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ISSUES OF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT: FRANCHISING AS TOOL OF
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Kobylyanskaya A.V.
PhD student, State University of Management, Moscow, Russian Federation
К ВОПРОСУ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ ИННОВАЦИЯМИ: ФРАНЧАЙЗИНГ КАК ИНСТРУМЕНТ ТРАНСФЕРА ТЕХНОЛОГИЙ
Кобылянская А.В., аспирант, Государственный университет управления, Москва, Россия
АННОТАЦИЯ
В статье исследована роль процесса трансфера технологий в современной экономике, его возможности, проблемы и перспектив, в разрешении проблем инновационного развития и формирования устойчивой инновационной среды отечественной экономики. Выделен франчайзинг как эффективный инструмент трансфера технологий. Проанализированы особенности трансакционных издержек оппортунизма франчайзинга и выявлено, что последние под влиянием особенностей франчайзинга приобретают целый ряд существенных отличий от трансакционных издержек оппортунизма в экономике в целом. Эти отличия обусловлены такими особенностями франчайзинга как специфика заключения и реализации акта экономического взаимодействия, а также рядом временных, финансовых и правовых аспектов. Эти различия, однако, не учитываются, что предполагает снижение эффективности функционирования системы франчайзинга, а, следовательно, и экономики страны в целом и что требует оптимизации.
ABSTRACT
The paper studies the role of technology transfer process in the modern economy, its opportunities, challenges and prospects. Also the paper carries out the analysis of the importance of technology transfer for the resolution of problems of innovative development and the formation of a stable innovation environment of the Russian economy. Franchising as an effective tool of technology transfer is emphasized. The analysis of the characteristics of transaction costs of opportunism in franchising was carried out and was discovered that they influenced by the characteristics of franchising acquire a number of significant differences from the transaction costs of opportunism in the economy as a whole. These differences are due to such features of franchising as the specificity of the conclusion and implementation of an act of economic cooperation, as well as the time, financial and legal aspects. These differences however are not taken into account, which implies the loss of efficiency of functioning of a franchising system, and hence the economy as a whole, and which requires the optimization.
Ключевые слова: инновационные процессы, трансфер технологий, франчайзинг, трансакционные издержки оппортунизма.
Keywords: innovation processes, technology transfer, franchising, transaction costs of opportunism.
Formulation of the problem. In the global economy there is a tendency to strengthen the priority of innovative processes and technological nationalism. The modern economy - the knowledge economy, where the main employment growth accounted for the profession with a predominance of intellectual labor. Knowledge becomes the fourth factor of production, and its importance is becoming a higher priority than the resources, capital and labor.
Modern Russia's economy is characterized by a highly controversial state: on the one hand, our country has enormous natural, intellectual, human resources, on the other hand, it is characterized by a lack of development and aging
infrastructure innovation. Also in the domestic economy for a long time maintain disequilibrium processes that threaten to become a chronic, like the transition to a new technological system, market economy, etc. The prolonged transitional stage in the development of the Russian economy, and especially its regions, characterized by the presence of acute problems in the interaction of science and business. Overcoming this situation is significant for the formation of a new technological image of the country, creating a protective field of innovation and for healthy functioning of the national economy.
A stable institutional structure of the national economy is impossible without strengthening the interaction of science
and production systems needed to create competitive high-technology «from scientific idea to serial production» and to strengthen Russia's position in the global technology market. However, in Russia there is no real connection between industry and the scientific community, due to the low interest of domestic manufacturers in the results of innovation activity and manifested a break reproductive configuration intellectual property.
This gap is one of the reasons for the lag of the domestic economy because it decelerates implementation of scientific and technological potential of the country. It is necessary to create an innovative environment that will allow to realize the potential of the Russian economy and take into account the specifics of its financial, organizational, legal, fiscal and institutional aspects, and to support the competitiveness of the internal process. To manage the innovation environment at the national level requires infrastructure - the lymphatic system, which would link all elements of the environment. The most important element of this infrastructure is technology transfer.
In a broad sense, technology transfer is a series of social and technical processes of exchange and acquisition of ideas, knowledge, technologies and specialized technical skills, through which ideas and concepts move from the lab to market.
