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acknowledge that at this conjuncture Russia's WTO accession is beyond the purpose. As for export it will hardly give more than 2-3 milliards of dollars in a year but many consumer industries and our most technically perspective manufacturing industry being a basis of modernization plans will be under the threat. One thinks that it will be more useful to postpone our accession for 10-15 years if we begin seriously preparing our economics for new and probably stricter competition conditions. It's significantly that it took 15-20 years for China for WTO accession preparing beforehand having laid the American and European markets in a store of its products.
Russia's modernization strategy can't but take demographic and territorial problems of the country into consideration. Measures on rise in births and mortality decreasing without the most serious organized immigration especially in the districts behind the Ural will hardly overcome the Russian population decreasing. May be this problem won't be super urgent even during several decades. But it's necessary to solve the problem of brewing economic postponing (and even a possible formal separation) of these districts now.
"Vlast", M., 2010, p. 15-26.
A. Yunusova,
doctor of sciences (history)
ISLAM IN RUSSIA
Ethno-confessional processes with Islam participation in Russia, from one hand, are more or less constructive being headed and controlled by a public need, synergetic. One can say that destructive consequences of "state separation from church" are overcome; consequences of the later miscalculations and mistakes of ecclesiastical leaders settled down to a course of the poor Russian ummah schism in
90-ss of the last century are gradually being overcome. The most part of experts are sure that Islam has regenerated in Russia. Therewith several problems frustrating the formed idyllic ideas on this revival are just now emphasized in the Russian Islam besides organizational unity lack and religious education drawbacks. Characterizing the results of postperestroika period for the Russian Islam D. Khairetdinov writes: "In those times (the beginning of 90-s) the Moslem leaders didn't really know what measures they should take firstly and secondarily under those new conditions and properly struggled against bureaucracy violence and money lack - it's correct and true; but another matter is also true - even at that time many imams and leaders defined quite different values than religion for themselves and take only their own narrow interests later on. The interests of the people and the religious leaders didn't coincide but in some cases the Moslem community was alienated from its official leader. We see the results today: clan system, heredity, closed corporative group forming around many and many Moslem figures of Russia. It's no doubt that one of the limited interest consequences of that or any person is dissidence among imams. Under these conditions a growth of opposition moods among some strata of the Moslem people especially among the youth became objectively inevitable. The Islam leaders didn't take some steps to coordinate the positions of the different groups and just then the communities emerged being differently nicknamed and named following some mufti examples. Seeds of discord greened out not only on the Caucasus but also in many native Tatar-Bashkir districts were planted several years ago and the Moslems must remember it today".
Radical ideologies were distributed in separated Moslem area; extremist religious-political organizations prohibited in the Russian Federation such as "Khizb ut-Takhrir al' Islami" found their followers very easily. Today the following processes with the participation of the
Moslem leaders or withot their participation took place in the Russian Islam:
- redistribution of the Islam area of Russia between both the old participants of split and the new actors - the leaders of the different movements with the Islamic slogans and rhetoric;
- the Moslem clergy politicization;
- Islam "nationalization", interpenetration of religious extremism with nationalism of the regional "super activists" on the base of Islam.
Besides, the religious leaders fairly defending the Moslem community autonomy began pretending for exclusive rights to solve economic, juridical and constitutional problems being the state prerogative. But one will hardly find ten persons of those in ummah itself who possesses the corresponding knowledge to solve such problems. The named phenomena are typical for the Turk-Moslem society throughout Russia.
The Russian Islamic area distribution on the example
of the Southern Ural and the Volga region
Russia's Central Spiritual Governance of the Moslems (RSGM) and its subdivisions are a stronghold of the traditional Islam - non-politicized, moderate, tolerant and peaceful being completely loyal to the state and its laws. Among the clergy one can observe a low level of a political activity, comparatively low level of a religious education, spiritual function limitation with religious rites in that degree which satisfies parishioners. One can't consider it from the point of view "bad"/"good"; they only state a real situation which doesn't agree with the modern trends of the Russian Islam development and is criticized by some Moslem leaders, public Islam-oriented movements especially the young Moslems waiting for the new changes.
The Moslem organizations being at the junction of Europe and Asia, between Siberia and Central Russia are greatly influenced by two centers of the political consolidation of Islam within Russia which were established after the split of Russia's Central Spiritual Governance of the Moslems in 90-s of the last century - the Board of Muftis of Russia (Moscow) and Spiritual Governance of the Moslems of the Asian part of Russia. The board of muftis of Russia and Spiritual Governance of the Moslems of the Asian part of Russia are firmly united by the general interests, ambitions, commercial partners and financial sponsors for a long time. They practically divided the Moslem area within Russia: the board of muftis distributed its influence up to the Ural (R. Gainutdin) but behind the Ural - Spiritual Governance of the Moslems (N. Ashirov). The movement "the Russian Islamic heritage" joins them; its activity was carried out taking onto account the interests of the board of muftis and Spiritual Governance of the Moslems.
