 1807-1808, 2,000 more arrived, followed in 1809-1811 by over 2,000. In 1829, the area received 70,000 Armenians from the Ottoman Empire. Between 1829 and 1831, 34,000 Armenians from Turkey arrived in Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki and 5,000 in Borchali. By 1865, there were 122,000 Armenians living in Georgia; in 1897, there were 197,000 of them. Between 1897 and 1902, 55,000 Armenians arrived in Georgia to bring the numerical strength of Georgia’s Armenian population up to 252,000 by the early 20th century; 124,900 of them (about half) lived in Tbilisi.
This was how Georgia received its Armenian population. “It was a purposeful process, through which the border areas were settled to make it easier to detach them from Georgia and to annex them without the use of force.”11 The newcomers “destroyed churches, towers, fortresses, and historic ruins. Monasteries were captured and holy images plundered, the peace of the cemeteries was disturbed.”12 Armenians did not limit themselves to these “cultural operations.” They brought their icons into old Georgian churches; at the earlier stages of Armenization, the Armenians limited themselves to building their churches next to Georgian churches. As the process gained momentum, they began using ruined Georgian monasteries with their fences still standing to build their own structures.
Back in 1926, Academician Ivane Javakhishvili wrote in his report to the Government of Georgia: “In 1828, Russia captured from the Turks Samtskhe, Javakheti, Erusheti, and Palakatsio populated by Muslim Georgians, who, driven to despair, had to leave the land of their ancestors. They moved to Turkey, but Count Paskevich would not allow Georgians from Imereti to settle on the vacated lands. He moved in 30,000 Armenians from Turkey. In 1830, due to the Russian officials, the Armenian population became the majority in Meskheti, where, until 1828, the Georgians had comprised over 90 percent.”13
Armenization of Javakheti
Early in the 20th century, in his book with the telltale title of Armenian Scholars and the Crying Stones, Georgian Ilya Chavchavadze exposed the Armenian “Kulturtragers” (barbarian beasts!). This outstanding writer and humanist concluded his book with: “Whether we were rich or poor when you came to our land, we gave you shelter and befriended you. Do not treat us as ene-
9 S. Minasian, “The Socioeconomic and Political Situation in Javakhetia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3 (33), 2005, p. 143.
10 See: Sh. Vadachkoria, op. cit., pp. 112-113.
11 Ibid., p. 112.
12 D. Berdzenishvili, “Akhalkalaki of Javakhetia,” Artanudzhi (Tbilisi), No. 7, 1998 (in Georgian).
13 Report by I.A. Javakhishvili to the Government of Georgia. 1926, Georgian State Historical Archives, rec. gr. 476, f. 6, sheets 82-111 (in Georgian) (quoted from: D. Berdzenishvili, op. cit.).
mies on our own land. An old Georgian saying warns: ‘It is much safer to meet a lion on your road than to have an enemy at home.’ This is what we say now and this is what any sober-minded Armenian will agree with.”14
The descendants of those who were brought to Georgia in the 19th century not only treat the Javakheti land as their own—they intend to remove from it the very memory of the Georgians. One of our contemporaries has written: “A huge poster of about 15 meters wide and 3 meters high placed at the roadside not far from the Russian military barracks in Akhalkalaki says: ‘Live on this land as its masters without fear ... there is the Russian army to defend you...’ The portrait of the man who said this is on the poster. I wondered who revived General Paskevich, who the Bolsheviks described as a reactionary. This is addressed to the Javakheti Armenians; these words encourage and incite them.”15
In 1830, the Russian Empire turned Karabakh and Javakheti into delayed action landmines operated from Moscow.
Until the 14th century, there were no Armenian inscriptions in Javakheti, which abounded in Georgian inscriptions to a much greater extent than all the other regions.
In 1903, after 75 years, the Armenians were in the majority among the 54,816-strong rural population of Javakheti; in 1913, in the Akhaltsikhe uezd alone, there were 41,873 Armenians. On the eve of the Bolshevik coup in 1921, Armenians comprised 82 percent of the uezd’s total population.
