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323ISRAELI ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE: DENIAL AND RECOGNITION
Yadr Auron1
The attitude of Israel toward the Armenian Genocide is significant. Israel regards itself as the state of the Jewish people who were victims of the Holocaust. It is difficult to overestimate how important the position of the Jews, and especially the attitude of the state of Israel to the Armenian Genocide, are for the Armenians (as well as to the Turks and the rest of the world), because the Israeli state was established by a nation victimized by the Holocaust.
During an international conference “L’actualite du Genocide des Armeniens” (“The Reality of the Genocide of the Armenians”), organized in Paris by the Armenian community of France on April 16-18, 1998, one of the leaders of the community declared from the podium that the Armenians are going to struggle for the recognition of the Armenian Genocide by the US, Israel and France.
France did recognize the Armenian Genocide in January 2001. In the U.S. the issue has been raised in the Congress several times, and the processes of recognition, in one way or in another, began, but these processes were stopped by the American administrations, both Republican and Democrat in 1985, 1987 1989, 2000, 2007 and 2009. The Turkish Government warned that American interests might be jeopardized, including permission to maintain American military bases on Turkish territory, and the American administrations gave up. Israel is very far from any real process toward a possible recognition of the Armenian Genocide.
1 Associate Professor, The Open University of Israel.
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In the 1980s, the authorities in Israel were reserved and restricted regarding recognition of the Armenian Genocide and practically tried to avoid it. Later on Israel refused to recognize it, and furthermore, became the most significant supporter (with the U.S.) of the denial policy promoted by Turkey.
The theoretical debate over morality versus politics or interests is not within the scope of our article. Let us note, however, that the ancient Greek philosophers did not distinguish between morality and politics. This distinction characterizes the thinkers of the beginning of modern philosophy, like Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza, Thomas Hobbes, and Nicholas Machiavelli, whereas the liberal philosophers tried to combine, in one way or another, politics and morality. It seems that politics and its cynical calculations are quite often not related to morality in modern times.
All states are guided in their foreign policy by considerations of their interests and sometimes even need to appeal the raison d'Etat. This is practically an international standard. But all (at least many) states also set limits to such pragmatic and cynical considerations, limits that are dictated by the most profound aspects of their national ethos. Not a few claim that Realpolitik, which sacrifices justice at the altar of political considerations and compromises, is no longer acceptable, and surely not in the case of genocide.
In the debates in Israel over the Armenian Genocide (and practically in every state where the issue is debated), the tensions between values and interests, between morality and politics have been high. It is obvious that from a purely political attitude, it is a logical decision to support Turkey. In Israel it was and it is still political interests that dominate.
It is clear that the short term interests of France were harmed because of the decision in 2001 to recognize the Armenian Genocide. The significance of moral values in the French as an example decision is a fact that many Israelis find difficult to face. It is difficult for them to admit the Israeli moral failure regarding its attitude to the genocides of other people in general and its attitude to the Armenian Genocide in particular. It is easier to regard morality as utopia - as indulging in luxury. It is easier to say I cannot than to admit I do not want to. It is crucial to notice that by downplaying the moral factor in the French decision and portraying instead the political configuration that made such a decision worthwhile one undermines the possibility to criticize the Israeli policy regarding the issue. If the recognition of the Armenian Genocide is nothing but a cynical political maneuver that may become worthwhile under certain conditions, then as long as Israel does not confront such circumstances, there is not reason for it to recognize the Armenian Genocide,
The relationships between Israel and Turkey are considered one major factor
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underlying the Israeli and French attitudes toward the Armenian Genocide. In Israel they even spoke about “vital interests” regarding the situation of the Jewish communities in Iran, Syria and Turkey itself. On the other hand, the recognition of the Armenian Genocide by Israel is crucial, since the denial of the Armenian Genocide is very similar to the denial of the Holocaust of the Jews (even though the denial of the Holocaust can have also direct implications, and can strengthen the anti-Semitism). Understanding and remembering the tragic past is an essential condition, even though not sufficient in itself, for preventing the repetition of such acts in the future.
The Armenian Question was not a major subject in Israel and was regarded as a marginal issue. Only ten to fifteen out of 120 Israeli members of parliament attended the debates.
1. Israeli Attitudes
The question of Israeli recognition of the Armenian Genocide was never debated in the Knesset directly, but the State of Israel has consistently refrained from acknowledging the genocide of the Armenian People. Government representatives do not participate in the memorial assemblies held every year on April 24 by the Armenians to commemorate the Genocide. The public debate in the State of Israel about the attitude toward the Armenian Genocide has focused on some prominent media events: in 1978 the screening of a film about the Armenian Quarter in Jerusalem was canceled after pressures of the Turkish government that opposed the film because it included several references to the Armenian Genocide, primarily the testimony by several survivors of the genocide of 1915 who resided in the Armenian Quarter of Jerusalem's Old City. In 1982, the Israeli Government intervened in plans for an international conference on the subject of the Holocaust and genocide. The Israeli Foreign Ministry applied heavy pressure on the organizers of the conference in order to prevent the participation of Armenian researchers. Six out of 150 lectures planned dealt with the Armenian Genocide. Finally the conference was held with the participation of 300 out of an originally expected 600 researchers from the United States, Europe, and Israel. In 1989, the Israeli Government was apparently involved in preventing the commemoration of the Armenian Genocide by the American Congress in dedicating a memorial day in the American calendar, and in the debates in the U.S. Congress over the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, in 2000 and apparently in 2007. In 1990, the screening on the Israeli television of an American television documentary film, "Journey to Armenia," was canceled, a decision that raised a lot of critics. In 1994, a controversy also developed over teaching about the Arme-
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nian Genocide and genocide, in general, in Israeli high schools. Till today the issue is not taught officially in high schools and the level of knowledge of the young Israelis about the Armenian Genocide is very limited. In 2003 one of the people who were chosen to enlight the beacons in the ceremony in Mount Herzel, that marks the end of the Memorial Day and the beginning of the Independence Day, was an Armenian nurse. She was not allowed to mention, in her short personal representation, the fact that she is the third generation to the Armenian genocide because of pressure put on the Israeli government by Turkey. Every one of these events raised a vive polemic; many articles were written in the press, most of them criticized the official attitude.