Technology transfer increases the stock of knowledge receptor, which forms the basis for their further exploitation and development into new products, processes, and is one of the most important factors in improving the competitiveness at the market. Of course, the technical superiority does not guarantee success in the market and a significant increase in profits. Nevertheless, the importance of technology in value-added products and services in the market economy cannot be denied.
At the macro level, technology transfer contributes to the accumulation of knowledge and enriches the technological basis of the country, acting as a catalyst for national economic growth, contributes to the formation of technical expertise and know-how of the country, stimulates production and increases the competitiveness in world trade. Technology transfer promotes adaptation, absorption and diffusion of knowledge and technology in society as a whole, forms the background to the generation of new knowledge, strengthen cooperation and interaction between the parties, improves the quality of life. It is a key factor in economic development, reducing the technological gap between the two countries, enhance the efficiency of all sectors of the economy [1]. The problem of technology transfer is important for both developed countries and developing, as the tool of problem regulation in various fields from medicine to ecology and energy and space exploration [2].
The Russian economy needs a policy of «technology push» and infrastructure capable of supporting and correct its effects. On the one hand technology transfer will allow to form a stable point of contact between large corporations, small / medium-sized businesses and the population, and to provide practical recommendations for corrective legislative and methodological support of the innovation environment. On the other hand, it will solve the problems of the innovative environment at the level of long-term management as a question of principle is not only a breakthrough, which in these circumstances is
likely, but the willingness and ability to maintain and increase the innovative capacity of the domestic economy, which is currently not possible.
One of the most flexible and mobile tools of technology transfer is franchising. In world practice, the franchising is recognized as an effective form of mainly small and medium enterprises, the possibility of which is not enough implemented in the domestic market. Already we can note that the variety and applicability of franchising promotes Russian middle class has an impact on the market structure, promoting self-employment, improve the quality of products and services. Especially the franchising concept is significant in terms of active development of globalization processes on the background of the crisis, the imposition of sanctions in relation to the Russian economy and the acute problems of the regions.
Also franchising is a form of transfer of accumulated know-how, available to consumers, and can operate with any know-how, the form that the government can use as the most effective mediator between technology and the consumer. It is important to ensure that there is no export of ideas for the foreign market, and cultivate innovation in relation to the integration of Russia's borders in order to achieve a high concentration of ideas and technical solutions and the formation of much needed stability in our country. It should also be noted that the franchising corresponds to the basic principle of the implementation of the processes of technology transfer - permanent relationship between the two companies so that the recipient can adopt the technology in line with quality standards and cost-effectiveness and the subsequent distribution of risks, resources and experience. In general, alliances, such as franchising, are crucial for the development of technology transfer. Along with it, franchising opportunities are not enough implemented in the Russian economy.
Analysis of recent researches. World practice has shown that franchising is one of the most effective ways of business development for companies already achieved success and want to develop their success further. On the other hand, franchising is the best opportunity to organize own secure business, not only for the small entrepreneurs, novice businessmen, but even for a men who never ran their own business. In the United States during the period from 1980 to 2003, the number of franchised retail outlets increased by 146 percent, increasing by an average of 6 percent per year, and if from 1980 to 1991 their number has increased by only 28 percent, then from 1995 to 2005 by 92 percent, reflecting the significant growth rates [3]. The development of franchising in Russia during the same period, 1995-2005, was lagging, largely due to the peculiarities of the Russian legislation, non-stimulating and non-supporting the franchising, and in some respects - even hindering its development. However, we must remember that if the world experience of franchising counts more than 100 years, in Russia this method of business organization came into practice only in the period of perestroika (restructuring), in 1993, gaining sufficiently high growth rates in the subsequent years.
From 1995 to 1999 42 franchising systems has emerged in Russia. During the next two years the number of franchises has almost doubled and has continued to grow rapidly, increasing by 1.5-2 times every two years, and decreasing the rate of growth in recent years, which is obviously due to the crisis of
2008 and the present, but still remains at a high level, rising by about 15 percent every year.