In 1922, when Soviet power struck root in the Central Caucasus, Erevan presented Moscow with its project, under which the larger part of Javakheti should have been joined to the Borchali uezd (Georgian territory with a mainly Azeri population) to form an Armenian administrative unit. Ivane Javakhishvili wrote in his report: “This plan was obviously the first step in a skillfully masterminded project under which two uezds were to be detached from the Georgian S.S.R. and transferred to Armenia. There would have been a second stage as well. A glance at the maps drawn by the Dashnaks is enough to realize that this was an attempt to achieve old aims using new means.”16 This attempt failed.
According to the U.S.S.R. 1989 population census, there were 437,211 Armenians living in Georgia (8.1 percent of its population). About 150,000 of them (34.2 percent) lived in Tbilisi; and about 75,000 (17.1 percent) lived in Abkhazia. The largest Armenian community (about 200,000, or 45.7 percent) was found in Samtskhe-Javakheti.
Javakheti is divided into two administrative units: the Akhalkalaki District (1,235 sq km with a population of 69,103) and Ninotsminda District (1,353.8 sq km with a population of 37,895). Javakheti is an Armenian region: according to official Georgian figures, Armenians comprise 91.3 percent of the local population.17
Armenian Movement in Javakheti
Economically, Javakheti is the least developed part of Georgia; in the absence of adequate funding it lacks highways and railways, while its urban infrastructure leaves much to be desired. There are many reasons for this sad state of affairs: the typical post-Soviet contrast between the center and the
14 I.G. Chavchavadze, Armenian Scholars and the Crying Stones, Tiflis, 1902, p. 123 (in Georgian).
15 D. Berdzenishvili, op. cit., p. 74.
16 I.A. Javakhishvili, op. cit., pp. 82-111.
17 See: Eri, 10 April, 1991 (in Georgian) and Panorama nedeli (No. 32, 1997) wrote that Georgians comprised 2.5 percent of the region’s total population.
periphery and the expansion, in the late 1950s, of the border area from the normal width of 7 to 27 km to 78 km along the Soviet-Turkish border. Its special conditions (applied to the larger part of Java-kheti and all of Meskheti [now called Samtskhe]) survived until perestroika. The local Armenians regarded it as an encroachment on their rights to maintain contacts with Armenia. In the latter half of the 1980s, when the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh supported by Erevan and Moscow stirred up trouble, the Georgian government adopted a special Program of the Socioeconomic Development of Javakheti.
Karabakh set an example for the Armenian nationalist movement enthusiastically emulated in Javakheti. The regions located in close proximity to Armenia have many things in common. It is no coincidence that volunteers from Javakheti (Akhalkalaki) poured into Nagorno-Karabakh to fight side by side with the local Armenians. Filaret Berikian, who for four years engaged in sorting out the Karabakh problem on behalf of the Armenian government, insisted that the Javakheti Armenians demonstrated intensive national self-awareness: “There were many of them in Karabakh and they formed their own armed units.”18
The volunteers brought back heaps of firearms; today Javakheti brims with weapons. It comes second only after Abkhazia and can be described as a potentially volatile region.
On 5 February, 1988, a week after the Karabakh movement swept Armenia, the local Armenians set up the Javakhk (Armenian form of the Georgian toponym Javakheti) Committee in Akhalkalaki to offer material support to their “Karabakh brothers.” In April-May 1988, the Committee developed into the mass Javakhk Popular Movement (JPM); in 1989, it was registered by the local authorities. Acting in the ethnically strained context influenced by the events in Georgia and encouraged by Erevan, the Dashnaktsutiun Party, the Armenian Church, and the Armenian diaspora JPM soon developed into a political movement. Today it can be described as an oppositional political organization with armed units that participated in the Karabakh conflict. It set up provisional administrative structures in Akhalkalaki that remained in power until November 1991 when an Armenian became the prefect. In 1994, when President Shevardnadze decided to set up the Samtskhe-Javakheti administrative unit, the Javakhk movement demanded independence for the local Armenians.19 It draws its radicalism from the Dashnaktsutiun Party.
So far the movement does not insist on separation from Georgia: the political demands formulated by the local Armenian sociopolitical groups in 1995 and addressed to the president of Georgia are limited to the desire to become a federal structure. Javakhk rejects the Samtskhe-Javakheti Province and wants to become “independent.”