Many observers estimate, in the case of the Armenians, that one act could radically change the long-standing denial of their Genocide: recognition of the Genocide by the United States or Israel. These are the pivotal countries that could bring about a Turkish recognition of the Genocide. There is a connection or even interdependence between the decisions of the two states. If one of them recognized the Genocide, sooner or later the second would do the same.
There is no doubt that, morally speaking, Israel should be the first. Sadly, however, taking a realistic view of Israeli society and policy, this is not likely to happen in the near future. In my view Israelis are held to a higher standard than other nations not because we are the chosen people, but because we are, generally speaking, survivors of the Holocaust and because of the Jewish legacy and heritage. I'm aware to the fact that not all the Israelis and not all the Jews agree with this point of view. However, we Israeli-Jews failed to keep higher moral standards (also regarding our attitude towards acts of genocide like those in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia).
Two main reasons can be given to explain the attitude of the state of Israel to the Armenian Genocide: (a) constant pressure by the different Turkish governments; and (b) strong pressure from groups within Israeli society that are afraid that the recognition of the Armenian Genocide would damage the concept of the uniqueness of the Shoah. Apparently the impact of the second reason is less significant in the last years. The political establishment of Israel, from the left wing as well as from the right wing, with a few exceptions, has decided to further develop and strengthen the relations between Turkey and Israel. It was a geopolitical decision and a strategy influenced by political and military interests that were sometimes represented as "vital Jewish" interests and later on as "vital Israeli" interests.
To all those involved, overtly and covertly, in the controversy – Jews, Turks, and Armenians, but also the rest of the concerned world – it was clear that there was special significance to the issue which went beyond the debate, for example, over
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the screening of a film about the Armenian Genocide in any other country. The fact that the country in question was of the people who were the victim of the Holocaust, and the unique problems which resulted, came to the fore.
In the debates over the Armenian Genocide, it is often said by officials in Israel and in other countries, that historians, not politicians, should discuss the issue. That is what Israeli officials said to Turkish representatives after the Minister of Education Yossi Sarid’s statement in April 2000 (see later), and what the Clinton administration (like all the other U.S. administrations before it) claimed, when it tried and succeeded in preventing the legislative initiative in the U.S.A. in the year 2000. This argument was also raised during the debate in France over the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, eventually adopted by the Parliament. It is significant in this context to mention the statement in which 126 Holocaust scholars affirmed in June 2000 the incontestable fact of the Armenian Genocide and accordingly urged the governments of Western Democracies to recognize it as such1 [1].
The claim of politicians to leave the issue to the historians is, of course, cynical, and it is usually a device to avoid discussion, mainly because of political interests. However, in recent years - after a stubborn struggle by the Armenians and their supporters, usually on moral grounds – the debate over the recognition of the Armenian Genocide did enter some parliaments that recognized it.
2. Israel1994: Semi Official Recognition?
In 1994, the Armenian Question was raised in the Israeli Parliament. This time the debate centered on a report on Israeli First Channel Television (FCT). The reportage was connected to the curriculum that was being prepared about the Armenian Genocide, which ultimately was rejected, and to the Armenian Memorial Day. The Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Turkish Embassy in Tel Aviv exerted pressure, as in previous cases, not to air the program, although unsuccessfully. Finally, the report (12 minutes long) that included information about the Genocide, interviews with Armenians, including one survivor of the Genocide who lived in Jerusalem, and interviews with Israeli students were shown, followed by an interview with the Turkish Ambassador in Tel Aviv, which repeated the official Turkish version about the events of 1915 and criticized the fact that Israel is interested in the Armenian Question, which was, according to him, against the common interests of the two countries.
1 The New York Times and the Jerusalem Post, June 8, 2000. The petitioners also asked the Western Democracies to urge the Government and the Parliament of Turkey to finally come to terms with a dark chapter of the Ottoman-Turkish history and to recognize the Armenian Genocide.
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Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin (in the Rabin government, in which Shimon Peres was the Foreign Minister) answered (April 27, 1994) on the podium of the Knesset the question about what the Turkish Ambassador had said in the reportage some days before [2]. In his written answer, Beilin stated that “according to the Jewish historical experience, we cannot but express understanding of the suffering and the destiny of the Armenian people.” He said also that the attitude of Turkey is well known to us, but this issue should not become a source of tensions between the two countries, which have recently considerably improved their relationships.