However, despite the high rates of franchising market growing in Russia in its absolute and relative quantitative indicators according to the company E.M.E.G. and the World Franchise Council (WFC) for 2010 are almost one of the lowest among the ten most developed countries in the world where this form of business organization has been used for much longer.
However, maintaining such high rates of growth of the franchising market in Russia we can look forward to a positive forecast of its development in our country. This requires a number of factors, first of all, the development of an independent legal basis of franchising, since available in the Civil Code franchising format is not equivalent to the concept of «franchising». According to the Russian Franchise Association about 50 percent of Russian companies can successfully develop, using the franchising strategy, including in Moscow and the Moscow region - more than 120 companies. According to the statistics of all the newly established enterprises 85 percent ceased to function within the first five years, while of companies established under the franchising - only 14 percent [4]. At the same time franchising shows high efficiency in industries with low-risk, the entrance to which is not expensive. For example, in industries where the cost of creating a single enterprise numbering millions of dollars, franchising is rarely used (large shopping centers with numerous personnel). An exception is the hotel business.
Another feature of franchising in Russia is unevenly spread across the country, despite the vast natural resources and a growing economic potential. Thus, in early 2010, the franchising is used widely only in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Nizhny Novgorod, Omsk, i.e. in priority are the major cities with a population of over 600 000 people. The use of franchising in the regions is inextricably linked to the economic situation and the level of development of business in these regions [5]. However, smaller city but with high purchasing power (Tyumen, Khanty-Mansiysk, Irkutsk) can also be markets for franchising. The factor of population growth taking place in recent years in Russia, provides stability demand and more opportunities for development of exactly domestic franchising networks.
If in the 2000s with the establishment of franchising relations in our country, the main share of franchises were foreign, currently the largest share of offered in the Russian market franchises are owned by domestic companies. However, foreign franchises continue to win our market, including due to a higher level of development of franchising and particular franchising networks abroad.
In contrast to the foreign market sectoral diversification of the franchising market in Russia is relatively narrow, since mainly aimed at expanding sales and focused on the retail trade, public catering and consumer services, and «is stewing in its own juice», without receiving financial assistance either from government agencies or from private banks, and does not export the franchises which greatly reduces business performance in the country. And in this case, the high rate of development in the narrow direction will not be effective enough, contributing only sales of imports mainly in the same
areas of the retail trade and catering. It is certainly beneficial to the population in the short term, as it allows to saturate the market and meet the demand, but assessing the current situation on a national scale we can say that it increases only the economies of other countries. This is contrary to the existing priorities of development of the Russian economy and does not provide advanced foreign technology revenues in the domestic production and the provision of business services [6]. Undoubtedly, the greatest interest is the problem of improving the franchising and enhance the role of franchises in terms of the Russian market, which requires a target orientation in this regard and which is virtually non-existent.
Thus, in Russia franchising only begins to develop and requires adaptive improvement, ways of which may be different. This is risks minimization, territorial expansion, information and communication system and others. Along with this transitional type of economy is characterized by the need for restructuring of its entire institutional structure in which one of the most important, but far understudied parts make up the cost, representing a key business issue.
According to the fundamental works costs consist of the costs of transformation and transaction costs [7, p. 97].
It is known that the transformation costs are associated with the function, the implementation of which is aimed at changing the physical properties of the resources, with the result that we get a product with a certain value, and the costs associated with its implementation, form elements of transformation costs. The last act in the form of recycled raw material costs and materials, payment of labor compensation and capital equipment wear and so on. As a result of these costs occurs physical transformation of economic goods, and they are respectively defined by technological factors.
Transaction costs are substantially different from transformation costs and are not associated with a change in the properties of the economic benefits. Transaction costs, the basic unit of which is an act of economic cooperation, trade, transaction, are one of the main components of a new trend in modern economics, neo-institutionalism, and are determined primarily by legal and human factors, and, in contrast to the transformation costs are not related to technological factors.
The category of transaction is used to refer to the exchange of the goods as well as legal obligations, and also not only short-term but also long-term transactions, requiring along with a detailed and sometimes meticulous documenting, a simple understanding of the parties that provided mostly by documenting. Costs and losses that accompany such interactions actually constitute the subject of the transaction costs.