Most of the local Armenians have sided with the Javakhk movement, the stated aims of which are: “Preserving the Armenian cultural heritage and science, teaching the history of Armenia in local secondary schools, defending national interests, and developing the region.” The movement has assumed the duty of protecting the rights of the local Armenians; its final aim, however, is unification with Armenia, autonomy within Georgia being but the first step toward the final goal.20
From the very beginning Moscow has been supporting these plans of the Armenians in Georgia and encouraging the separatist sentiments of the Abkhazians and South Ossets.21 Fully aware of Moscow’s support, the Council of Representatives of the Armenian Population of Javakheti supported the idea of “independence of Javakheti.”
The Abkhazian war of 1992-1993 added tension to the situation: first, the Abkhazian Armenians supported the Abkhazians; this fanned anti-Armenian sentiments in Georgia. Second, Russia,
18 V. Guretskiy’s interview with F. Berikian, Erevan, 28 August, 1997, in: V. Guretskiy, op. cit.
19 See: D. Darchiashvili, “Ethnic Relations as Security Factor in Southern Georgia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1, 2000, pp. 50-51.
20 See: V. Guretskiy, op. cit.
21 Ibidem.
which supported Abkhazian and South Ossetian separatism, could provoke a similar conflict in Java-kheti. There is the opinion that this was done in the fall of 1993 when Tbilisi was defeated in Abkhazia. The Javakhk leaders deny this, but admit that they cooperated with the Russian military base in Akhalkalaki. Had Georgian forces invaded Javakheti, they would have met with an “adequate response.”
The expert community is convinced that official Tbilisi cannot grant autonomy to the Armenians of Javakheti because conflicts usually start in autonomies, no matter how perfunctory they were under Soviet power. The Central Caucasus has supplied numerous examples: Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. The autonomous status encourages the local administrations to separate from the state, an intention frequently supported by referendums. This means that autonomous Javakheti might become the “Georgian Karabakh.”22
Their obvious separatist sentiments and steps notwithstanding, the Javakhk leaders continue to say that they have no intention ofjoining Armenia or demanding independence from Tbilisi: “We are not following in Nagorno-Karabakh’s footsteps.” They insist that they are campaigning for rights similar to those enjoyed by the national minorities of the “civilized world” and for the guarantee that these rights will be observed.23
In fact, the plans nurtured by Javakhk are separatist: having started with demands for autonomy in the future Georgian federation, the Armenian nationalists, encouraged by the example of Nagorno-Karabakh, will not stop at that. This explains why the Georgian press writes about the “Javakhk fifth column” and accuses the Javakhk leaders of separatism with good reason: Javakhk has not dropped the idea of separation from Georgia and remains devoted to it as one of the possible solutions.24 For the record, they are never tired of repeating that the “Armenian” administrative-territorial unit in Georgia is needed only in order to “have Armenian schools and conditions in which the local Armenians can preserve their traditional life style.”
Any casual observer can say that Javakhk is readying itself for all sorts of developments. The Armenians of Javakheti set up Parvants (the Armenian name for a lake called Paravani in Georgian), a quasi-military organization armed with Russian weapons left behind when the Russian military base was liquidated.
There are 5,000 fighters in the JPM’s ranks; its radical wing is influenced by Dashnaktsutiun, a party that has practiced terror at all stages of its history and insists that the province should become part of Armenia. The JPM also looks at Moscow and Erevan for guidance.
In view of the already smoldering conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the potential Ja-vakheti problem will create threats and disrupt Georgia’s territorial integrity.
The area is strategically important for Georgia, for Armenia, and for those who back both countries. In other words, while the rights of the local Armenians are Georgia’s domestic issue, the problem as a whole is at least a regional issue. Suffice it to say that:
■ The prehistory of the issue created by the Russian Empire’s resettlement policy in the Central Caucasus goes back to the 19th and early 20th centuries;
■ The Javakheti issue appeared in the latter half of the 19th century in the context of the Ar-menian-Georgian territorial contradictions25 at a time when Russia started moving large numbers of Iranian and Ottoman Armenians to the Central Caucasus, which it had captured by force. Since that time, Armenian and Georgian intellectuals have been engaged (purely academically under Soviet power) in heated debates about Javakheti’s historical affiliation;
22 [www.abkhaziainfo.f20/org/analytics.shtml].