In another question, a member of the Knesset claimed that the Turkish Ambassador’s statement that “in war like in war” could support the deniers of the Holocaust and therefore we have to answer if they were killed as a result of war or as a result of genocide. Then he raised the issue of morality and politics in claiming “this [the Armenian Question] is an issue that is above politics for us as Jews.” In his answer to this, Beilin replied that Israel had never yielded to Turkish pressures to obliterate the terrible massacre, and that “we will always reject any attempt to erase those events, even for some political advantages.” Later on he added “we never accepted the very superficial analysis that it [the Armenian tragedy - Y.A.] was done in the war. It was not a war. It was certainly massacre, genocide. We will support remembering it because this is one of the events the world must remember.” [2] By this Beilin practically rejected the Turkish denial of the crime and the claim that what was involved was only “a civil war,” or that the Armenians were victims of the war’s acts.
Significant as these last words of Beilin’s were, and they represented the view of some other members of the Knesset, the comments which appear in Dadrian’s comprehensive book, The History of the Armenian Genocide, that claimed “Israel issued its first official condemnation of the Turkish genocide of the Armenians, ending a tradition of silence, to appease its regional ally, Turkey,” are unfortunately an exaggeration, and in fact only a wish [3].
3. Israel and the Recognition of the Armenian Genocide
Five years after his declaration in 1994, in April 2000, Yossi Beilin, then minister of Justice, said with the same decisiveness:
It doesn’t have to be this way. I think that our attitude toward such a dreadful historical event cannot be dictated by our friendly relations with Turkey, even though this relationship is particularly important to me as one who worked so hard
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to develop it. I also see the contradiction between the political track and the ethical one. Something happened that cannot be defined except as genocide. One-and-a-half million people disappeared. It was not negligence, it was deliberate. I do not think that the government has to take an official decision on the issue, but we must clarify to the Turks that we cannot accept their political demands to ignore a historical event. An ethical stand cannot be dictated by political needs - these are two separate tracks [4].
The declarations made by Sarid on Armenian Memorial Day on April 24, 2000 (see later) and by Beilin, caused, paradoxically, the lukewarm attitude of the Foreign Ministry to be even more explicitly cool. The attitude of Barak’s government in late 2000 to the beginning of 2001 was clear - it accepted the Turkish argument. In an interview with the Turkish Daily News (October 26, 2000), the Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry Undersecretary Dr. Alon Liel was reminded of certain Israeli ministers’ comments on the so-called Armenian Genocide, to the effect that Turkey should recognize it [5]. Liel said that the Israeli authorities sympathized with Turkish anger over these statements of the two ministers (Sarid and Beilin) and that they had received the Turkish side’s message on the matter loud and clear. “Our government policy is that we should refrain from making these kinds of statements. These topics should not be for politicians to comment on, but for academics,” said Liel.
In January 2001, France officially recognized the Armenian Genocide. Unlike the U.S. Congress, the French Parliament, did not yield to Turkish demands and to the demands of its government and was thus “punished” by Turkey. Turkey hoped to stop the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, which had gained momentum during the years 2000-2001, by other countries. It withdrew its ambassador to France, one of its main trading partners; cancelled a spy satellite contract with a French firm, worth $259M (according to Turkey’s Defense Minister); the Turkish government was also considering excluding French companies from ten other projects. Among them was state-owned arms maker Giat, which lost the chance to tender for the joint production of 1,000 combat tanks, estimated to be $2 billion worth [6]. Cynical as it is, it seems that Israel profited from these developments. While the negotiations over the deal went on, an Israeli firm had lost to a French company, but when the relations between France and Turkey soured over the Armenian question, Ankara threatened to cancel projects assigned to the French firm [7]. Israel won the major contract to upgrade hundreds of Turkish tanks in a deal estimated at $2 billion (a contract was agreed upon in March 2002). The Israeli Foreign Minister, Shlomo Ben-Ami, raised the possibility that Turkey might also reconsider buying an Israeli imaging satellite.
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The attitude of the Israeli government, being in a much more complicated and sensitive situation, is very far from even the ambivalent attitude of other western states involved in the matter. There is much more at stake where Israel is concerned. In some cases that involve its very existence, Israel has to make many difficult compromises, moral and otherwise. Unfortunately, Israel has made compromises even in cases where its very existence was not at stake.
4. Peres Statement hi April2001 and the Ambassador's Statement in February2002
The headlines of the Turkish Daily News, the influential English Turkish daily on April 10, 2001, were clear: "Peres: Armenian Allegations are Meaningless..." [8] The newspaper described Shimon Peres, Foreign Minister in Sharon's government (currently the Israeli president), as being a supporter of the Turkish position regarding the dispute over the meaning of the events that had taken place during World War I. Peres had been described before in the Turkish press as the personality who had influenced President Clinton in preventing a pro-Armenian resolution in the House of Representatives in the year 2000. This claim was repeated in the Turkish press in 20011.
The interview with Peres was conducted on the eve of his official visit to Turkey. Peres claimed in it that it is for historians to deal with such historical issues.
According to the Turkish newspaper, Peres said that Israel should not take a historical or philosophical position on the Armenian Question, but added: "If we have to determine a position, it should be done with great care as not to distort the historical realities."
Furthermore, Peres was quoted as saying:
We reject attempts to create a similarity between the Holocaust and the Armenian allegations. Nothing similar to the Holocaust occurred. It is a tragedy what the Armenians went through, but not a genocide.