In contrast to the neoclassical school, studied the transformation costs, institutionalism has not yet been able to bring the transaction costs to the level of knowledge that would allow to use them the same extent that the costs of transformation are used.
And if the role of transformation costs in the economy as a whole is largely known and considered to be less important, the role of transaction costs, which are more related to the legal and human factors, not common to transformation costs is higher, accounting for over 50 percent of all costs that is highlighted by leading economists [7, p. 97; 8, p. 3], but it is
largely underestimated and studied by relatively small number of researchers. As for the role of transaction costs with respect to the franchising, this problem has not been studied and is reflected only in some foreign papers, along with the fact that this role is clearly seen and potentially more significant, especially considering that franchising itself is more inclined than other forms of business, to the same problems as the transaction costs. All this despite the overall similarity of types of transaction costs in the economy as a whole and in franchising, forming part of the first, largely determines the specificity of transaction costs in the franchising . Non-inclusion of the latter, according to our hypothesis, may reduce the functionality of the franchising and is a significant drawback.
Unsolved issues. The optimization of transaction costs of franchising is significant problem. However, with respect to the specificity and the role of transaction costs in franchising there are only a few, mostly declarative, indication and any detailed researches on this problem, which demands the solution to this problem.
Purpose of the study. Define the role of transaction costs of franchising and their specifics.
Results (considering transaction costs of franchising). Our preliminary analysis of the literature also shows that the most significant costs in the structure of the transaction costs in the economy as a whole are the transaction costs of opportunism, representing 31 percent [9] (TACO). TACO ratio in franchising in general is the same, but they are more likely to involve human and legal problems, that is precisely the characteristic of the franchising .
As is known, the opportunism - is following individual interests in economic relationship. The impact of the institute of opportunism on the activities of firms is extremely ambiguous. On the one hand, in a normal state, opportunism is a positive component: it develops company's properties such as stability, activity and efficiency, serves as a catalyst of choice and action acceleration. However, on the other hand, the expansion of opportunism detects its negative side, depriving the company of integrity. Hypertrophy of the institute of opportunism leads to atomization, the erosion of the structure and objectives, loss of pursuit of trust and reciprocity, and subsequent decay.
Mechanisms of opportunism formation are interpreted in different ways. Some foreign scientists attribute the problem of opportunism to agents' conduct uncertainty arising as a result of the constant lack of information about their choice and motivation, and evaluate opportunism as one of the most powerful forms of motivation in the economy [10]. And if this motivation is realized with the collateral damage to the party, its destructive impact on the partnerships cannot be overstated. Others emphasize that opportunistic behavior is not related to the uncertainty of agents' conduct and the influence of the environment, but is rather the result of lack of effective forecasting and regulation of agents' conduct, which is a variable component and which can be affected [11].
Anyway, contemporary economists are unanimous in determination of opportunistic behaviour as not only an important element of enterprise management, but also a central issue in the study of transaction costs in general.
Model of opportunistic behaviour is genetically based survival mechanism necessary to protect the interests of any
agent, but pathogenic for the system in which it is included. The main problem is instability or lack of clear rules and boundaries between the permissibility of opportunism and its hypertrophy, due to the diversity of the manifestation of opportunism: this agents' conduct is not always directed to the removal of direct financial benefits, but can be targeted to a reallocation of resources in their favor, or simply associated with passive dishonesty .
As noted above, this effect can wear positive - stimulating -nature, and also negative - leading to financial, managerial and system losses, which represent TACO.
If opportunistic behaviour becomes typical for the company, this significantly reduces its resistance.
Franchising relations to a greater extent than other forms of market relations based on reciprocity, the ideological - any franchising system is a separate ideological space - as well as economic - the success of the partners turns into the success of the entire system. However, as in any form of market relations, there is a place for asymmetry of interests in franchising. Agents anyway constantly attempt to go beyond the limits of specified rights, there is are constant latent struggle of interests, which is capable of destruction of the ideological integrity of the franchising system.