23 See: S. Minasian, op. cit., pp. 147-148, 152.
24 See: V. Guretskiy, op. cit.
25 See: D. Darchiashvili, op. cit., p. 45.
■ In the post-Soviet period, however, the issue acquired geopolitical dimensions. Russia, which established close military and economic contacts with Armenia and plans to create a Moscow-Erevan-Tehran axis, is directly involved in the debate. First, Russia needs this to restore its former, pre-1991 influence in the Central Caucasus. Second, it wants its share in the regional and continental projects in which Azerbaijan and Georgia are involved. Third, it wants to close the door to the Central Caucasus for the West, the United States in particular. Fourth, it needs to neutralize the Ankara-Tbilisi-Baku axis that tends toward NATO to keep the U.S. and its allies out of the Caucasus. Fifth, by encouraging separatist sentiments in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Ajaria, and Javakheti, Russia plans to create a corridor between Armenia and Batumi independent of Georgia26;
■ As separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia threaten to rupture Georgia, the Armenians of Javakheti are sounding restive enough to prompt worries about a new breakaway movement27; they attach great importance to the Russian factor (the local Armenians were dead set against the withdrawal of the Russian military base from Akhalkalaki: it was seen as a military guarantor, an employer which paid in Russian currency willingly accepted in the region; while Armenians comprised a large part of its military contingent.
Armenia offered a non-trivial solution28 :
■ Ensuring physical security of the local Armenians;
■ Temporary deployment of a limited American contingent in the area;
■ Economic rehabilitation of Javakheti;
■ Erevan and the Armenian diaspora are prepared to shoulder the task of dealing with the most urgent measures designed to defuse the situation.
Armenia is paying a lot of attention to the region: there is an advisor on the issue among the staff of the Armenian prime minister (as if Javakheti were part of the Republic of Armenia), who has said: “The population feels they are not able in any way to be involved in the governance of their area. People are beginning to think that they are going to have to solve the issues themselves. The efforts to alert the Georgian government to social or economic problems fall flat, as officials tend to react to any noise as if it were the sound of separatist thunder.”29 A leader of Virk, one of the many local Armenian organizations, agrees with this. He explains that he favors autonomy because «we do not see any practical moves taken by the authorities in ... the past 10-12 years.”30
There is every reason to believe that Armenia has already “decided” the future of Javakheti.
Javakheti Today
Javakheti is another delayed action mine in a country badly wounded by two conflicts (in Abkhazia and South Ossetia). The increasingly insistent demands for autonomy do not allow the Georgian leaders to forget about this.
More than that: Erevan is also very active behind the scenes. First, with its extensive experience of “crawling annexation,” it is unlikely to stop halfway. Second, it can always count on Russia, which
26 See: Ibid., p. 46.
27 See: K. Stier, “Rumblings in Georgian Province Worry Two Countries,” available at [http://www.eurasianet.org/ departments/insight/articles/eav043002.shtml].
28 See: S. Minasian, op. cit., p. 152.
29 K. Stier, op. cit.
30 Ibidem.
wants to regain the lost position in the Central Caucasus. Third, Armenian emissaries who visited Javakheti were pleasantly surprised to find home from home there: the Armenian language is used everywhere; and Armenian music is heard from every side. Only the Georgian car number plates are a reminder that the area belongs to Georgia. Fourth, the Russian military base was an inalienable part of the local people’s everyday life.31 Inspired, the Armenian emissaries never hesitate to say that the withdrawal of the Russian base “could create certain threats to the physical safety of the Armenian residents of Samtskhe-Javakheti.”32 Erevan resorted to threats and warned Georgia that if it engages in acts of force against the Armenian political movements in Javakheti, “official Erevan will not remain impartial to the fate of its fellow countrymen living in Javakhk.”33
For many reasons Russia has still preserved its influence in the Central Caucasus and in Java-kheti as its part.34 Suffice it to say that:
■ In the 17th-19th century, it defeated the Ottoman and Iranian empires in a series of wars for the Caucasus;
■ During the 19th and early 20th centuries, it dominated the sub-region, which was part of the Russian Empire’s Caucasian vicegerency;
■ At the same time, it moved Ottoman and Iranian Armenians to the region in large numbers;
■ It set up its military and political structures in the 20th century and tied the region to Moscow with numerous economic threads.