Israel, as we have shown briefly, had been systematically avoiding the Armenian Question. Now the Foreign Minister joined the deniers on behalf of the Israeli government. This represented an escalation from passive to active Israeli denial, from moderate denial to hard-line denial. Imagine the Israeli and Jewish reaction to a similar claim by another country's Foreign Minister regarding the Holocaust. What would be their reaction if the Holocaust had been called a "tragedy"?
1 For example see Burcun Imir, "Sharon: Turkish Israeli Relationship Can Be Defined as an Alliance of Democracies," Turkish Daily News, August 6, 2001.
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And what was, in fact, the reaction in Israel to these controversial words of Peres? At first, the Israeli media ignored the subject completely, although Peres's visit to Turkey had received much attention in Israel. Only after the outraged reaction of the Armenians all over the world, including those who live in Israel, and the reaction of some "Armenian supporters" was the issue raised at all in the Israeli newspapers [9].
Why did Peres, the experienced, respected politician decide to make this statement? Surely not out of ignorance of the Armenian Genocide. It is very difficult to point to any enlightened politician in a democratic state – surely not of the stature of Peres – who has ever made such blatant remarks as these on that issue. Many politicians avoid using the term "genocide,” but never, to the best of my knowledge, have any official person claimed that it was not a genocide. It seems that Israel wished to advance its relations with Turkey and completely push aside the subject of the Armenian Genocide, including all the moral and historical implications of such a position.
After a lot of protests poured into Israeli embassies and consulates around the world by outraged Armenians, and after some critics in Israel denounced Peres for genocide denial, Peres claimed (through his officials) to have been partially misquoted. The Israeli Foreign Ministry then issued the following cable to its missions:
Israel’s position regarding Armenian massacre: 1. a number of missions have received protests, partly by e-mail, over an inaccurate report of Foreign Minister Peres's words in the Turkish press during his visit to Ankara. 2. In case you need them, here are the exact comments made by Foreign Minister Peres (as reported by Ankara): A. The subject should be left to historians, not politicians. B. We do not support the comparison of the Armenian tragedy to the Holocaust. C Israel will take no political or historical stand on this issue. D. The minister absolutely did not say, as the Turkish news agency alleged, “What the Armenians underwent was a tragedy, not a genocide. ”
Peres himself did not retract his statement. He has made no serious attempt to correct the newspaper or to deny what was quoted in the Turkish media. This cynical use of the Armenian Genocide as part of a bargain by the Israeli government continues.
Israel, a state under siege, has the right to seek military alliances with states such as Turkey. It has the right not to take an official position on the Armenian Genocide if it deeply and sincerely believes that an official act of recognition would cause it irreparable harm. Though not the most ethical of decisions, that
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may be understandable and even tolerable [10]. But this does not give justification for Peres, in the name of the state of Israel to have "entered into the range of actual denial of the Armenian Genocide, comparable to the denial of the Holocaust." [11] After Sarid's statement in 2000 (to be discussed in detail later), Israeli officials claimed that it was his personal view; nobody claimed the same this time. It should be clear: Israel was ready, and is ready, to bargain with the memory of the Armenian Genocide. It used the Genocide as merchandise, and by doing so Israel is ready to go beyond a moral boundary that no Jew should allow himself to cross. Israel should never, under any circumstances, and for any reason, aid and abet those who deny a genocide, any genocide.
But Israel has gone even further. The new Israeli Ambassador in Georgia and Armenia, Rivka Cohen, repeated Pere’s statement in a press conference she held in February 8, 2002, in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia [12]. She made remarks to the effect that, while the Jewish people are saddened by the deaths and tragedy that were suffered by the Armenians between 1915 and 1916, the Holocaust was a unique phenomenon, as it was a planned program for the annihilation of an entire nation and nothing should be compared with it. This was not reported in Israel at the beginning, but Armenians in Armenia and all over the world were enraged. Government officials and politicians demanded that the Ambassador be declared persona non grata. The Armenian Council of America declared:
We categorically reject the Israeli government’s policy as immoral and unprincipled. It is most abhorrent that the Israeli government would use the Armenian Genocide as a bargaining chip towards its interests. We call on the Jewish people, who are still reeling from the pain of the Holocaust, to condemn the Israeli government policy regarding this issue. We ask them to discourage the Israeli government from becoming one of those governments, which until recently were denying the Holocaust with lame excuses [13].
In an unprecedented action, several hundred Armenians held a demonstration in front of the Israeli consulate in Los Angeles [14]. This also was not reported in Israel, to the best of my knowledge.
The Foreign Ministry of Armenia made an official note of protest to the Israeli Foreign Ministry (February 15, 2002), saying that Armenia considers any attempt at rejecting or belittling the significance of the Armenian Genocide as inadmissible, regardless of the motivation. "Armenia never intended to draw parallels between the Armenian Genocide and the Jewish Holocaust, believing as we do that any crime committed against humanity is ‘unique’ with its own political, legal, historical, and moral consequences."
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The official answer of the Israeli Foreign Ministry (February 18, 2002) was: Israel has never tried to deny or diminish the reality of the events that occurred during the years 1915-1916. As Jews and as Israelis, we are especially saddened by the deaths and the tragedy, which took place in 1915 and 1916. We understand the strong emotions this subject arouses in both parties considering the enormous number of victims and the great suffering undergone by the Armenian people. Investigation of this sensitive subject must be approached through open public discussion and dialogue between historians, based of course, on documents and facts.