However, franchising is largely based on the specific contractual and partner relationship in which TACO acquire special significance and, moreover, under the influence of the features of franchising costs of this kind acquire a number of significant features, characterized by a number of temporary, financial and legal aspects: duration, mode of payment, the autonomy of the franchisee, objects of intellectual property. Foreign scientists see TACO problem in franchising as a problem of searching for balance between trust, risk reduction and uncertainty of the environment, as well as the completeness and specificity of the contract [12; 13; 14].
Contribute to the formation of TACO already discussed above unclear legislation and the low overall level of trust in society.
The most difficult to predict and interesting to explore scenario of TACO is franchisees' withdraw from franchising relationship with baggage accumulated managerial expertise and business experience with view to creating their own enterprise. Subsequently, the franchisee, in the role of an independent entrepreneur, may become a competitor to the franchisor. However TACO carry a threat not only of financial losses of the franchising network, but also can cause damage to brand reputation and even make unprofitable entire franchising system.
All this leads to the need for priority consideration exactly of TACO, especially considering that they make up a large part of all the activities of the franchising system, and franchising itself in the first place is related to the legal issues specific to transaction costs as such.
Results (considering TACO factors). As comparative analysis of TACO in economy in general and in franchising shows, such a leading factor in the formation of TACO as a contract, representing a basic tool of the establishment, formalization and control relationship between the parties is characterized by many features defining these relationships. In any transaction agreement it plays a key role, as is intended
to optimize the interaction between the parties, with access and possession of various resources. Franchising is not the exception.
This is fundamentally important that the franchising contract has its own characteristics, which is caused by «a close intertwining of business and legal aspects» [15, p. 111]. These include the market structure, production program, the vertical joint, unified appearance, the specifics of the rights and obligations of the parties, the economic dependence of the franchisee from the franchisor along with legal autonomy, mandatory for the franchisee to inform the consumer about the use of their system of exclusive rights of the franchisor, mutual constraints for parties, long-term contractual obligations.
Another important difference in the franchising agreement is that the parties are characterized by a common object of interest - the subject of intellectual property. The latter are means of individualization of goods produced by the franchisor, works or services provided, ensuring the formation of clearly defined image and high reputation of enterprise in the market. The image provides franchisor recognition and makes it stand out in the market of similar businesses, and provides franchisees interest in joining the partnership business relationship.
In addition to the organizational features franchising in Russia is caused, and, therefore, is associated with the imperfection of the legislation, the ambiguity of the terms and regulatory provisions that could lead to disagreements over various issues of the transaction, which is frequently a source of manipulation. Therefore, each point of the contract should be clear, with no contradictions and shadow features, carefully thought out, down to the nuances that provides its legal basis, as well as high efficiency of business and a strong position of the franchisor, because «qualitative, detailed agreement is a legal point by which the franchisor will continue to perform well» [16, p. 107].
To one of the important factors of TACO and standards that define the degree of access to the franchisees profits and, accordingly, the amount of profits of the franchisor, refers royalty. This tool of regulation of economic relations is salient in those segments of the economy, where the relations between the parties are related to the industrial property, creation of technologies, know-how or the development and production of natural resources, which are those pillars on which the country's economy is based.
In franchising royalty plays the role of operative financial instrument of interdependence regulating and the rights of the parties defining. Franchisee pays the franchisor regular payments - royalty, which may take the form of a fixed payment, a percentage of revenue, margins on the wholesale price of the goods, the obligations set wholesale purchase quantity. The optimal form of royalty is a fixed payment, because it provides the franchisor needs to obtain a guaranteed income from the sale of the rights to his intellectual property, and motivate franchisees to increase residual income from the activities of its franchising points [17].
Royalty payment in any form is a compromise that optimizes the relationship of both parties. Its value must be of interest to the franchisor to sell a franchise and the franchisee to buy it, that is, depends on the ratio of supply and demand on the franchising market [18, p. 83].
Studies have shown no connection between the size of royalty and survival of the franchising system [19]. Therefore, in the framework of a franchising it is rarely carried out a revision of royalty and one-time payments, but still there are some ranges in which the change in payments does not affect the relationship counterparties. This adaptation allows to distribute risk between the franchisor and the franchisee, contributing not only to maintaining the reputation, but also to ensuring the survival of the system as a whole.