There is Russia's Spiritual Governance of the Moslems (Talgat Tajuddin) between them and its influence is distributed over the half of parishes of each among the south-Ural regions, one part of parishes of Permskaya, Ul'yanovskaya, Sverdlovskaya oblasts, Chuvashiya and Mordoviya. A number of parishes dependent on Russia's Spiritual Governance of the Moslems (RSGM) aren't constant; together with mosques of RSGM mosques of RBM and SGM of the Asian part of Russia are built and opened; very often the parishes are persuaded to have the other subjection after the departure of RSGM' representatives and a mosque's opening. At the present OOD "the Russian Islamic heritage" gets involved in mosque opening as it had place in Chelyabinskaya oblast though it isn't its statutory functions but cultural heritage of the Moslem civilization of the Volga region, the Ural, Siberia and the Caucasus are beyond this structure's attention.
What does it bring to? We can see by way of example of the Volga region that as a result of RSGM's split and many Islamic High Council forming for a short period the Moslem community was qualitatively changed (mainly in the Tatar community). Here it's characterized with a high public and political activity of the Moslem organizations and leaders, not infrequent Islam positioning as alternative of national idea but the Moslem elite - as ideological opposition, trends of the Islam modernization and innovations in the sphere of the Moslem economy development, culture and education, close contacts with the foreign Islamic funds. Here one can observe advanced, comparatively young -according to the age of the leaders - quickly adapting to the modern economic conditions but also politicized Islam. The Moslem clergy of the given region being mostly susceptible to the different radical Islamic ideologies confidently defends the interests of the extremist organizations in the courts and creates the human rights centers. Besides, it itself is often a generator of the radical demands and claims with respect to a state and power.
The carriers of the political activity and Islam politicization in the Volga region are representatives of the Tatar ethnos. The words "the Tatar" and "the Moslem" are interpreted as synonyms in the regions of the Volga region but Islam - as the Tatar religion. Islam and its slogans are needed by the Tatar political elite as an instrument to mobilize a political activity of ethnos and "revival" itself of Islam happens under the sign of the Tatar nation rebirth here.
Islam is apolitical and it isn't a factor of influence on state power in Bashkortostan, Orenburzh'e, Chelyabinskaya and Kurganskaya oblasts. As for "bashkirskogo" Islam it isn't out of the sphere of the initiatives of the Bashkir national revival ideologies both during the period of the state sovereignty developing and now when a federal center gradually stops using a word combination "a state sovereignty" of
the national republics. Islam isn't politically dependent on the Bashkir political elite and it isn't a slogan of the political manifestations of the Bashkir youth; it simply remains a belief of the Bashkirs. Such Islam doesn't fit in with ethno-system of the Southern Ural. It greatly depends on peculiarities of Islam distribution and functioning over this territory. Characteristics of the Islam in the Volga region slightly belong to Islam in the Southern Ural and Trans-Urals where one can observe confusion of the ethnic Moslems - the Siberian Tatars, the Kazakhs and Bashkirs.
As far as moving to the east Islam is ever more characterized with traditionalism revival, a low level of socio-cultural mobility of the Moslems, a distinction between "rural" and "urban" Islam being persistently preserving, orientation of the clergy and the leaders at a state and demonstrative loyalty with respect to top leadership of the country and regional authority.
Increasing activity of the representatives of RBM and SGMAP in the regions dependent on RSGM indicates a keeping trend to redistribute the Russian Islam area. A goal of this redistribution is the Islam holding forming within Russia. It per se is in RBM, SGMAP and OOD "RIN".
There emerged the new actors of a process confronting not only a traditional organized system of Islam in Russia but also a system of state-Islam relations. The carriers of the political Islam being opposition to "Putin-Medvedev regime" are "Islamic committee" of Geidar Jemal' and structural subdivisions of the movement "Islam nation" initiated by him in the regions of the country. The methods of network marketing are also used allowing making ramified hierarchic structures.
The Islamic area redistribution and the Islamic opposition forming is made when there is a real danger of mass distribution of extremist and radical ideologies in the Moslem society. In 2005-2008 there were criminal cases according to the fact of the activity of
extremist religious-political party "Khizb ut-Takhrir al'-Islamiya" and the other radical organizations formed according to a system of ramified hierarchic structures in Chelyabinsk, Magnitogorsk, Orenburg, Tuimazakh, Baimak, Buguruslan, Yekaterinburg - in all oblasts of the Ural and Transurals.
It reflects a general trend of the new structure of "new Islam" and "new Moslems" forming in Russia. The first stage of this process is a confrontation the traditional Islam in all its manifestations -organized, socio-cultural and mental. Herewith one of the most effective methods of competitor striking was selected - its cynical discredit, massive attack on the carriers of the traditional Islam using mass communication media and electronic technologies looking for a support in government bodies, State Duma and in surroundings of the country president.
"Etnos. Obshestvo. Tsivilizatsiya: IIKuzivskie chteniya." Ufa, 2009, p. 36-40.
G. Klochkov,
politologist (the city of Astrakhan) THE INTERNAL REASONS OF THE ETHNIC-POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN THE SOUTH OF RUSSIA
The South Federal District is the most complicated and mixed region in terms of its composition in the Russian federation. Therefore the SFD always was, is and will be the place of constant collision and dialogue of ethnic groups, cultures and even civilizations. The conflict and the dialogue in the SFD will take place simultaneously, comprising various aspects of public and spiritual reality of individuals, society and state.