Israel also asserted that the Holocaust was a singular event in human history and was a premeditated crime against the Jewish people. Israel recognizes the tragedy of the Armenians and the plight of the Armenian people. However, the events cannot be compared to the Holocaust. This does not in any way diminish the magnitude of the tragedy [15]. [Some sources wrote that the events cannot be compared to the Holocaust and others that they cannot be compared to genocide. However, both Peres and the Ambassador had said that the events that occurred during the years 1915-1916 cannot be compared to genocide - Y.A.]
The implication in the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s statement is that while the Armenian deaths of up to 1.5 million may have been a tragedy, they do not constitute a case of genocide. Another implication is that there must be public discussion and dialogue between historians to determine the facts of what happened to the Armenians.
There is no way to minimize the historical significance of this terrible statement. Not a Holocaust, not a genocide - only “victims,” “plight,” “tragedy” without even mentioning who the perpetrators were. There is no mention of any responsibility for the murders, as if they were some natural disaster. But there is mention of the emotional relevance to both sides — the Turks and the Armenians (imagine Jews and Germans being mentioned together in the case of the Holocaust!). And of course, mention is made of the uniqueness of the Holocaust.
There is a lot of cynicism, arrogance, self-contradiction and irresponsibility in this dangerous official statement. By it Israel took another big step from passive to active denial. And this declaration was made by a state whose people were victims of the Holocaust only a little over 60 years ago! It puts in question the whole significance and relevance of historical scholarship on genocide, not to say that it also desecrates the memory of the Holocaust and its significance.
In Israel the “usual protests” were publicly made by only a few people [16]. The arguments used by the Foreign Ministry in this debate are the basic principles of Israeli policy toward the Armenian Genocide to today (2009).
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5. Sand’s Statement –2000
Education Minister Yossi Sarid supported the idea of visiting the Armenian Quarter on Armenian Memorial Day, April 24, 2000, realizing that his visit and statement there would create a precedent. It should be said that Sarid (Meretz Party) was not the first Israeli minister to visit the Armenian community on Memorial Day. Yair Zaban (Meretz), the Minister of Absorption in Rabin’s government, had previously done so on Armenian Memorial Day, April 24, 1994. However, visiting the Armenian Quarter was Sarid’s personal decision, taken without consulting anyone, and without asking permission of Ehud Barak, the Prime Minister, or even informing him. He may have assumed that such permission would not be granted.
Sarid carefully planned his address to the Armenians, aware of every word and knowing the significance and consequences of his act. Although he did not represent the Israeli Government on this occasion, his presence there was emphasized as being in his capacity as Minister of Education.
“I am aware of the special significance of my presence here today, along with other Israelis,” he said early in his speech. “Today, perhaps for the first time, you are less alone.” He went on to say, “I am here, with you, as a human being, as a Jew, as an Israeli, and as Minister of Education.” Sarid noted that it was the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau Sr., a Jew, who, in 1915 was among the first to tell the world about the genocide of the Armenians. He also referred to The Forty Days of Musa Dagh, the novel of the Jewish writer Franz Werfel, which had influenced him and his generation. Sarid concluded his statement with a declaration of commitment to ensure that the Armenian Genocide would be included in the Israeli secondary school history curriculum.
Sarid’s speech received much attention in the Israeli and the world press and was quoted in many countries. At first there was no official protest by the Israeli government, which usually acted in support of official Turkish opinion. But quite soon it was obvious that Sarid’s attitudes were not in accord with the official policy of the State of Israel.
A Ha’aretz Editorial (April 27, 2000) carried a very clear title, “The Need to Learn and to Remember,” and stated that:
Israel’s stuttering official position about the genocide of the Armenian people rests upon the mistaken assumption that there is an irresolvable contradiction between political interests and a moral stance.
Though it would seemingly be natural for the people brutalized by the Holocaust to recognize the mass murder done to another nation, lobbying pressure ex-
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erted by Turkey, which disclaims responsibility for the Armenian genocide, has influenced Israel’s position. In recent years, when important relations with Turkey have solidified, Israel’s cautiousness has risen, approaching a situation tantamount to the willful forgetting of the past sufferings of another people.
The problem isn’t the lobbying pressure exerted by Turkey: instead, the problem is that Israel submits to it.
Israel’s position appears particularly problematic when it is examined in light of the campaigns waged by the Jewish people to counter renewed trends of Holocaust denial, efforts which peaked recently in the libel trial involving David Irving. One doesn’t need to ponder similarities and differences in the fates of the two peoples to understand that Israel’s waffling about Armenian history weakens the moral cogency borne by campaigns against Holocaust denial, as well as efforts to educate about the lessons of the Holocaust.
Israel’s fuzzily obscure official statements expressing “regret about the deaths of many Armenians in wars which accompanied the end of the Ottoman Empire,” and declarations that overlook the circumstances of these deaths, erode its moral right to demand that the world make sure that the Jewish Holocaust is never forgotten. And cautious Israeli formulations about the “massacre” of Armenians do little to improve Israel’s moral position.
Israel missed its chance to become the first country to recognize the Armenian genocide officially. A growing cluster of nations has conferred such recognition; these include France, Belgium and Sweden. Study and remembrance of the murder of another nation must be a supreme normative priority for the people that endured the Holocaust, and no perceived diplomatic interest should be allowed to obstruct such earnest reckoning [17].