By changing the amount of the royalty, the franchisor may affect competition between the franchisees and their pricing policy. The lower royalty payments are the more interested franchisees to increase sales. On the contrary, a high percentage of royalty will reduce sales of franchisees and increase prices. Decrease as well as increase in sales could be the cause of opportunistic behaviour - in the first case, due to the franchisees' desire to compensate for the lack of income, in the second case, due to franchisees' striving to further increase income and confidence that the successful activity may serve as a cover for opportunistic behaviour.
Speaking about the next factor of TACO formation such as shirking, it should be noted that it leads to another type of costs - the agency costs. The latter are an alternative character - this is what the entrepreneur loses. Unlike many of the transaction costs, agency costs cannot be counted that makes management process more complicated and shadow.
Features of shirking in franchising are related to the redistribution of resources of time and management exclusively in favour of the franchisee. Unspecified in contract franchisee's conduct can be neutral to the requirements with regard to its work. However, if the franchisee also doesn't perform the necessary functions, there begins infringing the interests and the direct loss of the franchisor, because in the absence of adequate control franchisee is able to pursue their own goals, in particular the insertion means of network in risky projects, etc. Because in franchising the work of each enterprise is a matter of principle, shirking can cause irreversible result - the loss of consumer loyalty to the brand system, which contributes to destructive processes in the franchising system.
The business management is inherently based on the realization of a variety of business models, depending on the characteristics of the market, the scope of activity, product, consumer, etc.
Franchising is fundamentally different because the implementation of the business model involves the use of tough algorithm by virtue of its systematic character. Such an approach to the management of the franchising network is due to the dynamism and high level of competition of the market and is a protective response of the system to aggressive external factors, including risks and opportunism. On the one hand, the rigid standardization of franchisee's operation contributes to the development of standardization, quality improvements and the conquest and consolidation of the brand's reputation. On the other hand, it reduces franchisor's anticipation for opportunistic behavior occurrence, and thus increases the risk of its occurrence, and generates opportunities for concealment.
Not the least of the TACO factors is the violation of a tool such as quality and brand marks control that could ensure the preservation of the benefits of different forms of management
in the long term and sustainability of companies.
From this standpoint, franchising, unlike other forms of management, has a clear advantage: one party, the franchisee receives from the other party, the franchisor, the right to use the trade mark, and perhaps some specific knowledge and skills in exchange for one-time payments and royalty. The franchisor is able to raise funds for the network development to a more acceptable terms. Such a system of relations is also attractive because it allows to use of powerful market motivation, because the franchisee with the release on the market under the well-known trademark is able to quickly master it and explore and is entitled to a residual income.
Due to the need to maintain the reputation of the franchising system, organizationally independent franchisees have to agree on the implementation of a number of conditions: to comply with the established quality standards, purchase raw materials only at predefined providers, restrict the activities of provision of goods and services offered under this brand, invest in specific assets as collateral and validation of his obligations. If is discovered the customer service quality standards have been violated, the franchisee will incur substantial irreversible costs, which will reduce the level of confidence in him, his motivation to work in the system and withdrawal from it. If such situations are not unique, the damage done to the brand, will become systemic in nature, since the «potential consumers consider each franchising company as part of a holding structure using a single trademark». [20, p. 67]
Thus, the factor of the insufficient level of quality and brand control along with the loss of profits from sales results not only in loss of the franchisee, but also the various imbalances in the franchising system, and even system collapse.
Use of the rights and the franchisor's brand in the bad faith is a TACO factor contributing to the decrease in quality of the product produced by the franchising network, and certainly profits, the size of which can be greatly offset that is regulated by changing or cessation of the activities of the franchisee. However oblige the unfair franchisee to change or stop their activity is quite difficult and almost impossible, if these issues are not addressed in detail in the contract. The network uses economies of scale due to the positive business reputation of the franchisor, verified and standardized business processes, unified marketing policy, centralized bulk purchases of raw materials. Improper use of this effect can lead to a substantial reduction and the loss and use of the rights and the brand in the bad faith by franchisee leads to the loss of a systemic nature (loss of profits, loss of revenue, causing damage to corporate identity) and the loss of the integrity of the franchising network.