Thanks to the persistent efforts of Erevan and Moscow, the situation in Javakheti is growing more and more political. It is under their influence that the local Armenian organizations have been demanding broad autonomy with even more zeal than before.35 The radical political parties of Armenia, Dashnaktsutiun, and the Armenian leaders never hesitate to interfere in the Javakheti problem.36 At the 29th Congress of Dashnaktsutiun in February 2004, it was stated: “We cherish our friendship with Georgia and might be interested in preserving its territorial integrity if its authorities realize that by refusing to grant autonomy to Javakhetia, something that the local Armenians want, they might threaten the interests of the entire country.”37 “The Dashnaktsutiun program states that one of its aims is to make Akhalkalaki part of Armenia.”38 Javakhk bases its program on similar strategic political ideas.39 The Armenian Church and diaspora are also involved in the Java-kheti issue.
Inspired by Moscow and Erevan, the Armenians of Javakheti and their organizations asked official Tbilisi “to grant the region of Samtskhe-Javakhetia (within its current administrative borders) and contiguous population settlements of Kvemo-Kartli, where most of the residents are also Armenians, the status of an autonomous federal unit of Georgia with broad self-government powers, including the right for the local population to elect all local self-government bodies, as well as make the Armenian language the second official language in the region.”40
31 [www.mediakavkaz.by.ru].
32 S. Minasian, “Samtskhe-Javakhetia: What Will Happen after Russia Withdraws Its Military Bases from Georgia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1 (37), 2006, p. 81.
33 Ibid., p. 83.
34 See: N. Gogorishvili, “Social and Political Situation in Samtskhe-Javakhetia and Around It,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5 (41), 2006, p. 139.
35 See: Ibid., p. 141.
36 See: Ibid., p. 143.
37 Ibid., p. 144.
38 Ibidem.
39 See: Ibidem.
40 S. Minasian, “Samtskhe-Javakhetia: What Will Happen after Russia Withdraws Its Military Bases from Georgia,” p. 85.
C o n c l u s i o n
It can be said that de facto Javakheti is an Armenian settlement on Georgian territory, since Tbilisi’s power can be described as virtual. The situation brings to mind Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
We should bear in mind the following:
■ In Kvemo-Kartli there are about 500,000 of Azeris; they are the most numerous national minority of Georgia;
■ Official Tbilisi should “rejoice” that the largest minority—the Azeris—who live in a compact group in Kvemo-Kartli, are saying nothing about autonomy or independence; they never act under separatist slogans, they have no political organizations of their own, they do not look to Baku for instructions: in short, they do not emulate the Javakheti Armenians, Abkhazians, or South Ossets.
In connection with the Armenian-Georgian disagreements over Javakheti, we should pay attention to the following:
■ There is an advisor on the Javakheti problem in the Armenian state structures;
■ This suggests that this problem is discussed at the higher state level and is heading in a definite direction;
■ From this it follows: Armenia is resolved to make Javakheti “Armenian territory;”
■ There are aspects that may cool the hot heads of those who want to detach Javakheti from Georgia. I have in mind the international geo-economic projects that need peace, order, harmony, and stability in the Central Caucasus;
■ They are TRACECA and the Great Silk Road—two transport lines that connect China and Europe via the Caucasus; the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Batumi-Supsa oil pipelines; the Blue Stream gas pipeline, which branches off to the Central Caucasus, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline; the agreement between Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine on a transportation corridor; the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway project; the Central Caucasian countries’ involvement in EU programs, NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, and their involvement in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, GUAM, and CIS.
If Erevan continues considering its relations with Baku and Tbilisi from the point of view of Moscow, it risks remaining on the roadside of globalization, which has already arrived in the Central Caucasus. Today, Armenia, which has limited its political horizon to Moscow and Tehran, is a political outcast in the economic, information, social, ethnic, financial, trade, and geostrategic and geopolitical respects. In short, the Republic of Armenia has driven itself into a corner by its territorial claims to its Central Caucasus neighbors.