The Armenians were moved by Sarid’s statement and praised him. The Armenian National Institute translated the speech, which they called “a powerful statement,” into English. The speech was reproduced, or quoted extensively, in the Armenian media all over the world. Armenian communities world-wide, including, of course, Israel, congratulated him for his “precious decision,” and his “courageous role as a human rights defender,” and expressed their gratitude1.
The Turkish reaction was wholly different. According to the Anatolia News Agency in Ankara and Turkish Daily News (May 3, 2000), Turkey was reassured that no change in Israeli policy on the Armenian “so-called genocide” had occurred. The
1 Letters to Yossi Sarid from, among others, the Union of Armenians in Italy, Milan; May 16, 2000; from Armenian Educational and Cultural Society, Athens, May 19, 2000; from “one who lost most of my family members in 1915,” May 10, 2000.
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Israeli Ambassador, Uri Bar-Ner, said that Sarid’s statement reflected the democracy in Israel, bat the attitude of the government is different and clear. Diplomatic sources said that at the meeting between Ahmet Uzumcu, Turkey’s ambassador to Tel Aviv, and Israeli Foreign Ministry officials, they stressed again that the statements made by Yossi Sarid, Israeli Minister of Education, pertaining to the so-called genocide of the Armenians were his personal views, and noted that they did not reflect the official policy of the government. These officials said to the Turkish Daily News that Israel desired to further improve bilateral relations between the two countries. They stressed that there was no policy change whatsoever on the part of Israel, and that they would stick to their position that historians, not politicians, should discuss the issue. Speaking to the Turkish Daily News, an unidentified Israeli diplomat said, “It is not a matter needing an official declaration. We do not want to take a side on this issue; we leave it to the historians. The two ministers’ statements are their personal opinions and they do not reflect the government’s policies.”
Because of the opposition of the government of Turkey, and because of fears that the significance of the Holocaust would be belittled, the Armenian Genocide is not taught in Israel1.
Another time the Armenian Genocide was raised in the Israeli Parliament was in March 2007. This time, member of the Knesset Haim Oron (Meretz) proposed to discuss the issue of the Armenian Genocide in the Knesset. He did not ask to recognize the Genocide at that stage, but only to debate it and later on, not in the same session, to vote on it, and hopefully recognize it.
The coalition of the government opposed his request that the subject be debated in plenum or even in the Committee of Education. The government won the vote (16 against 12) of 120 members of the Knesset. The Knesset decided that the issue could not even be discussed.
In the following year, in March 2008, Oron again raised the issue before the Knesset. This time the Knesset accepted Oron’s initiative and in an unprecedented move decided to discuss the Armenian Genocide. Eleven Knesset members voted in favor of the proposal, and none were opposed or abstained. Oron had requested that
1 What is the current status of the Armenian Genocide in the Israeli school curriculum? In reply to a question by Georgette Avakian, the head of the Armenian Case Committee in Israel, to the Director General of the Ministry of Education, Shlomit Amichai, the Chairman of the Pedagogical Secretariat, Michael Abitbul wrote (July 31, 2000), that a comprehensive book on the Armenian genocide would be published soon by the Ministry of Education. According to the promise of the former Minister of Education, Yossi Sarid, the book was to be available for history teachers who intended to teach the subject in the school year 2000-2001. Up to the time of this writing, however (2009), the book has not materialized. To the best of our knowledge, it will not materialize in the near future. After the nomination of the new Minister of Education from the Likud, and after another new Minister of Education from the labor, and then another form the Likud, the possibility of the program’s realization are, in fact, close to nil.
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the Knesset’s Education Committee hold the discussion, but the government decided it would be the Committee of Foreign and Security Affairs, where the debate could be closed even to journalists. To the best of our knowledge the debate did not take place. Oron raised the issue another time in March 2009. To conclude, we can notice that there is not a real or deep difference between the left wing and the right wing in Israel regarding their attitude toward the Armenian Genocide, at least when they are in the government.
Both wings regard the issue with a pragmatic attitude, one of Realpolitik - giving priority to relations with Turkey. When the issue was raised in the Knesset, it was raised mostly by members of the Meretz Party (Civil Rights with Socialist or Social Democrate tendency), which is quite a small party, comprising only five, and since 2008 three, members in the Knesset. In their view, politics and morality are not contradictory, and the policy of a state can be and has to be moral. The late member of the Knesset Yuri Stern from a right wing party supported the recognition of the Genocide; that shows that sometime the personal convictions are significant.
6 The Turkish-Israeh Alliance
The geopolitical considerations of Israel have to be noted in examining Turkey-Israel relationship. One might argue that they have to be given greater weight. One can surely appreciate that Israel stands between a variety of rocks and a hard place. The need for allies is great. Turkey, as a secular Moslem, highly militarized state, permits certain latitude to Israel with respect to countering fundamentalist ambitions to annihilate Israel as a sovereign entity - and even its population of Jews.
In order to understand the pragmatic Raisons d’Etat and Realpolitik, considerations that have influenced the Israeli attitude toward the Armenian Genocide, a brief overview of Israel-Turkey relations is needed. However, it is beyond the scope of this study to go into Israel-Turkey relations in depth1.