Important factors of TACO include and the difficulties of their diagnosis, that taking place in the economy as a whole, are more complex in franchising, being complicating by its features. Must be taken into account that the above-considered features of the franchising system related with such aspects the tough algorithm implementation of business models and control system along with a positive have a negative impact. Such «rigidity» and standardization can be used by the franchisee as «cover» because he knows in advance how reporting for the franchisor should look like. Therefore, these features contribute to TACO hiding in franchising, significantly complicating their detection and identification.
Life cycle of the enterprise or system is considered as crucial factor of TACO. As the analysis of the literature shows, it is particularly stages of the life cycle that cause entrepreneur's behavioral strategy in situations of risk and uncertainty and taking operational decisions, without which it is sharply reduced or not achieved the necessary level of efficiency of the enterprise in the market.
The life cycle of a franchising network is dynamic because it depends not only on the life cycle of the franchisor, but also his franchisees. The number of franchisees, the ratio of experienced and novice, trusted partners, and partners with whom relations are just beginning, and the constant change of all of these parameters leads to extreme volatility across the whole franchising network lifecycle. Such instability requires constant adjustment of control system.
All these features of TACO in franchising are associated with the specificity of the franchising itself, but are not taken into account, also because they are not examined, which is a significant drawback.
Conclusions and proposals. Conducted analysis indicates that TACO influenced by features of franchising acquire a number of significant distinctive features, mainly related to the specifics of the conclusion and implementation of an act of economic cooperation, and characterized by a number of temporary, financial and legal aspects: the term of the relationship, mode of payment for sold through one-time payments and royalties, law, but not the economic autonomy of the franchisee, intellectual property, the right to use which is the basis of formation of franchising relations. Failure to account for these differences assumes a reduction in the franchising system operation, and hence the economy as a whole. This requires optimization of TACO in franchising, which will lead to improvement of franchising itself and as a tool of technology transfer and make it more flexible element of innovation management.
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ОСНОВНЫЕ ПОЛОЖЕНИЯ МЕТОДИКИ СТИМУЛИРОВАНИЯ ТРУДА НАУЧНО-ПЕДАГОГИЧЕСКИХ РАБОТНИКОВ ВЫСШЕЙ ШКОЛЫ
Лёшина Мария Александровна,
к.э.н., доцент Ефимкина Евгения Петровна,
доцент
Михайлова Любовь Ивановна,
старший преподаватель
Смоленский областной казачий институт промышленных технологий и бизнеса (филиал) ФГБОУ ВО «Московский государственный университет технологий и управления им. К.Г.Разумовского
(Первый казачий университет)»
АННОТАЦИЯ
В статье представлено описание основных положений разработанной методики формирования управленческих решений по вопросам стимулирования труда научно-педагогических работников вузов; сформулировано правило формирования функции полезности, которая обозначает меру полезности произведенных стимулирующих выплат для вуза с учетом влияния деятельности научно-педагогических работников на показатели функционирования вуза. Ключевые слова: методика стимулирования труда научно-педагогических работников, теория полезности.
Система стимулирования труда научно-педагогических работников высшей школы является многоэлементной системой с возможными неопределенностями, возникающими в процессе функционирования. Кроме того, ресурсы стимулирующего центра всегда являются ограниченными. Остановимся более подробно на характеристике вузовской системы стимулирования труда научно-педагогических работников.
Указанная система является многоэлементной потому, что в вузе работает множество научно-педагогических работников ввиду специализации научно-педагогических работников и разнообразия дисциплин, содержащихся в
учебных планах основных образовательных программ.
Рассматриваемой системе стимулирования труда присущи элементы неопределенностей. Деятельность научно-педагогических работников регламентируется разработанными ими индивидуальными планами, однако, выполнение плановых показателей не всегда может быть достигнуто по объективным причинам, не учтенным в момент разработки планов. Например, научно-педагогический работник запланировал защиту кандидатской диссертации на определенную дату, но она по причине болезни председателя диссертационного совета или официальных оппонентов не может состояться по плану. Или