Turkey and Israel have since the 1990s forged an unlikely alliance that baffles many observers of the region. On the face of it, there would seem to be little historical or contemporary logic to a close relationship between the two; one is the well-established successor of a vast and long-lived empire; the other an embattled state -whose boundaries and very existence are constantly challenged by neighbors; one is
1 Many articles and books have been written about this in Israel. Our short survey is based mainly on Rapheal Israeli, “The Turkish-Israeli Odd Couple,” Orbis, volume 45 issue no. 1 (winter 2001), p. 65-79. See also: Alon Liel, Turkey in the Middle East, Oil Islam Politics (Tel-Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1994); Alon Liel, Tukey-Military, Islam and Politics 1970-2000 (Tel-Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1999); Aryeh Shmuelevitz, Turkey in the 20th Century: Between Modernization and Tradition (Tel-Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1997); Ehud R. Toledano, An Introduction to the History of the Ottoman Empire (Tel-Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1985).
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Muslim, the other Jewish; Turkey is just emerging from what is considered Third World status and aspiring to join the European Union, while Israel is thoroughly modernized and well entrenched in Western culture; Turkey is notoriously deficient with regard to international norms of human rights and the rule of law, while Israel is a liberal democracy (with its internal deep tensions between being democracy and a Jewish state and the fact it controls another people); Turkey is highly influenced by its military, while Israel is civilian in its demeanor; one is large in size and population, the other is comparatively tiny.
There are numerous elements in the Turkish-Israel alliance, each of them complex and deserving of in-depth treatment. In this framework we can only identify them as factors affecting Israel’s response to the Armenian Genocide. These factors include the following:
1. The Jewish community in Turkey;
2. The provision of water, gas and oil to Israel by Turkey;
3. Turkey as a military ally against Iraq and Iran, with whom Turkey does not maintain cordial relations;
4. The US policy towards Russia and Turkey’s role in that policy;
5. The US policy in the Middle East, especially regarding oil, and Turkey and Israel’s role in that policy.
Of all the complex issues affecting Turkey’s relationship with Israel, security, strategy, military and technological collaboration are perhaps the most acute and certainly the most important ones for the Turkish generals, who monitor their country’s politics. It is therefore no wonder that the most striking and rapid advance in the relations between the two countries has been in the military-strategic domain. Turkey has purchased advanced Israeli weaponry and electronics, engaged in joint maneuvers, cooperated in counter-terrorism and intelligence gathering, and exchanged high-level visits with the Israeli military. These initiatives rest on the assumption that Turkey, surrounded by hostile, authoritarian, unpredictable, and anti-Western regimes, would be foolish not to cooperate with the only other power in the Middle East that is democratic, stable, strong, and pro-Western.
No doubt, the dilemma of morality versus policy is at the core of the issue. The close relations between Israel and Turkey are based on the mutual interests of the two countries. The question is whether Israel erred in the Armenian Question in the early stages of its relations with Turkey. In the 1970s and 1980s, the rationale of the Israeli government as to why it should yield to Turkish pressure was that it has been
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important to keep relations with the only Muslim country willing to do so. More important (and mysterious) was the claim regarding Jewish interests: it was explained by Israeli officials that supporting the Armenian Question could endanger the lives of Jews in Turkey, as well as in some other countries (once saving Jews from Syria was mentioned, and on another time saving Jews from Iran). This was sometimes described as a “vital interest.”
We do not presume to judge if these issues are really in the “vital interest” of Israel or the Jews. Suppose, however, the pretext of “vital interest” was not used. What would Turkish-Israeli relations look like if Israel had explained from the beginning that the memory of genocide – any genocide – is not a negotiable issue in the relations between two sovereign states, especially when one of them is the country of the survivors of the Holocaust? What would have happened if Israel had explained to Turkey that what Israeli children learn in school and what is shown on Israeli television channels is an internal Israeli concern?
The number of Armenians in Palestine grew significantly with the arrival of the refugees from the Genocide during the First World War and after it. In addition to Jerusalem, they settled in Jaffa, Haifa, Acre and a few families in some villages in the Galilee. Nowadays the small Armenian community in Israel of around 3,000 members, divided between citizens of Israel and Armenians living in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, has very little political power. The Armenians of East Jerusalem live amongst the mosaic of different communities, and their future is uncertain if a political agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians is implemented – who will control the Armenian Quarter? In considerations of Realpolitik, the small Armenian community, its tragedy and its memory, have no weight.
The Armenian Question has been, from the outset, one marked by political weakness. Armenia is a little country, isolated in a difficult economic situation. In the Diaspora there are two big and strong communities: the US and France.
Also in other countries the Jewish communities are involved in the struggle about the recognition. We want to mention briefly the debates in the USA.
There is no doubt that Israel was involved at least in some of the debates (1989, 2000) in the US over the recognition by supporting the Turkish side directly, and in other cases by asking Jewish organizations to act on behalf of the Turks.
Jews and Israeli diplomats work to prevent commemoration of the Armenian Holocaust (the word "Holocaust" and not "Genocide" was used) was the front-page headline in the respected Hebrew newspaper Ha'aretz (October 17, 1989). The Turks accused the "Jewish lobby in Washington" and the Jewish representative in Congress
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of involvement in the debate by supporting the Armenians. In 1989 the chief Rabbi of Turkey sent a personal letter to every member of the U.S. senate saying that the new initiative greatly troubles their community.
Both in Israel and in the Jewish community in the US there was a public debate over the involvement of Jews and Israeli representatives in the affair.
There were those who supported the Jewish organizations and Israeli involvement – individuals and at least part of the Jewish establishment that raised the pragmatic considerations. Against those considerations tied to the Israeli-Turkish relations moral arguments were presented both in Israel and the US. The enormous sensitivity to Jewish involvement in the affair acquired an additional dimension in the relations between Israel and Diaspora. Liberal Jewish organizations in the U.S. were embarrassed. Some of them criticized publically, sometimes anonymously, Israel. To demonstrate its different attitude, the Union of American Hebrew congregations passed a resolution at its biennial convention in November 1989 in support of marking Armenian memorial day and to teach in its synagogues the facts and lessons of these tragic chapters in modern history.
Generally speaking, the attitudes of the Jews and the Jewish communities in Diaspora are more universalistic than the attitudes in Israel, which are more Zionist oriented, more pragmatic and less universal. Surely they are more open to the Armenian tragedy than the official attitude of the state of Israel. In my view in the real world, realpolitik will not always trump moralpolitik, even though this is the case in many events. Moral attitudes have their own power, and if individuals, parties or states that struggle for justice (in our case against genocide and for recognition of past genocides) in a consistent way, they can succeed. Politics and morality are not contradictory, and the policy can be and has to be moral.
In my view there are almost no purely moral decisions or only cynical, selfinterested decisions. If we were to look at the tension between morality and selfinterest as two ends of a scale, decisions are somewhere in the middle. I don't accept the assumption, mistaken in my view, that there is an irresolvable contradiction between political interests and moral stance.
Epilogue
The strong alliance that had existed between Turkey and Israel since 1990s passes a crucial crisis in 2009. Turkey became very loud voice against the Israeli operation in Gaza in December 2008-January 2009. In October 2009 the relationships became very critical and the crisis – open and public.
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At the same time (October 2009) Turkey signed with Armenia a historical agreement; they decided on diplomatic relations and opening the borders between the two countries. The Armenian Genocide, a main issue between the two countries is not mentioned.
Some circles in Israel who were angry and upset of the hostility of Turkey against Israel proposed to answer Turkey by recognizing the Armenian Genocide, as if Turkey will pay the price of its new hostility toward Israel, by using the Armenian Genocide as a weapon. When there are not at all (or almost) moral considerations these cynical calculations can become the essence of the struggle for recognition of the Genocide, and its memory is lost.
November, 2009
Reference Sources and Literature
1. Harut Sassounian, “Jewish Lobby Pledges All-Out Support for Turkey and Azerbaijan in Congress – Commentary,” California Courier On-Line, August 5, 1999.
2. Protocols of the Knesset, April 27, 1994.
3. Dadrian, 1997, p. XIX, quoting United Press International and Associated Press.
4. Lilly Galili, “A Holocaust by Any Other Name,” Ha’aretz, April 25, 2000.
5. Selcuk Gultasli, “Israeli Undersecretary Liel: We Are Disappointed in Turkey,” Turkish Daily News, October 26, 2000. Dr. Alon Liel was nominated Foreign Ministry Undersecretary a short time before the interview, by the Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben Ami. Later he became the General Director of the office, until March 2001 - the beginning of the Sharon government.
6. “Turkey Punishes France,” BBC News, January 23, 2001.
7. Aluf Been, “Turkey Hints That Israel May win $2 B Deal to Upgrade Turks,” Ha’aretz, January 21, 2001; “Israel Company to Complete M-60 Tank Project,” Turkish Daily News, January 26, 2001; Metehan Demir, “Mofaz to Visit Turkey,” The Jerusalem Post, February 4, 2001.
8. "Peres: Armenians Allegations Are Meaningless,” Turkish Daily News, April 10, 2001.
9. Israel W. Charny, A public letter to Shimon Peres, April 12, 2001 (it was reported in various press outlets, including an April 18, 2001 article by Robert Fisk in The London Independent and on April 19, 2001 in the California Courier); also Yair Auron, "As Tu Peres?" Maariv April 16, 2001.
10. Jonathan Eric Lewis, An Open Letter to Armenian-Americans, April 18, 2001.
11. Charny, op. cit.
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12. “Israel Thinks it is Highly Important to Develop Links with Armenia,” Armenian News Network, Groong, February 8, 2002.
13. “Declaration by the Armenian Council of America,” Armenian News Network, Groong, February 21, 2002.
14. Harut Sassounian, “Israel’s Ambassador should be Expelled from Armenia,” The California Courier, March 14, 2002.
15. “Armenian Foreign Ministry Regrets Israeli Envoy’s Genocide Remarks,” Armenian News Network/Groong, February 11, 2002; “Diplomatic Incident: The Ambassador was not ready to compare the Armenian Holocaust to the Jewish Holocaust” [Israeli] Ynet News Agency, February 18, 2002; Corinna da Fonseca-Wollheli, “A Perplexing Indifference,” Jerusalem Post, May 3, 2002; “Israel Replies to Armenian Protest Note, saying 1915 massacre was not Genocide,” Armenian News Network/Groong, February 20, 2002.
16. Yair Auron, “It Was Genocide,” Ha’aretz, March 3, 2002; Israel W. Charney, letter to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shimon Peres.
17. Ha’aretz Editorial, “The need to learn and to remember,” (April 27, 2000).
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